



From am. Affair & Father
J. J. F. F. F.

MEMOIR AND CORRESPONDENCE

OF

GENERAL JAMES STUART FRASER

OF THE MADRAS ARMY

BY HIS SON

COLONEL HASTINGS FRASER

MADRAS STAFF CORPS

LONDON

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TO
CHARLOTTE ELIZABETH MACKENZIE FRASER.

MY DEAR WIFE,

As no one has so fully tested and appreciated its materials and objects, and as no one has encouraged me so much in its progress, to no one can this completed work be so appropriately dedicated as to you.

HASTINGS FRASER.

ARDACHIE,
INVERNESS-SHIRE,

September 1881.

P R E F A C E.

MANY years ago my determination was formed, and communicated at the time to the Secretary of State for India, and to the Viceroy, to publish a memoir of my father, with a considerable selection from his correspondence, partly because I found in the declared principles and the actual practice of his long career in India much that it seemed to me would be useful and interesting both to the historian and the statesman; and secondly, because I knew his desire to refute and repel a complete misrepresentation of his views on a central point of Imperial policy, which had been set forth, under the highest sanction, in a Return made to Parliament.

It was only during the last few years of General Fraser's long Indian service, extending over fifty-two—commencing with the century, and ending in 1852—that the honours of the Bath were granted at all freely to the officers in the East India Company's service, and the Order of the Star of India had not then been instituted: and thus, although he had been in political charge, and for some time in the military command of a small army, which in one short and sharp campaign had conquered the valuable and interesting province of Coorg for the British Empire; although he had been warmly thanked by Government for promptly

and peacefully suppressing the worst of Indian perils, a military mutiny; although he had occupied in succession, and with high credit, every political post of any consequence in the Madras Presidency, and had held the most important place of that description in the Empire for the unusually long term of fourteen years; he was undistinguished in his retirement by any decoration except the war medal! This was a matter of unaffected indifference to him, but I confess it is not entirely so to me. I desire to show, and I think it will be made clear enough, that this absence of those visible honours that have since become so familiar to us, was in this instance a real distinction and a special honour. It is easily explained, so far as his earlier services are concerned, by those customs and precedents of the period to which I have alluded; but there can be no doubt that the position he had attained before he left India would have been recognised—as in the case of several of his contemporaries—by some title or other mark of the Sovereign's favour, but for the fact that he had for some time differed, in the most undisguised manner, on a very important subject of Imperial policy, with the Governor-General, the Marquis of Dalhousie, who was then in possession of plenary power in India, and at the very height of his reputation at home. Lord Dalhousie, as he will be seen to have acknowledged under his own hand, did not brook opposition, and hardly tolerated close argument, even among the highest of his official subordinates. Where a point involving, as my father conceived it, at once the honour and the security of the Indian Empire was at stake, he allowed no scruples of etiquette or of human respect to restrain him from giving, without reserve, his honest and mature

opinion. The consequence was, as will be seen in due course, that he left India, not only without public honours, not only without the thanks of Government, but, as he afterwards discovered when the papers were published, loaded with an absolute misrepresentation of the principles he had advocated and of the counsels he had offered to Government.' I therefore consider myself bound, on public grounds, as well as from those private and personal motives which are surely legitimate in my case, to set this question in a fair and true light before the Parliament and people of my country.

For the last fourteen years of General Fraser's active career he filled the important office of Resident at Hyderabad, the capital of the Nizam's dominions—that State of the Deccan which Sir John Malcolm declared to be "the centre of gravity" of the whole Indian Empire. The pre-eminent importance of the Hyderabad State in population, in revenue, and in the historic relations of the dynasty to the Mogul House of Timour, to the British Government, and to the Mussulman population of India, prevails as distinctly now as at any period in the annals of our Empire. Having myself served for twenty-seven years continuously in various appointments connected with the Hyderabad Residency, I have learned, almost, I may say, from year to year, to appreciate more fully and more earnestly the wisdom and foresight of General Fraser's advice on the principal subjects that, in my experience and under my own observation, have been discussed between the Nizam's Government and our own, and between the several Residents and the Viceregal authorities at Calcutta. It is with some personal and hereditary claims to attention, therefore, as well as

with an unusual command of private materials, that I enter on the task before me—a task, I may add, the commencement of which I have already placed before the public, and the eventual completion of which I then announced as under contemplation.

During my father's life-time, I published a historical sketch of the Hyderabad State, under the title of *Our Faithful Ally the Nizam*.¹ In the Preface to that book I mentioned that I was not then at liberty to use documents in my possession throwing much light on our political relations with Hyderabad, and particularly on that very important measure, the assignment of the Berar Provinces, but that at some future time that restriction would probably be removed. I was not then so fully informed as I am now, from the private correspondence between them, how widely the views of Lord Dalhousie and General Fraser diverged; nor did I then understand how much my lamented father's name had come to be identified, very inaccurately and unfairly, as a result of the *officially* published misrepresentation which I shall have to correct, with the assignment or sequestration of the Nizam's Berar Provinces. The restriction as to the publication of my father's papers has now been finally removed by his demise, and I am unwilling any longer to incur the responsibility of withholding from English statesmen and the public generally the exclusive and otherwise unattainable and *private* information contained in this book, and which, I may add, I have refused, very much against my own interests, to place at the discretion and disposal of parties in England for publication.

¹ Smith, Elder, & Co., Cornhill, 1865.

When I placed before the Secretary of State and others, in 1866, the accurate details regarding the surplus revenues and the accounts withheld from the Nizam, in dereliction of Treaty obligations, I was fully aware of the fact, and have never lost sight of it, that the Home Government in Lord Ellenborough's time refused to endorse the design of the Government of India to appropriate the surplus revenue of any part of the Nizam's territories that might come under our management.¹ My recommendation at that period resulted in the Secretary of State informing me that from that year the Indian Government had been instructed to account for the surplus to His Highness the Nizam, and to pay it according to Treaty.

I may observe that in preparing this book for the press I have only been continuing in a course that has received the sanction of a Viceroy and a Secretary of State, and that I have borne in mind the precedents of many biographies and other works by eminent Indian officers, such as Sir John Malcolm, Sir William Sleeman, Sir John Kaye, Mr. H. M. Durand and Colonel Malleon.

I trust that materials may be found in the pages of this book for dispelling many erroneous notions regarding the actual condition of the Nizam's subjects, even in bygone days of disorder and maladministration, that from time to time, and very recently, have been spread abroad.

With the views I have always entertained and expressed as to Hyderabad affairs during the long administration of the late Nawab Sir Salar Jung, a period marked, as explained in the body of this work, by the

¹ *Post*, pp. 188, 189.

establishment of reforms already planned and partially introduced by his uncle, Sooraj-ool-Moolk, under General Fraser's advice and influence, it may be conceived that I read with mingled regret and irritation an article in the *Fortnightly Review* for April 1884, by Mr. J. E. Gorst, M.P., the chief object of which seemed to be to decry the work of Sir Salar Jung's life by a combination of faint praise and undisguised abuse. Mr. Gorst says that Sir Salar Jung's "attempts to establish a sound system of administration failed completely", accuses the Nawab of "hoodwinking the British Government", and says that in this alone his "reformed administration was completely successful" (*Fortnightly*, p. 523). If this were true, it would say very little for the perspicacity or the honesty of the successive Residents at Hyderabad since 1854, who have *all* borne testimony to the progressive and beneficial character of Sir Salar Jung's administration,—testimony accepted and confirmed by the Marquis of Ripon at the State Banquet given in his honour at Hyderabad. (See Additional Appendix, page lxi.) Perhaps, after twenty-seven years of personal observation and experience, my opinion may be considered as valuable as that of Mr. Gorst, whose stay at Hyderabad was limited, I believe, to about three weeks, and whose views as to the condition and prospects of the Nizam's dominions are not in accord with my own observations. Mr. Gorst ventures to say that "the condition of the kingdom is wretched", and that "the people" are "unhappy" (p. 529). I have no hesitation in meeting those assertions with a direct and positive contradiction. The condition of the kingdom and its inhabitants is far better now than it was twenty years ago, and in general prosperity and

contentedness the people will compare favourably with those of our own provinces.¹

The late Ameer-i-Kabeer, whom Mr. Gorst may recognise under his previous title of Wikar-ool-Oomra, father of the present Ameer-i-Kabeer Khoorshed Jali, frankly acknowledged, in personal conversation with me, that the whole country had progressed in good order and in material prosperity under Salar Jung's rule; adding that the districts under his own charge came quite up to the general standard, for which result he gave much credit to his several Commissioners.

Mr. Gorst introduces the whole subject by saying that at some vague date, "a few months ago", in some unnamed "village in the Deccan", a case of torture for the extortion of revenue occurred, similar to those related in the Reports of the Madras Torture Commission many years ago (p. 522). In the absence of some specification and authentication, Mr. Gorst, as a lawyer conversant with the law of evidence, and as a student of history, will pardon me if I decline to attach much importance to this story. I believe that all such malpractices have been as completely put down in the Deccan as in the Madras Presidency.

But Mr. Gorst has formed a very bad opinion of the inhabitants of the Deccan. According to him, the 350,000 citizens of Hyderabad, among whom I thought I knew a few hard-working and meritorious persons in every rank of life, are all occupied in "squandering in riotous living" the wealth produced by "more than 9,000,000 tillers of the soil",—the sole "pleasure" of those same tillers of the soil being that of "getting drunk

¹ See *post*, pp. 439, 440, 441.

on toddy" (p. 522). After twenty-seven years' familiarity with the cities and villages of the Deccan, I do not recognise the picture.

Mr. Gorst says that when he visited Hyderabad "the officers of the British Residency favoured the Peshcar" (p. 530). I was then an officer of the British Residency, of much longer standing than any other one there, and by no means unfriendly to the Peshcar; but this at least I must say, that if that high functionary was indeed so "favoured", as Mr. Gorst states,—on which subject he is, perhaps, better informed than I am,—it was the first time during the last forty years in which the political officers of the British Residency had shown a bias with regard to that family.

And although I do not consider myself in the least biassed against the Peshcar and his friends, I may mention that a coolness arose between us in the last two or three months of our intercourse in 1883 and 1884, in connection with the prearranged visit of Mr. Gorst, M.P., and with the refusal to listen to my advice and warnings on the subject of the social persecution of Mr. Seymour Keay. My counsel in those matters was, I conceive, neither unfriendly nor unwise.

Should I resume office at Hyderabad, and have the pleasure of meeting Mr. Gorst, who, I see from the newspapers, is about to visit the East again, I shall be happy to see him and explain what otherwise he may be unable to comprehend from the few remarks I make. On publishing my next work, however, if we do not meet, he will see that I have much to say in behalf of our common friend the Peshcar. Rajah Naraindhar Pershad can hardly be held responsible for the occurrences of 1883,

and more especially at the earlier part. He is of a kindly disposition.

While the greater part of this book has been in type, four long articles, averaging four columns, have appeared in the *Times* (August 20, 26, September 2 and 10), headed "*The Native States of India*, from a Correspondent."¹ These articles, placed in a position of such advantageous prominence, and reviving, as they do, all the contemptuous aspersions against Indian Princes and their rule, which were the prelude to Lord Dalhousie's annexations, are calculated to excite alarm and ill-feeling in every Native Court throughout India, among our protected Allies, as well as among our tributaries and feudatories. A few words of correction and warning may not, therefore, be out of place here.

The articles abound with blunders and misunderstandings as to matters of fact, that are somewhat remarkable in a writer who has evidently ransacked Blue Books for his information. For example, one of the articles (No. II, *The Mohammedan States*, August 26th) is chiefly given up to "the most populous as well as the largest of all the Native States", Hyderabad, or the Nizam's dominions, and especially to what is said to be its "too lavish military expenditure". He very much overrates in numbers, and especially in the number of guns, the troops in the immediate service of the Nizam. Instead of that Prince having 725 guns in "his Army",²

¹ Since this was in type these articles from the *Times* have been reprinted in a small volume, with none of the errors hereafter pointed out by me corrected, published by Messrs. Chapman and Hall, and dedicated to the Earl of Dufferin, who is recommended "to imitate the policy of Lord Dalhousie".

² *The Armies of the Native States of India*, pp. 63-64.

he and the principal Chieftains holding lands under him on military tenure, have not altogether more than 30 guns equipped, a few horsed, and others with bullocks, capable of making their appearance on parade. The large number of guns mentioned in the article can only have been arrived at by counting up all the old guns, mounted and dismounted, for the most part mere old metal, lying about in dismantled forts all over the country,—not the guns of “an Army”, and not even capable of being so converted.

It is only by this enumeration of old honey-combed cannons without carriages or means of transport, that the ridiculous returns can have been made of “Hindoo armies with which the Central India Agency has to deal”, of “not fewer than 3,180 Cavalry, 34,000 Infantry, and 434 guns, in addition”—it is added—“to the forces of Gwalior, Indore, and Bhopal” (Article III, *The Hindoo States*, September 2nd).

The readers of this volume will find a good deal of information in its pages as to the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force and the Hyderabad Contingent,—the origin of those two Forces and the terms on which they are now maintained. The writer in the *Times* confounds and confuses the duties fulfilled and the localities occupied by these two Forces in a manner that would alone make his article, apart from its want of principle, utterly worthless as a basis for action or as a guide to policy. He says that the Nizam’s own Army, with its “725 guns” aforesaid, “is watched and supposed to be kept in check by the Force called the Hyderabad Contingent, numbering 8,000 men, and which occupies the cantonment of Secunderabad and eight other places.”

The Contingent does not occupy Secunderabad, and not one of its Regiments is quartered there.

The writer goes on to say :—

“There would not be much ground for surprise if the very generally accepted view as to the doubtful fidelity of this Force, if turned against the Nizam, were to prove the correct one, for the Hyderabad Contingent is nominally an army of the Nizam, although paid out of the revenue of the English-governed province of Berar, and notwithstanding that it is officered by Englishmen.

“If a Nizam ever could have the courage to unfurl the green flag of the Prophet, which I admit is doubtful, there would be small thought of opposing his decision among the Contingent at Secunderabad.”

The Hyderabad Contingent is *not* “nominally an army of the Nizam”. It “ceased to be part of the Nizam’s Army”¹ under the Treaty of 1853. It is an auxiliary Force thoroughly under British control. It is not only as efficient, but in every respect as trustworthy as the Regiments of Madras and Bombay.

As to the question of comparative military efficiency, the correspondent of the *Times* is entirely misinformed. He speaks of “the antiquated organisation termed the Hyderabad Contingent”, and says that “it is admitted to be considerably inferior to the ordinary Native Regiments of the Line”. The Infantry Regiments of the Contingent have nothing “antiquated” in their “organisation”, and are quite as well drilled and disciplined as our Native battalions of the Line. The Cavalry of the Contingent is unequalled in India.

In one sentence of this article, the writer, in his blundering confusion as to the Contingent occupying Secunderabad, has plunged into an admission and a suggestion

¹ Aitchison’s *Treaties*, vol. v, p. 9.

for which he deserves no thanks from his friends! He says :—

“The Hyderabad Contingent is a survival of a state of things that has long passed away, and it should be reorganised or abolished, and its duties transferred to the Madras or Bombay armies.”

It is quite true, and the truth will be made clear in this volume, that the Hyderabad Contingent, both before and since the Treaty imposed on the Nizam in 1853, has been doing the “duties” properly devolving under the Treaty of 1800 on the Subsidiary Force, which occupies the cantonment of Secunderabad, and that those “duties” ought to be transferred to the Madras or Bombay armies. The “correspondent” who has contributed these articles to the *Times* recommends “the substitution of an Anglo-Indian garrison for the Hyderabad Contingent”. He is quite right, and “the Anglo-Indian garrison”—quite sufficient for its “duties” under treaty—is there on the spot in the shape of the Subsidiary Force at Secunderabad. Whether the Contingent ought to be “abolished”, or “reorganised” as a purely Imperial Force, is a question open to argument, but which I shall not be tempted to pursue here even by the unguarded admissions of the writer in the *Times*.

The “correspondent” is as unfair and as inaccurate in his assertions regarding the civil government of Hyderabad as he is regarding its military affairs. He says, for example, that “although the Nizam is allowed, by official consent, a position of *quasi* independence, there is no State in India wherein our interference has been more often rendered necessary by internal discord, and carried into effect in complete disregard of the Nizam’s sovereignty.”

This is not the case. The contents of this book will prove, from the acknowledgments of a succession of Governors-General, including Lord Dalhousie, that no "internal discord" or maladministration in the Nizam's dominions has ever "rendered our interference necessary". No such interference has ever taken place.

A "sovereignty" and an "independence" resting only on what this writer in the *Times* calls "*official consent*", would be, indeed, what he terms "a mere fiction and a hollow pretence". Officials are in the habit of magnifying their office and stretching their powers considerably, but I am not aware that they have yet openly asserted the faculty of granting or withholding the sovereignty or the independence of States. The sovereignty and the independence of the Nizam, as acknowledged by every Governor-General and Viceroy, without exception, down to the present day, rest on solemn Treaties, and are limited solely by the Articles in those Treaties which concede to the British Government the arbitrament of war and peace, the prerogatives and functions of conducting the external and federal relations of the whole Indian Empire.

The Nizam is not, and never has been, either a feudatory or a tributary to the British Government. The Hyderabad State has, on the contrary, for a long series of years, paid subsidy for services to the British Government, and received from it a tribute for provinces held in feudal tenure under it. These relations have unquestionably been modified by time and the force of circumstances, but the Nizam's position at present, under Treaty, is that of a Sovereign Prince, and a protected Ally of the Queen, Empress of India.

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ERRATA.

Page 3, line 18 from the bottom, *for* "1854", *read* 1852.

Page 414, heading to page, *for* "An Afghan Note", *read* An Alarming Note.

GENERAL JAMES STUART FRASER.

CHAPTER I.

Ancestry and Parentage—Letter from Warren Hastings—Education—Appointed a Cadet—Quick Promotion—First Staff Appointment—Aide-de-Camp to the Governor of Madras—Officers' Mutiny in 1809—Letters from Sir Walter Scott—Expedition to Mauritius—Town Major and Military Secretary—Commandant of Pondicherry—Commissioner for French, Danish, and Dutch Settlements—Coorg War—Resident at Mysore—Resident at Travancore—Letters to Sir Frederick Adam on the Sequestration of Mysore, and on Canara Rebellion.

ALEXANDER, sixth Lord Lovat, and eleventh of the house, settled the lands of Ardachie in Inverness-shire by charter, in 1552, on his third son, James, from whom my grandfather, Colonel Charles Fraser, was directly descended. Thomas, third in descent from James, succeeded to the Ardachie estate in 1637. A century later, my great-grandfather, Thomas Fraser of Ardachie, was married, about the year 1735, to Charlotte, daughter of the Hon. Charles Campbell, third son of Archibald, Earl of Argyll, who was beheaded in 1685. My great-grandfather was Collector of Customs at Campbelltown in Argyleshire, where he possessed some landed property. His affairs appear to have become disordered, partly in consequence of some costly litigation; and between 1744 and 1757, in two successive transactions, the Argyleshire property was sold, and his eldest son, my grandfather, having previously served for six years in the Royal Marines, proceeded to Madras in 1762, in the military service of the East India Company. I shall give one brief extract from an old diary kept by my grandfather from 1755 to 1761:—

“1755. Left Campbelltown, Tuesday, the 20th May 1755. Arrived in London, Tuesday evening, the 3rd of June. Came to Portsmouth the 17th of ditto, being Tuesday, and remained at Quarters till Saturday, the 9th August, when I embarked aboard His Majesty's ship, the *Essex*, with a party of seventy private marines and serjeants, two cor-

porals and one drum, commanded by a Captain. Next day, viz, 10th, we sailed from Spithead to St. Helen's, and from thence to sea the same evening. About the 24th, we joined Sir Edward Hawke's fleet in the Bay, having first met the *Monmouth* and *Savage*, who had been separated from the fleet for some days. Upon our delivering to Sir Edward a packet from the Admiralty, the fleet had orders to commit hostilities on the French shipping, and to send as much of their trade as fell into our hands to England; and accordingly, that cruise, upwards of one hundred of their merchantmen were detained by our fleet."

After serving in India for about five years, my grandfather came home on leave. He was married at Campbelltown, on the 16th of December 1768, to Miss Isabella Hook, and after the lapse of about a year they sailed for Madras. Their eldest son, born at Vellore on the 25th of August 1771, was named Hastings, in acknowledgment of kindness and good services received from Warren Hastings, the first Governor-General of India, who at that time was a Member of Council at Madras. A few days before he left that Presidency to take up the higher position of second in Council at Calcutta, he wrote the following letter to Captain Charles Fraser:—

"Fort St. George, 15th January 1772.

"DEAR SIR,—I learnt with much Pleasure from Mr. Anderson some Time ago the Honor which you had done me in making me one of the Sponsors for your Son. I am much obliged to you and Mrs. Fraser for this Distinction, though I cannot hope for some Years to have the Pleasure of seeing my Godson, or of being a Witness of his Growth and Improvements. I shall be glad, however, to be informed of the Progress which he makes in both, and of his Health, and shall be truly interested in his Welfare.

"I have taken the Liberty to send a Piece of Shawl directed to you, which I request your Permission to present, as a mere Token of Affection to my young Namesake, and to plead a Right to his Acceptance of it, from the Relation that you have given me to him.

"I beg you will present my Compliments to Mrs. Fraser, and

"Believe me to be, with esteem,

"Yours very faithfully,

"WARREN HASTINGS."

My grandfather, accompanied by his wife and children, returned home on a second furlough in 1781; and my father, the youngest

of a large family of six sons and three daughters, was born at Edinburgh on the 1st of July 1783.

In the year 1776, as the result of some family arrangements consequent on litigation carried through more than one generation, General Fraser of Lovat conveyed the estate of Ardachie to his cousin and clansman, my grandfather, Charles Fraser, the heir male and representative of that branch, on his repaying certain sums that had been advanced for the purchase of the lands from another member of the family. The deed is dated 7th September 1776.

My grandfather returned to India in 1783. He rose in due course to the charge of a brigade, and ultimately of a division, and held the latter command at the time of his death at Masulipatam in 1794.

His eldest son, Hastings, then a young officer in the 86th County Down Regiment, succeeded to the estate of Ardachie. My uncle led his regiment into action at the storming of Seringapatam in 1799, and subsequently at the taking of the island of Bourbon in 1810. During this latter expedition he was given the command of a brigade, on which the brunt of the fighting fell, and so delighted were those who served under him with his fine qualities as a leader, that his own corps presented him with a valuable sword, and the native regiments with a service of silver plate.¹ When General Hastings Fraser died in 1854, at the venerable age of eighty-three—Colonel of his old corps, the Royal County Down²—the Ardachie estate became my father's property.

My father's first school was at Ham in Surrey, and, so far as the education of a boy of sixteen can be said to be complete, his was completed at the Glasgow University under the special care of Professor Miller. But he was, in fact, a student all his life, especially of history and science. Even in his latest years of retirement at home he continued his favourite astronomical studies. He had, also, remarkable attainments as a linguist, both in Oriental and European languages.

¹ These relics of soldierly goodwill towards a brave and considerate commander are now in my possession.

² I cannot resist mentioning here that it was my happy fortune to be brigaded with my uncle's old regiment during the Central India campaign of 1857-8, when, as everyone would testify, it was to the splendid bearing and spirit of this fine corps that Sir Hugh Rose (now Lord Strathnairn) owed so much of his brilliant success.

He went out as a cadet to Madras in 1799, and was posted to the 18th Regiment of Native Infantry. He attained the rank of Lieutenant on the 15th of July 1800, and that of Captain on the 16th of November 1809. His military promotion, in a service regulated by seniority, was remarkably rapid. He rose to be Major in 1819; Lieutenant-Colonel in 1824; Colonel in 1829; and Major-General in 1838, before his fifty-fifth birthday. But his advance in the line of special and select employment, where no element of luck, and very little of what is commonly called interest, operated in his favour, was even more marked, and commenced at a period unusually early in the career of an Indian officer.

His first appointment was that of Assistant in the Political and Military Department to Lieutenant-Colonel Marriott, engaged in transporting the families of the Mysore Princes, descendants of Hyder and Tippoo, from the Carnatic to Bengal, by land in 1807, one of the precautionary measures taken after the mutiny at Vellore. At Calcutta he seems to have attracted the favourable notice of Sir George Barlow, who was then officiating as Governor-General until the arrival of Lord Minto; and when Sir George Barlow was made Governor of Madras in 1808, he appointed Lieutenant Fraser, of the 18th Native Infantry, to be his Aide-de-Camp.

And here it may, perhaps, be appropriately mentioned, as this first substantive office held by my father was of a somewhat courtly and ornamental character, that he possessed the not inconsiderable advantage of a decidedly handsome, not to say imposing, personal appearance—he was upwards of six feet three inches in height, with a light, graceful figure even in old age, and was an excellent horseman.

It was during the government of Sir George Barlow that one of the most extraordinary incidents in the administrative annals of India occurred, the mutiny—for it was nothing less—of the British officers of the Madras Army in 1809, instigated and led by their Commander-in-Chief, the exciting cause being the abolition of certain contracts for tents and camp equipage which were profitable to regimental officers. The conduct of Sir George Barlow in dealing with this incredible outburst of discontent and insubordination, made him for the time excessively unpopular

with the English commissioned officers of the army, who for many months withheld from the Governor and his supporters all ordinary courtesies and social observances. His proceedings were also violently attacked at home, but were approved in Parliament and by a majority of the Court of Directors. The following letter to his uncle, Captain Hook, in Scotland, shows that his young Aide-de-Camp, as might naturally have been expected, was not among those who took an adverse view of Sir George Barlow's method of dealing with his contumacious comrades.

“Madras, 6th May 1810.

“MY DEAR UNCLE,—I have just time to write a few lines, and to forward what perhaps you may have some desire to peruse, the trial of three of those officers whose conduct during the late disturbances in India was considered most reprehensible, and therefore first brought under the attention of a court martial.

“The most perfect tranquillity is now restored; and I trust the army will never resume these violent proceedings, which have left upon its reputation so indelible a stain.

“For this happy conclusion of what may justly be considered the most alarming and dangerous commotion which ever agitated an army, England is unquestionably indebted to the wisdom and unequalled firmness of Sir George Barlow.

“An expedition is just on the point of sailing for the purpose of attacking Bourbon and eventually Mauritius; which have so long afforded to the enemy a means of distressing our commerce, and the capture of which it is so surprising was not long ago attempted.

“All my family in this country are well. They have written for my sister Charlotte to be sent out; and I am excessively sorry for it. India is, in my opinion, a detestable country for a man, and, if possible, still worse for a woman.

“Since I last wrote home I have been promoted to a Captain-Lieutenancy, and indeed it was high time, for I have been superseded by great numbers. This circumstance, however, is of little consequence while I remain away from my Regiment, and I do not see much chance of my joining it soon. I am still in the Governor's family; and, in addition to the situation of Aide-de-Camp, I am now acting as Private Secretary.

“This last duty, however, I shall probably not have long to perform; as it will cease at the return of Mr. Buchan, who was sent home on public duty soon after the breaking out of disturbances.

“I hope my sister and Archy will have received the last letters I

wrote them, though I am rather inclined to be apprehensive that they may not.

"For above a year past, I have been in the habit of enclosing *all* my letters for England in a packet to Colonel Capper's address—and God knows whether Colonel Capper be alive to have received these packets.

"I am sorry to have to inform you of the death of my cousin, Lionel Hook. He was a Lieutenant in the 22nd Dragoons, and Brigade Major to Colonel Hare. He died in camp about a month ago, of the small-pox, which it seems he caught accidentally. His loss is deeply lamented, for he was highly esteemed and beloved by the officers of his Regiment, and by all who knew him.

"I beg you will give my love to all friends at home, and remain

"Your Affectionate and Dutiful Nephew,

"JAMES STUART FRASER.

"P. S.—If it be not giving you too much trouble, I should be particularly obliged by your sending me out, when an opportunity occurs, any papers or pamphlets which may be published in England on subjects interesting to us in India; and more particularly any which may be relative to the late discussions in the Army, and the disputes between Government and the Commander-in-Chief."

Among a somewhat long list of relatives and connections in the Madras Presidency, one of those with whom my father maintained a very constant and affectionate intercourse was Mr. Charles Carpenter of the Madras Civil Service.¹ He was Captain Fraser's brother-in-law, having been married on May 25th, 1805, at Mount Capper, Cuddalore (where my grandmother lived in her widowhood until her death on the 19th of October 1821), to Isabella, third daughter of Colonel and Mrs. Charles Fraser. Mr. Carpenter had another brother-in-law at this time in Scotland, Mr. Walter Scott, Sheriff of Selkirkshire, who had married his sister, Charlotte Margaret Carpenter, in 1797.² Mr. Scott, already of great note as a poet, and soon to be more celebrated as Sir Walter Scott, author of the *Waverley Novels*, kept up an animated and constant correspondence, seconded by Mrs. (afterwards Lady) Scott, with Mr. and Mrs. Carpenter. From a large collection of these letters, carefully preserved by my aunt, I cannot resist publishing a few, though they do not rightly fall within the scope and object of this.

¹ He died in India on the 4th June 1818.

² See *Life of Sir Walter Scott*, by J. G. Lockhart (Cadell, 1848), vol. i. pp. 97 to 102.

book, because they give some insight into the political sentiments of their illustrious writer, and into the contemporary effect produced by some of the Duke of Wellington's victories during the war with the French in Spain.

"MY DEAREST BROTHER,—I have just received your letter of 18th September 1802, the first I have had from you since you had received the melancholy intelligence which I transmitted to you with so much pain. I am more concerned than surprised at the deep impression which such a loss must necessarily have made upon your mind, but you must give me leave to hope that your reflections are now in some degree turned from so very painful a subject to your own fair and flourishing prospects. I know that good news from Scotland will have considerable effect in enlivening your spirits, and therefore I hasten to tell you that we are well, happy, and prosperous. Charlotte, about four weeks ago, presented me with a little damsel, whom we have called Anne, in compliment to my worthy mother. Had it proved a boy, it was to have been a little Charles. My little Sophia is a thriving, lively Scotch girl, and the boy uncommonly stout, healthy, and robust, in short, quite a model for a little Hercules. My worldly matters jog on very well. Government propose to increase the appointments of the Sheriffs, which will put an additional £100 a year into my pocket. Moreover, I have contrived to turn a very slender portion of literary talents to some account, by a publication of the poetical antiquities of the Border Counties, where the old people had preserved many ballads and ancient songs descriptive of the manners of the country during the wars with England. This trifling collection was so well received by a *discerning* public, that after receiving £100 profit for the first edition—which, my vanity cannot omit informing you, sold off in six months—I sold the copyright for £500 more. I am seeking a mode of conveyance to transmit to you this precious compilation. You will hear a good deal of our motions from a Dr. Leyden, who goes to Madras in this fleet, should his fortune throw him in your way. Charlotte has given him a few lines to you merely as an introduction; but I must let you a little deeper into his history. He was the son of a very petty farmer in Roxburghshire, and had so little education that at twelve years old he did not know how to write. Nature had, however, been liberal in her gifts: he caught a taste for knowledge, and, under the most distressing circumstances, made himself master of most of the learned languages, of those of modern Europe, and even dabbled in Eastern literature. When he found his way to Edinburgh College, his merit by degrees became noticed, and at length conspicuous. I had the good luck early to discover both his literary and

personal worth, and at different times he lived a good deal with us, till it was in my power to procure him his present appointment of Assistant-Surgeon on the Madras establishment, which I accomplished through Mr. Dundas. Lord William Bentinck¹ is to countenance him in his labours, which I suppose will be rather literary than medical. He will certainly make an effort to see you, if it be possible. You must be prepared to encounter and pardon some peculiarity of manner arising from his early history, and which even his intercourse with the first-class people here and in London has not quite erased; but you will find this amply atoned for by a great fund of knowledge and native kindness of disposition. He will be able to tell you a thousand little anecdotes regarding our domestic habits, etc., etc., for things of very little importance in themselves are pleasing and interesting when they relate to separated friends. I am rejoiced to see that at length you fix a period at which we may hope for your return to Britain. Happiness depends so much less upon the quantity of the fortune than upon the power of enjoying what we have, that I am sure you, my dear brother, after having spent your early years in acquiring a respectable fortune, will not delay enjoying it for the purpose of making it still larger. Remember Scotland will have a claim upon you for one part of the year, if upon trial you like its society and climate, and I am so true a Scotchman that I think it impossible you can dislike them. Besides, our women are generally reckoned handsome and accomplished, and I hope, notwithstanding your attachment to Old England, you will give our nymphs a chance at setting their caps at you. Your sister says you positively must be married soon after your arrival, so you must prepare for fetters, even in the land of liberty. I would send you political news, were there any worth sending. Those from France are singularly gloomy. Subjected to a very rigorous military Government, all attempt at domestic happiness seems to be given up for the *fracas* of public amusements and immense parties, where none dare tell his mind to his next neighbour, should it involve anything more important than an opinion on the merits of the newest *cantatrice* or *figurante*. Besides all this, a pestilential disorder is now raging at Paris. At home, the most remarkable event is the discovery of a plot to assassinate the best of Kings by a gang of low ruffians, the leaders of whom have been executed. Colonel Despard, the ringleader of these miscreants, was once in the army, and had a character for bravery and skill in his profession. Being intrusted with some presents intended to conciliate the Chiefs of the Mosquito Indians in the Bay of Honduras, the worthy Colonel chose to appropriate the gifts to his own purposes; for which peculation he was broken by a court-martial in the

¹ Governor of Madras.

West Indies. Having become totally desperate, in consequence of this well-merited disgrace, he embraced eagerly the opportunity of avenging himself on Government by embarking in all the seditious proceedings during the wars, which procured him a lodging in Cold Bath Fields; where his fate was deplored and howled over by Sir Francis Bardett and other reforming members of the House of Commons. The first act of this worthy and oppressed patriot, upon his liberation, was to organise the murder of his sovereign. It does not appear from his trial that any persons were associated with him excepting the ruffians who were to be the immediate actors, but it is generally believed that he acted as the link betwixt these subordinate agents, and a higher rank of conspirators, as it is hardly to be conceived that a person of sense and education would embark in so desperate a project without being assured of more powerful allies than a set of low blackguards not exceeding 30 or 40 in number. Colonel Despard died like a true Jacobin, neither fearing God nor regarding man. The Peace seems likely to hold, notwithstanding it is confidently asserted that we are to retain Malta as the only security against the preponderance which the French have acquired in the Mediterranean, by the cession of Elba, and by the Chief Consul's having been placed at the head of the Cisalpine Republic. Those who talk of the retention of Malta (and I have heard some very high authority upon the subject) reason thus. If Buonaparte does not wish to quarrel with this country, or again to possess himself of Egypt, which would produce an immediate breach, then our cession of Malta cannot be to him a matter of such importance as to precipitate himself into war. But if he really wishes to have Egypt, the removal of our fleet and armies from Malta will be an indispensable preliminary, and such a removal would be followed by his immediately invading Egypt, and consequently by a war with this country under circumstances much more unfavourable than if we still held Malta; so that the proposed cession might accelerate, but could not possibly avert, a breach with France. Such were the sentiments which I heard delivered by a very eminent statesman, and I think there is good sense in them, though I do not pretend to understand the subject. To revert to domestic affairs. As soon as your sister has quite recovered I intend we shall go to London, where I am called by some professional business; so we shall have the pleasure of seeing all our good friends in Piccadilly, which will be no small gratification to me as well as to Charlotte. She is recovering from her indisposition uncommonly well, and desires a thousand expressions of the kindest affection to you. Joining cordially in all her good wishes, I am, ever most sincerely,

"Your truly affectionate Brother,

"Edin., 6th March, 1803.

"WALTER SCOTT.

"Charles Carpenter, Esq., Commercial Resident,
Salem, Madras, East Indies."

"MY DEAR BROTHER,—This accompanies a copy of my new poem for Mrs. Carpenter's kind acceptance. I hope it will amuse her as much as she is so good as to say my former ditties did. There are very few hard words in it. I also hope it will reach you safe, as Lady Minto is so good as to take charge of sending it with the Governor-General's baggage. Lord Minto and I used to be very good friends, and if you should happen to see him, I am sure his Lordship will remember me, and perhaps you may experience some civility on my account, which would give me great pleasure indeed. I write to him with a copy of this same poem, and will take the liberty to mention your name, as indeed I have done before. It is very probable all this is of no consequence to you, yet it can do no harm, and I only hope you will not think me officious. The present President of the Board of Control is also my old and intimate friend and schoolfellow. So if you can devise anything for your comfort, or convenience or advantage, I would try my interest in your behalf, which would give me the greatest pleasure if successful. I sincerely hope this will find Mrs. Carpenter's health amended, which I judge to be the case, since she has altered her plan of coming to England before you. Most heartily do I hope you will look this way together, and soon. Your kindness will make you anxious about our present situation, which is in every respect comfortable, and promises daily to become more so. My literary attempts have been very useful in point of profit as well as for the degree of general regard which I may without vanity say that they have procured me. My present situation is that of one of the principal Clerks to our Court of Session, the income of which runs from £800 to £1,000 a year. The worst is that the gentleman who retired to make way for me retains the appointment, while I do the duty. But it gives me leisure for my literary pursuit, by which, by my Sherifdom, and by my private fortune, I can maintain my rank in society, and even make money, *en attendant* the death of the old life-renter. This was rather a hard bargain, but it was made when the Administration was dissolved upon Pitt's death. All was going to pieces, and I was glad to swim ashore on a plank of the wreck, or, in a word, to be provided for anyhow ere the new people came in. Nobody, to be sure, could have foreseen that in a year's time my friends were all to be in again. There is just now to be appointed a High Commission of Parliament to revise the structure and forms of our Scottish Courts of Jurisprudence, and I believe I am to be named Secretary to the Commissioners. This, I suppose, will be well paid; but I am principally pleased with it as being a very respectable appointment conferred on me by our principal Law Lords and King's Council, and consequently an honourable professional distinction. The employment will be but temporary, but may have consequences of importance to my future lot in life, if I give satisfaction in the discharge

of it. I wrote you a few days ago by a little cadet, by name Alexander Russell, a cousin-german of mine, who goes to Madras by these ships. Should chance throw him in your way, I would be much obliged to you to show him kindness. I suppose you think by this time that my cadet cousins grow up like crops of pease and beans, but I assure you this is the last you are likely to hear of, for I hope you will be home long before an after-crop comes up of younger exportation commodities. I am sure you are obliged to us, and we to you, for I fancy our frozen climate raises a great number of the soldiers, sailors and merchants that are transplanted to yours. My little nursery, two of each sex, are thriving and hearty: your little namesake, a merry, cherry-checked fellow with an unrestrained stock of health and spirits.

"I sincerely hope this will find you in health, Mrs. Carpenter quite recovered, and your land in quiet. Since Russia has quarrelled with us, we are looking rather anxiously towards you, from a general idea that Bonaparte has a scheme of marching an army through Persia against our Indian dominions. I am no believer in the possibility of his executing such a plan, though I think it not improbable he may attempt it, as his success hitherto gives him a right to calculate on anything. He seems tired of the threat of invasion, especially since the seizure of the Danish fleet, which might have had its sails bent at this moment, ready to sail north to Ireland with 20,000 Frenchmen, had it not been for the precautionary measures of seizing their ships and stores. The emigration of the Royal Family of Portugal to the Brazils is another of those wonderful events which our time has been destined to witness. Its effect on the spirits of the merchants has been that of a cordial.

"Once more, dear Carpenter, remember me kindly to your lady, and thank her in my name for two affectionate letters, to which I am sending a handsome reply by the ships, and besides this, by the little cousin cadet. I must have worse than usual ill luck if none of these letters come to hand.

"Believe me, your affectionate Brother,

"WALTER SCOTT.

"Edinburgh, 16th February 1808."

"Ashcote, 25th August 1811.

"MY DEAR CARPENTER,—I take the opportunity of Sir Samuel Hood's going out to command in your Indian Seas to inquire after your welfare and that of Mrs. Carpenter, and at the same time to make you known, should circumstances permit, to the very accomplished and pleasing woman who takes charge of this letter. Lady Hood is by birth a daughter of Lord Seaforth, one of our greatest Highland Chiefs, and a

keen Scotchwoman, so I hope Mrs. Carpenter and she will be agreeable to each other as countrywomen; although I fear there is small chance of your being at Madras in case the Admiral's vessel touches there. If it should fortunately happen otherwise, you will, I am sure, be glad to see a valued friend of Charlotte and me; and Lady Hood will, I know, be happy in making your acquaintance. She has always lived in the first circles of society in London, but deserves regard still more from her valuable personal qualities than from her rank and manners. Sir Samuel Hood is an amiable and unaffected man, and as much distinguished by his gentle and unassuming manners in society as by his professional gallantry, of which he has given so many proofs.

"I have very little domestic news to send you. Our little people are shooting fast up from childhood towards youth, and show promising dispositions both for morals and learning. Your namesake and godson, little Charles, seems to be the cleverest of the family, and indeed exceeds any child at his age I have ever seen. As my lease of this place is out, I have bought for about £4,000 a property in the neighbourhood extending along the banks of the river Tweed for about a mile. It is very bleak at present, having little to recommend it but the vicinity of the river; but as the ground is well adapted by nature to grow wood, and is considerably various in form and appearance, I have no doubt that by judicious plantations it may be rendered a very pleasant spot; and it is at present my great amusement to plan the various lines which may be necessary for that purpose. The farm comprehends about one hundred and twenty acres, of which I shall keep about fifty in pasture and tillage, and plant all the rest, which will make it a very valuable little possession in a few years, as wood bears a very high price among us. I intend building a small cottage here for my summer residence, being obliged by law, as well as induced by inclination, to make this county my residence for some months every year. This is the grandest incident which has lately taken place in our domestic concerns, and I assure you we are not a little proud of being greeted as *Laird* and *Lady of Abbotsford*. We will give a grand gala when we take possession, and as we are very *clannish* in this corner, all the Scotts in this county, from the Duke to the peasant, shall dance on the green to the bagpipes, and drink whisky punch. Now, as this happy festival is to be distant for more than a twelvemonth, during which our cottage is to be built, etc., etc., what is to hinder brother and sister Carpenter to give us their company upon so gratifying an occasion? Pray do not stay broiling yourself so long in India—not for a moment longer when you have secured comfort and competence. Don't look forward to peace: it will never come either in your day or mine; for the political atmosphere of Europe looks more gloomy and stormy than ever. Nor do public matters at home look very consoling. The poor

old King is so very ill that death will be a deliverance which may be soon expected. All parties look up to and claim an interest with the Prince, whose plan seems to be to rely upon none of them, but breaking them up by a partial distribution of his favour, to form an Administration dependent only on the sovereign and not upon any public man or party-leader. This is all very well should such an Administration prove successful and popular; but if otherwise, the public resentment, which in other cases is confined to the Minister, may, in that supposed, take a higher object. God turn all to the best, but our prospects are at present very unsettled.

"Adieu, my dear Carpenter. Your sister sends kindest love to Mrs. Carpenter and you. I daily scold her for her silence, and she always promises to write, as I naturally judge she will know better what can interest you than I. But to say truth, though your sister and my wife, she is the worst penwoman I ever saw.

"Your affectionate Brother,

"WALTER SCOTT.

"Favoured by the Honourable Lady Hood.
"Charles Carpenter, Esq., Commercial Resident,
Cuddalore."

"MY DEAR CARPENTER,—The melancholy news of poor Leyden's death reached me some time before your kind letter. General Malcolm has touched his character with equal truth and kindness. The little oddities, for they really hardly deserved the name of faults, only served to shade his high attainments and the excellent qualities of his heart. He will be a great loss to Eastern literature, and not less to his European friends, especially to myself. Thus as we advance in life our social comforts are gradually abridged. Do think of this, my dear Carpenter, and come back to Britain while the circle of your friends is not materially diminished. I am happy to see from your last expressions that affairs promise to let you escape from India in a year or two. As health is better than wealth, I trust you will hasten the period of your return as much as possible; and pray send us early intelligence, as I shall make a point to meet you in London at least, if not at Portsmouth.

"Our private affairs continue prosperous and our family healthy. They are all fine children, but little Charles, the youngest, promises to possess extraordinary talent. My income has been greatly increased by my predecessor, or rather colleague, in office being placed by Government upon a superannuated pension, which gave me access to nearly all the emoluments of the office (£1,300 in gross), to which otherwise I could only have succeeded after his death. To bring this

about was one of the last labours of poor Lord Melville, whose steady friendship for me was active in my favour to the very verge of his life. Encouraged by this good fortune, my lease of Ashiestiel being out, and it being necessary as Sheriff that I should reside in Selkirkshire occasionally, I have bought a farm of about 120 acres, lying along the side of the Tweed. This indeed is its only advantage in point of situation, being quite bare of wood, and unenclosed. But as the Spanish proverb says, 'Time and I against any two'. I have set to work to plant and to improve, and I hope to make Abbotsford a very sweet little thing in the course of a few years. Till we shall have leisure—*i.e.*, time and money—to build a little mansion, we have fixed our residence in the little farm-house, where our only sitting-room is about twelve feet square, and all the others in proportion. So that on the whole we live as if we were on board of ship. But, besides the great amusement I promise myself in dressing this little farm, it is convenient and pleasant, as lying in my native county, and among those to whom I am most attached by relationship and friendship. We have also a very pleasant friend of yours in our neighbourhood, the fine old veteran, General Gowdie. He lives about three miles from us, and was here the other morning, as keen as a schoolboy, about a fishing party to a small lake in our vicinity. He and I have a debate about a new harpoon for striking salmon, which he invented, and which I have the boldness to think I have altered and improved. He speaks very often of you, and will be delighted to see you.

"I left your friend, Captain Campbell, in Edinburgh. He is married, and is desirous of getting upon the recruiting staff in that city. I have used all the interest I had in his favour with the officer who is at the head of the department in Edinburgh, and who happens to be my particular acquaintance, but I fear the appointment will be made in London.

"Public affairs assume a much more pleasant aspect than of late. Lord Wellington, whose splendid military talents are daily more and more manifest, having expelled the French from Portugal, is now in a fair way of clearing Spain of them; unless Bonaparte has the means of bringing his Russian quarrel to a speedy termination, which is very unlikely, if the Russians adhere to their plan of avoiding a general engagement, and suffering the invader to involve himself in the interminable deserts of their country. This, it is said, is the plan suggested by Bernadotte; I trust in God it will not be rashly departed from. Domestic matters are not so comfortable. There have been, as you will see from the papers, very serious disturbances among the manufacturers of the midland counties, which, by the mistaken lenity of Government, have been suffered to assume an alarming degree of organisation. Correspondence has been carried on by the malcontents

through every manufacturing town in England and Scotland, and the infection had even reached the little thriving community of Galashiels, a flourishing village in my district. I was not long, however, in breaking their association, and securing their papers. The principal rogue escaped me, for having heard I was suddenly come into the place, he observed, "It's not for nought that the hawk whistles", and so took to the hills and escaped.

"Charlotte is in very good health, and begs her kindest remembrances. She proposes to write, but I will not wait for her letter, knowing her talents for procrastination in such matters.

"There is a noble estate, with a fine old house and park, to be sold within ten miles of us. I wish you were here to buy it, with all my heart, as it would suit you very well for a summer residence. Charlotte joins in kindest regards to Mrs. Carpenter, and

"Believe me, dear Carpenter, ever

"Your affectionate brother,

"WALTER SCOTT.

"Abbotsford, 4th August 1812.

"P. S.—The Dumergues were well when we heard last; but I have not seen them for two years, and am scarce likely to be in London, unless with the hope of meeting you."

"MY DEAR CARPENTER,—I have just got your letter of 10th February, and a fortnight before Charlotte received the valuable and much admired package of cotton and long cloth, which she values still more as a pledge of Mrs. Carpenter's regard and friendship. Our little girls will be all as fine as so many little queens, and Charlotte herself will feel no little pride and satisfaction in appearing in a dress which she owes to the kindness of so valued a relative. I observe Mrs. Carpenter finally proposes leaving India in October. I should like very much to be in England on her arrival, and if possible I will certainly contrive it. We have two months' vacation from 12th March to 12th May, during which time I should think it likely Mrs. Carpenter will reach Britain; and should she then think of coming North, I will undertake to be her escort, if she will accept of me.

"Public news continue favourable. The great victories of Lord Wellington in Spain, and the determined resistance exhibited by the continental Powers, seem to augur a favourable termination of the war. Yet I think while Bonaparte lives and reigns, peace is hardly to be hoped for, for Sebastiani, one of his favourite Generals, who knew his character well, told a friend of mine that if Europe, Asia, and Africa were at Bonaparte's feet, he would be miserable until he had conquered America. And I do not think his spirit is of that kind which learns

moderation from adversity; otherwise his disasters in Spain and Russia must have taught it. So we poor mortals must abide the course of events, and drift down the stream, making ourselves as happy as we can while we drive on.

"Our domestic news are limited to our being all well. The little people are much what I could wish them—very affectionate to each other, and dutiful to us. They have all rather good parts, and little Charles, your name-son, shows marks of genius which may, perhaps, turn to something remarkable. But as our Scotch proverb says, 'It is long time to the saddling of a foal.'

"Upon the death of the Poet Laureate, the Prince Regent was pleased, of his unsolicited and most unexpected goodness, to offer me the situation. But after a little consideration I declined the proposed honour as handsomely as I could. The emolument was not any great object, being under £200, and might, I thought, be better conferred on some literary person who was otherwise unprovided for. But besides, I wish to be altogether independent of Kings and Courts, though with every sentiment of loyalty to our own; and that would not have been easy had I taken a part in the household, however small. So I now have only the hope that my humble excuses will be favourably received.

"Lord Minto has done great credit to himself by patronising poor Leyden while alive, and honouring his memory when no more. I looked forward to poor John's return as one of the most pleasant events in futurity. But such disappointments are the lot of humanity. I am delighted that you have met my dear Lady Hood, who is a most charming woman. I hope Sir Samuel is in the way of increasing his fortune on your side of the world. I hope Mrs. Carpenter received a 4to. volume from me, forwarded by our friends Smith and Jenyns, in the beginning of the year. Charlotte writes at length to Mrs. Carpenter, and sends you her affectionate love, in which all our little folks join, and

"Believe me ever, dear Carpenter,

"Yours most affectionately.

"Abbotsford, near Melrose,

"WALTER SCOTT.

"5th September 1813.

"P.S.—It has just occurred to me that it might be agreeable to you to have an introduction to Lord Moira, your new Governor-General. I therefore take the liberty to enclose a few lines for that purpose, having had the honour to know him pretty well while Commander-in-Chief in Scotland."

"MY DEAR CARPENTER,—You must be ill to please with good news, and with a wholesome return to the old European balance of power, if you are not amply contented with the information which this packet will bring you; for never since Europe was civilised, or I may almost say had a name, has there been such a marvellous succession of good fortune. Our Ministers here have the utmost credit with the country, and most deservedly, for the extraordinary firmness with which they managed matters which otherwise, I am well assured, would have gone wrong more than once but for Lord Castlereagh's steadiness. I had all the desire in the world to have gone to the Continent, and as I am well acquainted with Lord Aberdeen, and somewhat known to Lord Castlereagh, I should have been well enough off if I had ever got to head-quarters. But the difficulty would have been to get to the main army, through the clouds of partisans on both sides, who plundered in every direction; and truly a non-combatant makes but a foolish figure in such a scrape.

"I trust India, and you in particular, will soon feel all the advantages which a solid and lasting peace must necessarily afford. The Continent, however, has been so completely drained of specie, that for some time trade will not resume its former activity. Over-speculation on the effects of peace has already made one or two great bankruptcies; but these were people who had been long in labouring circumstances, and who made a bold dash in the hope of redeeming all. Pray make a heavy purse, for I assure you the expense of living here is doubled since my marriage, and in England has increased in at least a similar rate. I trust you will find a summer residence in Scotland, where very advantageous purchases of land can still be made. I fear London will have too many charms for you in winter to permit us to hope you will become a citizen of Edinburgh.

"As for my own affairs, they are going on very well. Rich I shall probably never be—contented and independent I am and hope to remain, my whole professional income being now in my own possession. I have been busy with my little property, which I hope will begin to look rather pretty by the time we have the pleasure of receiving Mrs. Carpenter and you there, as the trees are now about three years old, and a couple of years hence, which I now set down as the definitive term of your stay in India, or rather the time of your arrival in Britain, will give them some appearance of covering a bank which is now very bare. We have not built there, contenting ourselves with the smallest of all small cottages, but which Charlotte's taste has made very neat within doors, and our out-of-door offices are complete enough upon a small scale. The children come up upon us fast; and in a few years I must look to getting the two boys out into the world. They are both very much what a parent could wish, and particularly affec-

tionate towards each other, and to your sister and me. They will have the advantage of a good education, and, if I live, of good interest in any line which may be thought advantageous for them. Little Charles shows a good deal of genius. I think at present to breed him to the bar, if he continues the same promise of talents. It is but a beggarly profession without them; but cleverness, joined to the necessary degree of attention and a great deal of patience, seldom fail to get forward. All this is only between an uncle and a papa, for the old proverb says, 'It is a long time till the saddling of a foal.' The girls are also hopeful, natural children, and in general very well liked.

"And now, dear Carpenter, make up your pack as fast as you can, tie it well up, clap it aboard of ship, take Mrs. Carpenter under the arm, and come back to England—Britain, I mean—to see your relations. I hear so much of you that I account myself quite acquainted with, and prepared to love, you both; and it will go hard but I am one of the first friends that welcomes you to English land, as I shall certainly come up to receive you. Pray come before my head is quite grey, and especially before I turn a stupid old buzzard, for I assure you I am not so as yet. Charlotte and I wrote six months ago to thank Mrs. Carpenter for a superb present of muslins, which we value as coming from her.

"Ever yours truly,

"Edinburgh, 25th June 1814.

WALTER SCOTT."

Here is a letter from Lady Scott, written with the prospect before her of my uncle's almost immediate return to his native country:—

"MY DEAR CHARLES,—I hope that my letter dated the 11th January 1817, and the other March 16th, are come safe to your hands, particularly the former one, as in it I had given you a full account of our family, as it seemed you wished to hear more particularly about them, and had enclosed a few lines to Mrs. Carpenter, whom you had given me to hope we should have seen before this time, and not hearing from you makes me truly uneasy. I cannot account for letters being so often lost, which must be the case, as you surely would not be so long without writing and in answering Scott's letter. We have also been much disappointed in not seeing Colonel Fraser, Mrs. Carpenter's brother.¹ Not even did we receive a line from him, but the letter you sent by him came by the post, so that we had not even the chance of finding in what part of England he was, or is, at present, which is a very great disappointment. You can have no idea how anxiously I look for the time that is to bring you back, and how many plans and

¹ Colonel Hastings Fraser.

arrangements we make; for we hope that you will settle in Scotland, at least for part of the year. We have already allotted you and Mrs. Carpenter a room in our cottage, which is by Tweed-side, so that if you are fond of fishing you may kill salmon as many as you like, and for shooting we have very near, and even upon our own ground, grouse, partridges, and blackcocks, and our *little boy* Walter, who, as I told you, is *six feet* high (although not fifteen), will show where they are. He is a very good shot. As for your namesake, Charles, he is not come to that yet. He may retain the name of 'little' with more propriety, and will, I dare say, in the course of three years be quite fit to attend you. Your two nieces, Sophia and Ann, who are both great girls, taller than myself—although that is not saying much—will sing to you some old Scotch ballads when you return from your fishing or shooting, which will be your country evening amusement. So much, my dear Charles, can I promise you for your country life with us; but I should not forget to add that, besides our own family, I can promise to introduce you to the very best society you can possibly wish, for Scott, having acquired much celebrity among the admirers of literature, we receive visits from the most select and respectable set of men, high in reputation as in rank. I hope, as a specimen I wish to give you, that you may have received the letter in which I sent you word of the very flattering reception Scott received from the Prince Regent, who not only asked him to dine often with him, but made him a present of a handsome box with his picture on it; the Prince always treating him with marked kindness and, I might almost add, respect. He had, of course, after all that, to be presented at Court, where he was received by the Queen in a most courteous and flattering manner. All this I mention, my dear Charles, that although you should come here as a stranger you would not long remain one; and I know that among the Scotch you will find many and many of your Indian acquaintances, from whom I hear so much in praise of my brother that I feel myself so proud and anxious to have him here that I believe I must take my passage for India unless you come soon. In case some of my letters should be lost, I again mention our having had a visit from Miss Dumergue and Mrs. Nicholson, who first arrived at Edinburgh, and remained at our house there a fortnight, then came with us to our cottage on Tweed-side, about thirty-four miles from Edinburgh, where they remained with us six weeks more; since which time Miss Dumergue and Mrs. Nicholson have been twice to Paris, and have, since poor Mrs. Dumergue's death, become great travellers. I should suppose she has been left a handsome fortune, by the style she lives in, as, besides travelling as she does, she continues to keep a very elegant carriage, with three men servants, and that with a delightful house in Piccadilly, but which does not prevent her, like the rest of the world,

to complain of poverty. Miss J. Nicholson, I hear, is going somewhere abroad. I am sorry to say she has given up my acquaintance, as with the rest of her old friends; but of that, as of many other things, I will explain when we meet. I am afraid to tire you, my dear Charles, with all the nonsense this letter contains, therefore will conclude by offering our kind and best wishes to attend you and Mrs. Carpenter, and believe me to remain,

“Ever your affectionate Sister,

“M. CHARLOTTE SCOTT.

“Abbotsford, Oct. the 8th, 1817.”

The following letter of condolence from Sir Walter Scott shows that the meeting between the long-parted brother and sister was never to take place.

“DEAR MRS. CARPENTER,—My wife is quite unable at present to write, but I am anxious that a ship should not leave Britain without carrying with it our deep and heartfelt sympathy in our common loss. To us it was a shock as unexpected as afflicting, for we had entertained the vain hope of shortly seeing in Britain the object of our present regret. I had not, as you are aware, the advantage of personally knowing Mr. Carpenter, but all we know and have heard of him makes that circumstance rather aggravate than diminish my regret. Charlotte is very much overcome by her feelings, and it cannot be otherwise—he was the only blood relation she had in the world; and though long separated, she always looked to Mr. Carpenter, and spoke of him as one of the closest ties which she had to existence. From witnessing her distress, I imagined what, my dear madam, must be your so much more severe affliction when deprived of the object of so many years’ affection. It is a consolation, though a sad one, that no circumstances had accelerated your return to England, as was once proposed. To have been absent at the moment when your affectionate attendance might soothe the mind, though it could not relieve bodily disease, would have been a most painful reflection, and I am thankful, both on your account and my late brother’s, that it was otherwise ordered.

“I was obliged by Mr. Heath’s very kind and attentive letter on this melancholy occasion, and I have written to him to request everything in the way of business may be managed with the most implicit attention to your wishes.

“Our regretted friend has been pleased to adopt my children as his own,¹ and the least they can do is to have towards you every respectful deference and attention which in circumstances of similar distress they

¹ Mr. Carpenter’s fortune was left to the Scotts, his widow having a life interest.

should have to their own mother. Allow me to claim for them on your part, and as the nearest relation of Mr. Carpenter, some interest in their future views and settlements in life, and that you will consider them as young people who have many ties to love and respect you. My eldest son's choice is the army, for which he is well qualified; but I should wish him to see a little of the world before entering it, and propose to take him to the Continent with me next winter. I should be anxious to be in England at your coming over, although it has pleased God we are not to meet in the joyful manner to which I had been for some time looking forward. I trust that our deep sympathy will be some alleviation to your distress. I will not dwell any more on a subject so painful. My family offer their best wishes, and I am sure my wife will take a very early opportunity to express her own feelings on this most distressing occasion. I have the honour to be, dear Mrs. Carpenter,

"Your very affectionate Brother,

"WALTER SCOTT.

"Edinburgh, 6th December 1818."

Captain Fraser did not continue to perform the quiet functions of Governor's Aide-de-Camp for a very long term. In May 1810 he joined, as Deputy Commissary, the force embarked for the invasion of the Mauritius, and acted on the personal staff of the commandant, Colonel Keating, in all the actions that preceded the surrender of the island.

From 1811 to 1814, he filled the offices of Town Major of Fort St. George, and Military Secretary to the Governor. In 1815, he took the field as Assistant Adjutant-General of the Army Reserve, under the personal command of the Commander-in-Chief, by whom his conduct was highly commended.

Immediately on the close of these operations, Captain Fraser was appointed Joint Commissioner with Colonel Caldwell, and subsequently sole Commissioner, for conducting the restitution of the French settlements on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, under the Treaty concluded at Paris in 1814, and also for restoring to the Danes their settlement of Tranquebar, under the Treaty of Kiel in the same year. These peaceful arrangements were disturbed by the return of Napoleon from Elba, when Captain Fraser was appointed Commandant of Pondicherry, but were resumed after the battle of Waterloo. Pondicherry was finally handed over to the French Governor, Count Du Puy, on the 16th of December 1816, and the smaller settlements of Karical, Mahé, and Yanam, and the French "factory" at Calicut, in the months of January

and February 1817. The transfer of the French factory at Masulipatam was not completed until the end of 1817, in consequence of an utterly inadmissible claim made by the French authorities to open what they called "a free port" on the narrow slip of sea beach, not more than a hundred yards in length, which was the territorial extent of the Masulipatam factory, a possession of which the sovereignty was very questionable. This will give some idea of the numerous delicate and intricate points, diplomatic, judicial, and administrative, consequent on the interruption of French rule for twenty-five years, which were eventually decided, to the satisfaction of both the English and French Governments, by the judicious and well-considered proceedings of Captain Fraser. The Government of India repeatedly thanked and commended the British Commissioner for "the marked ability and the conciliatory disposition" which had "distinguished" his conduct throughout every stage of these long and laborious negotiations, which called forth, likewise, warm expressions of gratitude and esteem from the several representatives of the French Government.¹ The tedious and complicated business of defining the boundaries of each settlement belonging to France and Denmark, after many exchanges of territory had been made to obviate the inconvenience of the intermixture of English, Danish, and French villages, was not concluded until the end of 1819.

Major Fraser's literary and colloquial mastery of the French language, an accomplishment by no means common among Anglo-Indian officers in those days, had so very much facilitated the successful conclusion of these important arrangements, as to mark him out as the best, if not the only, person available for work of this description. He was appointed in 1819 Special Agent for conducting correspondence with all the foreign settlements, and in 1825, being now Lieutenant-Colonel, Commissioner for taking possession of the Dutch settlements within the Presidency of Madras, ceded to Great Britain by the Treaty of London on the 17th of March 1824. At the final transfer of the Dutch establishments, the Government of Fort St. George, in a letter dated 1st February 1828, expressed "the highest satisfaction and the most perfect confidence" in Colonel Fraser's performance of these important duties.

¹ See Appendix, "Letters of Count Du Puy".

In February 1834, Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser was appointed Acting-Secretary in the Military Department; and the contumacious conduct and defiant attitude of the Rajah of Coorg having just then made the necessity of coercive measures evident and imminent, the Governor of Madras, Sir Frederick Adam, proceeded to Bangalore, the base of operations, accompanied by his Military Secretary. Immediately on their arrival at Bangalore, Colonel Fraser was appointed, 3rd of March 1834, by the Governor-General, Lord William Bentinck, to be his Political Agent with the force ordered to proceed against Coorg. Before passing the frontier, Colonel Fraser issued the following proclamation, which will explain sufficiently the cause of the war, and of the Rajah's deposition:—

“ PROCLAMATION.

“The conduct of the Rajah of Coorg has for a long time past been of such a nature as to render him unworthy of the friendship and protection of the British Government.

“Unmindful of his duty as a ruler, and regardless of his obligations as a dependent Ally of the East India Company, he has been guilty of the greatest oppression and cruelty towards the people subject to his Government, and he has evinced the most wanton disrespect, and the most hostile disposition, towards the great Power from whom he and his ancestors have invariably received every degree of kindness and protection.

“It would be needless to enumerate the several instances of his misconduct, but it is sufficient to state that, in consequence of an asylum having been afforded in the British Territories to his own sister Devam-maji and her husband, Channa Basavappa, who to preserve their lives had fled from his oppression, the Rajah has presumed to address letters replete with the most insulting expressions to the Governor of Fort St. George and the Governor-General of India; that he has assumed an attitude of hostility and defiance towards the British Government; that he has received and encouraged the proclaimed enemies of that Government; and that he has unjustifiably placed under restraint an old and faithful servant of the Company, named Kulputty Karnikāra Manoon, who had been formerly deputed by the British representative for the purpose of opening a friendly negotiation, thus committing a gross outrage, not only upon the authority by whom the above-named individual was deputed, but upon the established rules of all civilised nations, by whom the persons of accredited Agents are invariably held sacred.

“The ancient alliance and the firm friendship, which had so happily subsisted between the predecessors of the present Rajah and the

Honourable Company, have caused his errors to be treated uniformly with indulgence. The most earnest remonstrances have been in vain tried, to bring him to a sense of his obligations, and it is not until further forbearance would be culpable, that his Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General, at the suggestion and with the concurrence of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, has resolved on employing the only means left of vindicating the dignity of the sovereign State and of securing to the inhabitants of Coorg the blessings of a just and equitable Government.

"It is, accordingly, hereby notified, that a British army is about to invade the Coorg territory; that Virarajendra Wodear is no longer to be considered as Rajah of Coorg; that the persons and property of all those who conduct themselves peaceably or in aid of the operations of the British troops, shall be respected, and that such a system of Government shall be established as may seem best calculated to secure the happiness of the people.

"It is also hereby made known to all British subjects, who may have entered the service of Virarajendra Wodear, that they are required to place themselves under the protection of the British authorities, by whom they will be kindly received, and their rights and privileges respected, and that such of them as may in any way render assistance to the enemy will be considered as traitors and punished accordingly.

"This proclamation will be carefully made known in Chittledroog, Raidroog, Mysore, Bellary, Malabar, Canara, in order that the relatives of such persons as have taken service in Coorg from those places or adjoining districts, may adopt the earliest means of communicating its purport to the parties in whose safety they are interested.

"J. S. FRASER,

"Lieut.-Col. and Political Agent of H. E. the Right Hon.
the Governor-General.

"Issued at Bangalore this 15th day of March 1834."

The counter-proclamation by the Rajah of Coorg's Minister (literally translated) is a veritable curiosity:—

"PROCLAMATION TO THE BRAVE PEOPLE OF COORG.

"The explanation of the Proclamation, issued through the ignorance of the bad English people, who are mean slaves and servants of the auspicious feet of the Halery Samsthan Maharaja.

"In answer to a proclamation of the bad Englishman, son of a slave girl, who in a state of forgetting Mahadeva (God) and through pride had written on a paper whatever occurred to his mind, for the purpose of giving information to the inhabitants of Halery Samsthan, and fastened the same near the boundary, I, the slave of my Master's Majesty, let

you know as follows, that the proclamation (containing the evil subjects) which was fastened in the boundary by the wicked Englishman, the son of a slave, is not at all possible even with our eyes or heard with our ears, and in the very time of tying the said proclamations, which are replete with indecent subjects, the hearts of all of us, who are the servants of the king's feet, were inflamed as the fire through wind. The wicked Christian European, the son of a slave, who resolved to prepare this, should be beheaded, and his head thrown out; the hands, mouth, and head of the person who wrote this should be cut off, and the generation of the low caste blasphemer and bad European should be burnt down. These hopes are to be soon fulfilled. All the above subjects are certain. All the wicked Europeans, all the sons of slave-girls, have evil intentions that shall come to naught. Very well, very well, my children, we will fill up all your bellies according to your wishes. Be this known to you all, written on Sunday, 6th of the waning moon of the month of Phalguna."¹

The campaign was brief and decisive, though at several stockades in the passes of the Coorg Hills there was some determined resistance. On the 10th of April, the British flag was hoisted over the fort of Mercara. Colonel Fraser offered the Rajah life and honourable treatment, if he surrendered. Accordingly, on the night of the 23rd of April 1834, accompanied by his whole family, a train of about 2,000 attendants, and fifty palanquins containing his female establishment, he arrived at Mercara, and reoccupied his palace, where he remained a close prisoner, until the orders arrived for his future place of residence. The following letters from Sir Frederick Adam, Governor of Madras, will show how Colonel Fraser's management of the expedition was appreciated:—

“Ootacamund, 16th April 1834.

“MY DEAR COLONEL,—Your letter of the 11th reached me on Sunday, and I must explain the delay in thanking you for it, and explain also why I do no more by this post than briefly offer you my congratulations. Monday and yesterday I was really so far from well that I was almost incapable of any exertion at all, and the little I could do was to get a few indispensable letters to go by the *Forbes* steamer. To-day I am rather better, but as an express goes to Madras in hopes of still catching the *Forbes*, I have been busy writing to Europe all day, till to thank you in these few hurried lines is a race against time. To-morrow I

¹ 30th of March 1834.

will write more at length, and in the mean time you will have received instructions to send away the Rajah.

“Believe me, with great truth and regard,

“Most truly yours,

“FREDERICK ADAM.

“P.S.—Your apology for not writing to me during the progress of active operations was quite unnecessary. I was not so unreasonable as to expect it, seeing that I got all your reports from Lord William Bentinck, F.A.”

“Ootacamund, 17th April 1834.

“MY DEAR COLONEL,—I wrote such a scrawl to you yesterday, that I must to-day make you an apology for it. I think we have much reason to consider ourselves fortunate in having brought ‘the Coorg war’ to so early a conclusion; and certainly if the means of defence had been properly taken advantage of, it must have cost us a considerable effort to obtain ultimate success. Failure, eventual failure, of course I never contemplated, but to have been worsted in the first attempt would undoubtedly have led to very serious consequences. We have reason to be very thankful that your success has been so early and so complete. I shall await with anxiety your reports after the Rajah has quitted the Coorg territory, and when you have had an opportunity of ascertaining what the real feelings of the Coorghas are as respects a Government under a descendant of Veera Raj (if any such be in existence) or as to their becoming subjects of the British Empire.

“In the meantime I am very desirous of ascertaining whether a suggestion thrown out partially by Lord William Bentinck would meet your views.

“The Mysore question is referred to England for ultimate decision; and until that arrives, the Residency on the present scale of expenses is to be reduced. Mr. Casamajor goes to Travancore, and Lord William thinks that the new Resident ought to have Political charge of the Coorg country also. I presume this may be called administrative charge of Coorg also, for it is clear, whether a minor of the Coorg family be put on the throne, or the country becomes an integral part of the British possessions, it must be governed as a separate and distinct jurisdiction under our management. Now Lord William Bentinck’s desire, I am pretty sure, is to offer you this double office, if it suits your views. He does not think the appointments could be raised higher than 2,000 rupees a month, exclusive of your military appointments, which would be on the same footing as they were in your late office at Cuddalore.

"You are no doubt aware of all the *agréments* which the Mysore Residency offers in respect of climate, goodness and variety of houses, etc., and you can judge better than anyone of the probabilities of Coorg being an agreeable residence or otherwise.

"I ought, in confidence, to tell you that the proposal regarding Mysore is to make a new Treaty, by which the Rajah yields to us the Nuggur, Chittledroog and Bangalore Foudarrees, and retains in full sovereignty, and paying us no subsidy, the other three Foudarrees of his actual State, viz., Munjerabad and—I cannot recall the other two names at this moment.¹ It is to a Rajah thus circumstanced that the Resident will be accredited.² In the meantime, the Mysore territory remains as at present assumed by us, and Colonel Morrison sole Commissioner.

"Will it suit you to hold the Residency of Mysore and Coorg, under such an arrangement as I have sketched an outline of? And I am sure Lord William Bentinck would like to know your sentiments before making you the offer, which it is his intention to do.

"The only observation I shall venture to make is, that it opens the Political line to you, and I believe the opening is all you require to get to the goal.

"Forgive the abruptness of the termination of this letter, but not to lose the post obliges me to finish.

"Believe me, my dear Colonel, with truth and
regard, very faithfully yours,

"FREDERICK ADAM.

"Lient.-Colonel Fraser, etc., etc., etc."

On the 13th of June 1834, Colonel Fraser was made Resident at the court of His Highness the Maharajah of Mysore, Commissioner for the affairs of Coorg, and Military Commandant in that province. And in 1836 he was appointed Resident in the States of Travancore and Cochin. It was while he was engaged in the duties of the Travancore Residency that he wrote a letter to Sir Frederick Adam, expressing plainly enough, in the following extract, those views as to the then still recent sequestration of the Mysore dominions and their management by a British Commission, the unaltered nature of which he indicated after the lapse of more than thirty years, by signing, in 1866, a petition to Parliament recommending the restoration of the Mysore State to native rule.

¹ Ashtagram and Shemoga.

² The Court of Directors would not ratify Lord William Bentinck's proposal of a partial restoration, so that the new Treaty was never concluded.

LETTER TO THE GOVERNOR.

‘MY DEAR SIR,—I do myself the pleasure to enclose for your perusal the accompanying letter which I have received from the Rajah of Mysore. As Governor of Madras, you are not very likely to learn the Rajah's sentiments from any other source; and in the official form I know not how far Major Stokes keeps the Madras Government apprised of the state of affairs at the Mysore Durbar. The poor Rajah has suffered from many afflicting events in his family of late, his last letter to me previous to this one having informed me of the death of a son. I think it will be satisfactory to you to perceive, from his unreserved and familiar communication to me, that he is contented with the increased allowance lately made to him by the Supreme Government; and that he expects to be saved by this grant from any further accumulation of debts. I have never been able to bring myself to be quite satisfied with our treatment of this weak, but good-natured and kind-hearted man; and our permanent assumption of any portion of his country would have been a stain upon our good faith and national character of which I should have been quite ashamed. Our system of non-interference, or at least our abstinence from regular and well-considered guidance in his youth, did the mischief, and then we pounced on the prey which our policy had driven into the toils. I am very glad to find that the Rajah likes Major Stokes, and that the latter is serving himself, so far as I can judge from his letters, an honest friend and a very judicious adviser to the Rajah. He has lately sent me a good deal of his correspondence with his Highness, and with the Supreme Government, to read; and it strikes me that, under the circumstances in which the Mysore country is now placed, Major Stokes is as good a Resident there as anyone I know, either civil or military, could be; and the same sound sense and judgment will render him perfectly capable of conducting the same duties when he shall have a much more independent part to play than at present.’

The rest of the letter refers to Cochin affairs, and is of no particular interest.

In December 1836, an insurrection broke out in the province of Canara, on the western coast of the Madras Presidency. The insurgents chiefly congregated in that part of Canara that bordered the hilly country of Coorg, and included two small districts that originally belonged to the little Raj, but had been detached at the time of its conquest, contrary to General Fraser's advice, because it was considered they more naturally formed part of Canara, and could more easily be administered by the Collector of that district. The insurgents had calculated on the co-operation of the recently

annexed people of Coorg, but they were very much out in their calculations. The brave Coorgs were so well satisfied with the rule of Captain Le Hardy, the Superintendent whom Colonel Fraser had placed over them, that they rallied round him in response to his call, armed with bows and arrows and battle-axes, and gave most valuable assistance in putting down the insurrection. It is to this incident that Colonel Fraser alludes in the following letter from the Travancore Residency to Sir Frederick Adam, who had just returned to England at the end of his term as Governor of Madras:—

“Trevandrum, 17th June 1837.

“MY DEAR SIR FREDERICK,—You will probably have learned before this letter reaches you that, about the time you got half-way home, this most combustible of all countries exhibited an explosion on the Western coast, which, though not in the slightest degree foreseen at the time you left Madras, rapidly rose to an extent which threatened to throw the whole of this part of India into a flame. The particulars of the progress of the insurrection, and the pouring in of troops from all quarters, especially from Bombay by sea, will be seen in the public papers: therefore I need not recapitulate them here. But as I wish you to know exactly what the conduct of my old friends the Coorgs has been, I do myself the pleasure to transmit for your information the accompanying letters and copies of despatches on the subject which I have received at different times from Le Hardy.

“The Coorgs, in fact, put down the rebellion; and if they had not proved staunch to the British interest, and firm in their personal attachment to Le Hardy, I have not the slightest doubt that we should have got into a disagreeable kind of war of quite indefinite duration. I hope you will be pleased with the conduct of these brave fellows. I confess it is a source of satisfaction with me to have been one of the first among us to become acquainted with them. Le Hardy has deserved well of the Government, and I trust that his conduct, which has been marked by judgment and conciliation, and the talent of preserving the affection of the brave people over whom he is placed, will be duly appreciated and rewarded. The whole of the papers I now send form a private communication, for I have no right to regard it otherwise; but yet I think, if you deemed it proper to give the perusal of them to your own friends among the Directors, they would not be found altogether uninteresting, and I should certainly be happy that anything were done which would give a good opinion of so estimable a person as Le Hardy.

“The real and original cause of the insurrection yet remains, I believe, shrouded in mystery. I think it not improbable that the discontent of the inhabitants of Ninar Soolia and Pootoor, the two districts we

separated from Coorg for the purpose of annexing them to Canara, may be found to have been one of the principal and most influential motives with the insurgents. I could not refrain from expressing my apprehension to the inhabitants of those districts, at the time when a party among them petitioned Lord William Bentinck to allow of their being annexed to Canara, that they would regret the day when their request was complied with. And by this time, I fancy, they are pretty well aware of the difference between our Collector and Courts of Justice and the simple old-fashioned system of revenue and trial by Punchayat which we established in Coorg.

"The rest of India seems pretty quiet at present, but how long it will remain so, it would be difficult for the wisest politician to pronounce. If ignorance is bliss, we have it here in perfection; for never in the world did human beings live in a more complete state of uncertainty in regard to future events than we do, because we are so ignorant as to the feelings and the projects of those around us.

"We are paying a good deal of attention at this moment to the amelioration of agriculture, the introduction of various kinds of fine cotton,—coffee, also, which I hope to see growing in every garden and orchard of Travancore—the culture of silk, etc.

"I know not whether I mentioned to you before you left India that I had determined to try tobacco to the Southward. I have done so with both the Ceylon and the Tinnevely kinds, and they answer so perfectly that it is quite a marvel with me why they were not tried there before. I have several times made the inquiry, but no one could give me an answer. The Ceylon Government, and the revenue interests of Tinnevely, may suffer a little from this; but Travancore will save at least a lakh and a half of rupees per annum by it, besides being able to give the article at a much cheaper rate to the inhabitants, with whom it is a necessary of life, though at present a most expensive one. The consumption of it also will probably be thus greatly increased, and a corresponding advantage, of course, derived to the Travancore treasury.

"The measure of abolishing the transit duties has succeeded perfectly. The people of the country loudly acknowledge this to be an absolute blessing conferred upon them; while a statement which I have just received from the Custom House at Allepee shows an increase of export duties during the last four months to the amount of 10,000 rupees, at that port alone, above any former year; and this is attributed by the Customs officers there entirely to the discontinuance of the transit duties.

"I am happy to say that I have been so fortunate as to obtain from Government the services of Lieutenant Horsley, to be permanently attached to the Travancore Circar; and all the various works which I have been contemplating in his department will now be undertaken without fear of failure, and conducted with spirit to their conclusion.

"But I am dwelling upon matters of which the interest must be gradually fading away from your mind, since you have re-entered into the more distinguished and important scenes of European life. I have now given an incipient movement to all the arrangements I proposed in Travancore, and anybody else can now forward them as well as myself. I have, therefore, no particular wish to remain here, for I cannot help thinking that, with all its advantages, Travancore is a terribly confined spot. In the last most kind and gratifying note you wrote me, on the morning of your embarkation from Madras, you were again so good as to allude to my appointment to the General Staff, and the employment of your interest to this effect with the Court of Directors. This would be pleasing to me, as a fitting termination to a long Indian career, otherwise partaking somewhat too much of the civilian and idler character. I shall not remain longer in India than my poverty demands; but this, unfortunately, demands more than the second sight of my native country to see its termination. While I am here, I should certainly like to be actively and honourably employed. No Indian employment can be more honourable than a high military command; and if blended with the exercise of political duty, it becomes still more so. But if any suggestion with this view, either to your relative, Mr. Loch, the Chairman of the Court of Directors, or to anyone else, were likely to elicit on the part of the Court, or of the Government of India, any disagreeable remark on its being unmerited by me, either by the description of service in which it is my misfortune to have been almost exclusively employed, or by any other circumstances of the case, I would, in the event of this appearing probable, content myself with my present obscurity. The plain truth is, that if such a remark were made, either in England or India, it would, perhaps, not be without some foundation; for if a man has any merit, in any capacity at all, it is pretty sure to be recognised, sooner or later, and to find the level to which it is entitled. I am sensible that I have played a very insignificant, though not a disreputable, part in the game so far; and this sense comes upon me with the agreeable perception that the fault must somehow or other be my own, and that by this fact alone I am proved to be pretty nearly in the position I ought to hold.

"I remain, my dear Sir Frederick,

"With every sentiment of grateful regard,

"Yours most faithfully,

"J. S. FRASER.

"P.S.—As I have not your direction, I shall address the envelope of this packet to Mr. Loch. It will have the advantage of going free of postage to Madras, and on its arrival in London, cannot but find its way without difficulty to Leadenhall Street."

CHAPTER II.

Appointed to officiate as Resident at Hyderabad—Sketch of Hyderabad history—Lord Elphinstone's Announcement—Political and Fanatical Agitation in Southern India—Letter from Lancelot Wilkinson—Letter to Lord Auckland—The Nawab of Kurnool and Mubariz-ood-Dowla.

IN Colonel Fraser's appointment to the post of Officiating Resident at Hyderabad, coincident with his promotion to the rank of Major-General in 1838, we arrive at the most important scene and the most eventful period of his official career; and so much of this memoir will be occupied by a full account of his policy towards the Nizam's Principality, and of his efforts for its reform, that a brief sketch of the history of that State and of the reigning family, extracted from one of my previous publications, may appropriately, almost necessarily, find a place here, as an explanation of much that follows :—

“ Hyderabad is, for good or evil, the political centre of India, and upon our diplomatic management of that great State must really depend, in great measure, the success and prosperity of the Indian Empire. The story of the Nizams really commences at the period of the death of the Emperor Aurungzebe; and the rise of a family so pre-eminent in rank and power among the princes of India is well worth tracing. *Nizam* is a title, not a name. Family names among Mahomedans are unknown, and those by which living families are known bespeak no relation, and have no reference to any held by predecessors. Hussain son of Abdoolah, for instance, is as intelligible as an ordinary Christian compound, but titles afford in some cases means of distinction, and we find ‘Nizam’—part of the original title, Nizam-ool-Moolk or Regulator of the State,—to have been conferred upon an ancestor of the present Nizam by the Emperor Ferokhsir so far back as 1713. Much of this history of native India, immediately preceding our own entry on the scene, is curious and interesting enough; and the gradual rise of the Nizam, chequered with intermittent conflict at Delhi, and chronic provincial disturbance, would afford ample material for more space than I can reasonably seek. The Nizam of the period referred to found his most formidable rivals at the Court of Delhi in the Syuds of Basha; and his ascendancy there seems to have nearly coincided with their decline. That was

indeed a time for a bold leader, a far-seeing diplomatist, to strike out a pathway for himself, and to find, it might be, a kingdom at the end of it. Thus waited and watched the Nizam-ool-Moolk Asof Jah for his crowning opportunity, and revolting in Malwa, under pretext of restoring peace to the disturbed Deccan, contrived to obtain possession of the whole country. This adroitly got converted into a confirmed hereditary right by temporary resumption of his administrative duties at Delhi, whence he finally went to the Deccan, finding the Empire untenable under the joint shock of Nadir Shah's invasion and irrepressible internal dissensions. Content, however, with actual sovereignty, he never assumed its title and insignia. The family, indeed, to the last, professed subordination to the Court of Delhi; and the Nizam's successors continued to be formally confirmed by mandates from the Mogul Emperors. The immunity enjoyed by Nizam-ool-Moolk, in a practical surrender of the Deccan to his rule, appears to have been mainly due to his essential importance, as the only available check to the growing power and harassing incursions of the Mahrattas—a constant source of disturbance and alarm to his titular master.

“The evening of his eventful life, whose span is said to have exceeded a century, was spent by the first Nizam, with singular retention of extraordinary physical and mental faculties, in his so strangely gained Principality, when death closed, in 1748, a career remarkable and prominent in a stirring and productive time.

“Impartial estimates of his character can hardly begrudge his descendants a pride in the founder of their name and renown; for his politic and tenacious hold of independent power was unstained by treachery or cruelty; and the later annals of the family are similarly clear of the grosser incidents of conquest. He left them, too, an example of equanimity undaunted in adversity and superior to elation by success. His immediate successor, Nizam Ali Khan, entered upon no undisputed inheritance, and upon far from quiet times. Foremost among formidable competitors for supremacy, and for possession of the Deccan, were the old troublers of Delhi, the Mahrattas. But to enlarge upon their exploits, with the counter-struggles of the Nizam's family, would soon transgress the scope and aim of an unambitious sketch. It is noteworthy, however, that this precarious and assailable tenure of a coveted province led, in process of time, more or less directly, to the establishment of French influence at its capital, and to that general ascendancy upon which their leaders, Dupleix and Bussy, had long been bent. So early as 1755 a resolute but abortive effort to arrest and subvert this growing influence, through a diversion of English aid to Hyderabad, had been made by Lord Clive, but the final checkmate (disallowed to his urgent advice at home) was reserved for his successor, Lord Wellesley.

"In the meantime the Nizam, French support notwithstanding, was getting so hard pressed by his inveterate foes, that in 1760 he was compelled under treaty (that of Oodgheer) to surrender, in a large slice of his western frontier, a fourth of his revenue, or £620,000 a year. This cession, however, was wholly recovered by the Nizam through subsequent alliance with us. Taking advantage of the signal reverse sustained by the Mahrattas at Paniput, the Nizam had retaliated upon Poona, and had exacted from the Poishwas territory valued at £270,000 a year, while in 1763 similar vicissitudes of fortune had left neither side stronger or nearer to durable peace. .

"British power, meanwhile, had steadily advanced, mainly through expulsion of the French from the Northern Circars by Lord Clive's vigilant activity, resulting in our acquisition of those provinces, as conferred upon us by the Emperor of Delhi. The Nizam, again deferring to French instigation, had essayed to thwart us in the Carnatic, with no better result than an abortive campaign, and he was narrowly withheld from attempting recovery of the Circars by an embassy from Madras. This opportune intervention resulted in the first treaty between the two Powers, that of November 12, 1766, which assigned to us the Circars in perpetuity, subject to an annual tribute of five lacs, the contracting parties being bound to mutual military aid. But now was beginning one fierce and protracted struggle with Hyder Ally of Mysore, another dangerous aspirant to independent sovereignty, which ended with the final conquest over Hyder's son and successor, Tippoo Sultan, in 1795, and his death in the storming of Seringapatam. In this conquest the Nizam participated, his troops being commanded by Meer Allum, and half of the conquered territory, after reconstituting the Hindoo State of Mysore, was allotted as the Nizam's share.

"During the early years of the second Nizam's reign, Scindia and the Bhonsla of Nagpore entered into alliance, and assumed a menacing attitude on the Nizam's frontier. This confederacy General Wellesley was ordered to counteract; and, with a view to eventual co-operation with the Subsidiary Force at Secunderabad, under General Stevenson, he advanced towards Poona, where he opened communications with Colonel Collins, our Resident at Scindia's Court. The remonstrances of Collins proving unavailing, he retired from Scindia's camp on the commencement of hostilities. In the north, the battles of Delhi and Laswaree, and those in the Deccan of Assaye and Argaum, were followed by an overture for peace from the allied chiefs. The real aim of Scindia's attack on the Nizam was the recovery of districts, valued at thirty-four lacs, which had been successively wrested from the Mahrattas. The resulting gain to the Nizam was, therefore, a release from this serious liability; and at the close of the campaign he received the

country lying between the Ajuntah hills and the river Godavery, together with the extensive districts ceded by the Rajah of Nagpore, situated to the westward of the Wurdah river, and south of the Sathpooora range of hills, which were added to his dominions. The territory then acquired, including Berar, must now yield not less than £750,000, or seventy-five lacs.

“Complete reduction of the Mahratta chiefs had now freed the Nizam from all alarm, conferring, too, on the people of the Deccan a tranquillity seldom enjoyed before. After the final subversion, in 1819, of the Mahratta power, and the dethronement of the Peishwa, the British Government abandoned all demands for ‘chout’, amounting to one-fourth of the Nizam’s revenue, ceded to the Mahrattas by the treaty of Oodgheer. Under anything like vigorous administration during the long tenure of Chundoo Lall, the then Minister at Hyderabad, the State might soon have recovered from the effects of incessant warfare and vicissitude. The Nizam, Secunder Jah, was but ill-advised.

“The new Nizam virtually secluded himself from affairs of State, and so made the position of his first Minister, our old friend Meer Allum, most onerous and embarrassing. For many years this upright and able man was mainly instrumental in preserving amicable relations between the two Powers. To our interest he was always well inclined, remaining throughout the steady friend of England, and loyally attached to the Nizam. But, unfortunately, he was not long spared to discharge the duties of his exalted post. At his death it was conferred upon Mooneer-ool-Moolk, but only as a dignity, Rajah Chundoo Lall remaining in possession of all executive power, and on the death of Mooneer he became Prime Minister. The irresponsible power now established was speedily and injuriously manifest. Sekunder Jah appears to have wholly abandoned the conduct of affairs, and to have surrendered the country to the management of a Minister who entirely neglected the trust. Of Chundoo Lall, however, it is to be noted that to a certain period none had more clearly recognised the importance and advantage of the English alliance, or more consistently and sedulously laboured to maintain it; but otherwise reckless, he so yielded to the temptations of a virtually irresponsible position that serious embarrassments began to oppress the State.

“After the settlement which (in 1822) followed the final Mahratta war, and by which we abandoned all vexatious demands in respect of that country, an attempt was made to improve the Nizam’s internal administration by introducing English supervision. Sir Charles (afterwards Lord) Metcalfe was now Resident at Hyderabad. This eminent public servant and future statesman was one of that gallant band of mercenary adventurers who worked under the immediate superintendence of Lord Wellesley, writing to his dictation; and who, before he was yet twenty,

had resigned his appointment at the Court of Scindia, on account of a difference of opinion with Colonel Collins, an esteemed friend of his own father. In him the civilian garb covered a 'full soldier', as good and daring as ever discipline turned out. So clad, he mounted the breach at Blurt pore, and met, with unruffled mien, the onslaught of the Rohilla chief Ameer Khan, who, besmeared with gunpowder, vainly reckoned upon intimidating the young diplomatist. At the still early age of twenty-three he was entrusted with a mission to the Court of Runjeet Singh, to counteract the suspected design of Napoleon and the Russian Autocrat after their memorable conference at Tilsit, where, it is now known, they arranged for co-operation in the East. It was he, too, finally, who, with his handful of sepoy, engaged the fanatics of Umritsur. Transferred to political or administrative action, Sir Charles now devised, in conjunction with Chundoo Lall, a scheme for settlement of the land revenue through the agency of English officers, so as to secure a levy of equitable incidence, and sufficiently permanent to increase the revenue of the State, by extending cultivation and stimulating production. The measure was immediately and largely beneficial. The Minister, however, began to chafe at the bonds in which, as he alleged, the English supervision held him; and there can be no doubt that when its primary purpose—increase of revenue and revival of confidence—had been attained, he grew anxious to be rid of it. 'There is not room' (according to a Hindoo proverb which he quoted to Sir Charles Metcalfe) 'for two swords in one scabbard', and he set himself to demonstrate and realise the truism. It was, of course, impossible for the Resident to remain neutral or passive when differences arose between the district executive and his own superintendents; and consequent discussions too often drifted into acrimony. Supervision specifically arranged for particular ends and junctures was not likely, under divided administration, to be lasting and generally applicable; and ultimately, at the death of Secunder Jah, and on the accession of his son Nasir-ood-Dowlah, in 1829, the first step of the new Government was to request the immediate removal of all the English officers engaged in the administration of districts. This was promptly complied with, but not without a stipulation that whenever the terms of settlement remained unexpired the district superintendents should remain to see them fulfilled.

"Lord William Bentinck, as Governor-General, was actuated by a policy of non-interference; but the independence produced no good, and the system so failed that by the end of 1835, after repeated warnings, the Court of Directors were impelled to an emphatic remonstrance which plainly threatened to recommend a change of Ministers at Hyderabad. The Nizam and his advisers were, at last, thoroughly alarmed into trying the expedient of a Commission of native officers to

rectify provincial abuses. This makeshift proved, as might have been expected, an utter and disastrous failure; and evils already patent became more and more flagrant."

General Fraser went to the Hyderabad Residency just at this crisis, in succession to Colonel Stewart, and the appointment was notified to him at Trevandrum, the capital of Travancore, in a private letter from the Governor of Madras:—

"Madras, July 21st, 1838.

"DEAR SIR,—In forwarding the enclosed letter from Lord Auckland to your address, I beg to be allowed to express my gratification at the intelligence which it conveys, and which, I trust, will be acceptable to you as a proof of the Governor-General's appreciation of your services, and not materially inconvenient to you on private grounds. I am not without hope that it may afford me the opportunity of making your personal acquaintance, as you will probably pass through Madras on your way to Hyderabad. If so, and that you have no better engagement, I shall be happy if you will consider this house as an inn, and take up your residence in it during your stay in this place. In the meantime, I beg to offer my services, if I can be of any use in furthering your arrangements.

"Believe me, etc.,

"ELPHINSTONE."

The invitation was more warmly renewed in the following reply to a letter from the General:—

"Madras, August 2nd, 1838.

"DEAR SIR,—I am honoured with your letter of the 27th ulto., and am very happy at the prospect which it gives me of your being able to stay a few days with me at Madras. Should Mrs. Fraser accompany you, I hope that she will not be deterred, by any apprehension of crowding the house or of occasioning any inconvenience, from bringing with her all her family and servants. I have plenty of room for all, and should be very sorry indeed if, from any such scruples, she were to decline her share of my invitation, which was, of course, intended to include every member of your family."

The personal acquaintance formed in the hospitalities of Government House at Madras was kept up for several years by a very frequent correspondence between Lord Elphinstone and General Fraser, not only on the more pressing and confidential topics of public business, but on the more congenial subjects of French literature and general history which interested them both.

When General Fraser assumed his new duties at Hyderabad, the air was thick with rumours of Wahabee conspiracy and of general

disaffection in many provinces of India, in which one of the Nizam's brothers, Mobariz-ood-dowla, was deeply implicated, in concert with one of our petty chieftains, the Nawab of Kurnool, whose territory was on the southern frontier of the Nizam's dominions, and who had originally been one of the Nizam's feudatories.

The best explanation and apology for the Russophobia of 1838, which led to Lord Auckland's memorable proclamation of October the 1st, to the march on Cabul, and the substitution of Shah Soojah for Dost Mohammed as ruler of Afghanistan, is to be found in the spirit of unrest that unquestionably prevailed at that time throughout India, more especially among the Mohammedans, characterised by a prevalent belief that the Russians were coming, and manifesting itself by many conspiracies, and by several incipient outbreaks that were only baffled by vigilance and prompt repression. A private letter from Captain Lancelot Wilkinson (afterwards Colonel and Resident at Nagpore), then Political Agent in the Mussulman State of Bhopal, which Colonel Fraser received soon after his arrival at Hyderabad, will give a better notion of the thoughts that then filled men's minds than can be gathered from the official despatches of the same period.

" Schore, Bhopal, 28th September 1838.

" MY DEAR SIR,—I have the pleasure of enclosing copies of petitions from my newswriter at Bhopal, reporting that an emissary of the Shah of Iran¹ or Russia had made his appearance there, and gone off suddenly, after hinting that he was charged with letters to several Princes of Hindustan. I and all my neighbours made instant inquiries and pursuit after him, but without any success. I therefore send these papers on to you, as he may have bent his steps towards Hyderabad. Colonel Sutherland told me that he had learned that three or four emissaries of Russia or Persia were now moving about the Bombay Presidency; and that some had Russian passports with them, and had come from Tiflis. You will have heard of Scindia's handing over to Sutherland a letter addressed to him by the Nepaul Rajah, who is said to have sent like missions and emissaries to most of the Indian Chiefs. He is said to have altered his tone when he heard of the new and more strict alliance into which we have entered with Runjeet Singh.

" The activity and intrigue of Russia are surprising. The Russians conduct themselves in a very different way from what we do. Conscious.

¹ Persia.

of rectitude, we seem to care nothing whether our policy and mode of proceeding are thought well of by the people or not. The Russians accommodate themselves to all circumstances,—seek to conciliate all the various tribes and nations they wish to bring into subjection. They are all things to all men. Their want of money sharpens their intellect, and makes them rely on clever negotiations more exclusively. We neither study what will be popular and agreeable to the people, nor seek to conciliate them. Some of us, carrying the Anglo-mania to an extreme, would make them all learn English, and expect unheard-of things from this charm. In the meantime we are only adding to the general disgust of our rule. We have set loose most intriguing and talented men among the Faithful against us, by stripping them of their rent-free lands. If they have no right to the lands, let us resume them, but let us grant three-quarters or a half of them to the cleverest and most learned Mussulman doctors of the present day, and not only stop their mouths but raise up a body favourably inclined to us.

“One of the most disastrous things in our treatment of this country is the gross partiality shown by England to herself by the tariffs of England and India. England insists that we receive all her manufactures and goods either free of duty or with only a nominal duty, while she imposes *ad valorem* duty, ranging from 30 to 50 per cent., on all our manufactured goods. What is the consequence? Chintzes and coloured cottons and Manchester long cloth, cotton thread, and the like, are selling, not only at Madras, Bombay and Calcutta, but even at Delhi and in Central India, cheaper than the produce of the Native looms, and than the thread of the Natives’ own spinning. Consumers are little benefited, for they all unite in crying out against the want of durability of our English cloths and cottons. But all our large manufacturing towns here are involved in ruin and decay. The weavers are reduced to beggary. Spinning was formerly a source of subsistence to thousands, or rather to hundreds of thousands of poor respectable females. Now we have robbed them of their daily bread, and of their means of contributing to the support of their families, by inundating the country with our cotton twists. Every friend of India should unite to get this growing evil removed. If the Spitalfields weavers lose their employment for a week, all England is made to re-echo their groans. Queens wear home-made silk aprons that weavers may dine; and Duchesses put on cotton stockings that Glasgow may grow fat. But we and our ladies, who are the lords and peeresses of this land, have no such sympathy for our starving millions. Our rich men have been known to boast that their soup was English, their salmon English, their carrots English, and their dessert English. Our dress is all English. In short, we in no way supply the place of the princes and nobles whose seats we occupy, nor do we seem

to wish to do so. If we alter not our policy, we may come to regret our want of foresight.

"Believe me, my dear Sir,

"Yours sincerely,

"LANCELOT WILKINSON.

"P.S.—I sent a couple of copies of a Telugu work on geography and astronomy to my friend, your late predecessor, Major Cameron, shortly before his death. He promised to let me know what some of the best astronomer Joshees of the place thought of it. I should be greatly obliged to you if you could get the written opinions of the individuals consulted on the work. It is a most admirable book, written by one of my Shastrees, who calls it the Sheromani Prukash. It is a comparison of the Pooranik, Siddhantic and Copernican systems of the world."

Whatever may be thought of Captain Wilkinson's opinions regarding Russian diplomacy, his letter is interesting as a disclosure of the current views of 1838; and whether his Political Economy be sound or not, his lamentations over the decay of Indian manufactures and the apparent exclusiveness and selfishness of English measures and English manners, may remind us of certain results of our administration as they struck the Natives in his day, and as they continue to strike them, in some respects with greater force, at the present moment.

General Fraser thus commenced his duties as Resident at a period that made a great call on his judgment and energy, both on account of the unsettled and fanatical temper of large classes throughout India, and of the disorder and embarrassment in Hyderabad affairs, especially with regard to the finances of the State.

With an interval of less than five years—from December 1820 to August 1825—filled up by Charles Metcalfe's persistent attack, in spite of the displeasure of Lord Hastings, on the Palmer and Rumbold combination, the policy of the Residents at Hyderabad for more than thirty years, down to the date of Colonel Fraser's appointment, seems to have been confined to the unflinching support of the Minister, Rajah Chundoo Lall, against all his rivals, and even against his own sovereign. Metcalfe had succeeded before his departure, as already stated, in instituting certain administrative reforms, and in placing them under the only possible safeguard, the superintendence of English officers; but in 1829, on the accession of the Nizam Nasir-ood-dowla, the Eng-

lish officers were withdrawn, and the unchecked authority of Chundoo Lall reinstated. Immediately before General Fraser's appointment, his predecessor, Colonel Stewart, after making a tour of inspection through the Nizam's dominions, had sent in a report to the Government of India, in which he expressed the opinion that only one thing was wanted to give us the power of reforming the administration, and that was the formal assurance of His Highness the Nizam that he would abstain from any interference in public affairs. Were an assurance of this nature formally given it would be "most beneficial", according to Colonel Stewart, "by inducing the Minister to look solely to the Resident for support".

What were the views formed by General Fraser when he had occupied the first few months of his incumbency in studying the situation and outlook of affairs, will be seen from the following private letter addressed by him to the Governor-General, Lord Auckland :—

"Hyderabad, April 6th, 1839.

"MY LORD,—It would have been as well that I had done myself the honour of writing to your Lordship at an earlier period after taking charge of this Residency ; for my deferring to do so has been productive of but little advantage, nor have I much more information to offer now in regard to the state of the Nizam's dominions than I possessed within a month after my arrival here. It would be the same case were I here for years, under the present constitution of affairs, and of our relations with this Durbar.

"I concluded, as a matter of course, that men of family and distinction from the city would find the means of introducing themselves to me, and that, from their conversation and remarks, I should be enabled to derive such information, not only of the country in general, but, to a certain degree, of the character and views of the Nizam, and of the leading nobles of the State, as might be worthy of being communicated to your Lordship. But in this expectation I have been entirely disappointed, and I have remained in the same isolated state as at first, and in which I imagine that most, if not all, of my predecessors have been purposely kept. From a jealousy on the part of the Minister, in which he has apparently induced the Nizam to participate, scarcely any person above the rank of a merchant or soncar, or, at most, some native gentleman who happens to be entirely unconnected with the Government, is ever permitted to come near me. It is well known that I should have been happy to receive the visits of any respectable person ; and there can, I think, be no doubt that the noblemen and gentlemen of the city would have been glad to avail themselves of the privilege

of frequenting the Residency. But this was forbidden, or tacitly prevented; and Shums-ool-Oomra, Mubariz-ood-Dowla, Sooraj-ood-Dowla,¹ and others, men of rank and eminence, remain as entirely strangers to me, and I to them, as if I had never come to this part of India. There is nothing new in all this. The same practice has prevailed here for many years; and the persons I allude to are not only debarred access to the Resident, but are, generally speaking, prevented from having intercourse with each other. This system is so thoroughly understood and (by what means soever) rigidly maintained, that no person presumes to come to the Residency who has not an express or implied permission to that effect from the Minister.

"I might, perhaps, have been able to break through this barrier; but, in doing so, I should have altogether changed the terms subsisting between the Minister and the Resident, and probably, on the whole, less good than evil would have been the result. I determined, therefore, on allowing matters to remain, for the present, in this respect, as I found them; and I so far took advantage of circumstances as to apply direct to the Minister for information on several points, which the very state of the case I have just described enabled me to do in a manner not likely to excite his suspicion of any intention on my part to exercise any interference in the administration of affairs—in terms, on the contrary, which should indicate a friendly and exclusive confidence in him.

"So far as I can judge from the very little I have yet seen of the Nizam's dominions, or heard of them from the English officers who have had any opportunity and capacity of observation, the country is by no means in so very bad a condition as I had previously supposed, and as is generally imagined throughout India. Yet, if the word 'anomalous' was ever applicable to the Government of a country, it is so here. There seems to be no fixed or intelligible system for the management of the Revenue, and protection of the ryots from the inordinate demands of rapacious Talookdars. There is none, or none generally observable, for the administration of justice. The Nizam's military force (exclusive of that portion of it which is under our control), is for the most part, little better than a lawless and useless rabble. The Arabs, of whom there are (by the latest account) 3,860 in the whole country—1,600 of them in the city—are a turbulent race, acknowledging no jurisdiction whatever, but such as they choose to establish and recognise among themselves. Yet, excepting that they bear a bad character, and might give us some trouble if ever we had occasion to take military possession of the city, or any part of it, and

¹ Afterwards entitled Sooraj-ool-Moolk, and Minister of the Hyderabad State.

were to be resisted by these men, I have no reason to complain of them, and have heard but very little against them, since I came here.

"It may appear remarkable that under the circumstances I have described, the government of the country should have been maintained at all, and that the whole machinery of the State had not been destroyed, or its movement stopped, many years ago. This may, in some measure, be attributed to the Minister's personal character—the mild and clement disposition which prevents him from ever committing a harsh or cruel act, his generosity and lavish disbursement of money, which secure him many friends and partisans; and the skill with which he has always managed parties at Hyderabad, so far concentrating the whole power in his own hands as not to have had, for many years, a rival or antagonist to disturb the course of his administration, or to impair or call in question the autocracy (in the most absolute sense of the word) which he has created for himself. But the general tranquillity of the country, and absence of any serious disturbance, are, no doubt, principally to be ascribed to our support, to the presence of our troops, and to the close connection and friendship known to have always subsisted between the British Government and the Minister. Yet all this but accounts for the protracted existence of the Nizam's Government, which may still consist with much wretchedness and degradation.

"Different views are entertained by different persons of the real condition of the country; but I imagine there can be little doubt that it has been in a state of progressive deterioration for some years, and that the crisis so long and often foretold by successive Residents must at length arrive. At what particular period, I cannot say; but, I think, not while Chundoo Lall lives, and retains his wonted faculties. Upon his death I should not apprehend any fatal or destructive crisis; but I fear that some confusion and embarrassment might arise, especially in regard to the financial condition of the State, unless means be previously taken to avoid the danger.

"Before I consider the question more particularly, I may be permitted for a moment to touch upon the extent to which our own immediate interference in the Government would be useful or justifiable. I think that a mixed or conjoint administration would be of little or no use, and that it might even be injurious rather than otherwise.

"The character, the views, moral feeling, and mode of conduct of a European and Native are so different, and, in general, so diametrically opposite, that I conceive they cannot, where vested with co-extensive and equal powers, or, *a fortiori*, where the Native is in possession of superior authority, amalgamate or coalesce to any good purpose. It is an attempt to mingle discordant elements, between

which there exists an irresistible principle of repulsion. If I were permitted, or enjoined, by the British Government to establish a connection with Chundoo Lall which should seem a very close and intimate one, and to avail myself of this coalition to offer him my suggestions and advice, nothing would be easier to me, and, to outward appearance, nothing would be more agreeable to him. He would professedly regard my advances as a proof of friendship, and he would promise implicit submission to my counsels and direction. But no useful result would ensue. Comprehending neither my intentions nor the ends at which I aimed, and having different objects of his own to fulfil, he would counteract while he professed to second me. His designs and political aims are restricted to the present or immediately coming day; and plans for future years enter not into his contemplation. He would not understand me, and would never, therefore, cordially receive me as an adviser or coadjutor. The execution of the measures I recommended, even if they were approved, not depending upon myself, but upon one who never at any time possessed much energy, and who cannot be supposed to have acquired additional strength of mind when he has arrived at the extreme verge of existence, would never be realised. I should share his responsibility for the distracted state of the country, and for the existence of all those evils which I could not amend; and I should become—with very little chance, I fear, of doing good—a participator in the shame and disgrace which attach to a weak and ill-organised Government. But these may be considered rather negative evils than otherwise: there might be positive ones. My interference would impair the power of the Minister. It is, on certain occasions, and in some parts of the country, but feebly and imperfectly acknowledged, even at present. If the hand of the Resident were seen—which it has not been, since I came here—complainants and malcontents would address themselves to me. The extant standing order of the Government, that ‘it is unnecessary to bring petitions to the Residency, since there are regular Courts of Justice to receive them in the city’, would cease to influence the people; parties and intrigues would be formed on my side; and the Government I attempted to aid—concentrated, such as it is, in the person of Chundoo Lall—would, there is reason to believe, be essentially impaired in strength, in consequence of its being regarded by the country as divided.

“The application of a partial remedy, then, I regard as promising no advantage. Nothing short of an actual assumption of the government of the country would, in my opinion, be an adequate remedy for the evils that prevail. All requires to be reconstituted, and the whole frame of government remodelled. The system of revenue is wretched, and demands reorganisation. The administration of justice—more defective than even the revenue branch—has to be provided for: a

police has to be organised; thousands of useless soldiers should be disbanded, and a small, but effective, force substituted; means of education should be supplied, commerce protected and encouraged, and the resources of the country—with respect to which the most perfect ignorance prevails—should be made the subject of inquiry and research.

“But is such an assumption of the government as this would imply—or our bringing forward any proposition to this effect—justifiable, or in any way warranted, by the circumstances of the case? I apprehend not. We have no treaty with the Nizam which provides (as do the Mysore, Travancore, and other treaties) for our taking the country into our own hands under any circumstances, and for even a temporary period. We are, of course, powerful enough to insist upon the measure, and to enforce it. But be the meaning of the word Supremacy, and the sense in which it is now frequently used in reference to our government, what it may, of course it will never be made to imply a departure from the laws of honour and good faith. If the Nizam could be induced to spontaneously resign to us the management of his country until its financial embarrassments were removed, and a just and rational system of general administration were established, the end desired would be obtained, and the restoration of the country to him might be attended with such a stipulation for the subsequent admission of the counsels and eventual agency of the British Government as should effectually preclude any risk of its falling, a second time, into the same state of embarrassment as at present. But the Nizam would never agree to this temporary resignation of the management of his country to us; or, at least, this is so highly improbable that it would be but a loss of time to contemplate such a contingency and its consequences.

“Our partial interference in the administration presenting little or no advantage, and entire assumption of it appearing to be impracticable, what remains to be done? Are we to continue satisfied with the present state of things—content to see so large and fair a portion of India (the dominion of a Prince with whom we are on terms of the closest alliance), if not actually a prey to anarchy and disorder, as generally supposed, yet certainly not in the condition wherein we should wish to see it placed, and in which, if the predominance of our power and a consequent right of interference are to be regarded as grounds of reasoning for the settlement of the question, it becomes our duty to see it placed? Are we patiently to look on, and await in silence, those events which, under the circumstances of the case, must, almost necessarily, lead to increased embarrassment and ultimate confusion, forcing us, in all probability, at some future period, to interfere, as the law of nations would authorise our doing in any part of the world, and, in

ference even to the most independent States, for the security of our own dominions?

"Regarding this as a private letter, and venturing to assume that our Lordship allows me to address you with the same freedom and absence of reserve which might be permitted in conversation, I find it difficult to abstain from adverting here to the subject on which I recently addressed a public letter to the Supreme Government, as well as to that of Fort St. George, connected with a supposed disaffection to our government on the part of the Natives of India, and certain machinations now in progress, especially among the Mohammedans, to form a party in our Native Army, and to plan some confederacy, or scheme of hostility against us.

"I certainly cannot bring myself to think that we possess the affection of either Mohammedans or Hindoos; and I apprehend that we shall commit the most hazardous mistakes, if we found on the opposite supposition any general system of procedure for the maintenance or extension of our power. It does not seem to me to be surprising, and I am not aware of its arguing any particular fault on our part, that we are not regarded by the Natives with the same feeling as formerly. It appears natural enough that this should be the case; and it may be sufficient to remark—without entering into any lengthened train of reasoning on the subject—that the dazzling illusion of our early stories has passed away, or, at least, that this cause has ceased to maintain, as it once did, a continued ascendancy over the native mind; and that the effect of that sudden relief from tyranny and oppression, and from insecurity of person and property, which was the necessary attendant of our first conquests, has become blunted, if not effaced, by the elapsing of time, and by removal of the generation which directly benefited by those events, and had an immediate and personal interest in them; while calculation and reality have taken the place of enthusiasm and hope, and Religion—either genuine, or assumed for political purposes—comes in aid of Ambition, to reclaim the rights and splendour of a condition which both have lost.

"In so far as our Empire was one of opinion (which I believe it was, to a very considerable degree) we have ourselves contributed to sap the foundation on which it rested. The Natives know, as well as we, and are able to appreciate our relative political positions. We have unhinged their religion and undermined their superstitions, for which deism and free-thinking have become the substitutes. The Native mind is in a restless and transition state; and the consequences of all this are sufficiently obvious, unless physical power, or other powers which wisdom may devise, be brought to supply the place of that superior moral influence we once possessed and the implicit obedience we once commanded.

"But this is not all. The power that the Natives of India most required, and in the absence of which a considerable portion of our security consisted, was that of effecting a union among themselves—of imparting common views, of simultaneously influencing the masses, and of exciting and directing their attention to a specific and definite object. With this advantage we have furnished them; and if treasonable, or—as they will consider them—religious and patriotic songs and poems, artfully composed, and directly addressed to the strongest passions, obtain, as we have every reason to believe they are now doing, circulation among our Sepoys, we have the example of every nation on the face of the earth, ancient and modern, for the effect they must produce and the excitement they will inspire.

"The tenets of Wahabeeism are making rapid progress in India, and have found their way, to a considerable extent, among our troops. The Wahabees are actuated by a dangerous principle which they carry farther, perhaps, than the Mussulmans have ever done, namely that it is a meritorious act and enjoined duty to destroy all who are not of their own sect, and who reject their tenets. Ambitious and discontented chiefs may thus handle religious fanaticism in furtherance of treasonous political ends. It is impossible to say how far the two are at present in conjunction, or to estimate the degree in which religious and political feelings are united, or may still be distinct from each other. If the flame ever break forth, it may prove wide and spreading, and difficult to control. The danger, I think, ought not to be despised; and it will probably be deemed right that the progress of this formidable movement should be attentively watched. I am doing so, as far as I can dare; and, no suspicions having yet arisen that I am aware of what is going on, or engaged in inquiry, I am in hope that in the course of a few days I shall have further information to give to the Supreme Government on this subject.

"I expect to obtain the perusal of letters—and to be able to take copies of them—which have been addressed to Mubzariz-ood-dowla by one of the Ameers of Scinde, by a Beloochee Chief, and by the son of Ameer Khan, the chief of Tonk.

"That any immediate enterprise will now be undertaken, or any extraordinary event occur, does not appear to be likely. The eyes of the South of India are attentively fixed on our proceedings in the North-West; and our success there has been a blow that has, I believe, destroyed, for the present, all their schemes. My hesitation in proposing any new system of management for the Nizam's dominions, or any essential change in the mode of its existing administration, has arisen from grave doubt whether it is practicable to submit any reasonable proposal for your Lordship's consideration at this moment, or unless I

had a clearer discernment of the ground on which it is deemed likely or desirable that we should stand hereafter.

"If your Lordship command me to say whether any immediate suggestions have occurred to me, in reference to the Nizam's dominions, the adoption of which might seem to be desirable, I am constrained to reply that, as long as Chundoo Lall lives, I apprehend little or nothing can be done. He is very old (between 77 and 78); and, in all human probability, the grave cannot be far removed from him. He has played the game of government long and skilfully—a word which I use rather than ably; for I cannot ascribe to him genuine capacity, nor, still less, great talent. We have been the tools in his hand. Adroitly opposing the Nizam to us, or us, at other times, to his sovereign, as might suit the aim and object of the moment—keeping both parties in a state of estrangement from each other, and aided by other means alluded to at the opening of this letter, he has contrived to keep the Government—or, rather, the dictatorship—of the country in his hands for thirty years. Still, whatever his motives may have been, and how far soever actuated by self-interest and determination to uphold his own authority, he has been, truly and essentially, our friend. Were he any other man in the world than what he is, or were his mortal career less far advanced towards the period of its termination, the whole existing system of administration could be remodelled; and if this were rendered impracticable by ignorance or perverse opposition, we might justly feel ourselves called upon to advise the Nizam to consult the honour and welfare of his country by the election of another Dewan.

"The extreme age of Chundoo Lall, his infirmities, his gentleness (or I might, perhaps, more correctly call it, feebleness) of character, his apparent (and, I believe, avowed) anxiety to be allowed to sink towards his final rest in peace and repose—all indicate the futility of our looking to him for any measures requiring energy and activity, or for even departure from established usage. We might as well pronounce his death-warrant as make the attempt. Any discussion between myself and the Minister which indicated displeasure on my part, or alienation, or withdrawal of support, would probably be followed by the Nizam casting him off; for he completely identifies Chundoo Lall with the British Government, as did his father, Secunder Jah. Parties would be formed against him which are now kept down only by the countenance he receives from us; and it is possible that not only his political career, but his life, might be brought to a sudden close. I do not think he would survive his degradation and loss of office, even if he escaped the poison or dagger of a foe. We have been pursuing here the same course as at present for thirty or forty years, with slight variations not worth describing, which have produced no material consequences;

and any extensive change in the Nizam's Government will be found impracticable until Heaven shall have taken this aged being to its mercy.

"If we but wish the country to remain quiet—which, after all, is something in these disturbed and menacing times—I think this object is secure as long as Chundoo Lall lives, provided that the British Resident be known to remain on friendly terms with him.

"But his death may cause embarrassment, which it will be desirable that we should, if possible, guard against by adopting some precaution. The debts of the State to soucars will, almost certainly, be productive of financial difficulties; but if any actual disturbance should occur on that occasion, it will probably arise from the claims of the Nizam's troops, Arabs, battalions of the line, horsemen, and others, for payment of their arrears. This danger might, I imagine, best be obviated by our knowing who the Minister's successor was to be, and by our having previously concerted measures with that personage to meet the eventual difficulty and demand. But no one knows, or can give any probable indication, who is to be the successor. This appointment to the office of Dewan is left by the British Government to the Nizam; and he has never declared, nor ever—as far as I can learn—hinted, what his intentions are in this respect, if, indeed, he have yet formed any.

"The Minister and his friends think, and profess to be almost assured, that his son Bala Pershad will succeed; but I cannot learn that the Nizam has ever said anything to warrant such an expectation. Bala Pershad, I believe, is not deficient in ability; but he is said to be rapacious in the extreme, and to have accumulated very large treasure. He is so far associated with his father in the transaction of public business that he has abundant opportunities of gratifying his ruling passion by extortion of Nuzuranahs and bribes. The father himself is understood to possess nothing; yet it is but a small share of merit that can be ascribed to him on this account, if he has knowingly permitted his son to be guilty of the vice he has himself avoided.

"For some time after I came to Hyderabad, besides Bala Pershad, a person named Gholam Hyder Khan, with the title of Iktidar Jung—a servant of the Nizam, who remains always near his master's person—was sometimes mentioned as not unlikely to be nominated to the Dewan. I never saw the man; and I know no one who is acquainted with him. He bears, I understand, a tolerably respectable character; and I have heard nothing particular said against him.

"Some attention has lately been directed to Sooraj-ood-dowla, the son of Mooneer-ood-Moolk, the former Dewan. He is about thirty years of age, and is said to be a man of considerable ability. Him, too, I never saw, nor have I had any communication with him. I believe

the principal reason for it being supposed that he has a chance of the appointment is that the Nizam has been a little more attentive to him, of late, than usual, and has received him at the Durbar, on one or two recent occasions, with an observable degree of courtesy. But, in reality, the question of the succession to this office is, so far as I can learn, absolutely undecided; and I meet no one who seems to possess trustworthy information on the subject.

"Besides those I have mentioned, the only other person here from whose character and station it might seem not impossible that the Nizam should select him for the office of Minister, is Shums-ool-Oomrah, though I have never heard his name mentioned in this view. He is spoken of as a respectable man. He is, I think, between 50 and 60, and, from his office of Commander of the Pagah,¹ may be considered as next in rank and consequence to the members of the Nizam's family.

"I have never seen Shums-ool-Oomrah, and it may give your Lordship a sufficient idea of the thralldom in which the Nobles of this country are kept by the Minister, to mention that even this personage, high in rank as he is, was afraid to have it known that he once sent me a few elementary school-books in Hindostanee and Persian, which were printed by him, a year or two ago. Hearing that he is a literary man, acquainted with certain branches of mathematical science, I one day sent him, through his physician, Dr. Vertue, two or three Persian school-books on Astronomy and Geography, which I happened to have by me, and which I thought he might be pleased to examine and to compare with the similar works he had himself published. In acknowledgment of this slight civility, he sent me, a few days afterwards, a set of his own printed school-books in return. They were forwarded through the same medium; and the note that accompanied them, written by a French secretary in the service of Shums-ool-Oomrah, is so characteristic and significant, that I requested Dr. Vertue to leave it with me, and I now enclose it, in order that your Lordship may note, in the last paragraph, a proof of the fear I have already alluded to as entertained by the highest Oomrahs of Hyderabad of being discovered in holding intercourse, even of the most casual and conventional kind, with the British Resident. The French secretary appears to participate in the apprehensions of his master, and, instead of naming the Minister, obliquely designates him as '*l'homme que vous savez*.'

"The only way, I imagine, to ascertain the intentions of the Nizam, with respect to a successor to Chundoo Lall, would be, to ask him the question. But this could scarcely be done without the Minister's

¹ The household troops.

knowledge; and, unless he considered that our aim was to promote the views, and, so far as possible, to secure the succession of his son, Bala Pershad, would, doubtless, regard our interference in reference to the contingency it implies, as indelicate and offensive, and as involving a risk of injuring his son's prospects, unless we formally declared a purpose of advocating them. It may also be observed that if the Nizam were once appealed to, and any intimation elicited of an intention not to hereafter nominate Bala Pershad to the Dewanee, it would immediately tend to weaken, if not to subvert, the authority of Chundoo Lall; and the consequences might then be more mischievous, and fraught with more danger, than those we were seeking to avert.

"Since, then, it would be difficult, in the circumstances of the case, to obtain this information, perhaps the best way left to secure the tranquillity of the country on the demise of Chundoo Lall, would be to induce him to render a true and accurate account of the debts of the State, and to authorise the Nizam's Government—in the event of this measure meeting their own views—to open a six per cent. loan, to the extent so arrived at, under the guaranty of the British Government, with adequate security for repayment of the principal in five or six years.

"The loan thus constituted should be paid into the Resident's treasury, not that of the Minister; and not a rupee of it should be subsequently disbursed, but under the Resident's orders, after thorough and correct understanding of the exact nature and validity of the debts claimed. I know not whether the Court of Directors would sanction this, even if the Nizam (which is not certain) approved of it; but, if both parties concurred, there can be but little doubt that the Minister would gladly avail himself of the occasion to discharge the debt that oppresses and embarrasses him, a great part of it bearing interest at 18 per cent. per annum. Not only would this onerous burden be thrown off, but numerous reductions might be made, and many of the troops disbanded, which cannot now be done for want of means to discharge their arrears. We should know what we never otherwise shall—the precise financial condition of the State; and a principal source of apprehension, in the event of the Minister's death, would be at once removed.

"Of course, many subsidiary arrangements would require to be made; and I now merely touch on the subject in a very general manner, reserving more particular discussion of it for future communication, should your Lordship be of opinion that any proposition of the kind, emanating from the Minister, would at all be entertained.

"Another point, to which I may take this opportunity of requesting your Lordship's attention, is the succession to the Musnud itself. It may naturally be supposed that the Nizam will desire to be succeeded

by his eldest son, now a boy of ten years of age; though he has never yet made any open express declaration of his sentiments on this subject. His Highness is a strong, and apparently healthy man, and not more than fifty years of age. His death, therefore, cannot in human probability, be anticipated to take place for many years; but as this event may occur unexpectedly, and as, unless arrangements be previously made, we may have before us the difficulties of a disputed succession, and, at all events, the embarrassment of a minority and temporary regency, it will be for your Lordship to determine whether it may not be desirable to provide against these possible sources of inconvenience, and to embrace the first favourable opportunity of ascertaining the Nizam's sentiments on the subject. This might be impolitic and inexpedient, were it likely to produce any disagreeable impression on the mind of his Highness; but, with his knowledge of the turbulent and vicious character of his brothers, it would probably tend much to conciliate him and to tranquillise his mind, as well as to ensure the future peace of the country, that we should recognise as his heir the person (if unexceptionable) whom he might be disposed to select.

"If this is to be done at all, I am inclined to think that it should be, in the first instance, by a direct and private communication with the Nizam. Previous admission of the Minister to the settlement of a question so important and interesting might open a road to the deepest and most dangerous intrigue.

"On this, and, indeed, on most of the other subjects adverted to in this letter, I shall abstain (except in circumstances of the strongest and most imperative necessity) from adopting any measures whatever, or instituting any course of procedure, until I shall have been honoured by the expression of your Lordship's sentiments.

"The records of the Hyderabad Residency show that very different and opposite systems of policy have been enjoined by different Governments, and that the same public measures have sometimes elicited applause which, at others, have met with disapproval. Not only have varying opinions been entertained at the seat of Government, but the decisions of the Home authorities do not appear to have been always guided by an undeviating rule of judgment.

"I perceive, on review, that I have presented to your Lordship little else than a tissue of difficulties and doubts; but such, I regret to say, is inherent in the nature of the case. We may apply, as we have been doing—or endeavouring to do—for many years past, palliatives and expedients; but I apprehend that the Nizam's country will never be free from embarrassment, nor rise from its present grade of mediocrity, until it shall have been placed under a decided British administration.

"I have expressed myself on the subject with freedom and unrestraint, profoundly sensible of the privilege of addressing your Lordship in a

less formal and reserved manner than would be suitable to a public and official record.

"I have the honour to be, etc.,

"J. S. FRASER."

This letter has been given *in extenso*, not merely to indicate at the outset the grave difficulties of General Fraser's position, but to lay down the first documentary proof that his political foresight ranged far beyond the immediate horizon, and was not bounded by the limits of his official charge. It will prove, also, that his convictions and his objects, with reference to British relations with the Nizam, were founded on principles of honour and equity, and never varied from the day of his arrival until that of his departure from Hyderabad.

In a letter dated the 24th of July 1840, Lord Elphinstone reminds General Fraser that the previous day was the first anniversary of the capture of Ghuzni, while, he continues, "to-day is the anniversary of the taking of Gibraltar in 1704. At the period of the greatest vigour, if not the widest extension of Mohammedan power, these places may be said to have marked its extreme limits. Both now contain a British garrison." Neither of the correspondents could then foresee that the brilliant exploit, for which General Sir John Keane was raised to the peerage and endowed with a pension for two lives, would prove so barren and even so disastrous in its results. But we can well understand now, what they cannot but have known well, that the capture of Ghuzni must at the time have been an immense relief to Lord Auckland, giving him apparent assurance, after months of work, suspense, and anxiety, that the expedition into Afghanistan would prove an easy success. We can well understand how it was that, in the midst of the plans and preparations for the double advance on Calul through the Khyber and Bolan Passes, the Governor-General delayed for a long time replying to the long letter in which the Resident at Hyderabad gave his first impressions and suggestions as to the condition and prospects of the Nizam's dominions. The answer came at last, after the lapse of five months.

"Simla, Sept. 13, 1839.

"MY DEAR SIR,—I have many subjects upon which I have long wished to write to you; but my time has been sadly occupied.

"Your letter of April last, upon the present condition of the Nizam's territories, appeared to me to take a just view of their condition, and one which very much coincided with my own opinion, and with information previously received by me. The administration is, no doubt, irregular, unequal, in some instances violent and corrupt, and, throughout, apparently inefficient. Yet it holds together; and the result is, generally, far less bad than—in the absence of system, of regular police, and of courts of justice—might be apprehended. And so it will probably continue through the life of Chundoo Lall. Frequent interference on our part in partial cases would apparently make us liable for evil, and do but little good; while a general and complete interference is not justified by either treaty or circumstances. For the present, we must, as we have long done, go on with palliatives and expedients.

"The only proposition, perhaps, which could be usefully entertained would be one by which assistance could, upon certain conditions, be given towards discharge of the present debt of the State, by a loan bearing a lower rate of interest; but much difficulty would probably occur when the nature of the guarantee and the consequent rights of interference came to be discussed.

"I shall look with interest for the result of your Commission; though, at the same time, I hope that inquiries will not be pushed too far. The arrest of an individual so intriguing and turbulent as Moobariz-ood-Dowlah cannot but have done good, and will check the combinations of which he would have been constituted the leader, in vague designs of mischief.

"But the result of attempts to pursue in detail any alleged Indian plot, is almost always worse than unsatisfactory; for they generally prove nothing, and leave behind feelings of alarm and suspicion. Enough, perhaps, has already been done at Hyderabad—or is in progress on the side of Kurnool—to prove that the Government is neither blind nor insensible to injury; and the minor instruments of mischief may be presently allowed to lose themselves in the community.

"I have only one more subject on which to write; and as I intend to address the Court upon it, I would gladly have your opinion of it in detail. I allude to the proposal of the Court that all Native States should reimburse to the Company the amount of pay given to officers in the several Contingent services. I hold it to be impossible that we should call upon the Nizam to pay more than he at present does; nor can we, with any justice, withdraw from the officers now in his service the advantages which they possess. And were these advantages withheld from future appointments, we should not find officers ready to accept them. Unless, then, some means of retrenchment could be devised whereby more money would be made available, I feel that the

strongest objections may be urged to the proposition; and upon this, as upon other points on which I have touched, any information you can afford me will be most gratefully received.

“Very faithfully yours,

“AUCKLAND.”

A decided check and deep discouragement were given to the intrigues and plots of this time by the early successes of Lord Auckland's policy of restoring Shah Shujah to the throne of Cabul. The Nawab of Kurnool, just at that crisis, was clearly detected in the very act of assembling a military force, and of holding communications with Wahabee leaders, and other fanatics and malecontents at Hyderabad and in other towns of the Deccan and Carnatic. Lord Elphinstone having consulted him as to the smallest force with which the Commissioners of Inquiry about to start for Kurnool ought to be supported, General Fraser sent the following reply:—

“Hyderabad, 12th July 1839.

“MY LORD,—Sir Henry Montgomery's¹ estimate of the strength of Kurnool is certainly very different from mine, if he really thinks half a regiment and a company of Artillery would be sufficient to take it. My impression has been, though it is possible I may be mistaken, that it was one of the strongest native forts in the country, and, judging from the evidence that I have received here, that it was garrisoned by about 4,000 men, mostly of the best fighting castes. On this point, however, I need say no more until my information is more complete, or until I receive an application from the Government of Fort St. George for the service of any portion of the Nizam's troops.

“I am very sorry, but not much surprised, to hear of the misunderstanding between Mr. Casamajor and Mr. Stonehouse. I have always heard the former spoken of as a very good man, but at the same time, to use the odd French expression, *un peu difficile à vivre*.

“I tried as far as I could to serve Mr. Cormack, the Postmaster at Hyderabad; but to tell you the truth, he is not a first-rate artist, and I fancy has not found much to do here in that way. I got the old Minister, Chundoo Lall, to sit to him; but it was not at all well done, and I therefore made him copy one which had been done by a superior artist some years ago. You may like to see it, and I send it to you by this opportunity. You have only to fancy the countenance a good deal older and more worn, the body infinitely more attenuated and bent

¹ Sir Henry Coningham Montgomery, Bart., of the Madras Civil Service, afterwards a Member of the Indian Council in London and a Privy Councillor, died in 1878.

almost double, without a single jewel or other ornament on the person,—for he never wears them now,—and you have Chundoo Lall still before you.

“I am not aware whether the Nizam would have any objection to have his picture drawn, but he has at least none to see the pictures of other people. Sooraj-ood-Dowla, the son of the former Minister, Mooneer-ool-Moolk, pleased him very much a few days ago by presenting him with a handsome framed engraving of the Queen.

“It is singular that I should be so frequently suspected of a wish to interfere in the religion, spiritually considered, of the people of India. There is not a man in the whole country who would abstain from this more scrupulously than I would, not only on political grounds, but on what is more important, moral ones. I would, however, never allow myself to be deceived by a name, and if Wahabecism chooses to call itself religion, when I know it in fact to be treason, I would treat it accordingly.

“I remain, your Lordship’s ever faithfully and obediently,

“J. S. FRASER.”

The Government of Madras was chiefly and deeply indebted to General Fraser for information, derived from his intelligence department, as to the proceedings of the Nawab of Kurnool and his treasonable communications with Mulariz-ood-dowla, the fanatical brother of the reigning Nizam. Some troops of the Hyderabad Contingent, then usually called “the Nizam’s Army”, detached and directed by the Resident, co-operated with the British Field Force under Colonel Dyce despatched against Kurnool. The bands of Rohillas and Arabs assembled by the misguided Nawab having resisted the occupation of the fort, and refused to lay down their arms, were attacked and routed with great slaughter. The Nawab of Kurnool was taken prisoner, and ample proof of his evil intentions was discovered in his palace and its vicinity, especially in the form of a perfectly marvellous accumulation of guns and munitions of war. This is mentioned in a letter to General Fraser from Captain (afterwards General) Edward Armstrong, of the Madras 34th Light Infantry, dated “Kurnool, 10th October 1839”:—

“It is impossible to describe to you the state of the Nawab’s arsenal, his preparations for war in ordnance, stores, and ammunition are prodigious, and we are one and all filled with amazement at what we have this day beheld. The gardens of his palace and zenana are

covered with foundries for casting guns, shot and shells, and pieces of ordnance are to be found in every stage of preparation. Two of the mortars, beautiful brass pieces, are probably the largest in the world,—the diameter of the bore of one being twenty-six and the other twenty-three inches, the thickness of metal at the muzzle nine inches. For these monsters of their kind there is an abundant supply of shells. The various buildings in the palace and zenana are turned into vast magazines of every imaginable weapon, from guns of the heaviest calibre to double-barrelled pocket pistols. In one shed, which had the entrance bricked up to appear a dead wall, we found forty-five brass guns, from two- to six-pounders, mounted on new carriages, while in the same place there were seventy or eighty new carriages for guns that were buried near the shed. It is impossible as yet to form an accurate estimate of the number of guns found, but on a rough calculation I should say we have seen upwards of six hundred of all sizes, most of them new; some of them six-pounders, with the Company's mark on them. With the exception of fifty or sixty, all of these were buried or placed in sheds and built up, when the Nawab heard we were coming to take a look at him, and they would have escaped discovery had not some of the workmen employed turned traitors, and pointed out the places of concealment. An endless number of tumbrils and waggons have been found, ready packed with powder, shot, *live* shells, grape and canister, and matted over,—so as to take the field in good condition at a moment's notice. Ranges of godowns of great extent are filled with powder, sulphur, saltpetre, and other materials. In fact, it would appear as if the whole life of the Nawab had been devoted to the collection of warlike stores, and that the revenue of his country must have been expended for years for this purpose. Indeed, it is incredible and impossible that he could, unaided from outside, have collected these materials of war from his own resources. I am satisfied we are on the threshold of important discoveries, and that this place being considered obscure and not likely to be suspected, was chosen as the grand dépôt for a hostile movement of no ordinary character. Namdar Khan, the vizier, accompanied us, and at each successive discovery affected astonishment, and expressed entire ignorance of the Nawab's operations. He has been placed in arrest. The Nawab is still in the hands—voluntarily, I suspect—of a body of about 1,000 Rohillas encamped within a mile or two, under the command of your friend, Shah Wullee Khan. He must be taken, dead or alive."

In a letter dated the 18th October 1839, Captain Armstrong continues his narrative of events at Kurnool

"The order I anticipated arrived yesterday morning from the Madras Government—the country to be resumed, the Nawab to be deposed and to submit himself without conditions to the British Government. The foreign mercenaries were guaranteed payment of their arrears, protection of life and property, and a passport to their native countries. Some of them were inclined to accede to these terms, but our friend Shah Wullee Khan, the Rohilla, was most insolent—refused to receive the letter addressed to him and the other Chiefs, or to permit the Nawab to surrender, unless his arrears, without further inquiry, were paid up on the spot. He said he looked on Feringhee promises as mere deceit. Finding that persuasion was useless, Colonel Dyce moved his detachment into position—consisting of only seventy-five Europeans of H.M. 39th Foot Artillery, with two six-pounders and two howitzers, and 400 men of my regiment, 34th L. I.—to attack the Arabs and Rohillas in a stone enclosure surrounding a durgah,¹ while a squadron of the 13th Dragoons and a squadron of the 7th Light Cavalry were sent off to the right of the attacking force to cut up runaways. After a few rounds of canister from the guns, the line advanced in gallant style and carried all before them. The loss of the enemy has been very heavy, the cavalry having given a good account of them as soon as they were driven from their defences. We have a large body of prisoners, among them the Nawab, untouched, whom I had the good fortune personally to secure in the durgah. Colonel Dyce's arrangements were admirable, and to the rapid advance under a very heavy fire our trifling loss is alone ascribable. Nothing could have been better than the conduct of our troops on this little occasion, when opposed to more than double their number of well-armed Arabs, Rohillas and Pathans, behind their favourite stone walls and in strong buildings. The Sepoys used the bayonet in a way I have never seen or heard of before. It is impossible yet to say how many of the enemy were killed; we have a great many wounded among the prisoners. I regret to say Lieut. White of H.M. 39th is killed, and a noble lad of the 34th, Yates, Mrs. Byam's brother, mortally wounded. The doctors say he cannot survive, his wound being a stab in the stomach. Major Wright and Lieut. Ouchterlony of the 39th are wounded. I almost regret Shah Wullee Khan has escaped the halter he so long richly deserved, by being killed. I have made sure of this by seeing his body. Many other chiefs are killed; many are prisoners. I think party of Blair's Horse, in posts twenty-five miles apart, will be desirable for some little time longer, as the fugitives will no doubt make for your City as opportunity offers."

Ample evidence of his treason having been obtained, the Nawab of Kurnool was deposed and deported, and his country annexed to

¹ A praying place or small mosque.

the Presidency of Madras. After inquiry by a special Commission at Hyderabad, Prince Mubariz-ood-dowla, who had always been a turbulent and troublesome character, was confined by his brother, the Nizam, as a State prisoner, to the Fort of Golconda, where he remained for many years. General Fraser alludes to these matters in the following letter, placed a little in advance of its chronological order, to Lord Elphinstone.

“ Hyderabad, September 10th, 1840.

“ MY LORD,—I was happy to receive your very obliging letter, with the copy of your Minute which accompanied it, on the subject of the affairs of Kurnool, herewith returned. I entirely agree with the opinions therein expressed, and should hope that they may have the effect of awakening some degree of caution in the Supreme Government with respect to the state of the Mohammedan mind in the South of India. It is probable that the members of the Government have formed their judgment principally in reference to the character of the Mohammedans of Northern Hindostan, who are, I believe, in many respects, a superior race, and less dissatisfied with the British Government. Were they better acquainted with the troublesome population of Triplicane,¹ Trichinopoly, Arcot, Vellore, Bangalore, and Southern India generally, I think their opinions would undergo considerable change.

“ I cannot help persuading myself that the majority, if not the whole, of this class—excepting only, perhaps, our own troops, and some other of our immediate dependents—would be delighted to annihilate the British power, and to massacre every Englishman in India, if they possessed sufficient strength to carry their objects into effect.

“ If that disposition really prevails, of which I have no doubt, the mildest term that can be given to it is disaffection; and the state of affairs must be very much altered before I consent to qualify the designation. I should imagine that no question could exist as to the propriety of the manner in which you have disposed of Kurnool. Any other measure would have been dangerous and impolitic, and tending to perpetuation of a long-acknowledged evil.

“ I think I have the good fortune to concur entirely in the views entertained by your Lordship with respect to the fittest manner of dealing with the petty Native Chiefs and Princes of India. You have explained, in what appear to me very just and correct terms, the nature of the original rise and existing status of most of those persons; and I think we should avail ourselves of every opportunity that may

¹ The Mussulman quarter of the city of Madras.

present itself in the rebellion or serious crimes of the parties concerned, to declare their titles forfeited, and their principalities or other possessions reannexed to the Empire at large. We ought, however, to continue, on the other hand, to treat with liberality and confidence all those Native Princes whose original titles were of acknowledged validity, with whom we have formed political treaties, and of whose good will towards us we have yet had no reason to entertain distrust. I do not approve, in our dealings with Chiefs of this description, of that ostentatious assumption of what we call 'paramount power' which the Governments—more especially their subordinate political officers—habitually exhibit in an offensive degree. I have always doubted, and have frequently expressed the doubt to Sir Frederick Adam and others, the justice of our having assumed the Mysore country so abruptly and decisively as we did; and I now learn, by a letter just received from a friend in England, that Lord William Bentinck himself, before his death, repeatedly declared his regret at having ordered that measure. I should be sorry to see any such arrangement contemplated with respect to the Nizam's country, and have argued in both public and private against any project whatever of assumption, or infringement of the independent power of the sovereign, as an act uncalled for, and inconsistent with honour and good faith. I am disposed to think, also, that we ought to employ respectable Mohammedans more than we at present do, bringing them more prominently forward in the higher and more honourable offices of the State. Men will not give us their affection for nothing; and if we do nothing to conciliate their good will, we ought not to be surprised that we lack it.

"I have much pleasure in sending you the Duchess of Abrantes' Memoirs, in two successive banghy despatches—one containing the first nine volumes, and the other the three last. These treat of other and more interesting matters than the schemes and confederacies of bearded Mussulmans; and I think you will be much pleased with the lady's lively account of the interior of Napoleon's life, and of the curious scenes of the Tuileries, Malmaison, and St. Cloud.

"I either possess, or have commissioned from Calcutta, most of the books which your Lordship mentions, including another work on India which—from the extracts I have read—appears to be interesting, by a Swede or Norwegian with a remarkably long name, whose orthography has escaped my recollection.¹

"I should be very happy to be favoured with perusal of the first part of Tocqueville's *Démocratie en Amérique*, when it can be spared with perfect convenience.

"Some of the books required by Lord Munster I have obtained; but they are still to be copied, as the owners of valuable Oriental works

¹ No doubt General Count Biornstjerna's book.

generally decline to part with them. When I see my way a little more clearly to the extent of success upon which I can reckon in this respect, (which will probably be about the time of departure of the second steamer from this date), I shall do myself the pleasure of replying to his Lordship's letter on the subject.

“Always, my Lord, yours most faithfully,

“J. S. FRASER.”

At the time that Mubariz-ood-dowla was sent by the Nizam as a State prisoner to the fort of Golconda, forty six Moulavees and preachers of the Wahabee sect, who had been in close communication with the fanatic Prince, were apprehended and kept in close custody. Some of them were British subjects, and partly on that account, partly on account of the conspiracy in which they had been engaged being mainly hostile to British power, General Fraser was led to propose to the Nizam the measure of a full investigation into the intrigues and plots that had been going on, by means of a mixed Committee of English officers and Mussulman Sirdars connected with the Nizam's Government. This plan was carried out with the approval of the Government of India, and with very beneficial effect. The following extracts from a despatch dated 19th June 1839, will explain the grounds on which the Resident had arranged the assembly of this mixed Committee.

“Several reasons have led me to propose to the Nizam's Government a mutual participation in the inquiry.

“This may be considered due to the Hyderabad Circar, from the offences that are to constitute the subject of inquiry having been committed equally against both States; to which it may be added that the removal of Mubariz-ood-dowla having been effected by the orders of the Nizam, and by means of his troops exclusively, without the intervention of any of ours, it appears desirable that in a matter so interesting to Mohammedans generally, they should have an opportunity of knowing that its examination had rested equally with the Mussulman as with the British Government, and that the final disposal of the case should be equally the act of both.

“The principal offender being the brother of the Nizam himself, some delicacy was necessary in proposing arrangements for the conduct of an inquiry that was likely to end in the further incrimination of that person: and his Highness would, perhaps, on this ground, have objected to an investigation in which the officers of his Government had no part.

"Many of the prisoners in custody are subjects of this State, and the inquiry taking place at Hyderabad itself, it would have indicated offensive distrust if I had proposed to establish an exclusively British and *ex parte* investigation into these matters.

"The suggestion of a joint Committee was intended to give proof of a friendly feeling, and a desire to act in union with the Circar, which could scarcely fail to be agreeable to the Nizam, and to inspire him with sentiments of good will which may be of much advantage hereafter.

"An associated Commission, with a common object in view, has a tendency to draw together the two States, and to make their respective officers known to each other, between whom there has hitherto been little or no intercourse.

"The whole transaction will contribute, in its further progress and termination, as its antecedent proceedings have already done in no inconsiderable degree, to produce a more familiar acquaintance between the Nizam and the Resident, and to facilitate any communications which may be requisite with his Highness for objects connected with the future improvement of the country.

"Points of a religious nature, especially as connected with the distinction that now prevails between the orthodox Mohammedan religion and the reformed or Wahabee faith, will necessarily be brought to the notice of the Committee, and in this respect it will be attended with obvious advantage that the Mohammedans of this country generally, who hear of these proceedings, should know that they have been submitted to persons of their own tribe and creed, conjointly with British officers, and not to the latter exclusively.

"Proof will be given to the country at large that we not only acknowledge a community of interests between this State and the British Government, but we shall exhibit upon a small scale, what I think it is highly desirable we should begin to do on a more extensive one, a wish to see brought prominently forward and employed in honourable office, and united with us in our councils and deliberations, men of rank and respectability among the Mohammedans.

"I should have wished for the instructions of the Supreme Government before I adopted the measures above described; but the time required for this would have annulled, or at least weakened, some of the anticipated results; and procrastination or apparent hesitation might only have emboldened the Chiefs and others who are in league against us, to proceed to the completion of their treacherous designs.

"This State cannot but be regarded as a powerful and important one; and situated, as the Nizam's country is, in the heart of India, of which it constitutes a large portion, the disposition of its Government can scarcely fail to exercise a considerable moral influence over the

Mussulman population in our own dominions. It is of the greatest consequence, therefore, to preserve the tranquillity of this country, and to maintain the friendly feelings which the Nizam now maintains for us.

“Mubariz ood-dowla, from his rank and family, and his ambitious and sanguinary character, might have proved a very dangerous foe to the public peace; and it is a source of gratification to me to know, from the assurances of the Nizam himself, that he is quite secure in the Fort of Golconda, and that there is no risk of his making his escape”

By the labours of this mixed Commission it was very clearly ascertained that Mubariz-ood-dowla had been deeply engaged in treasonous conspiracy with the Nawab of Kurnool, and had attempted to open negotiations with the Nawab of Tonk, the Nawab of Rampore, and many other Mussulman Princes and Chiefs, with hostile intent against the British Government, and against his brother the Nizam, whom he was endeavouring to supplant. It was proved that he had provided himself with two new seals, on one of which he described himself as “Omar, the son of Abd-ul-Azeez, Leader of the Moslems (Rais-ul-muslimin), Mubariz-ood-dowla, Successor of the martyr, Syud Ahmed”. On the other was the inscription, “The Protector of Religion, the Defender of the Moslem Faith, Mubariz-ood-Dowla.” These self-assumed titles were, as everyone who understands the forms and maxims of Mussulman Government will understand, a flagrant act of rebellion against his own Sovereign, and proof positive of determined hostility to British power.

The much more serious and alarming fact was also proved in the course of this inquiry, that Mubariz-ood-dowla and his gang, through the medium of Moulavees and fakeers, chiefly professing the new Wahabee tenets, who visited the lines of our Native Regiments at Secunderabad, and in some instances resided there, had been tampering with the loyalty of our Mussulman Sepoys—the Madras troops including a much larger and more influential Mohammedan element than either the Bengal or the Bombay Army. Lord Auckland had, from the first, been of opinion that when the conspirators were distinctly baffled, and their designs fathomed, the inquiry had better not be pushed too far, and that public prosecutions should, if possible, be avoided.

General Fraser had arrived at the same conclusion, when in May 1840 he submitted to the Government of India the pro-

ceedings of the mixed Commission of Inquiry. He recommended that Mubariz-ood-dowla and the Moulavees in custody, who were his most active agents, should be detained as State prisoners "until the perfect tranquillity of the country, and the cessation of external war", should admit of their being liberated without danger to the peace of India.

The wave of fanatical and malcontent excitement which swept through India about 1839, was by no means unknown or unprecedented in the annals of Indian history, and might, perhaps, be considered liable to recur; but it was, after all, a passing phenomenon, and had been successfully encountered and subdued. There were difficulties of a far deeper and more fundamental character connected with the administration of Hyderabad, with which General Fraser, from his first assumption of the Residency in 1838 to the day of his departure in 1852, conceived himself bound in duty to contend, equally with a regard for Imperial interests, and for those of the allied and protected State to which he was accredited. The finances of Hyderabad were in a condition of disorder and embarrassment that precluded all efficient administration and impeded every plan of reform, while this condition had lasted for so many years that it might be considered permanent, unless it could be cured by some heroic remedy. Such a remedy, General Fraser believed, was within our reach and capable of application. Although from our original relations with the Nizam, and under the stipulation of existing Treaties, we had no right of direct interference or dictation in his internal affairs, a long chain of circumstances had established so many and such close ties between the affairs of that Prince and our own, that it was impossible for the British Resident to abstain for any length of time from offering counsel and suggesting measures with more or less of energy and persistence. The chief cause at once of the Nizam's financial difficulties, and of the inability of our Government either to check them, or to escape being entangled in them, was—in the opinion of Lord Dalhousie and others,—the Contingent, commonly called in those days the Nizam's Army, commanded by British officers under the direction of the British Resident. "The debt to the British Government which burdens the Nizam", said Lord Dalhousie in 1853, "has been produced by the Contingent. The monthly subsidy, for which the Resident at

Hyderabad maintains a perpetual wrestle with the Dewan, and which transforms the representative of the British Government by turns into an importunate creditor and a bailiff in execution, is the pay of the Contingent. Were that sort of demand and dispute once adjusted, there is no Native State in India whose relations with the British Government would, as far as we know, be more friendly and unruffled. The Nizam has been our ally for much more than half a century."

"This Government," continues Lord Dalhousie. "disclaims not only the intention, but the wish, of doing any act by which the independence of the Nizam can be in any degree impaired. The Treaty itself offers a bar to any such design, by declaring, in the most emphatic terms, that the Government of India binds itself in no way to interfere with His Highness's subjects, servants, or concerns."¹

Two years previously, Lord Dalhousie had expressed himself even more strongly and clearly to the same effect:—

"Were it not for the existence of the Subsidiary and Contingent forces, our relations with the State of Hyderabad would be merely those which usually are formed between two independent Powers, and the position of the Resident would correspond in every respect with that of any accredited Minister of a foreign State."²

Very confused and contradictory notions as to the origin and legal status of the Hyderabad Contingent, or Nizam's Army, having prevailed, and having been officially stated, from time to time, at home and in India, it will be as well to introduce here a document dated four years before General Fraser assumed charge of the Residency, dealing with the history and constitution of that force from the very beginning, very slightly abridged.

"The first notice I find on the Records regarding the reformation of the Nizam's army is contained in a letter from Mr. Henry Russell, then Resident at Hyderabad, dated the 10th July 1811, from which I beg leave to subjoin an extract. Mr. Russell, in describing the deteriorated condition of Berar, stated that various causes might be assigned for that deterioration. Having treated of the number and power of the Naicks (a description of rebel and plunderer) as the first cause, of the local position of Holkar's district of Umber as the second cause, of the invasion of the Pindaries as the third, he proceeds:—

¹ *Papers, Nizam's Debts* (418 of 1854), pp. 98, 99.

² *Ibid.*, p. 37.

“Fourthly,—The defects in the military establishment. The whole of the Nizam’s troops now stationed in Berar, including those of the Jageerdars subject to the authority of the Local Government, consist of about 9,000 cavalry, about 3,000 irregular and about 5,000 regular infantry, with about 25 guns. Of the cavalry, about 5,500 are Sircar, and about 3,500 Jageerdar troops. All the irregular infantry are Sircar troops, except one small corps of about 700 men belonging to Shums-ool-Oomrah. Of the regular infantry, two battalions, consisting of about 900 men each, belong to Salabut Khan, and the remainder compose what is called the Nizam’s establishment of regular infantry in Berar. Salabut Khan’s two battalions, and Shums-ool-Oomrah’s irregular corps, have each of them two guns. All the remaining guns are attached to the Sircar troops.

“The cavalry in Berar are of as good a description as the ordinary run of Native cavalry in India. In every party, some will be found better than others; but, upon the whole, they are very much upon an equality. They are all of the kind called Silladar, where the horse is the property of his rider, to distinguish them from the Bargeer cavalry, who are mounted on horses belonging to the Government. Their pay varies from 40 to 50 rupees a month for both the rider and his horse, and one of the express conditions of the service is, that the horseman is not to receive any compensation if his horse is either maimed or killed in battle. The horseman’s subsistence depends entirely upon his horse. He generally borrows the money with great difficulty to buy him, and if he loses him, can seldom raise money to buy another. The loss of his horse, therefore, is the loss of his bread. The cavalry is very irregularly paid, too, as all the troops of Native Governments are, so that it would be unreasonable to expect much activity or exertion from them on any occasion.

“In the year 1804, a proposal was made by us to the Nizam to maintain a regular establishment of the Silladar cavalry, on the same footing as that maintained by the Government of Mysore. This proposal led to a long negotiation; and the Nizam at last consented generally to raise a body of Silladar cavalry, but he objected to all those parts of the plan by which alone its efficiency would have been ensured, and the proposal was therefore abandoned. The Nizam refused to make any satisfactory arrangement for their being regularly paid; and without that, they would not have been at all superior to any other party of horse in his service.

“The defects in this part of the establishment are too radical to be removed; but, although nothing can perhaps be done to make any substantial improvement in the condition of the cavalry, our influence may no doubt be usefully exerted in keeping their numbers as complete as possible, in getting them paid more regularly than they are at

present, and in suggesting plans for their disposition and employment.

“The irregular infantry chiefly perform the duties of Sebundies, and are indeed fit for nothing else. They may be useful in obviating the necessity of employing the regular troops for the collection of the Revenue, but it would be vain to think of their ever being made useful in any other way. The pay of the Sepoys in the irregular corps is from five rupees to five rupees and a half a month. There is also a party of about 200 Arabs included under the head of irregular troops.

“The two regular battalions belonging to Salabut Khan are very respectable corps. They are commanded by an Englishman of the name of Drew, who has a few other Englishmen employed as officers under him. The men are dressed like our Sepoys, and armed with our muskets, and, what is of much greater importance than anything else, they are very regularly paid. These corps are always stationed in advance, and I believe that their fidelity and discipline may on all occasions be confidently relied on.

“The Nizam’s own establishment of Regular Infantry is the most important part of his whole army to us. It is that which we are most concerned in improving and maintaining in efficiency, and to which our influence and attention may be most usefully and most successfully directed. It consists of six battalions, nominally of 800 men each, which are divided into two brigades. Each brigade is commanded by an European officer, who is called a Major, and each separate battalion has an European Captain Commandant and an European Adjutant. The men are dressed like our Sepoys, and armed with our muskets, and their establishment of native officers is nearly the same as that maintained in our native corps. The nominal pay of the men is seven rupees a month. Each battalion has a brigade of six-pounders and four tumbrils attached to it.

“To make his establishment really useful, both the number and respectability of the British officers ought to be gradually increased, the corps ought to be maintained at their full nominal Establishment; the men ought to be well paid and regularly disciplined, and they should be supplied occasionally with arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, to be purchased by the Nizam out of our stores. But the prescribing of these measures will be of no avail unless the Resident has the means of ascertaining that they are really adopted; and this he cannot have if he is obliged to rely for information upon the officers immediately belonging to the corps; both because, being dependent in a considerable degree upon the Nizam’s chief officer for the advantage and security of their situations, they would be afraid to report any of his abuses to the Resident, and because they would, in many cases,

find their own personal interest, either in joining in the extortions and peculations of the Mootsuddies, or in practising extortions and peculations of their own. But if an officer, on the part of our own Government, were stationed in Berar, and invested with a general superintendence and control over these corps, he would be able not only to keep the Resident constantly and accurately informed of their real condition, but also to exercise, upon the spot, that immediate personal authority which is indispensably necessary, first to raise them to a state of efficiency, and afterwards to check the operation of the numerous causes which would otherwise tend to reduce them to decay. If this measure were adopted, the establishment would soon become extremely respectable, and would conduce, in a very important degree, to preserve the internal tranquillity of the country, to support the authority of the Nizam's Government, and to confirm the security of our own interests. The maintenance of our establishment of regular troops, officered by persons of English birth or descent, is at once the most safe and the most effectual method of improving the military force of our Native allies, and affords perhaps the best remedy that can be applied to the defects which are inherent in the system of subsidiary alliances.'

"In consequence of the absence of the Governor-General from the Presidency, no determination was come to at the time on the above communication, and Mr. Russell addressed a second letter to Government, dated 31st March 1813, of which the following is a copy of the first four paragraphs:—

" 'Soon after the mutiny which took place in his corps last November, Mr. Gordon expressed a wish to retire from the Nizam's service, and Rajah Chundoo Lall transferred the men of his corps to Mr. Beckett, with orders to complete the battalion previously raised by him to the strength of 800 privates, and also to raise a second battalion of the same strength. Mr. Beckett has already made considerable progress towards the completion of this corps, to which the name of the "Russell Brigade" has been given. The men are armed, clothed, and equipped in every respect like our own Sepoys, and I trust they will be paid also with equal regularity. The first battalion is now paid out of my treasury on the 1st of every month by an order on the Peishcar, and I hope I shall be able to prevail on Rajah Chundoo Lall to extend the same arrangement to the second battalion as soon as it is completed. By the enclosed Return of the detail which has been fixed for this new brigade, the Right Honourable the Governor-General will see that it will amount altogether to very near two thousand men, and that a train of artillery, consisting of one 24-pounder, four 6-pounders, and two 5½-inch howitzers, is to be attached to it.

" 'In consequence of the application contained in my despatch to

the Chief Secretary of the 4th August 1812, Captain Beckett's original battalion has already been supplied with arms and accoutrements. I have now the honour to enclose a list of the articles which are required to complete the equipment of the new brigade in its full strength, and have been desired by the Minister to request that he may be permitted to purchase them out of our stores at Secunderabad, on indent under the signature of the Commandant and the counter-signature of the Resident, to be, of course, paid for by the Nizam's Government.

“ ‘ Mr. Beckett, by whom the Russell Brigade is now commanded, is a gentleman of birth and education. He has been for several years in the military profession, has seen a great deal of service, and is perfectly well acquainted with the languages, manners, and customs of India. I have the fullest confidence in his integrity and talents, and am satisfied that he is in every respect qualified to do credit to the situation in which he is placed. All the other officers are gentlemen of unquestionable character, and as soon as the Native part of the Establishment is completed, I shall recommend the Minister to make some addition to the number.’

“ The suggestions of the Resident were approved of in a letter, dated 15th of May 1813, in the following terms :—

“ ‘ I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st March, reporting the progress which has been made in forming a brigade of regular infantry in the service of the Nizam, under the command of Mr. Beckett, and communicating an application from Rajah Chundoo Lall for permission to purchase from the public stores the arms, accoutrements, and other articles required to complete the equipments of the brigade.

“ ‘ The Governor-General in Council having been pleased to comply with the Rajah's application, the necessary communication will be made to the Honourable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, who will be requested to communicate with you on the subject.

“ ‘ Your report on the state and progress of the new brigade, and of the respectable and efficient footing on which it is to be placed, is very satisfactory to the Governor-General in Council. His Lordship in Council entirely concurs with you in the expediency of gradually effecting a reduction in the Nizam's Irregular Infantry, and of supplying their place with corps formed on the plan of the brigade commanded by Mr. Beckett, and his Lordship in Council would approve of your availing yourself of any favourable opportunity which may present itself of pointing out the advantage of such a measure to the Minister.’

“ Captain Sydenham had been previously invested with the general superintendence of the Nizam's troops in Berar, and he was assisted in the duty by a Brigade Major.

"I find a letter from the Secret Committee, dated the 3rd April 1815, in which they deprecated our disciplining the troops of our Native allies generally, on the ground of its furnishing means of offence against ourselves; and another letter, dated 8th December 1819, strongly objecting to the appointment of half-pay officers of His Majesty's Army to the service of the native Powers.

"In reply to the last communication, the Supreme Government wrote as follows:—

"At Hyderabad and Nagpore the Residents had seen the policy of fashioning a portion of the allied army, so as that it might be eventually serviceable to your Government, while it would really be efficacious towards keeping within due submission the Zemindars who were otherwise habitually refractory. Having satisfied the Ministers of the benefit which would be derived to the State by the proper organisation of part of the forces, the Resident agreed to furnish a certain number of European officers to discipline what were called the Reformed Corps. The perfecting those troops in military exercise might not have been politic unless their devotion to us were secured by the stipulation that they should receive their pay through the European officers, from funds furnished for the purpose by the Minister to the Resident. The Reformed Corps thus became in truth a part of your army, though an inexpensive one, as they were maintained by their ostensible Sovereign. Their fidelity to your Government was not a delusive speculation. At the battle of Kirkee the Peishwah's Reformed troops fought on our side against their nominal master, and this was merely through the influence of their officers, their pay being received by those troops directly from the Peishwah.

"After such an experience, the motive for keeping those corps efficient at Hyderabad and Nagpore was much strengthened. The supplying them with officers could not afford any private gratification to the Governor-General or Members of Council which might unconsciously bias their judgment as to the measure. Holding the Residents responsible for the condition and management of those Reformed Corps, Government left the selection of officers absolutely and exclusively to those gentlemen. The request of the Residents was met in every instance where some decisive obstacle did not oppose itself.

"As this was a temporary provision for the maintenance of corps in themselves liable to be suddenly reduced at the will of the Native Sovereign, it did not occur to the Governor-General in Council as necessary to submit the arrangement specially to your Honourable Court, though the applications of the Residents, and our assent to them, of course appeared on our proceedings.'

"The letter from the Secret Committee, dated the 3rd April 1815, was not replied to until 1823, when the arguments contained in it were

combatted in a letter which I understand was written by Mr. Adam while at Bombay. The main arguments used are, that if commanded by British officers the Native troops of our allies would be virtually ours, or that if they deserted their European officers, they would be unable to act with discipline, and that under any circumstances such reformed troops would never be able to compete with our regular armies.

“In the meantime, in the year 1816, I find a correspondence regarding the Nizam’s cavalry, of which the following is an extract of a letter from the Resident at Hyderabad, dated 15th April 1816:—

“There are two measures, however, which before all others, would be fundamentally necessary to the proper constitution of this force—the provision of funds for its regular payment, and the placing it under the direction of European officers. Any plan of reform which might be undertaken would, I am persuaded, be found totally nugatory without the security of these two measures.

“The cavalry would neither be placed upon a respectable footing, nor maintained in efficiency, nor employed with judgment, promptitude, or effect in any case whatever, unless it were commanded and led by European officers. For all ordinary and internal purposes, the command might still be exercised by their own officers, and each division, when they are separately employed upon any service, should also have an European officer to lead and direct it.

“These two principal objects, for both the regular payment and the efficient command of the cavalry, being once accomplished, there would be no difficulty in introducing such few minor provisions as would be necessary. The following are perhaps the principal:—

“1. Every man and horse should be examined and registered, either by the European commanding officer or by some person delegated by him for that purpose.

“2. All musters shall be made in the same way.

“3. The value of every horse should be estimated and entered in the Register; and the owner of every horse killed or disabled in service should be paid for him by the Government at that rate.

“4. The European commanding officer should be authorised to see that every man is regularly and duly paid, and to receive and redress all complaints which may be made to him of injustice or severity of any kind.

“The pay of every Silladar horseman should not be less than forty rupees, and that of every Bargeer not less than fifteen rupees a month, and this pay they should receive without any stoppages or reduction whatever.

“The European commanding officer would correspond regularly with the Resident and the Agent in Berar.

“The introduction of this plan in the first instance will certainly be attended with difficulties, but I hope they will not be insurmountable. The joint authority of Rajah Chundoo Lall and Rajah Govind Buksh would probably be sufficient for the adoption of every measure that would be necessary; and as the plan in its present proposed extent would not involve the interests of any of the principal Ameers about the Court, it might not be found necessary to make any reference to the Nizam's personal authority. This, indeed, it would be desirable to avoid if possible, as we are almost sure of encountering his opposition in every measure we propose, be the intrinsic merits what they may. It would also be important to abstain as far as possible from any proposal that would be likely to excite the opposition, either of Rajah Chundoo Lall or Rajah Govind Buksh.

“For the present, also, it would be sufficient to propose the plan to Rajah Chundoo Lall, both as limited in its extent and temporary in its duration. If it should be found on trial to answer the expectations it is reasonable to entertain of it, the Ministers themselves would derive so much security and advantage from its operation, that they would hereafter concur with little difficulty in any proposal for increasing the numerical strength of the party and making it a permanent Establishment.’

“To the above propositions a reply was sent to the Secretary to Government, in a letter dated 27th of July 1816, from which the following is an extract:—

“I now proceed to the still more important object of the reform of the Nizam's cavalry. This subject, and the means of effecting it, appear to have been so carefully examined and fully discussed by yourself and Captain Sydenham, with a perfect knowledge of all local and personal considerations involved in the plan, as to leave little more to be stated by the Governor-General in Council than his concurrence in your sentiments on the question generally, as well as on the details and his desire that the necessary communications may be opened with the Government of His Highness the Nizam without delay, with a view to carrying it into effect.’

“From the period when the above despatch was written, the number of European officers in the service of the Nizam appears to have been gradually increasing. At the recommendation of the Resident, Company's officers, King's officers, and individuals not in either of the Services, were appointed.

“On the 7th of May 1828, the Honourable Court wrote in the following terms:—

“After acknowledging the receipt of our despatch of the 21st January 1824, and referring to your previous letter of the 18th of December 1823, you express a hope that the arguments therein con-

tained will have induced us to review the whole question, and to modify the orders conveyed in our despatch in the Military Department of the 21st January 1824, which, in consequence of a continued state of war, and the demand thereby occasioned for the services of the officers belonging to our army, you had hitherto been unable to carry into effect without completely disorganising the disciplined corps of the Native Powers. You further advert to the tranquillity and good order which had been maintained during the late war, by means of those disciplined corps, in the States of Hyderabad and Nagpore; and after quoting a passage from the Minute of the Marquis of Hastings, dated 3rd June 1820 (which was before us when our political despatch of the 21st January 1824 was written), you conclude by urging on our consideration the extreme severity with which our orders would operate on the British officers not in the service of His Majesty or of the Company, now employed with these disciplined corps, should their removal be insisted on.

“That portion of your letter which respects our orders in the Military Department has been replied to from that department. That having been done, there is little for us to add in this department further than that our sentiments on the general question remain unchanged.

“The arguments contained in your letter of the 18th December 1823, bear exclusively on the view of the subject taken in our Secret Committee's despatch of the 3rd April 1815, and we are willing to admit that, in that particular view of the question, they have great weight. But you must be sensible that the more serious objections to the system were stated in considerable detail in our despatch from this department of the 21st January 1824.¹ We have never denied nor doubted that the system is productive of some important advantages; but what we have contended is, that these advantages are too dearly purchased, and that on the whole the disadvantages preponderate. It appears to us that you look at one side of the question only, whilst we have endeavoured to regard it in its various bearings; and until it is shown that we have committed some mistake either in our data or in our conclusions, we cannot be expected to alter our opinions.

“That we never contemplated a sudden and total change of system must have been obvious to you from paragraphs 78 and 90 of our despatch from this department of the 21st January 1824. But

¹ This is a very long and discursive despatch, containing a great variety of objections to the system of interference with the internal concerns of Native States. The most forcible objection, to my mind, appears to be that which refers to the loss of influence and emolument which it occasions to the Native officers of such States.

there is a wide difference between reluctantly tolerating for a time an evil which cannot be promptly and radically cured without the infliction of a greater (every palliation of which it is susceptible being in the meanwhile applied), and pronouncing it to be a benefit which, so far from wishing to withdraw, we should be anxious to diffuse.

“In conclusion, we refer you to the positive instructions which will be conveyed to you from the Military Department in an early despatch.”

“Sir Charles Metcalfe, shortly after the receipt of this despatch, recorded a Minute under date the 17th May 1829, from which the following is an extract.

“The existence of a force paid by a Native State, but commanded by our officers and entirely under our control, is undoubtedly a great political advantage. It is an accession to our military strength at the expense of another Power, and without cost to us; an accession of military strength in a conquered Empire where military strength is everything. The advantage is immense. But I cannot say that I think the arrangement a just one towards the Native State. The same circumstances which make it so advantageous to us, make it unjust to the State at whose expense it is upheld.

“The subserviency of the Minister at Hyderabad has rendered this kind of force in the Nizam’s territories a sort of plaything for the Resident, and an extensive source of patronage, at the Nizam’s expense. The temptation is difficult to resist, and it is more to be regretted than wondered at that the expense is increasing. It appears from returns prepared in the Secretary’s office that the military and civil allowances paid by the Nizam’s Government to British officers amounted, according to earliest report received from Hyderabad, under date 1st January 1824, to 11,11,098 Hyderabad rupees, the number of officers being 101. On the 28th January 1825, to 9,16,260 for 83 officers. On the 1st March 1826, 9,99,420 rupees for 101 officers. On the 3rd December 1826, to rupees 11,34,828 for 116 persons. On the 31st December 1827, to rupees 12,48,696 for 119 persons; and on the 1st December 1828, rupees 13,49,880 for 123 persons. The necessity for this increase in the last two years is by no means obvious. The intermediate decrease, in 1824 and 1825, was no doubt owing principally, if not wholly, to the absence of officers during the Burmese War, who must, however, have returned by the end of 1826.

“It is not to be expected that we could withdraw entirely from all civil and military interference in the Nizam’s Government with perfect and unalloyed benefit.

“We must be prepared for mismanagement in the civil administration, whoever might be Minister. The loss of the force at our disposal would be a positive diminution of our military strength; and in future we should again have to complain of the inefficiency of the auxiliary

force which the Nizam is bound by treaty to furnish. We must also be prepared, if we withdraw our officers, to see the formation of corps under European or East Indian adventurers, such as formerly existed in the Nizam's service.

"Nevertheless, the restoration of independence to the Nizam's Government appears to me to be an object worthy of our attention; and worth some loss and some hazard, whenever it can be effectually accomplished.'

"It is within the recollection of Government that the Secret Committee, in a despatch dated 16th June 1830, strongly disapproved an arrangement which had been entered into with the State of Nagpore, by which we relinquished all control over the troops of that State, receiving in lieu a tribute or subsidy of eight lacs of rupees per annum. It is curious to find the Secret Committee of that day holding a line of argument wholly at variance with that of their predecessors, and finding fault with Government for doing that which the Government, considering the measure as an abstract question, had all along been opposed to. Not that there was any inconsistency on the part of Government; it parted with a positive good for what it conceived would be a greater benefit.

"This will appear more clearly from the following passages extracted from Sir Charles Metcalfe's Minute, recorded on the receipt of the above despatch.

"The real effects of the modification of our engagements with the Nagpore State were these:—We relinquished to the Rajah the command of a body of his own troops before commanded by British officers, and the government of a portion of his territory which had been reserved for the pay of those troops. We also abrogated several stipulations which gave us the right of interference in his internal administration, and that of introducing our troops into his fortresses, retaining nevertheless the right of interference in extreme cases. We became entitled at the same time to a tribute of eight lacs per annum, applicable to our own expenses. Such are the changes actually produced by that arrangement, and as they do not necessarily involve any consequences beyond what are apparent, the good and evil of the scheme may be at once estimated. The good seems to me to predominate, because we gain an accession of income highly desirable to meet our own expenditure, and more, because we improve the condition of our ally, and release him from galling bondage. The loss of the command of the auxiliary force is not a loss of such extent as need be attended with any serious apprehension. One half of it is replaced by the tribute acquired; and neither our security in India, nor our power to effect every proper object of an alliance with a Native State, will depend on the other half.

“ ‘It appears, in the case of Nagpore, that, under the peculiar circumstances of our conquest of the country, and subsequent establishment of an infant Rajah, whose territory we ruled for him during his minority, we acquired both the right and the habit of internal interference, and secured the former by treaty when we were relaxing the latter. With respect to Nagpore, therefore, whether it was desirable to maintain or relinquish some of the rights which we had acquired first by conquest and afterwards by treaty, is a question of policy, on which there may naturally be a difference of opinion. But the case of Nagpore is a singular one. That of Mysore approaches it the nearest. No other great State is in the same predicament.

“ ‘Let that of Hyderabad, for instance, be taken as an example. We never conquered the Nizam’s territories. Our relation with that Prince has always been one of alliance, and his alliance was once held to be of so much importance, that the officer who negotiated the treaty establishing it, was rewarded with a baronetcy. Since that period we have assumed much interference in that country, not warranted by any of our treaties. We effected the elevation of a Minister, who, emboldened by our support, ceased to be the Minister of his own Sovereign, and became, in fact, the reckless ruler of the country. Our extended interference then became necessary to remedy the mischiefs created by our former interference. We became bound to rectify our own misdoings. But when a new Nizam, succeeding to the lost rights of his father, demanded that our interference should be withdrawn, the claim could hardly, in justice, be denied. It was granted, and the opportunity was taken to withdraw the protection which we had granted to the Minister, and what had so long been a cause of constant embarrassment in our proceedings. Our command of a considerable portion of the Nizam’s troops still continues, but this is not derived from any treaty, but from an arrangement with the Minister whom we supported, and who, being still in power, finds this force essential for his own security and domination. When that cause for its continuance shall cease, it is not improbable that the Nizam’s Government will become impatient of the burthen, and demand its removal. I am disposed to think that we should have no right to resist the claim, although nothing, I presume, would now be done on such a demand without previous sanction from home. We should have a right to revert to those stipulations of treaty, in lieu of which an auxiliary force was placed under the command of European officers, and thence became subject by degrees to our entire authority; but I do not believe that any of our treaties with the Hyderabad State would justify our assumption of the permanent command of its armies; and it is only with regard to a specific force that we have ever pretended to exercise the command. Not only is our command of the Nizam’s auxiliary force liable to be withdrawn on the

Nizam's requisition, but it is likely to cease from another cause. It gives an undue power to the Government over its subjects, and may lead to our being the instruments of oppression. The aid of that force ought to be refused when we doubt the justice of the cause for which it may be required; and if the demand were often made and often rejected, such a state of things could not last long. It would almost necessarily lead to a dissolution of the arrangement by which we hold the practical command of a body of the Nizam's troops.

"I have taken the instance of Hyderabad, because our interference there has been great and of long continuance in various forms. But it is not justified by treaty, and what remains of it must in justice yield to a proper demand on the part of the Nizam."

"From the correspondence out of which the above copious extracts have been made, two facts may be held to be established—first, that the disciplining the troops of the Native Powers by means of British officers was regarded as a positive accession of strength to ourselves; and secondly, as involving such an undue interference with the affairs of our allies, that it was a proceeding not altogether just to them.

"The question for present consideration seems to be whether, in the event of the Nizam's requiring the withdrawal of the European officers from the troops, we should be warranted in refusing compliance, and whether, under the instructions from the Home Authorities, we should at all events await their instructions before doing so.

"With regard to the first question, I am decidedly of opinion that there is no agreement, express or implied, between us and His Highness's Government which could warrant our keeping European officers with His Highness's troops against his wishes.

"With regard to the second point, all I can find on record with express reference to the point, is an order from the Secret Committee, dated the 18th June 1830, in these words:—'You will not, except in any case of emergency, alter *any existing Treaty* with a Native Power without a previous communication with us.' The entire despatch, however, is so hostile to our relinquishment of any military advantages we may have obtained, that it is doubtful how far Government would be justified in withdrawing its officers at the requisition of the Nizam without a previous reference to the Home Authorities.

"But we have no treaty stipulating for the retention of European officers, or otherwise authorising us to interfere with the Nizam's troops. The treaty says he shall furnish a certain force in time of war. Would it not be a very strained interpretation of the treaty to argue that we are justified in appointing our own officers to his troops as a precautionary measure to secure their efficiency in time of war?"

Much of the information contained in this note has already appeared in the Hyderabad Papers submitted to Parliament in 1824, and this *précis*, coming down to a later date, drawn up by General Fraser's friend, Mr. (afterwards Sir William Hay) Macnaghten, was probably forwarded for the Resident's guidance on his arrival at Hyderabad.

Here is another letter to Lord Elphinstone, in which General Fraser describes his first interview with the Nizam. It is dated 26th October 1838:—

"I am much obliged to your lordship for the intelligence you were so good as to give me regarding political events, for though there are gentlemen here who have correspondents in Lord Auckland's camp, I do not think we get much more news by this means than we find in the public papers. We seem to be in rather a difficult situation all over India; and what with the Burmese, the Ghoorkas, several hostile tribes of Afghans, the Persians, and the Russians against us, and probably much disaffection to our Government on the part of many of the native Princes, our position cannot be considered to be exempt from danger, or such as not to require all the ability, foresight and energy, with which nature or experience may have endowed the Governor-General.

"If Russia is really in the background of the *mêlée*, our danger is largely increased. Her Government is too calm, and possessed of too calculating a judgment to have promoted war, or to have given us grounds for commencing it, without being well aware of the circumstances and the probable course of future events. It is impossible to say how far the Russians may have tampered with the external enemies around our frontier, or with the Native States that are nearer to ourselves. I have found no Russian *vakeel* here yet, though I have received communications from other Residents respecting Nepaulese and Persian emissaries. There is one of the latter at this moment in the city of Hyderabad, who is supposed to have letters about him for the Nizam's Government. The Persian friend with whom he is living, obtained possession of some of his papers, and sent them to my Assistant, Capt. Malcolm. They were two genuine *Khurcetas* in original, from the Governor-General and the Governor of Bombay, addressed to the Prince (heir apparent) of Persia, and contained nothing but the ordinary compliments. The Persian with whom the man is living, still supposes that he will discover some letters from Persia, if he is allowed to remain quiet for a few days. There was a traveller of this description at Bhopál a few days ago, as the Resident wrote to me, who distinctly stated to the person with whom he put up on his arrival there, that he had some letters about him from the Persian

Court for different Native Princes; but he unfortunately made his escape before he could be apprehended. That person, however, from the description, I received of him, cannot be the same that I have been speaking of. You mention that the Russian expedition on Khiva has failed. We have not yet heard how this event occurred, but whether the Russians have met with a repulse or not, it is important to know that they had actually commenced their march in that direction. If they have really met with a reverse at Khiva, the newspaper reports of their being in force at Samarcand, and intending to proceed in the direction of Candahar, cannot be true.

"I can hardly say yet whether I like or dislike my duty here, for I have as yet had little or none to perform. About a dozen Persian notes pass every day between the Minister and myself; but they are of such little importance that I have usually nothing more to do than to hand them over to Captain Moore or Captain Malcolm in their several departments. Men of rank, influence and ability, connected with the Court, are prevented from coming near me by the jealousy of the Minister. I have tried to turn this custom to advantage, by applying to the Minister for a report on the state of the country, which, as I have truly said to him, I can obtain from no one but himself. This may furnish me with materials, which I shall try to strengthen from other sources, for such observations as I may see fit to make, either officially or privately, to Lord Auckland, on the condition of the Nizam's dominions. I am inclined to suspect there has been some exaggeration in the accounts we have heard of the maladministration of this country. I found it, on crossing the Kistna, more fertile and better cultivated than many of the Company's districts I had passed through. Very few complaints have yet reached me, though this may, perhaps, be attributed to a system that appears to have been long established here, of discouraging the presentation of petitions to the Resident. I understand from officers who come in here occasionally from different parts of the Nizam's country, that the ryots are at least as happy as in our own territory, and that they are by no means disposed to consider as a grievance the absence of our artificial arrangements for the administration of justice and the collection of revenue.

"Chundoo Lall, the Minister, is a remarkable man. Above seventy-seven years of age, attenuated to a mere shadow, and bent nearly double, he yet has all the active intelligence of earlier life, and the same keen and expressive eye, with that pleasing and benevolent smile that never abandons him. When he called upon me he was obliged, on alighting from his elephant, to be borne up the steps of the Residency in a tonjon.¹ He conversed with me for an hour in the most animated way possible, speaking Hindustani and Persian with equal fluency.

¹ A sort of sedan chair.

"When I returned his visit, which was in the evening a few days afterwards, he gave me a magnificent entertainment in the grandest and most Oriental style. I had paid my respects to the Nizam on the same day that the Minister first called upon me, and immediately after his visit, so that he only just had time to go from my house to the Palace to conduct me to His Highness's presence. The Nizam received me standing in front of his musnud, and embraced me in the usual Mohammedan fashion. He is a tall, fine-looking man, but with rather a heavy, unintellectual expression. He spoke to me, from some motive of form and etiquette, only through the channel of the Minister, who sat on the ground immediately behind me. He said very little, and his principal questions were to ask after your Lordship's health and that of the Governor-General—how long I had been on the road, and what sort of climate there was at Madras. He abstained as much as possible from looking me in the face, but was occupied in moving his lips, as if he were muttering something to himself, while he stared in a vacant manner upon the empty air before him in the open apartment where we were sitting. Tired of his silence, and fancying that he, perhaps, expected me to say something, I addressed a few remarks to him on the honourable office to which I had been appointed at his Court, and expressed the usual diplomatic hope that I might be so happy as to maintain and strengthen the friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments. I thought that this would have stimulated him to some civility in return, but he replied only by the two words, 'Insha Ullah',—*Deo volente*. When we came away I questioned the gentlemen who were with me whether there had not been some apparent want of politeness on the part of His Highness; but they informed me that, on the contrary, he had spoken more than they had ever heard him do before, and that his manner had been unusually gracious.

"The question respecting the rate of exchange at which the troops at Secunderabad should be paid is rather a difficult one, and I have sent your Lordship a memo. on this subject by the Military Secretary, Major Moore, rather than commit my own judgment on a matter which I have not yet studied sufficiently.

"The best and most effective measure, perhaps, is that which at once suggested itself to me, and which, indeed, I have often thought of as being very desirable in Travancore also. This is to propose to the Native State to coin rupees not only of an undeviating value, but of a value exactly equal to the Company's rupee. The legend on the money might still be that of the Nizam, so that the sovereign right of coinage would still be preserved to him. To insure a fixed and permanent value, it would be requisite that there should be but one mint in the Nizam's dominions, and that it should be superintended by a

European officer. At present money is coined at several places in the country. The next best, and indeed the only alternative plan, so far as I can perceive, would be to fix the exchange of the Company's rupee according to the intrinsic value of the average Hyderabad rupee, which Major Moore thinks would be about 100 Madras rupees for 117 or 117½ Hyderabad rupees. I enclose Major Moore's written report on the subject.

"I have adopted the same plan with regard to the information which you desire as to the number of troops which should be kept in this country to ensure its tranquillity, and of the number which might be spared for service beyond the frontier. I should myself have been disposed to be satisfied with a less number in this country, but I would by no means think of placing my opinion in opposition to Major Moore, who is a man of the soundest sense and discretion, and, from his long residence in the country, intimately acquainted with its peculiarities and with the disposition of the people. Although perfectly quiet now, he thinks there are many jaghiredars, Naiks, Bheel chiefs, and others, who remain so only because they know we have a force at command by which they could at any time be coerced and punished, or reduced to obedience. A sketch map accompanies Major Moore's memorandum, by which your Lordship will at once perceive the disposition of our military posts furnished by the Nizam's Army throughout the country. The great number of detached posts on the North-West are for the purpose of keeping in order the Bheels, who abound there; and I understand that whenever the experiment has been tried of withdrawing any of those small detachments, the Bheels have always descended from their fastnesses, and renewed their depredations.

"The Subsidiary Force should consist, according to the 3rd Article of the Treaty of 1800, of 8000 firelocks, and 1000 horse, besides artillery, which it certainly does not do at present; and by the 12th Article of the same Treaty, if war breaks out between *the contracting parties* and any other Power whatever, the Subsidiary Force, with the reserve of two battalions to remain near H.H.'s person, may be immediately put into motion for the purpose of opposing the enemy.

"The same Article specifies the number of troops of the Nizam's own Army who, upon such an occasion, are to accompany and co-operate with the Subsidiary Force.

"If anything particular occurs connected with the great arrangements in progress around us, or with the events that may arise out of them, and not so secret as to be incommunicable, it would give me peculiar pleasure to hear of them occasionally from your Lordship, if you could spare a moment's leisure for the purpose. I am rather surprised that the Governor-General does not direct one of his Secretaries to keep the Residents and Political Agents apprised, secretly and

confidentially, if necessary, of the course of important measures now being undertaken on every side of our Indian possessions. A correct knowledge of these might materially influence the line of policy that would be expedient at the different Native Courts."

In a letter to his friend, the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, he mentions a second interview with the Nizam.

"Hyderabad, 29th November 1838.

"MY DEAR MACNAGHTEN,—I have just been writing to you officially about the retirement of Major Moore.¹ A better or more useful public officer has never served in India, and we lose by his departure more than I can well express. Circumstances have rendered his return to Europe unavoidable, and accounts recently received of the dangerous state of his father's health have only hastened the fulfilment of the resolution he had already entertained. I send you the Minister's original note on the subject of Major Moore's pension, which you can return to me after perusal. It will appear to you to be oddly worded, till you recollect that the Minister never troubles himself about the discipline or officering of the Army, but thinks only of papers, and hoondees and finance accounts, and of Major Moore's character and ability as exhibited in the management of *these* matters. The offer of a pension has been perfectly spontaneous on the part of Chundoo Lall, for, until my receipt of his note, the day before yesterday, I had no communication with him or any human being on the subject. It is probable that I should have adverted to it in sending in the official announcement of Major Moore's resignation, though I had not thought much about it, or by any means determined what I should propose. I am satisfied, also, that Major Moore was as ignorant as myself of what the Minister intended doing for him, and I am sure that no extraneous means or influence whatever has been used to promote this object. I hope that the Supreme Government will permit Major Moore to accept this boon, for though the provision is a handsome and liberal one, it is, in my opinion, well deserved. There are few other men under whom the Nizam's Army would have attained so high a pitch of excellence. Major Moore has not only acted as Military Secretary, Adjutant-General, and *Chef d'État Major* in every respect, but his general knowledge of the country and of Durbar politics, with his calm judgment and conciliatory temper, have rendered him, in all other departments as well as in his own, the most useful Assistant, I feel sure, that the Residents here have ever had.

"I really do envy you the task of regenerating Afghanistan, and more so your acknowledged ability to accomplish that task. You seem

¹ Afterwards for many years a Director of the East India Company.

to me to have an arduous duty before you, though I know not its exact nature, nor do I suppose you know it yourself. I had some desire formerly to go to Persia, though I never expressed it, because I thought, and think still, that I could have managed the Russians at Tcheran at least as well as any of the Envoys we sent there. I knew a great number of these Scythians in England, including Prince Lieven, then only Count, and in training to succeed the then old Ambassador, Count Woronzoff. They all spoke French as well as the French themselves, but English very imperfectly. This reminds me that I had a good deal of conversation a few months ago at Cochin with Captain Laplace, of the French frigate *Artemise*, on the affairs of India and the views of the French Government, or what he thought ought to be their views, in reference to this country. He spoke to me very unreservedly, and I saw that his real mission was that of a military and political observer and reporter. I should talk to you more about this if we were sitting together, but it would be tiresome for both of us in a letter.

"If you are with the Governor-General, pray give his Lordship my respectful compliments, and say that I shall have the honour of writing to him at the earliest opportunity.

"We are getting on very well here, and I have no fears of any sort. There are alarmists, of course, as there are everywhere, but I see no reason to attach importance to their representations.

"I requested another interview with the Nizam a few days ago, and everybody here seems to think that very happy effects have resulted from the visit. His Highness, they say, never appeared more pleased, nor ever spoke so much or so graciously. He probably expected to be censured, or to hear his country abused, as has, I imagine, been a good deal the custom heretofore. But instead of this I gave the administration all the praise which I certainly thought it deserved, and abstained from saying anything that could offend the feelings of His Highness or of Chundoo Lall. Neither of them knew what I was going to talk about, and therefore their satisfaction and relief from previous apprehension were the greater. After I had done speaking to His Highness, which I did at some length, he dropped his proud and distrustful expression of countenance, turned to me with a smile, and addressed me direct for several minutes. He has since given proofs that what there passed had produced a beneficial influence on his mind, and those here who know him better than I do, predict that with a few more such interviews our mutual relations will assume a decided change for the better. I am disposed, however, to think that it will be as well to abstain from pressing for more frequent intercourse just at present, until I have an opportunity of addressing Lord Auckland on certain

leading points, and ascertaining his Lordship's sentiments regarding them.

"I am very sorry I am going to lose you from your present situation at head-quarters. I doubt not that all is for the best, and I am sure that wherever you are you will be essentially serving the interests of your country."

CHAPTER III.

Prospects and Projects of Reform in the Hyderabad State—Views of the Court of Directors, of Colonel Stewart, and of the Government of India—Costliness of the Contingent and reluctance of the Nizam to maintain it—General Fraser's Plan—Letter to the Resident at Mysore—Chundoo Lall's illness—Lord Elphinstone and the Earl of Munster—Letter from the Prince of Travancore.

WHEN General Fraser had been long enough at the Hyderabad Residency to become acquainted with the actual situation, as revealed by the current records, and by such insight as he could obtain, under the difficulties explained in his letters, into the leading personalities of the Court and Ministry, he soon formed and expressed very decided views as to the malady with which the State was afflicted, and as to the prospects and means of a cure. The Court of Directors and the Supreme Government of India seemed to have arrived, almost with unanimity, at a conviction of the utter hopelessness of any internal, natural, or spontaneous reform of the disorderly finance, and the want of all rule and regularity that characterised the administration of the Nizam's dominions. The only remedies that had at last come to be considered efficient amounted to practical annexation. The Court of Directors in 1835 had disapproved of a proposal made by General Fraser's predecessor, Colonel Stewart, for the reintroduction of Sir Charles Metcalfe's European superintendents of districts—withdrawn, it will be remembered, in 1829, on the accession of the Nizam Nasir-ood-dowla—on the ground that it was liable to the same objection as the direct assumption of government, without possessing the same advantage, while it was evident that the disorders of the Hyderabad State “must speedily work its own extinction, when the financial embarrassments of the Government and the wretchedness of the people would constitute a case which would justify, and in fact compel, a resort to the ultimate remedy

contemplated by Colonel Stewart, viz., that of taking the administration, both financial and judicial, entirely into our own hands." With this prospect in view, the Court of Directors, "in order to avoid the imputation of having purposely allowed the country to fall into ruin, so as to have an excuse for taking possession of it", considered that the Nizam ought to be warned that we could not be indifferent spectators of his misrule, and that he should be urged to change his Minister, and to adopt such other measures as might appear advisable for the purpose of securing good government.

The measure of changing the Minister never seems to have been welcomed at Calcutta, where it had apparently become a settled article of faith that Chundoo Lall, being dependent on our support, was devoted to British interests, and was, therefore, the best man for Hyderabad. A warning communication, something to the effect suggested by the Home authorities, was consequently made to the Nizam by Colonel Stewart, through the Minister, without any beneficial results. The Resident was expressly told that the "entire responsibility" for the success of the measures of reform recommended must rest with the Nizam's Government.

It is very remarkable that, in the following extract from one of his letters to the Government of India, written in 1834, Colonel Stewart had very distinctly admitted that the responsibility for the maladministration of the Nizam's dominions chiefly rested with our Government, this admission being very much in accordance with Sir Charles Metcalfe's views already published in a Blue Book.

"Those who have witnessed the course of our policy at this Court for the last thirty years, who have seen how we put up creatures of our own as Ministers, and supported them against their Sovereign; how we have obtained the control of all the effective troops, and how we assumed the civil control of the country, can hardly feel a doubt, least of all can the Nizam himself, that we have considered ourselves as the actual rulers of the country. Many of the evils that exist in the State are unquestionably the almost unavoidable result of the anomalous nature of our connection with it. It seems hardly fair, therefore, to hold either the Nizam or his Minister responsible for the evil, situated as they are. I do not think that they had the power to correct them. In fact, we may, perhaps, more properly be regarded as responsible for them, having the power in our hands to remedy them, and having shown that we are no ways scrupulous about making use of that power when we think fit to do so."

Colonel Stewart, with whose views on this head General Fraser almost entirely coincided, proceeds to make a comparison between the results of revenue administration in the Hyderabad provinces and in our own, not entirely favourable to our symmetrical system, and, with a view to recent famine experiences, not unworthy of serious consideration at present.

“When I alluded to the extent of the comforts, or rather of the necessities of life left to the Ryot under the different modes of administering the revenue as being nearly alike in all the different parts of India, I did not take at all into account the degree of security which the Ryot had either for his property or for his life. I did not require the reports of the officers under me to know that acts of violence and oppression were committed by the revenue officers in the Nizam’s territories. These acts have no connection with the assessment on the land, which is, I believe, generally moderate. They are the unauthorised acts of the Talookdars, and are unchecked from the want of anything like the administration of justice throughout the country.

“We are so much in the habit of praising our own institutions, and vituperating those of the Natives, that I fear we do not always do justice to the latter. There are some things in our revenue administration that shock the feelings of Natives far more than the plundering of the Ryots even of their cattle and implements of husbandry. The sale of lands, for example, for arrears of revenue, is considered by the Natives as shockingly oppressive. I remember having occasion to speak to an intelligent Native in Scindia’s camp regarding some glaring act of violence and oppression committed by some of Scindia’s revenue officers on the Ryots under them. ‘It is true,’ he said, ‘these things are very bad; yet still, after the people have been plundered in this unmerciful way, the roots remain. But with you, when people fail to pay the revenue, you sell their lands—you dig them up by the roots.’

“Bad as the Native mode of administering the revenue is, it is not unmixed with good, and by attending to its operation we may sometimes obtain hints that may be useful to ourselves. I shall illustrate this by stating some occurrences which have lately come under my own observation here.

“During the scarcity which prevailed last year in this country, and in the Company’s neighbouring districts, it was the subject of remark by every traveller coming here from Madras or Masulipatam, that the moment they entered the Nizam’s dominions all the worst appearances of famine in a great measure ceased. They no longer saw the villages filled with the dead and the dying, as they did in the Company’s country, although the price of grain continued to be as dear, and in

some cases actually dearer than it was in the Company's country. Many people of observation inquired of me what I conceived to be the cause of this. I was unable at the time to give any satisfactory reason for it. I supposed, however, the cause to be that the cultivators of the soil in the Nizam's dominions probably possessed more substance and capital, which enabled them to resist the effects of a season of scarcity, while those of the Company, being in a state of greater exhaustion, sank under it. But on making close inquiries from those best qualified to give me information, I became satisfied that it was from no superior condition of the Ryots themselves in the Nizam's country that they were enabled to resist the effects of famine, but, on the contrary, that it was the result of what we regard as the very worst parts of the Native revenue system, viz., the farming of the districts, and the taking of large advances from the farmers. When the farmers of the Nizam's districts on the Madras frontier—persons of large capital here—saw the probability of a famine, they well knew that if their Ryots either died from starvation or fled the country, the large advances they had made to the Minister could never be recovered. They, therefore, immediately purchased up grain from all quarters, so as to be sure of having a sufficiency in their districts to subsist the people through the season of scarcity. They in this manner not only preserved the Ryots alive, but prevented their quitting the country; and thus, while many thousands of people in a state of starvation fled from the Company's territory into Hyderabad, where they were subsisted for several months by public and private charity, I heard of none that came from the Nizam's adjacent districts.

"Now, although I would not in consequence of the good which in this instance resulted from the revenue farming system recommend that system for our adoption, yet I would ask why our Collectors cannot do that for the public which the farmer does for himself. When the famine is partial, it can, I conceive, be easily done. Had the Collectors of Guntoor and Masulipatam, for example, been empowered, at a time when the scarcity might easily have been foreseen, to import and to purchase up grain to subsist their Ryots through the hot weather, much misery and a great sacrifice of human life would have been prevented.

"When Government takes from the cultivator of the soil such a proportion of his produce as to render it impossible for him to accumulate capital sufficient to subsist himself even for a few months of scarcity, it would appear to be as incumbent on the Government to feed the Ryots during such a season as it is on a West India planter to feed his slaves. But even laying aside all considerations of justice or humanity, it would be found to be the most economical plan. When the population of a district is destroyed, many years must elapse before

it can again yield its usual revenue, whereas by going to the expense of feeding the cultivators for a few months the district continues as productive as ever."

Colonel Stewart visited Calcutta in 1837, and had several personal interviews with Lord Auckland on the subject of Hyderabad affairs, the result being that on his return to the Residency he was exhorted in a despatch to make the maintenance and payment of the Contingent an object of primary importance, and that the assignment of special districts for the pay of those troops should be "sedulously sought for at any favourable opportunity". Colonel Stewart is also told that he should use his best endeavours "to establish some feeling of confidence with the Nizam", with whom, he is informed, it rests exclusively to appoint anyone to the place of Dewan on the death of Chundoo Lall; and on this point the Resident is desired not to be forward in indicating any opinion, but to give "your honest assistance and advice if it is asked".

Writing privately on the 7th of November 1839, in reply to Lord Auckland's letter on the subject of the Court of Directors' proposal for charging the Nizam and other Princes with what is technically called the "pay proper" of the English officers attached to British Contingents, in addition to the handsome allowances which were their chief emolument,¹ General Fraser pointed out that there was a legal difficulty in the way, for if the "pay proper" ceased to be issued by the British Government to the English officers of the Nizam's Army, they, being no longer in British pay, would no longer be subject to the Articles of War or Mutiny Act, which are applicable only to officers on full pay, while discipline could not possibly be enforced by any law of the Nizam's Government. But he urged, moreover, that such an additional demand on the Native Government would be "very unpalatable, if not odious", and that "if it had been necessary or just, it should have been so determined from the beginning".

"To impose it now, after the lapse of so many years, without any apparent cause to necessitate the change, would be to exhibit a saving disposition exercised at the expense of others, and to exact from the Native State what their subjection to us alone would oblige them to concede. The expense of the Nizam's Regular Army² is already about

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 54, 55.

² The Contingent.

(3,800,000) thirty-eight lakhs of rupees per annum ; an amount which the Circar finds it extremely difficult to pay, and which they pay, I believe, but very reluctantly, especially distributed as the army now is, tending not so much as it might do to maintain the general peace of the country, and therefore not admitting of the disbandment of many of the irregular troops."

On the 17th of January 1840 he writes as follows to the Governor-General on the same subject:—

"I have already offered generally my opinion to your Lordship on the subject of the proposal of the Court of Directors, that the Company's officers in the service of Native Governments shall receive that portion of their allowances which is technically termed 'pay' from the States under which they serve. It would be particularly unpalatable here, because the Nizam's Government already view with dislike the Native Army we have officered, and would most willingly get rid of the heavy expense which it involves. The Army is always four months in arrears ; and even in this way, they pay it with so much difficulty that any additional expense might be expected to become the subject of serious remonstrance, more especially when this expense has no reference either to the amelioration of the Army or the security of the Nizam's country, but is merely to be incurred as a measure of relief to the Company's finances. The very Army itself exists but upon sufferance, and if any decided objections were made to it, however we might be able to insist upon its maintenance, we should find it difficult to justify this act by a reference to treaties, or to any agreement which has ever been passed on the subject between His Highness the Nizam's Government and our own. I think, therefore, it were advisable to abstain from proposing a measure of which the justice would certainly not be perceptible to the Native State, and which might give rise to questions and propositions regarding the Army itself which it were, perhaps, as well to avoid."

In fact, in a letter to the Government of India in January 1834, the Resident, Colonel Stewart, had reported that the Nizam had expressed a wish that as the English officers employed in civil administration had, on his accession, been removed, so also the English officers might be removed from his Army, and his own control restored. There were no rebels, the Nizam urged, and no forces to annoy his Government ; therefore the Contingent Force was unnecessary. The Minister subsequently informed the Resident that he had persuaded the Nizam not to ask for this virtual abolition of the Contingent.

Upon this, Colonel Stewart suggested that some arrangement should be pressed upon the Nizam's Government for the permanent establishment of the Contingent. In their reply to this, the Government recognised the advantage that would arise from any measure that saved the Contingent from being "dependent on the caprice of either the Ruler or the Minister of Hyderabad, the means for paying that force being vested permanently in our Government", and recommended the Resident to seize upon any favourable opportunity for urging such a measure on the Nizam's attention.

The Minister and the Contingent were, in short, the two points of incessant contact and communication between the Resident and His Highness on the one hand, and between the Resident and the Honourable Company on the other. The Minister was always to be maintained if he "saved the Contingent from being dependent on the caprice of the Ruler", and left it entirely to our discretion. The Resident was constantly told that, above all things, permanent security for the payment of those troops was to be "sedulously sought for at every favourable opportunity", and that, except with that great object in view, "it were as well, perhaps, to avoid questions and propositions regarding the Nizam's Army."

How much the Supreme Government of India had come to rely upon the Contingent—or "Nizam's Army"—as virtually part of its own army, may be seen from the following extract of a letter dated October 26th, 1838, from Mr. J. R. Colvin,¹ Private Secretary to Lord Auckland, to Major Moore, Military Secretary to the Resident, afterwards a Director of the East India Company. The Governor-General's Private Secretary writes:—

"Kindly let me know, after consulting Colonel Fraser, what portion of the Subsidiary Force could, in his and your opinion, be spared from the Hyderabad territories for other service in emergency. I should say at least half. For *your* fine army is amply sufficient to maintain the general tranquillity of the country. But there should always be, doubtless, an imposing force near the City. Would it be ever safe to remove the Queen's corps from Secunderabad?"

General Fraser's opinions as to the condition and prospects of the Hyderabad State, and as to the part our Government might play in their improvement, were, I will venture to say, more

¹ Died in 1857 at Agra, when Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces.

characterised by hope, by good will, and by good faith towards the faithful ally whose fortunes lay so entirely within our hands, than those expressed by any of his predecessors at the Residency, except Lord Metcalfe, with whose policy, in fact, he entirely concurred. To begin with, all his observations and inquiries continued to prove the accuracy of his original impression that "the country was by no means in so very bad a condition, as was generally imagined throughout India."¹ It did not follow, apparently, that trade or agriculture should languish for want of judges and lawyers; or that because the troops were in arrears, courtiers complaining of their unpaid stipends, and bankers refusing further advances to the Minister, the ryot should be in distress. As from time immemorial, in every part of India under Native rule, it was well understood that the ryot, the milch-cow of every class and interest, must not be pressed too hard, and would prosper and produce the more, the less he was harassed with rules and regulations. Neighbourly and communal authority, embodied in the village patriarchs and the punchayut, gave him, without taking him far from home, all the judicial protection he could appreciate, and gave less advantage to rich litigants than the costly process of regularly constituted Courts.

And thus, although General Fraser from the very first considered that "nothing short of an actual assumption of the Government would be an adequate remedy for the evils that prevailed,"² he never suggested anything but a temporary assumption—for from three to five years—and always contemplated bringing prominently forward in honourable office, and united in the counsels of the Resident and his English Assistants, men of rank and respectability belonging to the Hyderabad State who could be trained and installed in the reformed Administration. The consent of the Nizam, which he deemed indispensably essential, under the obligations of existing treaties, to any temporary transfer of power, would never, he was convinced, be obtained, if anything like the sequestration of Mysore were proposed to him. That General Fraser never formed any plan for permanently managing the Hyderabad territories, or any portion of them, or for substituting a monstrous and highly salaried Commission of English officers—such as gradually grew up in Mysore, and subsequently

¹ *Ante*, p. 42.

² *Ante*, p. 44.

in Berar—for the Sovereign and the Native dignitaries, will be amply shown in the course of this work. The general bent of his mind on these points, about this time, is conspicuous enough in the following letter to Major Stokes, his successor in the Mysore Residency, in which he expresses once more his doubts as to the continued degradation of the Maharajah.

“Hyderabad Residency, 7th March 1839.

“MY DEAR STOKES,—If I could have replied to your last letter in any manner that would be useful to you, I should not have delayed doing it so long. The questions respecting the Rajah’s privilege of settling all disputes, and other matters of whatever nature, among the Rajbindees,¹ was agitated, or at least brought to our notice, when I was at Mysore; and to the best of my recollection, although I am by no means sure, the privilege was then conceded to him. I certainly do not remember any case arising to indicate that it was otherwise.

“With respect to the abstract right of the Rajah to exercise this authority, it may be difficult, perhaps, to form a clear and unexceptionable opinion. His right as to marriages, the adoption of children, and other caste usages, could hardly, I think, admit of a doubt. The division or disposal of property may be more questionable. But to express a definite sentiment on the subject, I should know, what I do not know, the position in which the Rajah stands. Is he, or is he not, ever to have his country restored to him? If we are merely, as I believe we profess to be doing, administering the country until we bring it into good order, and secure ourselves from eventual future loss, but still regarding the Rajah as him who is to be the future ruler and sovereign of the country, I have no hesitation in saying that I think we ought to concede to him the privilege you have alluded to in its utmost extent. Delicacy, and the respect due to his rank and station demand it; and it is rendered proper, I conceive, and almost indispensable, by every consideration referring to the relative position in which he and the Rajbindees will hereafter stand towards each other. But if he is never to be reseatd on the Musnud, and is to remain for life but a wretched and powerless dependent on our bounty, the necessity for which I now contend might perhaps not be so imperative.

“But even in this event, under the circumstances of the case, I would concede to him the right in question, and I would not hesitate to recommend this measure to the Supreme Government. I should think it was by no means more than was due to this most unfortunate and (I cannot but think) hardly used Prince. But I trust that the event

¹ Connections of the Royal Family.

alluded to is hardly to be contemplated; and in that case every motive for conceding this authority to him would necessarily press upon me with ten-fold force. Either as Resident or Commissioner, these, I think, would be my sentiments, and this my course of proceeding. But I know not what instructions Colonel Cubbon may have, or what views may have been imported with him with regard to the future destiny of the Mysore country. His proceedings may perhaps be plainly necessitated by the policy and future intentions of the Supreme Government, but if so, that policy and those intentions should not, I think, be kept a secret from you. You have at the end of your letter addressed some specific queries to me, which I fear it would be impossible to answer in such a manner as might not in many supposable cases lead to error and mischief, unless I possessed the full information alluded to above in regard to the views of superior authority for the future government of Mysore.

"Much might be done if you and Colonel Cubbon were on intimate and unreserved terms together. But not being so, you cannot, I imagine, know any more than I do what is in the mind of the Governor-General or of the Commissioner. Under these circumstances, I do not think I would hesitate, if I were in your place, to assume that we should, at no distant period, restore the Rajah to his power, and recommend on this, as a sufficient ground (even if no other existed), that the Rajah should exercise all the control he ever did over the Rajbindces, consistent, of course, with the absence of cruelty or violence—a very improbable contingency, but which, in my opinion, should be abundant reason for the Resident's immediate interference, equally whether the Rajah were on the Musnud and in the plenitude of his power, or in the low and degraded condition as at present ordained.

"This is a strange Court I have got into, and I know not what will happen to it, though I imagine that some very considerable change must take place one of these days. There is, I am afraid, a good deal of bad feeling against us throughout India, and it is supposed that many emissaries are at work endeavouring to spread disaffection to our Government. Pray let me know the state of *Wahabeeism* in your part of the world. Is it spreading, or do you not hear it spoken of at all? Religion has often been a cloak for political designs.

"Give my kind regards, if you please, to Mrs. Stokes. I continue to receive good accounts of my family. They are all still at Southampton, excepting my eldest boy at an excellent school at Kensington."

Although, in accordance with his predecessor, Colonel Stewart he was aware that the Nizam viewed the Contingent—called his Army, but entirely under our control—"with dislike", that he paid it "reluctantly", and "would most willingly get rid of the heavy

expense it involved",¹ General Fraser was not of opinion that retrenchment and reform should commence in this quarter. Whatever might have been the origin of the Contingent, whatever excess there might be in the cost of some of its details, he found it, as a force, on a recognised and accepted footing, and in a high state of discipline. It was not merely the most effective body of troops in the service of the Nizam, but the only one upon which any reliance could be placed in an emergency. Its existence was actually a reform accomplished in one department of the State, and an example of efficiency to the others. To commence by reducing the Contingent, while maintaining in full force the turbulent Arabs and Rohillas, the half-disciplined troops called "the Line", and a host of more or less irregular levies, existing to a great extent on paper only, and yet costing more than ninety lakhs of rupees (£800,000) per annum,² would not have been, in his judgment, an economy but a waste, and that from financial as well as from military considerations.

General Fraser's plan, in outline, was that the British Government should assist that of the Nizam with a loan—probably not exceeding a million sterling—at six per cent., with which all arrears due to the Arabs and other troops could be discharged, the necessary preliminary to their disbandment or reduction. The credit of the State would be restored by this measure, and by the payment of advances at heavy interest made by the soucars, or native bankers. This relief to the Hyderabad finances would be administered from the Resident's own treasury, and under his supervision, so that its due application should be ensured; and the repayment could be secured, if not as one essential incident of a period of temporary and reforming management of all the Nizam's dominions, at least by the assignment of districts for a certain term to the charge of persons in the Resident's confidence and under his control.

General Fraser was for some time inclined to think that these restorative measures must be deferred until the demise of Chundoo Lall; but the incorrigible corruption and prodigality of the aged Minister's rule very soon convinced him that every year's delay in Chundoo Lall's removal was bringing the Nizam's Government

¹ *Ante*, pp. 89, 90.

² About double the cost of the Contingent in 1839.

more close to the utter verge of ruin. Even when General Fraser, however, had arrived at this conviction, the removal of Chundoo Lall was not such an easy matter. The belief at the Court and in the city of Hyderabad in the irresistible support given to Chundoo Lall at Calcutta, was not at once to be dispelled. There was to the last a strange reluctance on the part of the Government of India to acquiesce in the Minister's retirement, that when all its publicly expressed grounds have been taken into consideration, still seems partially unaccountable.

It is clear, also, that for some months, perhaps for more than a year, after his arrival at Hyderabad, General Fraser was led, on several occasions, to entertain some hope of being able to institute certain measures of reform by the consent and with the co-operation of Rajah Chundoo Lall. It was only by degrees, the process of disillusion being very rapid when it once commenced, that the Resident learned to estimate how little depth or earnestness there was in the charm of the Minister's manner, or the grace of his professions. "The Minister and myself", wrote General Fraser privately to Lord Auckland on the 13th of October 1839, "are on friendly terms, and I believe that he has some confidence in me. He tells me that he places himself entirely in my hands, and that he will act in everything as I advise. This leads me to hope that, without having recourse to any extreme or violent measures—for which, indeed, there is at present no just ground—a gradual improvement may be introduced into the administration of affairs by means which, if judiciously maintained for two or three years, may, in the course of that time, produce a considerable change for the better in the affairs of the Nizam's country and the condition of its inhabitants."

Within a week from the date of this letter, there was great alarm and anxiety in the city of Hyderabad and at the Residency in consequence of the aged Minister being taken dangerously ill. General Fraser expresses his feelings on the subject in the following extract from a letter to the Governor-General, dated the 21st October 1839 :—

"I regret to say that I have this moment learned that the Minister is unwell. He was complaining during the night, and this morning, while at the Muth, or family place of worship, fainted. The Nizam was in a garden outside the City, but on hearing this he immediately

returned to his Palace, and sent particular inquiries after the old man's health. I have written to the Minister's son, Bala Pershad, to make inquiries, and if I receive a reply in time for this evening's tappal,¹ I shall either enclose it in this letter, or send it to your Lordship's Private Secretary. I should think the Minister's death at this juncture an event greatly to be deplored."

In a postscript he gives the substance of a note received from Bala Pershad, explaining that his father had suffered for some time from a chronic disease of the kidneys, and that the case could "not be considered altogether exempt from danger". The Minister was soon, however, restored to his usual health, and all went on as usual.

Everything thus concurs to show that General Fraser entered on the course of policy which he pursued until his retirement, with no intolerance for the system he found in force, and with no prejudice against the persons in power. He desired neither to supersede the men, nor to subvert the institutions of the country. In a despatch of the latter part of 1839, he expressed a decided opinion that "the disorder and misrule supposed to prevail throughout the Nizam's country will be found to have been somewhat exaggerated, and that they do not exist to such an extent as to render necessary any extreme measure of interference by the British Government". "The Nizam's Government", the Resident urged, "is a sovereign and independent one, and I perceive nothing in the present state which would justify any infraction of that independence which would be involved in an authoritative or violent interference on our part."

General Fraser, moreover, expressed his belief that "the inhabitants of this country are as happy and contented as our own subjects are in the Company's dominions. The administration is anomalous in many respects, but it may be doubted whether our rules and regulations would be advantageously applicable here, or whether they would be generally desired by the inhabitants."

The General's views on Hyderabad affairs, as well as on the general politics of India, are more fully expressed in the following letter to Mr. J. R. Colvin, Lord Auckland's Private Secretary :—

¹ Mail.

“Hyderabad, 28th October 1840.

“MY DEAR SIR,—I am much obliged by your kind communication of a copy of your letter to Colonel Sutherland on the affairs of Afghanistan. It is, I think, very useful that officers in political situations should be kept apprised, not only of the current incidents of the time, but also, in so far as may be convenient, of the general intentions and policy of the Government. This must tend more to effect a general union of purpose and an effective co-operation, than the simple issue of occasional orders and a blind obedience to them. The whole question of the extension of our arms towards the north-west is of immense importance, and one upon which no individual can form a correct opinion without such a knowledge of the ulterior views of Russia as I for one cannot pretend to possess. Letters which I received from one or two of the Directors soon after I came to Hyderabad expressed considerable and anxious apprehensions of the consequence of our passing the Indus. But in these I never participated, because, though personally unacquainted with the probable intentions and policy at that time of either Persia or Russia, I was quite sure that Lord Auckland possessed better information, and that he certainly had not without ample *connaissance de cause* given effect to measures which necessarily involved the risk of dangerous results, both proximate and remote.

“The late defeat of Dost Mahomed was a happy circumstance in reference not only to Afghanistan, but to the rest of India; and the Brigadier and troops by whom it was achieved deserve all our gratitude. I fear the interior much more than the exterior of India. The ultimate success of our arms in the field can never be doubtful against such enemies as we have now to contend with; but the slightest temporary check produces a reaction in the minds of our own subjects, which requires to be vigilantly observed, and is attended with perhaps the only real danger we have to dread. Major Clibborne’s defeat was a source of great exultation among certain parties at Hyderabad, and messages were sent by persons of high rank and consequence to the Nizam himself that our *Iqbāl*¹ was on the wane, and our *Dowlut*² departing. It gave me, therefore, great pleasure to be able to communicate to the Circar officially the intelligence of our victory over Dost Mahomed, which was received by the Nizam with expressions of satisfaction that I have no reason to believe feigned, and with an order for the immediate firing of a royal salute, which came most opportunely to quench the hopes of the disaffected who had been speculating on our downfall. They are so very ignorant, that they appear to have no more conception than children of the real nature and source of either our strength or weakness.

¹ Fortune.

² Dominion.

"You appear to be contemplating the possibility of a war with the Sikhs. This may be very necessary, and there may be good reasons for it, but they must be stronger than those to which your *precis* refers. The mere refusal of the Sikh Government to allow our troops to march through its territory, unless attended with other indications and proofs of hostility, would hardly, I imagine, give sufficient grounds for war if the international relations of Asia at all assimilate to those of Europe. If the transit of our troops through the territory were the only or principal object in view, abstractly considered, and irrespectively of other circumstances, it would seem that this might be a fit subject for diplomacy and negotiation, rather than a legitimate cause for war. However, I hope that the demonstration of the large force now to the Northward will altogether provide against the chance of war either with the Sikhs or Nepaulese, and effectually secure the peace of Afghanistan until that newly established empire is organised and better able than it appears to be at present to maintain its own tranquillity.

"With reference to the late concessions of Nepaul to our demands, and the diminished probability of a rupture with that State, we must still bear in mind the possible consequences of our war with China, which I wish most heartily had never been undertaken. To say the best of it, it came most inopportunely. A hostile cordon was already completed around us, when this unfortunate aggression comes in to support and confirm it in the two dangerous points of Burmah and Nepaul, independently of its involving on its own account an eventual drain of means from India, both in men and money, which we can ill afford, and the extent or duration of which it is impossible to foresee.

"To turn from great things to small, I am happy to say that the Nizam's country is quite quiet, and that I anticipate no danger or disturbance in it whatever. It will be my object to keep it quiet, for this I think of considerable importance, and that in the present state of affairs the Supreme Government would have but little reason to thank the Resident who should disturb the existing tranquillity of so important a portion of India.

"I recommended some time ago to the Supreme Government certain measures for the gradual and unobtrusive amelioration of the Nizam's country, such as the Circar could fully concur in, and which should in fact be the measures of the Nizam's Government itself. But the Supreme Government did not reply to my suggestions on that subject, and I have just heard that the grounds no longer exist on which I had principally founded my expectations of success. My views demanded not British agency, but that of natives, and of a native, especially in the Revenue Department, of peculiar and rare qualifications. These I

knew were to be found in a person of the name of Venketa Rao. He possessed just what I wanted—energy, capacity (particularly in the Revenue Department), and conciliation and kindness, with a gentlemanly manner and deportment. I have never communicated to this person that I entertained any decided expectation of being able to employ his services here, but my attention was fixed on him, and the Minister had confidentially expressed to me his full and cordial assent to receive the benefit of his assistance. Venketa Rao applied to me some time ago for my attestation of his character, etc., with a view to obtain a pension from the Company. I gave him what he required, and in acknowledging its receipt and thanking me for it two days ago, he informs me at the same time that he has just been re-appointed as Assistant to the Commissioner for the Government of Mysore.

“The qualities that he possesses, and which I had looked to make available for the improvement of the Nizam’s dominions, may possibly exist elsewhere, but I know them not, and am ignorant where they are to be found. Perhaps there is nothing better for it now, and under actual circumstances, than to remain quiet, and for the present at least to permit matters to take their usual course until I learn that either the Government of India or the Court of Directors entertain other views, or that incidents arise here which may naturally suggest a change of policy. With respect to the Court of Directors, I distrust them greatly as far as the Nizam’s country is concerned, for I suspect they know very little about its real condition, and that they imagine it infinitely worse than it is.

“The Minister is at present in good health and in excellent spirits. He and I are on the best terms, and I believe he is quite prepared to do anything I suggest to him which he *can* do. But he can do nothing. He cannot deviate from the old-established routine of half a century past, and he is trammelled and bound hand and foot in a thousand ways. New life-blood must be infused, and new energy inspired into the whole frame of Government, which I had hoped might be done in the manner I explained—gradually, and without exciting alarm or disturbance. That was a dangerous conspiracy which existed lately against the Minister connected with the financial affairs of Poorun Mull, and I believe the former attributes, in a great measure, even the present continued possession of his office to the support which I gave him on that occasion. I am myself disposed to participate in this view, and believe that if I had addressed the Nizam less decidedly than I did, the Minister would either have fallen a victim to party, or would have allowed himself to be bullied into concessions which would have disgraced both the Government and himself.

“I am ill requiting your agreeable and instructive communication

with a long and tedious letter; and returning you again my best acknowledgments for your kindness,

" I remain, my dear Sir,
 " Yours very faithfully,
 " J. S. FRASER."

" J. R. Colvin, Esq.,
 " Private Secretary."

The following letter is from the General's unfortunate friend, Sir William Macnaghten, then quite recently rewarded with a baronetcy and the reversion of the Governorship of Bombay for the brilliant restoration of Shah Shooja, and still pursuing with confidence the regeneration of Afghanistan.

" Camp, Jellalabad, February 6th, 1840.

" MY DEAR FRASER,—The enclosed will explain to you why I take up my pen to address you at the present moment, and I fear you will not thank me much when you find I am actuated by so selfish a motive in this attempt to renew our ancient feeling of friendship. I should have written to you oftener, and at length, upon all the interesting operations in which I have been engaged for the last twelvemonth, could I have ever secured the necessary leisure, but this has been denied me, and up to this hour it is as much as I can do, fagging from morn till night, to get through the current business of this situation. The progress of affairs in this quarter is exceedingly satisfactory. We are relieved of all apprehension from Russia or Persia; and the Dost, as Dost Mohammed is invariably called here—on the *lucus a non lucendo* principle, I presume¹—is said to be in a bad way in Bokhara. I know you will have rejoiced to see my elevation, and, therefore, I accept your congratulations offered "in spirit", as the Persians say. But to the purpose: this youth, William Carruthers,² is a godson of my father, who feels a great interest and anxiety in his welfare. If you could befriend him, I need hardly say you would confer a great obligation on me. I know nothing of his character of my own personal knowledge, but I have heard nothing but good of him. You, I imagine, are to the full as much occupied as I am, but if you ever have a leisure half-hour, I should be really delighted to hear from you, and to know how you are getting on in the Deccan. We are living in critical and exciting times, when neither the Indus nor the Irrawaddy presents a barrier to our arms.

" Believe me, my dear Fraser,
 " Most sincerely yours,
 " W. H. MACNAGHTEN."

¹ *Dost*, in Persian, means "friend".

² The bearer of the letter.

A letter from Lord Elphinstone, a few words of which have already been quoted, introduces a person whose gallantry as a soldier was not unworthy of that illustrious though irregular parentage, the morbid consciousness of which appears to have cast a shadow over his life, and to have led to his tragical end. George, Earl of Munster, the eldest son of King William IV, by Mrs. Jordan, the celebrated actress, had served with great credit in the Peninsular war, and had passed two years in India, from 1815 to 1817, as Aide-de-Camp to the Marquis of Hastings. He came home by the route, then seldom traversed, through Egypt, and published an interesting account of the journey. He also wrote a narrative of the campaign of 1809 in Spain and Portugal, in which he had taken part, and made many contributions to periodical literature. In 1827 he published, in the *Journal Asiatique*, three papers on the employment of Mohammedan mercenaries, a subject to which he appears to have devoted considerable attention. The contemplated work regarding which he and Lord Elphinstone wrote to General Fraser seems to have grown out of his extended researches in the same quarter.

“Ootacamund, July 24th, 1840.

“MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—It is long since I have written to, or heard from you. I take the opportunity afforded me by Lord Munster having asked me to assist him in procuring materials for the work, the objects of which are explained in the enclosed circular, and beg to say a few words on my own behalf as well as on his. If you can assist him, I am sure you will readily do it. The military nature of the work would alone be a recommendation to you, but this is not the only point of view in which it will interest you, embracing, as it does, the history of events which have influenced, and still continue to influence so powerfully, the destinies of mankind. Lord Munster's letter and books reached me yesterday—the anniversary of the capture of Ghizni—and to-day is the anniversary also of the taking of Gibraltar in 1704. At the period of the greatest vigour, if not of the widest extension of the Mohammedan power, these places may be said to have marked its extreme limits. Both now contain a British garrison. It seems, therefore, that the military history of the Mohammedan conquests may not unfitly be undertaken by a British officer. Whether Lord Munster be equal to the task or not, is more than I am competent to judge, but I honour the attempt and wish him success.

“I hear that the proceedings of your Committee on the intended episode or supplement of the Mohammedan Fasti are come to a close.

I should like much to see them, and if you would send me a copy I should be much obliged to you. The fate of the principal actor in *this* part of the scene has been tragical, but as unlike that of a Ghazi as possible, to be stabbed by one of his own followers in a Christian Church !¹

"Since Edward Elliot's departure there has been a great falling off in the secret department of the Police, and I have no means of forming an idea of the spirit and disposition of the Mohammedan population; though, from the absence of any reports to the contrary, I hope that the events of last year have produced a most salutary and sedative effect upon their minds. Foreign emissaries continue occasionally to be observed; and lately two Europeans, dressed as Arabs, but with an imperfect knowledge of Arabic, embarked on board the *Shah Alum* for Calcutta. Between themselves, and when they thought they were unobserved, they spoke German, and communicated their wants at Madras in Portuguese, but it was of the European, and not of the half-caste idiom.

"I am sorry to say that your successor in Travancore is not likely to hold his post much longer, if indeed he is able even to return to it. Poor Colonel Maclean is laid up at Coimbatore, on his way to this place, with such a bad swelling of his knee, and other symptoms so unfavourable, that for some time his life was considered in imminent danger; and although we have better accounts of him to-day, I fear that he is in a bad way.

"Believe me, my dear General,

"Yours very faithfully,

"ELPHINSTONE.

"P.S.—Pray remember me to Captain Malcolm."

About the same time the General received the following letter—it has no date—from Lord Munster himself on the subject of the contemplated work, to which Lord Elphinstone had referred, on Mohammedan military science.

"SIR,—I beg to apologise for addressing you, but my object in so doing being of an interesting literary nature, I trust that will not only forgive my thus intruding on your valuable time, but that you will (as much depends on your co-operation) kindly and warmly enter into my views.

"I have been for many years employed in collecting materials for a military history of the Mohammedan nations, from the rise of their Founder till the present time, and have already made great progress in

¹ Such was the end of the Nawab of Kurnool.

all details relative to the different people who have embraced that religion, whether of Arabian or Tartar origin.

"I have lately drawn up in Arabic a list of military and historical books which I am desirous to procure, and have accompanied it with a military notice of some length, in order to point out the subject of the works which would be most adapted to my researches.

"Perhaps you may be so situated as to assist me in its dissemination, and, although I am fully aware of the difficulty that surrounds an attempt of this nature in some Mohammedan cities, yet I hope you may have formed an acquaintance with some sheikh or learned man who might be persuaded to aid in searching for and purchasing for me the books I require.

"Should such a person exist, I shall be grateful if you will—with whatever precaution or secrecy that may be deemed necessary—put the accompanying memoir into his hand, and invite him to meet my wishes by procuring for me the class of historical and military works named or indicated in it, not only in Arabic, but in Turkish, Chagatai, or Tartar, in Persian, Hindostanee, and in all the indigenous languages of India.

"But not only do I look for books, but I should be greatly pleased and aided by any learned and intelligent Mohammedan gentleman or officer (some of the latter of Western Asia having been of late years educated in Europe) referring to my military memoir, and answering my questions one by one; and if he would give me in writing the information I desire, including all military technical synonymous terms, of the present as well as the past times.

"It is possible in Egypt, Western Asia, and Russia, and still more likely in India, that some European gentleman, from long residence in those countries, may be equal to answering the various items of my memoir. I have reason to believe that there are several intelligent European officers in the armies of the Osmanli, of Mehemet Ali Pasha, and of Persia, thus situated; while in India, many civilians and officers of the India Company's Service I know to be highly qualified to give me the aid I solicit, and who might, from advantages of vicinity and other circumstances, enter fully upon the Mohammedan art of war in India of all past centuries to the present time.

"If any gentleman of India would thus enter into my views, I would particularly point out (besides the past art of war of Persian and Tartar origin, and the collection of the past and existing military ideas and expressions of the present native camps and armies) the ancient indigenous Hindoo mode of warfare, previous to and wholly unconnected with that introduced by their Northern conquerors, and to the military forms (not forgetting the modern) either in the Sanskrit, or as preserved in its cognate existing languages.

"I need hardly say that I shall not be backward in acknowledging, both privately and publicly, any such assistance.

"I have limited the notices in my memoir to the end of the temporal power of the Eastern Khalifs (334 H.); considering the details I have brought forward sufficient to be a guide for similar research in after-periods and dynasties, and which I wish to be equally illustrated, whether of the Omniades of Spain, of the Fatimites of Egypt, of the minor kingdoms of the West of Asia on the decline of the Court of Baghdad, of the Seljuks, of the Moguls of Genghis Khan, of Persia, and of farther East, of the Ghisnives and Goarides, of the Pitan Khans, and of the family of Timour at Delhi, and of the numerous sovereignties both of Hindostan and of the Dekhan.

"I have reason to believe that the price of books (whatever it may be in Persia, India, or Cabul) in Western Asia is far from exorbitant, having just received two volumes from Egypt of considerable intrinsic value, for which I only paid 123 piastres, or twenty-three shillings, and would not wish you (as I am making similar purchases throughout the Mohammedan world) to give on ordinary occasions above one pound, or thirty to one hundred piastres, for a single volume.

"But as some peculiarly scarce, interesting, and valuable works may be offered, I shall beg of you to use your own discretion as to their prices and immediate purchase, or in first letting me know what is asked for them, or in that of the alternative of having them, if possible, copied.

"You may rest assured I shall be perfectly satisfied with your decision, and shall be grateful (should you be inclined to meet my wishes) if you will, as soon as you have ascertained that the books selected are pertinent to my objects, to pay for them, and I will instantly, on receiving your letter, transfer the amount to your bankers in London, including any expense in their transmission to 13 Belgrave Square, London, the mode of which I must leave to your friendly arrangement.

"I have the honour to be, Sir,

"Your obedient servant,

"MUNSTER."

In the next letter Lord Elphinstone again refers to the same subject.

"Ootacamund, 15th November 1840.

"MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—I am really more than ashamed to find not only that I have not yet sent 'Tocqueville' to you, but that I have actually not thanked you for 'Madame D'Abrantés'! I can offer no excuse for such remissness, which I can, however, in some degree explain by the way in which I have been for some time past living—

having everything packed and ready to return to Madras, and in the meantime living partly at Ootacamund and partly at Kaity, four miles off. Among my packages I have accidentally stumbled on the books which I meant to have sent to you, and which I put off sending, with the intention of writing at the same time.

"It is rather provoking, after having undergone two monsoons, to leave these Hills at the very moment when the weather has become delightful, and when their freshness and beauty are at their height; but the next two months are also the most agreeable that we have at Madras, and I must comfort myself in having escaped a very hot season, and in returning at the moment when the change will be least felt. Mr. Sullivan, you will have seen, has resigned his seat in Council, rather than leave the Hills. Mr. Lushington sets out to-day, proceeding by Trichinopoly, and by slow stages. I am going first to see the Khondas, and then run down as fast as I can to Madras.

"Lord Munster is very fortunate in meeting with anyone so well able, and so well disposed to assist him, as you are. He will be the more delighted, as I wrote him in a most discouraging strain upon the subject of his inquiries, and sent him a letter from Mr. Brown of the Civil Service, who is one of our best Orientalists, which gave him no hopes of his being able to furnish him with any information. Sanskrit or Hindoo works illustrating the progress of the Mohammedans and their method of warfare, there were none; and the few Hindustani works which treated of these matters were translations of Persian and Arabic authors already well known in Europe. This was the sum of Brown's reply.

"Major Havelock left me some time ago to join his regiment—two squadrons of it having been ordered to Scinde. He was at first disappointed at finding that a junior regimental officer had been appointed to the command of these squadrons, but they have since been countermanded by order of the Supreme Government. The defeat of Dost Mohammed will do much to tranquillise this part of the world, though the assemblage of a large force on the frontiers of the Punjab looks as if the occurrence of hostilities with the Sikhs were not impossible. I shall look with much interest to the arrival of the next Overland—if it is to arrive!—for though I am inclined to put much faith in Louis Philippe's declaration to Mr. Romeo Coates on the staircase of the Hôtel du Nord at Boulogne—that there will be no war—yet the state of affairs was not altogether settled when the last mail came away.

"Believe me, my dear General,

"Yours most faithfully,

"ELPHINSTONE.

"P.S.—I have sent also some sketches by Jules Janin, which I

think you will find lively and amusing. I thought those which I read had more spirit and nature in them than most of the French productions of a similar class that I have seen lately. The name need not repel you, though it is somewhat ominous—*Les Catacombes*.”

The alarm of war to which Lord Elphinstone refers was caused by our bombardment and storm of Acre, in pursuance of Lord Palmerston’s policy of helping the Sultan to take Syria from Mehemet Ali. This being done without French concurrence, M. Thiers was very warlike, but Louis Philippe decided for peace, and Guizot took the place of Thiers.

General Fraser did his best for the advancement of Lord Munster’s object, and sent the following reply to his letter:—

“Hyderabad, 22nd March 1841.

“MY LORD,—I have much pleasure in sending you a list of such books in the general catalogue you transmitted to me as are procurable at Hyderabad, with a slight memorandum of each, and the price at which it may be obtained. I greatly regret that so considerable a delay has occurred in executing your commission, but this has necessarily arisen from the isolated position in which the Resident here is placed, debarred from personal communication with the respectable part of the Native community. The list now forwarded has been prepared principally through the instrumentality of Moulavee Mohammed Karabut Ali, Darogha of the Foujdaree Adawlut of Hyderabad; and even this gentleman I have never personally met. He has, however, expressed a wish that on my transmitting the list of books I should mention his name to you as that of the person who has been employed in preparing it. I have accordingly much pleasure in doing so. He is said to be a highly respectable and well-informed gentleman, and it will probably be very gratifying to him to know that the little assistance afforded by him has been approved by you.

“In the event of its suiting your Lordship’s purpose to have any of the books mentioned in the list, I beg that you will have the kindness to inform me how they are to be addressed. I shall direct this letter to the United Service Club, as I conclude it will reach you by this means without risk.

“I remain, my Lord, very faithfully yours,

“J. S. FRASER.

“Colonel the Earl of Munster, etc., etc., etc.”¹

¹ In the brevet on the birth of the Prince of Wales in 1841, Lord Munster was made a Major-General. He was also Lieutenant and Constable of Windsor Castle.

The General having communicated the substance of his reply to Lord Munster's application, Lord Elphinstone again refers to the subject in the course of the following letter. The "late disturbances" mentioned are those connected with the occupation of the Fort of Badamee in the Southern Mahratta country, on which much will be said shortly.

" Madras, 7th August 1841.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,—I am really ashamed of myself for having so long delayed to thank you for the papers on the subject of the late disturbances, and for your kind letters. The former I have not had time to read as yet, but I shall take an early opportunity of looking into them. We can scarcely wonder at these occasional outbreaks, when we take all circumstances into account, though I think that with a better, or, indeed, *any system* of Police, they might frequently be prevented. One of the first effects of a real *system* would be that we should know the movements of all the roving adventurers and other suspicious characters that infest the country. Without it, I fear that it will be impossible to prevent the ingress of Arab mercenaries which you so justly object to.

"It is a sad pity that the sympathy of the public in England towards this country should be so misdirected as it is. Under different guidance it might strengthen our hands, and produce a corresponding feeling on the part of the people of India. At present I think the effect is the very contrary of this; for the discussions about the Rajah of Sattara have no interest for *them*, while the Indian Governments are discredited in proportion to the belief in the sensation against them at home.

"But I must stop, as it is getting late, and I am exhausted with the heat, which is great between the showers, which have at length reached us. I am much obliged to you for letting me keep the 'Duchesse D'Abrantés' a little longer. I have just received the second part of 'De Tocqueville,' and as I think you liked the first, I send it you for your perusal. I am reading my uncle's *History of India*, the first two volumes of which have been lately published, but I have not yet received *my* copy of it, otherwise I would send it, as I daresay you would like to see it. Lord Munster will be agreeably surprised if you send him any Mohammedan war treatises. I think he has given up all hopes of getting any from this quarter. I had a letter from him some time ago, reproaching me for not seconding his endeavours. He seems as full of his subject as ever.

"I have written to Lord Auckland on the subject of Mr. Strachey's appointment, which I took it upon myself to say would be acceptable

to yourself as well as to me. I have not done anything about the Post-mastership, as I believe that the nomination rests with you, so I have given this answer to all applicants.

“Believe me, my dear General,

“Ever faithfully yours,

“ELPHINSTONE.”

There is no further correspondence on the subject of Lord Munster's researches. The book on Mohammedan Military Science was never completed, and no vestige of it remains extant beyond the preliminary circular in Arabic, of which there is a copy in the British Museum Library.¹ Just a year after the date of the Resident's letter, in his house in Belgrave Square, on the night of the 20th of March 1842, Lord Munster shot himself through the head with one of a pair of gold-mounted pistols that had been given to him by King George IV. He had for several days exhibited symptoms of mental disorder. At the coroner's inquest, Mr. Hamerton, the surgeon who was called in when the dreadful occurrence took place, and who had attended the Earl daily for the preceding fortnight, said that the deceased “appeared very much affected by the late news from India, and often spoke on the subject, expressing himself in strong terms about the females who had been taken as hostages at Cabul. He was on these occasions much excited. He appeared deeply interested in the fate of the women. These thoughts, I have no doubt, increased the depression. He frequently said, ‘Suppose one's own family had been in such a situation, what a dreadful thing to reflect upon.’” The following letter from Lord Elphinstone, in which there are a few interesting remarks, is introduced here somewhat in advance of its proper place, in order to complete this episode.

“Madras, September 19th, 1842.

“MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—I have been very busy lately packing up and preparing for my departure and journey homewards, which has

¹ *Kitab-i-fihrist al kutub*, etc. A List of desiderata of books in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Hindustani on the Art of Warfare among the Mohammedans, compiled under orders of Lord Munster, by A. Sprenger, London, 1840.

interfered with my correspondence, and you must accept the excuse. Even now I cannot answer your very interesting letter of the 29th of August as I should wish, but must content myself with thanking you for it. It is possible that Lord Tweeddale may be the bearer of the grant of some indulgence or allowance to the Sepoys at Hyderabad, and I find that this opinion is very prevalent here; but I cannot discover upon what it rests. I shall be very happy to hear that it is well founded. I have never concealed from Lord Ellenborough, or anyone else, my opinion that it was due *to you* that something should be done.

“Poor Lord Munster! Disappointment, I fear, produced that aberration of mind under the influence of which he destroyed himself. He was always very ambitious, and overlooked the difference of the present age and that of King Charles the Second; therefore, he considered himself ill-used when he did not receive a dukedom, and returned the ribbon of the Guelphic Order which his father sent him, with the observation that he would be happy to receive one of a little darker blue, meaning, of course, the Garter. The King, who was kindness itself to all his children, was obliged to give him to understand that his expectations were unreasonable. But, in fact, his ever having entertained them is almost a proof that upon some points his judgment was not under the control of his reason.

“I am writing in such a turmoil of interruption and packing, that I am afraid you will not think that my ideas are of the clearest order, and, therefore, I will conclude this short letter. I shall have abundance of time to write before I leave this country, as I am going to pass a month or six weeks quietly in the Hills, as soon as I am relieved by Lord Tweeddale. I shall avail myself gladly of the opportunity of writing again to you. Meanwhile, I beg to thank you most sincerely for your most agreeable and valuable correspondence, and to assure you that I shall look back to it, and to having made your personal acquaintance, as one of my most pleasing recollections during my stay in India.

“Believe me, my dear General,

“Yours most sincerely,

“ELPHINSTONE.”

The exchange of letters of occasional congratulation and greeting with those members of the princely families of Mysore, Cochin, and Travancore, with whom he had become personally acquainted in his official capacity, was always kept up at Hyderabad by General Fraser, and even after his return to Europe. Here is the text of an autograph letter from the Elliah Rajah, or Heir

Apparent of Travancore, Prince Martanda Vurma, written when he was eighteen or nineteen years of age.¹

“General J. S. Fraser, etc., etc.

“MY DEAR SIR,—I am favoured with the receipt of your most kind letter of the 30th November last accompanying the beautiful chains you have so kindly sent to me, in accomplishment of the request I made in my former letter. I gave one of each description to His Highness my Brother, Mother, Father, and other friends, with your best compliments. We are all so much astonished at their neat workmanship that we are not yet enabled to satisfy our curiosity on the method of their construction; and we highly value them, especially on account of their coming from the hands of such an esteemed friend as you are, and I beg you to accept my warmest thanks for the same.

“As I am aware of the nature of business you are to transact there, I beg to inform you need not make any apology for the delay.

“I am in want of words to thank you for your most kind and interesting advices you were so good as to give, encouraging me for my English studies, which is the source of all manners of happiness, a test for distinguishing good from evil, and also a best plan for improving the mind; and, in consequence, confirming your advice always in my mind as a fundamental rule, I shall always continue them with much assiduity.

“The grand festival, Morajapom, having commenced on the 9th of November, is to expire on the 13th instant, and as I am much engaged in it, I beg you would kindly excuse the delay that occurred in answering your favour.

“How happy we shall be to see you returned to Travancore, and incessantly pray God Almighty to favour us with such an agreeable opportunity.

“I and the rest of my family are in the enjoyment of good health, and His Highness my Brother, as well as my Mother, desire me to present their best compliments and respectful remembrances to you; and my Father is highly thankful for the kind memory you still retain in your heart of the day we passed at Valy, and the conversation on our return; and he is always wishing to enjoy soon the happiness of such an agreeable company; and at the same time I beg you to accept the respectful regards of

“Your sincere and ever faithful friend,

“Trevandrum, 2nd January 1840.

“MARTANDA VURMAH, E.R.

“P.S.—I beg to acquaint you that the Governor, Lord Elphinstone,

¹ He succeeded to the throne in 1846, and died in 1860. His immediate successor, as well as the present Rajah, were pupils of a very distinguished Indian statesman, Sir T. Madhava Rao, K.C.S.I., successively Minister of Travancore, Indore, and Baroda.

was so good as to send me a book, *Don Quixote*, through Colonel Maclean, who delivered it to my Brother in a public meeting held on his arrival here; and Dr. Eaton desires me to offer you his compliments.

“M. V.”

The General was in the habit of receiving one or two letters every half-year from the Rajah of Mysore—to which, of course, he regularly responded,—but His Highness not being an English scholar, like the Prince of Travancore, his letters were dictated to an amanuensis, and then translated into English. For the most part they contain little but complimentary and friendly expressions, but some of them of a later period bear evident marks of the Rajah's own thoughts on several subjects of interest, and will appear in their proper place in this memoir.

CHAPTER IV.

Stagnation in the State—The Minister's Weakness and Strength on both Sides—The Badamee Outbreak—Letters to and from Lord Elphinstone—The Russian Prince Soltykoff—The Subsidiary Force—Great Military Authority and Responsibility of the Resident—Stoppage of the Sepoys' "Batta"—Disaffection and Mutinous Proceedings—Order and Obedience enforced by General Fraser—Thanks of Government—The Resident's Proposal for Inquiry and Relief rejected by Lord Ellenborough.

THERE was decidedly no progress of any description in the Hyderabad State during the years 1841 and 1842, unless it was that slow progress, through ever-increasing financial embarrassments, towards actual insolvency, which General Fraser desired to avert, and which yet sometimes appeared to him to be almost desirable, as a crisis that would necessitate some decisive step towards an effectual measure of reform. The Minister continued to be invariably courteous and cordial in manner and address, profuse in professions of his desire to meet all the Resident's wishes, but utterly impracticable as to any real change in the existing system, especially as to admitting any person of rank or capacity to undertake any part of those executive duties which he could not really perform in person himself, but which he would entrust to no responsible colleague. He would have none but submissive subordinates in any department, for fear he should be nursing a rival, or endangering the succession of his own son, Bala Pershad, to the Dewannee. He did not want anyone else to be trained for high office, or to be placed in a position to establish a claim to promotion by recorded service or manifest ability. Besides this, the debts of the State at exorbitant interest were accumulating at such a rate—the annual deficit, as it was afterwards proved, being about sixty lakhs of rupees in each of the four years from 1839 to 1843—that Chundoo Lall must have shrunk from communicating the facts to anyone who would have

been capable of appreciating their true import. Certain it is that General Fraser found great difficulty in obtaining accurate information as to the financial condition and exigencies of the State; although at this very time Chundoo Lall was most anxious to obtain relief, either by an advance from the British treasury or by the support of British credit, and must have known that no relief would be given without a full disclosure. General Fraser was not long in mastering the general outline of the situation, and lost no time in drawing a descriptive picture for the enlightenment of the Governor-General in Council. Chundoo Lall was manifestly the great obstacle to reform,—the incubus that weighed heavily upon the Hyderabad State, sunk in uneasy slumbers,—and yet the removal of that obstacle seemed a more and more delicate and troublesome operation. The Minister's position, both in Hyderabad and at Calcutta, was a very strong one, if only from his extreme old age, and his thirty years of undivided power. He had the repute on our side of having, in concert with Sir Henry Russell as Resident, established the Contingent, of having never opposed its augmentation in numbers or expense, and of having never refused his assent to any demand, or his concurrence in any plan, formed with a view to some advantage for the Honourable Company. Nothing apparently could be gained for the Government of India by changing the Nizam's Minister. On the other side, the Minister, besides the awe with which he was invested from the prevailing belief in his having British authority at his back, had, to his great honour, in the eyes of the Nizam and of all persons of distinction at His Highness's Court and capital, the reputation of having won for the State by his policy of alliance and active co-operation with our Government, entire freedom from the Mahratta claims of *chout* or tribute, and from the last vestiges of Mahratta participation in the revenues and sovereignty of Berar, now unquestionably the richest province in the Nizam's dominions. The Contingent might be costly, but the advantages of the Treaty of 1822 would never have been won but for the exploits of "the Russell Brigade". After all, it was the Nizam's Army, an army from which the Nizam's Government derived great security, and of which His Highness might well be proud. Such were some of the considerations, not without some plausibility, and even some degree of justice, that may well have been advanced by Chundoo

Lall and his more immediate adherents, and that cannot but have given greater weight and solidity to his credit in the Council-chamber of Calcutta, and to his absolute supremacy in the Hyderabad Durbar.

In the midst of the administrative stagnation of 1841 and 1842, some stirring events occurred which gave new proofs at once of the value and usefulness of the Nizam's Contingent, and of the very small aid, even in the way of local information, that the Resident could obtain from the Nizam's Minister. Early in May 1841, General Fraser had received reports from Captain Jackson, commanding one of the regiments of the Contingent at Muktlul, that armed men were assembling in the southern part of the Shorapore Raj, tributary to the Nizam, and that an Arab Jemadar named Kohran was at their head, while information came from other sources that small parties of Arabs were daily quitting the city of Hyderabad, to reinforce the insurgents. In the following letter to Lord Elphinstone the Resident describes the progress of this movement, and his own proceedings in connection with it.

“Hyderabad, June 11, 1841.

“MY LORD,—I have the pleasure to return the four volumes of ‘Janin,’ with two of ‘Tocqueville,’ which you were so good as to send me, with a thousand thanks for the gratification they have afforded.

“We have, just now, had another proof here of the volcanic character of the soil on which we tread. About six weeks ago, vague reports reached me that some Arabs and other vagabonds were assembling in the Nizam's country, at or near a place called Deodroog, in the district of Shorapore; and, almost day by day, their numbers were said to increase, though no one knew under whose orders they were acting, or with what ulterior designs.

“The Minister ordered down some of the Government troops to seize or disperse them; but the detachment, far from executing the prescribed duty, placed themselves in friendly communication with the insurgents. At length, an inroad upon the Company's territory began to be spoken of; and, determining therefore to defer no longer, I ordered the 4th Regiment N. I. to march immediately from Muktlul, and the undermentioned forces to move forthwith from Bolarum:—

6th Regiment Nizam's Infantry.	1 8 in. mortar.
3 Troops N. Cavalry.	2 5½ in. do.
2 5½-in. Howitzers.	A small party of Pioneers.
2 6-pounder Guns.	

"With this force I was going down myself, and within four-and-twenty hours should have been *en route*, when I received an express from the Political Agent in the Southern Mahratta country, apprising me that the insurgents had suddenly entered the Company's territory, seized upon the unoccupied fort of Badamee, plundered the town, and murdered many of the inhabitants. He added that a large military force had been ordered against them.

"Now, it was no business of mine to go in quest of adventures on the Company's territory. I therefore countermanded the movement of the Bolarum force, and confined myself to sending one of the Nizam's N. I. to the frontier, for the purpose of co-operating with the Company's authorities in any measure that might be deemed expedient against the insurgents. At the same time I ordered the three troops of the Nizam's Cavalry which I had at Bolarum, with four troops, or half a Risalah, from Mominabad, to move down immediately, by forced marches, to join the 4th N. I. I also ordered more Cavalry, to the extent of a complete Risalah, or eight troops, to be held in readiness to move from Morninabad on requisition of the Collector of Sholapore.

"I have further offered the Political Agent in the Southern Mahratta country any aid he may require from me in Artillery or any other arm. The Collector of Sholapore has availed himself of the power vested in him, and has written to Brigadier Blair to send half a Risalah of horse for protection of this district.

"Here matters are in suspense; and I am daily in expectation of hearing that hostilities have commenced. Badamee is an extremely strong place, and I hope that the military authorities in the Southern Mahratta country have sent thither a considerable force, especially of guns. The Nizam's Cavalry, if they arrive in time, will be the most useful arm when the insurgents shall have been driven out of Badamee.

"It is supposed, but not certain, that the insurgents are acting under the orders of an emissary from the ex-Rajah of Sattara, although the Resident there has not yet been able to obtain any authentic information on the subject.

"The insurgents have plenty of money; and the leaders (an Arab Jemadar named Kohran, and a Brahmin) pay their followers very high rates. The estimates of their number vary from 500 to 5,000. Of these fellows there is, of course, no real fear; but I should be somewhat apprehensive of the insurrectionary spirit spreading, and gaining over the other Mohammedans. These gentlemen I distrust; and I therefore regard it as highly important that this seditious movement should be immediately quelled, before gaining further head.

"I have again suggested to the Supreme Government to remove all the foreign mercenary troops, especially the Arabs, from India, assured

that they are most dangerous to the peace and tranquillity of the country. There are, perhaps, 5,000 Arabs in the Nizam's territory alone, of whom probably 3,000 are collected at Hyderabad. The whole of this race are banded together in strict union; and I received the other day, a report that, had I moved down with the Bolarum force, 600 Arabs from the city had determined to instantly join and reinforce their insurgent brethren in arms. Orders are now given to put to death any Arab who shall attempt to leave the city for the purpose of proceeding to the scene of disturbance; and every measure of precaution that I can devise has been taken to seize any of the rebel force endeavouring to escape, after expulsion from Badamee, into the Nizam's country.

"The Wahabee spirit, too, seems to be showing itself here. Some of this sect, a few days ago, murdered two Mahdavi Pathans near Kulburga, which has produced a strong excitement in the city; but I do not interfere in the matter. The Nizam, I hear, has ordered a strict watch to be kept over his brother at Golcondah.

"I remain, my Lord,

"Yours very faithfully,

"J. S. FRASER."

Lord Elphinstone promptly replied to this letter, and in his reply introduced to General Fraser a very interesting and then a somewhat mysterious person—whose name, in the person of his relative and successor, is now well known on the turf and in society—the Russian Prince Soltykoff.

"Madras, June 22, 1841.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,—Your kind letter has been most acceptable, for I had no other information of the disturbances beyond the Toombuddra, except the reports which reached the Collector of Bellary, and led him to detach parties of Cavalry for the protection of our frontier. I hope that this singular outbreak may now be considered at an end, and that I may congratulate you upon the fall of Badamee and the capture of its garrison. Walter Elliot,¹ who is just returned from sea, knows the place, and describes it as a most formidable position,—once invested, however, there was no escape, according to him, for those who had trusted to its inaccessibility; they must have been caught, as in a trap.

"What was the motive of this attempt at insurrection? Was it a remnant of the ostensibly Wahabee movement? Or was it instigated

¹ Now Sir Walter Elliot, K.C.S.I., who rose to be a Member of Council at Madras.

by some petty Chief who had his own cause of discontent, and no very precise idea of how he could show his teeth? At all events, your plan of expelling all the Arabs and foreign mercenaries of every nation from India, is a sound and politic measure, and I trust it will be adopted. Equally so appears to me your idea of stationing a portion of the Nizam's Regular Force in the south-west angle of his dominions. It would cut off in times of disturbance the Mahratta Chiefs from the disaffected in the Nizam's country, and thus prevent a dangerous combination, and it would protect the districts in which it is located, as well as those south of the Toombuddra, from the raids and forays to which they are now occasionally exposed. I hope that the Kurnool Sowars will in time become a useful body of troops for this purpose, in patrolling the southern bank of the river.

"Excuse a hasty letter, which I am ashamed to send, when you found time to write to me in the midst of the busy time which you must have had lately.

"There is here a Russian Prince, Soltykoff, who claims my acquaintanceship, and whom *I believe* that I remember in London, where he was Attaché to the Embassy. He was afterwards in a diplomatic situation in Persia, when Count Simonich was Minister, and I understand that he was at Teheran during the siege of Herat. He has brought *no* letters, and professes that his coming here at all is the effect of chance, as he had no idea of doing so till he met Sir Colin Campbell in Egypt. He is going to Hyderabad, and I commend him to your hospitality and kindness. He is a gentlemanlike man, and a most beautiful draughtsman. His groups of Persians, and other drawings of figures and landscapes, are very clever. He of course *says* he is only here for his amusement, and he even affects to fear that the Emperor will be displeased with him for coming here without leave.

"Believe me, my dear General,

"Very faithfully yours,

"ELPHINSTONE."

In a letter to Lord Elphinstone, dated the 12th of June, General Fraser reports that "our troops are fairly in position before Badamee". "The Minister", he continues, "wrote to me this morning to state that the Arab Jemadars of Hyderabad had discovered in an adjacent village, and had seized, the wife and family of Kohran, the leader of the insurgent party. The family consisted of a son aged sixteen, and a daughter six years of age. All these, the Jemadars added, according to the Minister, might now be blown away from guns, or punished in any manner the Government pleased. The Minister referred the case to me, and I have

desired him to keep these persons in confinement without any unnecessary harshness. All this proves that the Hyderabad Arabs are beginning to take alarm, and that they desire to exhibit some appearance of subordination."

On the 16th of June the Resident reports in private letters to the Governor-General's Private Secretary and to Lord Elphinstone the recapture of the fort of Badamee, with very small loss to our troops. Kohran, the Arab, and Nursing Rao, the Brahmin leader of the insurgents, fell into our hands, and more than a hundred Arabs were taken prisoners. The causes of this extraordinary outbreak remained most obscure after every possible inquiry had been made,—local rumours, for they amounted to nothing more, generally attributing it to a conspiracy fomented by the deposed Rajah of Sattara, then residing under surveillance, a sort of state-prisoner at large, at Benares. But there was no clear, or even intelligible evidence to that effect.

On the 25th of June he writes to Lord Elphinstone:—

"I imagine that these matters are now drawing to a close; and upon the old principle of 'shutting the stable door after the steed is stolen,' I hope we shall now either garrison our forts in the Southern Mahratta country, or dismantle them so far as to be useless to others."

A month later he writes more fully on the subject, and notices Lord Elphinstone's introduction of Prince Soltykoff, who had not as yet made his appearance at the Residency.

"Hyderabad, 25th July 1841.

"MY LORD,—The copying of the accompanying despatches being now finished, I do myself the pleasure to send them for your perusal. I cannot, however, suppose that you will actually read them, for they are dreadfully wearisome. I had scarcely patience to do so myself, although I was under the necessity of saying something about them to the Supreme Government. What I did say you will find in the copy of a letter to the Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 21st instant. It says, in fact, very little; for the singular cunning and secrecy of the rogues we have to deal with leaves little ground for the formation of any positive judgment. I have now no more certain knowledge than I had two months ago who was the real originator of this criminal enterprise; and it appears by a private letter which I received last night from the Political Agent in the Southern Mahratta country, that though he has possession of both the Brahmin, Nursing

Rao, and the Arab Jemadar, Kohran, he yet labours under just the same ignorance as myself. I do not think the Minister Chundoo Lall possesses any real information either. He has several times mentioned the name of the Rajah of Sattara, and upon one occasion distinctly stated that he was the author of the mischief. But the ridiculous and insufficient grounds on which he made this assertion will be seen in the translations of three notes that passed between us on the 13th and 14th instant.

"Your lordship has conferred a favour upon me in giving me, by your introduction, the pleasure of Mr. and Mrs. Strachey's society. The lady is evidently a very superior person, and the charms of her conversation make me regret that I am but little likely ever to enjoy the same advantage on a wider scale in England, where I suppose a cultivated mind and polished manner are rather more frequently met with than they are in India. Mr. Strachey is expecting that your lordship will assist his views by recommending him to Lord Auckland for the Nizam's service, and I have afforded what little aid I could by writing to Mr. Colvin, the Governor-General's Private Secretary, an attestation to the good conduct and abilities of Mr. Strachey, recently furnished by his commanding officer.

"I beg that you will not hesitate to keep the 'Duchesse d'Abrantés' as long as you are pleased with her. She is a delightful companion, and carries one off to times and scenes very much more attractive than the monotony of Indian life. If it were not almost a treasonable confession, I should feel inclined to remark that even a little insurrection every now and then is better than nothing. I imagined before I came here that the life of the Resident at Hyderabad must necessarily be an active and well-employed one; but, on the contrary, I find myself sinking down into a state of unwelcome and morbid stagnation. To see a Russian Prince here will be quite an adventure, and I beg that your lordship will be so kind as to assure M. de Soltykoff that I shall be most happy to receive him at the Residency.

"It will be quite an amusing problem to find out how far he deserves the character that has been given him of being 'a Russian spy'. My mind happens just at this moment to be filled with terrible visions of Russian ambition and projects of aggrandisement, in consequence of having read a work lent me by Mr. Strachey, called by a very long title, which I must give at full length:—'Exposition of Transactions in Central Asia, through which the Independence of States and the Affections of People, Barriers to the British Possessions in India, have been sacrificed to Russia by Henry John, Viscount Palmerston, H.M.'s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, constituting grounds for the Impeachment of that Minister,'—a most terrible array of charges against poor Lord Palmerston, if he deserves them. The pamphlet is

written by Mr. David Urquhart ; but what degree of credit it is likely to receive in England I cannot conceive. It is very likely, after all, that we are apt to exaggerate the absolute views and settled intentions of nations and States, as we are the qualities, good or bad, of individuals.

“Believe me, my dear Lord,

“Very faithfully and obediently yours,

“J. S. FRASER.”

It will be seen hereafter, that one of the greatest, if not the greatest, of all difficulties that General Fraser had to encounter in pursuing his plans for the reform of the Hyderabad administration, lay in the inexplicable reluctance of the Government of India to do anything, or to press any course of action on the Nizam, that had nothing more to recommend it than the intention and the hope of a beneficial effect on the allied State and its large population. If it were anything that might consolidate the Contingent, or ensure the regular payment of that force, or otherwise promote what seemed our direct interests, the authorities at Calcutta always found good and sufficient cause for strong words and effectual measures to enforce them. Where no such incentive presented itself, there were invariably, as will be seen, some scruples as to the Nizam's independence under Treaty, or some equally grave consideration, which forbade any exercise, however good the object might be, of our irresistible influence. An early instance of these peculiar scruples, in a case where our motives could not have been suspected, while the objects and benefits of the measure suggested were obviously and essentially Imperial, occurred as one of the consequences of the Badamee outbreak. In accordance with the opinions expressed in the preceding letter to Lord Elphinstone, General Fraser proposed to the Supreme Government that he should be authorised to press upon the Nizam's Government a general measure for destroying or dismantling the numerous hill-forts in various parts of the country, useless for military purposes, and in fact left open and abandoned as a temptation to freebooters and insurgents. The substance of the reply from the Government of India, in October 1841, was that “under present circumstances it was not the Governor-General's desire that he should authorise any measures for that purpose. Where the stronghold of a freebooter or a rebel, against whom it had been found necessary to employ troops commanded by British officers, had been occupied, it might be

right to destroy it, and to take precautions against its being reconstructed, but no more general proceedings were contemplated, or could be sanctioned by the Governor-General."

"When", indeed, continued the despatch, "circumstances may call for our direct interference in the management of the country, it will then be perfectly warrantable and expedient to insist on the disuse of means of defence against an authority, the just use of which will be within our own control."

"You will be sensible from the whole tenor of the policy of the Government in connection with the Hyderabad Residency, that it is not intended to force on any change of our position with respect to the Nizam's dominions, but only to watch the course of events, and to provide for the exigencies which may occur, as the actual state of facts and a just regard to all claims may render necessary."

Such was the general conception of a dignified and enlightened Imperial policy when Lord Auckland was Governor-General, and Mr. (afterwards Sir Herbert) Maddock Secretary to Government in the Foreign and Political Department; and this was very little, if at all, modified during the whole period that General Fraser occupied the post of Resident at Hyderabad. It really amounted, if properly analysed, to nothing more than this,—that the great duty of the Resident was to see that the Contingent was regularly paid, or was, at any rate, not more than four months in arrears; and that every precaution being taken, and every advantage seized, to secure the pay and permanence of the Contingent, all the diseased places in the Nizam's territory, even those that were dangerous to the general health of the Empire, might be left to fester and to inflame, until some pretext was afforded for our "direct interference in the management of the country". Then, and not till then, it would be "warrantable and expedient" to use the "authority" that would be "within our own control" for the reform of abuses and the redress of grievances.

From this doctrine, as will be abundantly made manifest in the course of this work, General Fraser continuously and consistently dissented, and throughout his unusually long tenure of the Hyderabad Residency—under the rule of Lord Auckland, Lord Ellenborough, Lord Hardinge, and the Marquis of Dalhousie—contended against it on every possible opportunity, and to the extreme verge

of official deference. His doctrine was very unlike that accepted at Calcutta. He conceived that it was at once the duty and the interest of the British Government, as the *de facto* paramount or Imperial Power of India, to prevent the arrival of a disastrous crisis in the affairs of our faithful and useful ally, the Nizam, by the timely promotion of reforms, under our predominant influence, without assailing the administrative independence guaranteed by treaty, without destroying local customs and institutions, without displacing the native dignitaries and officials of the Hyderabad State by an inundation of English gentlemen, or of Natives trained in our system. He did not consider it either just or politic to wait and to watch for what were called "exigencies", but to anticipate them and to guard against them.

In September 1841 the Resident reminds the Government that he had already suggested certain measures "that might lead to the gradual improvement of the country, which, however, elicited no reply", and that he had since "remained silent on the subject, because no more decided policy presented itself to his mind, which did not involve the removal of the Dewan Chundoo Lall from office," for which measure he had no "reason to suppose the British Government was prepared".

In summing up, in June 1841, the results of his inquiries into the causes and incidents of the Balamee outbreak, and forwarding copies of all the correspondence with Chundoo Lall, and all the reports received from him, General Fraser observes:—"These papers are for the most part of a very vague and unsatisfactory nature, and exhibit a proof of the extraordinary manner in which the affairs of this Government are carried on, and of the ignorance in which the Minister endeavours to keep the British Resident with respect to any transaction that may appear to be indicative of his own weakness, and discreditable to his personal administration."

In December 1841 he writes very much to the same effect, commenting with perfect candour, and without any disguise, at once on the incapacity of Chundoo Lall, and on the apparent indifference of our Government. "A great difficulty", he says, "is presented by a point in the Minister's character to which I have formerly adverted, his insurmountable propensity to concealment, so as to keep me in ignorance of everything that may discredit his

own system of government, or exhibit the Nizam's dominions in any other condition than that in which the Supreme Government would wish them to be. The disturbances and disputes between the local authorities and Zemindars or others, which frequently occur in different parts of the country, never reach my ears until reported by the officers of the Nizam's army; or are incidentally discovered at Hyderabad; or are brought to my knowledge by the Minister when he either stands in absolute need of the aid of the troops to extricate him from his difficulties; or, as is generally the case, when he finds that the information has already reached me from other sources."

The following paragraphs complete the picture of General Fraser's position, with reference to the Nizam's Minister and to his own Government, at the close of 1841:—

"It is the case, as I have observed on former occasions, that the whole of the Minister's administration is embarrassed by his financial difficulties. He is not his own master, but a slave to his creditors on every side, and entangled to an inextricable degree with various classes—Soucars, Arab mercenaries, talookdars, assignees of revenue, and others,—with whom he is connected in his pecuniary transactions.

"A proposition for introducing our civil administration would no doubt be strongly opposed by the Nizam; and I do not perceive that it would be justified by any extraordinary crisis that has arisen, or that any circumstances connected with the safety of our own territory would authorise so decided an infringement of the independence of this State.

"My proposition for strengthening the hands of the Minister by the assistance of Native agency, and the transfusion of vigour which might thus have been given to every decayed or weakened branch of the administration, was not entertained by the Governor-General in Council. I think, however, that it might have been attended with good effect, because it would not only have given an accession of talent and energy to the Nizam's Government, but it would have removed what I consider one of the principal sources of existing evil, which is the concentration of the whole power of Government, and exercise of its authority, in the person of the Minister alone, who exclusively directs, in such manner as we see it to be directed, every transaction of the State, from the highest and most important, to the meanest and most insignificant. This was the most moderate change I could recommend with any chance of advantage, and the Minister had expressed his willingness to consent to it."

The Minister's "willingness", it is, of course, understood, was contingent on the approval and instructions of the authorities at Calcutta, and the full support they could, if they chose, give to the Resident's recommendations. But that support was always withheld when it was wanted, and somehow or other the Minister seems always to have known that it would be withheld. If his plan of introducing a few able Native functionaries of tried ability and integrity, such as the Brahmin Vencata Rao,¹ who had been Minister of the Travancore State, was not to be carried out, then, said General Fraser—

"I perceive no remaining course of policy but to remove the Minister from office upon a pension for the remainder of his life, and to recommend the Nizam to appoint another Dewan. Into the details of this particular part of the subject, however, I shall not deem it necessary to enter, unless the British Government shall be of opinion that a total and radical change in the administration is indispensably called for."

Early in 1842, General Fraser's attention was for a time, and with good cause, turned from the administrative stagnation and financial disorder of the Hyderabad State to matters more immediately beneath his own authority, and more directly affecting the British Government. The Subsidiary Force, composed of Company's troops, became a more urgent object for his consideration, and for that of the Governor of Madras and the Governor-General, than the Nizam's Army. In consequence of certain alterations, very much to their disadvantage, in the scale of pay allotted to them in the stations most distant from the provinces in which they are for the most part recruited, and in which their homes are situated, a spirit of discontent manifested itself among the Madras Sepoys of the Subsidiary Force, in the great military cantonment of Secunderabad, near the city of Hyderabad.

The Sepoys refused to take their pay without the additional allowance called "batta", which they had been accustomed to receive, and the issue of which was suddenly and, as it seemed to them, arbitrarily and unfairly stopped. The Sepoy's pay was only 14s. a month, out of which he had to find his own subsistence, and the "batta", supposed to compensate him for the higher price of grain and other necessaries, and for other expenses consequent on

¹ *Ante*, p. 99.

great distance from home, amounted to from 4s. to 5s. more—a very appreciable and welcome addition to his monthly pittance. “Batta” was originally an allowance made to troops in the field, on active service, and was continued to them so long as they remained in what was called “foreign” territory. But as territory was conquered or ceded, it ceased to be foreign. As internal peace and British supremacy in India were established, there was a falling off in prize-money, plunder, and special gratuities. From 1756 to 1856, in proportion as the British dominions extended in area, the Sepoy’s marches became longer, and his emoluments were curtailed; while the excitement of warfare gave way to the brooding dulness of garrison duty. This gradual change was varied, but not relieved, by expeditions to Afghanistan, Burma and China,—outlandish and odious in Hindu estimation,—and by the wars in Scinde and the Punjab, which brought those distant regions within the range of the Sepoy’s ordinary service. Mr. H. M. Durand, the present Under Secretary in the Indian Foreign Office, has very justly observed in a recent publication, that “the sweeping annexations of Lord Dalhousie, while they weakened our military position, unsettled the minds of our Indian feudatories, and sowed fear and distrust broadcast.”¹ But the most dangerous results of annexation consisted in the distrust and unsettled temper of our Sepoys. Lord Dalhousie contemptuously charged Sir Charles Napier, who had suppressed a most dangerous mutiny in the Punjab, arising out of this same question of batta in a recently annexed province, with having made use of “extravagant and mischievous exaggerations”, with having brought “unjust and injurious imputations” against the Bengal Army. He had read “the statements” of the Commander-in-Chief “with incredulity”. He declared that “the safety of India had never for one moment been imperilled by partial insubordination in the ranks of its army”.² He pronounced in his Farewell Minute, that “the position of the Native soldier in India had long been such as to leave hardly any circumstance of his condition in need of improvement”.³ Even with regard to their

¹ *Life of Sir H. M. Durand* (W. H. Allen, 1883), vol. i, p. 282.

² *Papers printed by the East India Company, Discussion between the Marquis of Dalhousie and Sir Charles Napier*, 1854, p. 15.

³ *Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie*, 28th February 1856 (para. 151), p. 39.

material condition, much lowered by the increased length and frequency of marches, Lord Dalhousie was quite wrong. The moral condition, the temper, and good will of the Sepoys, the faith and confidence with which they looked up to the British Government, and the hope with which they regarded their own prospects, were all impaired and perverted by the incidents of territorial extension. I may add here, without saying my last word on the condition of the Indian soldier, that since 1857 the emoluments of almost every branch and every rank of the Native Army have been directly or indirectly augmented. But from about 1836 to 1856 there was a steady decline in the Sepoy's fortunes.

This decline was just beginning to be seriously felt by the Native troops, though not rightly understood or appreciated by the authorities, in 1842. It more immediately affected the Sepoys of the Madras Army, who had for two or three years been pushed on from the south to occupy stations which they had been accustomed to consider outside their latitude, but which had been vacated by the Bengal and Bombay troops engaged in Afghanistan. The military budget of India was swelled beyond all precedent by the expeditions to Scinde and Cabul, but savings were sought, under strict injunctions from the Court of Directors, by cutting off their accustomed batta from the Sepoys. This measure of economy was put in force just at the time when the Sepoys were being harassed with most unwelcome changes of quarters,—changes entailing special expenses on the Madras troops, who, unlike those of Bengal, are always accompanied by their families.

There is an early hint of the coming trouble in the following letter from Lord Elphinstone.

“Madras, January 21st, 1842.

“MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—You have heard of the refusal of a wing of the 52nd Native Infantry to take their pay without batta at Asscerghur, and of the mutinous conduct of the other wing, who, however, have taken their pay. I hear from various quarters that the whole of the regiments at Hyderabad intend to refuse their pay unless batta is issued to them. I should be very much obliged to you if you would tell me whether you believe that there are grounds for this rumour, and if so, in what manner you think that such a resistance can best be met. I fear that it would be impossible to compel so large a body of troops to receive their pay if they decline simultaneously to receive it; and the passive mode of resistance which the wing at

Asseerghur has adopted is perhaps of all others the most difficult to contend with. I shall be very happy to receive your suggestions, if, as there is too much reason to apprehend, there is any probability of the refusal said to be in contemplation at Hyderabad. I write in a great hurry, to save the post. I have just received the overland letters, and, what was even more interesting to me, a few lines from Meerut of the 6th of January, giving me the then latest rumour from Cabul, where an action is said to have been fought on the 12th of December, in which, after a sanguinary struggle, the insurgents were completely routed. I hope and trust that this may be true, for then the news of the capitulation (said to have taken place on the 9th December) must be false. But you will probably have later intelligence.

“Believe me, my dear General,

“Most truly yours,

“ELPHINSTONE.”

There was in 1842 no functionary in any part of India under the rank of a Governor, invested with such extensive authority and control over so large a military force of all arms as the Resident at Hyderabad. Including the Subsidiary Force and the Nizam's Contingent, General Fraser had about 15,000 men at his beck and call; there being in those days no telegraph to check his proceedings, and the post between Hyderabad, Madras, and Calcutta being carried by runners on foot at the rate of about 120 miles a day. No Commander-in-Chief, or military department of the Honourable Company—no one but the Governor-General—could interfere with the Resident's initiative and absolute discretion with regard to the Nizam's Army. Over the Subsidiary Force, concentrated at Secunderabad—about midway between the Residency and the headquarters of the Contingent at Bolarum—the Resident's authority, as will be seen in the following extracts from a reply given in 1848 to a reference on the subject, was decisive and paramount.

“The Governor-General thinks you are substantially right in the view you take of the authority which the Resident at Hyderabad ought to hold over the Subsidiary as well as the Contingent Force. The Governor-General desires that it may be distinctly understood that the Resident at Hyderabad, acting on behalf of the Supreme Government, has full authority over the Subsidiary Force and the Officer commanding it, excepting in matters of discipline and detail.

“The Resident has power to direct the movement of the Subsidiary

Force, or any part of it, for purposes of military service within the Nizam's dominions.

"The power of seeing the Force under arms, of inspecting arsenals, and everything connected with the Subsidiary Force, and reporting thereupon to the Supreme Government, must belong to the Resident.

"The Supreme Government will expect that the Resident and the Officer commanding the Subsidiary Force will on all occasions act cordially together for the promotion of the public service, without any unnecessary doubts or difficulties as to the precise limits of their respective authorities, which have now been pointed out so distinctly as to be readily recognised."

These instructions hold equally good, it must be explained, whether the Resident be a soldier or a civilian; always, in either case, with the reservation to the Commandant of the Force, of authority in matters of detail and discipline, and in the actual conduct of military operations. But even this reservation was removed when mutiny was impending in 1842; and in consideration of General Fraser's rank in the army, and his high repute for cool judgment and the capacity of command, complete military authority over the Subsidiary Force was placed in his hands. He was invested by the Government of Madras, under secret orders dated 27th of January 1842, with "unlimited discretionary power to act, in the event of necessity arising for prompt decision, in whatever manner he may consider most expedient, in the case of the whole of the troops composing the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force refusing to receive pay without batta." The General was even authorised to take the extreme course of conceding the demands of the Sepoys, of ordering batta to be issued, and of promising its continuance, if no other mode of preventing a serious conflict should present itself. He was, in fact, given *carte blanche*, and these unlimited powers were subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Government, Lord Auckland being still Governor-General.

The feelings with which General Fraser entered upon the task, which might possibly compel him to lead European soldiers against their Indian comrades, may be gathered from the following extracts of a letter to Lord Elphinstone, dated the 26th of January 1842. He was of opinion "that no measure should be taken to commit the Government finally either one way or the other, but that the question should be left as far as possible open to ulterior consideration and decision. This can be done without showing sym-

ptoms of fear or vacillation. If the order is once given to the men to receive their pay, the measure must, of course, be carried through, for there is but one way in which actual disobedience of orders can be dealt with."

"But," he continued, "the whole case is one that I do not at all like. The condition of the English officers has been ameliorated but that of the Sepoys has been made worse than before, notwithstanding the boon of the 21 per cent. I should be very sorry indeed that it were necessary to use coercion, or that a single drop of blood were shed in such a miserable cause. The discontinuance of the batta ought properly never to have been ordered, for pay or allowances which Sepoys once get, they are apt to consider ever after as their inalienable right. I do not consider the Madras Army to be in a state to be safely tampered with, and, least of all, in the present position of India, with our foreign Asiatic wars around us in every point of the compass.

"The Agra *Ukhar* of the 15th, which I received yesterday, immediately after your Lordship's letter, gives a shocking account of the state of things at Cabul, and in case you should not have seen the paper, I enclose an extract from it.

"I send also copies of some papers which I have just received from Major Wilkinson at Nagpore, to whom they had been sent by Sir Claude Wade, the Resident at Gwalior.

"I observe by the Madras papers received this morning that the death of General Elphinstone at Cabul is mentioned; but I conclude this must be a mistake, as it is not alluded to in either your Lordship's letter to me of the 21st, or in any of the Bengal papers I have seen.

"I begin to think that this Afghan expedition of ours, or, at least, our replacing Shah Shoojah on the throne, is not quite the most prudent thing we could have done. But in this policy we are unfortunately 'stept in so far, that should we wade no more, returning were as tedious as go o'er'."

On the 28th of January 1842 he again writes to Lord Elphinstone:—

"I have already remarked that I thought the retrenchment of the batta in itself a false and inexpedient step. It is hardly just to the Sepoy, for it leaves him with inadequate pay, and gives him reasonable grounds of complaint. Even if the measure were finally carried out

here, and that no overt act of mutiny took place, a strong spirit of discontent would be left in the minds of the men ; and it is impossible to say how far this might spread to other portions of the Madras Army. We cannot afford to try so rash an experiment. We are risking a pearl to gain a grain of wheat. To save a few paltry thousands of rupees per annum, we are perilling the allegiance of the Army, and perhaps the safety of the country. Besides all this, if the Secunderabad troops positively refuse their pay, I am by no means sure that we should have it in our power to coerce them. Some days ago I thought we might reckon on about a thousand men of the Madras European Regiment, but I find that, excluding recruits, sick in hospital, etc., there are not more than five hundred bayonets actually available. These, with the Company of European Foot Artillery, are all that we should have to depend upon, while on the other side we might have the force under-mentioned against us :—

- “Troop of Horse Artillery with six guns,
- “Company of Golundauz with six guns,
- “One Regiment of Light Cavalry, and
- “Three complete Regiments of Native Infantry.

“I beg to repeat that, under the whole of these circumstances, it seems to be a rash and unwise measure to discontinue the batta, and that this projected order should be abandoned. General Riddell fully concurs with me in this opinion.”

On the same date he wrote the following letter to Major Lancelot Wilkinson, Resident at Nagpore.

“Hyderabad, 28th January 1842.

“MY DEAR SIR,—I beg to return you my best thanks for your three kind notes of the 22nd and 23rd instant, and to return herewith the papers of intelligence to which they gave cover. I hope you will not be displeased at my having sent copies of them, confidentially, for the information of Lord Elphinstone, as I was already in private correspondence with him, and know that he feels much anxiety on the subject of Cabul. I shall say nothing at present of the miserable news from Afghanistan. The late atrocious proceedings there require acts, not words. In poor Sir William Macnaghten I have lost one of my oldest friends, as I believe the Government has one of its ablest and most enlightened servants.

“We are threatened here in a few days with a very disagreeable crisis in consequence of the projected measure of discontinuing the Sepoys’ batta ; and it is possible, I think, that this may give rise to a mutiny, which we have hardly sufficient force to put down. On our

side we should have only about five hundred bayonets of the Madras European Regiment and a Company of European Foot Artillery; while on the other there might be arrayed a Troop of Horse Artillery and a Company of Gollandauz, each with six guns, a Regiment of Cavalry, and three complete battalions of Native Infantry. I may inform you confidentially that under these circumstances, and as the Government has not yet committed itself by any positive order or announcement to the Sepoys, I have taken the liberty of suggesting to Lord Elphinstone to defer this measure, and to continue the batta for the present. I know not whether this suggestion will be acted upon; but in the meantime I have privately requested the Officer Commanding the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force not to issue pay, and not to do or say anything which can commit the Government either one way or the other, until he receives further instructions from Madras. You may, perhaps, deem it advisable to offer the same suggestion to your Commandant at Kamptee, and I have informed Lord Elphinstone that I should venture to recommend your doing so, leaving it, of course, to you to be guided by my suggestion or otherwise, according to your better judgment.

“Believe me, my dear Sir,

“Yours very faithfully,

“J. S. FRASER.

“Major L. Wilkinson, etc., etc., Nagpore.”

Distinct and positive orders from the Government of India, based on the absolute commands of the Court of Directors, for the issue of pay without batta to the troops at Secunderabad, having been communicated to the Resident, he proceeded resolutely to carry them out to the letter. General Fraser, although convinced in his own mind, as was, also, Lord Elphinstone, that the stoppage of batta was a great mistake and an injustice, was not the man to commit the Government of India to a capitulation before the sullen and menacing contumacy of their soldiers. He was willing and desirous to obtain a fair hearing for the Sepoys' claims, but insisted on immediate compliance with the orders of Government, acceptance of their pay according to the actually authorised scale, and the uninterrupted performance of all military duties. He held out to the Sepoys no promise or hope that the batta should be restored, but only that a full inquiry should be made into the prices and expenses of which they complained, and of the full cost of their subsistence, and that the final decision of Government should be given after such an inquiry. He took each Regiment

separately, making such a demonstration with the small force of European soldiers and Artillery at his disposal, and of the Nizam's Cavalry, as to impress them with his determination to exact obedience; and by his firm demeanour and persuasive language order and discipline were restored. A very small number of ringleaders in several regiments, who refused even in the General's presence to take their pay and return to their duty, were disarmed and made prisoners on parade by the European troops, and reserved for trial by court-martial. The arrangements were so complete that no attempt at resistance was made, and not a shot was fired. The whole work was done on the 7th, 8th, and 9th of February, the General being several hours in the saddle on each day. Lord Auckland was on the eve of his departure, and his successor, Lord Ellenborough, was then expected almost every day. The disastrous news from Afghanistan contributed to make the situation more critical. It was just at this time, a few days before the successful suppression of the threatened mutiny at Secunderabad, that Lord Elphinstone wrote the following letter to the Resident.

“Madras, 2nd February 1842.

“MY DEAR GENERAL,—I have just received your letter of the 28th January, and hasten to reply to it. On the day before yesterday I laid my own views upon the batta subject before you very unreservedly, and if it were for us to discuss the policy of the reduction, I fancy there would be little difference of opinion between us,—but that is no longer the question. After the strongest remonstrances on the part of the Madras Government, the order of May 1837 was finally pressed by the Supreme Government, and, after further remonstrances from Madras, confirmed and approved by the Home authorities. It was first ordered to be carried into effect about a year after its promulgation, when the whole of the troops at Secunderabad were simultaneously relieved, that all might be on the same rate of allowances, while none would be deprived of an advantage they were previously enjoying. The execution of this order, however, was stayed, upon a representation that the *agio*, or compensation for the debased Hyderabad currency in which the troops were paid, was not adequate to the loss which they sustained from this cause. The Government of India consequently appointed two officers, one belonging to the Nizam's service, the other to the Subsidiary Force, to revise the rate of exchange. This was concluded a few months ago, and orders were again received to relieve the troops simultaneously, and to give effect to the reduction (originally ordered

in 1837) immediately after the reliefs. Thus you will observe that this Government is neither responsible for the measure itself, nor for the time of carrying it into effect; but I believe you are under a great misapprehension in supposing that no announcement on the subject has ever been made to the men; for both upon this, and on the previous occasion, when the troops were relieved simultaneously, the strictest orders were given by this Government that the terms upon which they were going to Hyderabad were to be explained to the Sepoys, that they might make their arrangements for taking or leaving their families accordingly; moreover, two of the Regiments have already had their pay issued to them without batta. The 18th have received theirs quietly at Ahmednuggur, and so have the left wing of the 52nd at Mallegaum. The right wing of the latter at Asseerghur have, unfortunately, refused theirs, but measures have been taken to bring the leaders of the opposition to punishment, and to reward the few men who came forward in an orderly manner, and took their pay. Under these circumstances I think the thing has gone too far for us to yield any point *now* at Hyderabad. The decision, however, does not rest with me, but with the Supreme Government, and without indispensable necessity I am very much averse to postponing the execution of the orders of superior authority. In the present instance there will, I trust, be no such necessity, for I wrote privately to Lord Auckland on the same day that I first wrote to you upon the subject (21st ulto.), and I again wrote to him by express on the 26th and on the 27th, when the collective sentiments of this Government were forwarded. There will be time, therefore, for the Supreme Government's instructions to reach Hyderabad, especially if, as I recommended, they are sent direct to you, and by express.

"In the meantime, if you apprehend combination, I should not hesitate to break up the Force. I would, at all events, detach any Regiments which are supposed to be determined to resist. You can never be at a loss for pretexts in the Nizam's country; while in the field the troops will of course be entitled to batta, and at the end of the *campaign* it will be open to the Supreme Government to deal with the question as it likes. I am sorry that the 1st Europeans should be so ineffective—500 men for duty out of 1,000 (which is the exact strength given in the returns of the 1st of January) is a very inadequate proportion.

"I am waiting most anxiously for further news from Cabul, and was much obliged to you for the extracts you sent me yesterday. General Elphinstone, who commands there, is my relative, and though I heartily despise the anonymous gentlemen who supply the newspapers with hints and innuendoes, and believe not a syllable (no—not one of the asterisks in the *Englishman*) that has been printed or whispered

against his honour and character, yet knowing his wretched state of health,—he was about to return to England in consequence of a Medical Committee having, as he wrote to me, ‘cast’ him as unfit for further service in this part of the globe,—I feel anything but easy about him. Who can, indeed, feel easy about any of the poor fellows who have to face the hostility of an armed population, and the difficulties of mountain passes almost blocked up with snow, without carriage or tents, or adequate supplies of any kind, perhaps not even of ammunition?

“Great as have been the reverses, and sad the tragedy, the former may be retrieved by energetic measures. How can any other feeling but that of hatred ever exist between the Afghans and us? If we treat them leniently they will despise us, and attribute our clemency to fear. The alternative is to pay them off their present reckoning, and thus to run up another score to be settled, perchance, when the Russian plans of invasion or menace are matured! To steer a middle course will be almost impossible. And yet it must be attempted; and this will be the great difficulty of Lord Ellenborough’s Government.

“Believe me, my dear General Fraser,

“Most truly yours,

“ELPHINSTONE.

“P.S.—It is only the corps that are relieved this year that are to lose the batta. None of those at Nagpore or Jaulna are in this predicament.

Here is another letter from the Governor of Madras, written before he could have received by post the intelligence of General Fraser’s complete success in warding off the danger of mutiny, and when his mind, as will be seen, was more occupied with the terrible news of Akhbar Khan’s treachery and of the destruction of our little army after the evacuation of Cabul.

“Madras, Feb. 11th, 1842.

“MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—I should have written to you before to congratulate you on the success which attended the first day’s payment of troops at Hyderabad, and which you communicated to me by express, if that intelligence had not reached us on the same day which brought those sad tidings from Cabul, which have since been confirmed by the *Calcutta Gazette*. These ought not certainly to have taken me by surprise, nor can I say exactly that they did; yet though in some degree prepared for the worst, I had always hoped that the worst might be avoided. Even now it appears strange that the 1st Brigade should have halted so long at Peshawur—but it is useless to speculate now upon what might have been.

“I have seen a letter from Pottinger to Captain Macgregor, dated

the 28th, in which he accounts for their renewing the negotiations which had been broken off by the assassination of Sir William Macnaghten. It appears that, as a preliminary step, Sir William had agreed to give up some detached forts to the Chiefs, the possession of which forts unfortunately was extremely important. This false move, and the absolute want of provisions, and the numbers of sick and wounded within the Cantonment, whom they could not leave to the mercy of the Afghans, and had no carriage to remove, compelled them to treat with the enemy. They, however, seem to have been fully aware how little dependence was to be placed in their good faith, for Major Pottinger particularly alludes to this, but there appeared to be no alternative. The disastrous issue of the unequal contest which subsequently took place might have been anticipated, and can hardly reflect upon the military leader any more than the broken treaty can be considered a disparagement to the political one. We know the difficulties that General Sale encountered when he forced those passes in November; but they were nothing to what General Elphinstone's unfortunate force had to contend with. It is always more difficult to keep order in a retreating than in an advancing army. Sale believed that he had a strong force in his rear to support him, or to fall back upon; he had ample supplies and carriage; he was unencumbered by sick and wounded, and women and followers of all kinds; and the weather, though cold, was not so severe as in January; yet he had much to do to fight his way through. Need we wonder that the ill-supplied, half-starved Cabul Force was broken up?

"There is something in the very fact of disaster so humiliating, that it is hardly to be expected that people will weigh the circumstances under which it has occurred, or distinguish nicely between a reverse so complete, and a defeat disgraceful to our arms. Impartial people, however (and I do not suppose I am one of them, though I feel sure in this respect of their concurrence), will acknowledge that the disgrace in this case rests with the successful party, and I still trust that this will be the general opinion. Meanwhile, the fate of all those who were in the Force is a matter of most painful uncertainty.

"I sat down intending to write about matters connected with the issue of pay without batta to the troops at Hyderabad, and I have suffered myself to get upon the topic which absorbs so much of my thoughts. It is, however, really a matter of earnest satisfaction and congratulation to me, that amid the many embarrassments in which the Government of India is placed, it should have been spared the additional one of a mutinous spirit in any portion of the army. The present difficulty once fairly overcome, I should be glad to see the restoration of batta *conceded* to the troops; but this is a very different thing from its being extorted by them.

"Captain Grant has earned the best acknowledgments of the Government, and I am glad to find that he possesses much influence among the men. I should be very happy if I could do something to mark the sense which I entertain of the conduct of the two regimental officers, Captain Scotland and Lieutenant Brown, who persuaded their Companies to set a good example to the others. I would beg you to tell me anything that you can about these officers. Lord Auckland has desired me to name two Artillery officers to him for your army. They are to be junior to Lieutenant Lloyd; and as the senior I am going to send in the name of my aide-de-camp, William Orr. He will be able to join immediately, and I hope that, whoever the other may be, you will give him the benefit of his standing and the choice of appointments. There are some very excellent officers in the Artillery, junior to him, whom I should be most happy to serve in any way in my power; but it is only fair to him that he should not be deprived of the benefit of his seniority by his position on my staff, as he is ready to start at a moment's notice.

"Believe me, my dear General Fraser,

"Yours most truly,

"ELPHINSTONE."

On the 13th of February, when pay had been issued to the whole Force, and for the time, at least, the danger of actual mutiny breaking out appeared to have been overcome, the Resident sent the following letter to the Governor of Madras.

"Hyderabad, 13th February 1842.

"MY LORD,—I have the pleasure to send you Lord Auckland's letter, which I received by express on the 9th instant, in the midst of the scenes then going on at Secunderabad, and when I was much too far committed to a certain course of procedure to admit of the slightest pause or retraction. I send you, also, copies of the private letters I have written to Lord Auckland. We are well out of the scrape in which this batta question had involved us; and it will be a lesson to the Court of Directors not to be making any further reductions in the pay of their Native Army. I do not now anticipate the slightest renewal of any commotion here, and some of the Native officers of the 7th and 10th N. I., who have been with me to-day, have expressed to me their full assurance that the men of their respective Regiments will take their pay without the slightest murmur when tendered to them at the beginning of next month. The whole of the Native troops here are, in fact, quite subdued; and even if they were not so, we have abundant force to do what we please with them, now that we

have got rid of the violent 4th Cavalry, and the insubordinate portions of the 32nd and 48th.

"The labours and indefatigable exertions of Captain Grant,¹ night and day during the whole of these scenes, have been almost superhuman. I should have hardly thought it possible for a man to go through so much."

A letter to Lord Elphinstone, dated the 16th of February, proves that while recommending inquiry into the cost of the Sepoy's actual subsistence, and a fair measure of relief, the General never dreamed of any such concession to clamour as Lord Ellenborough will be seen to have subsequently deprecated.

"I have just had the pleasure to receive your letter of the 11th instant, and I trust my public despatches and last letter will satisfy you that the crisis had passed, and that no lasting injury is likely to arise from what has occurred here, either to the discipline of the Army or the authority of the Government. Remedial measures constitute a question which I hope will at once be taken into the serious consideration of the Government of India. Some measure of relief should, I think, be granted to the Native troops at Secunderabad, but it must depend on the information to be collected by a Committee. Your Lordship alludes at the end of your letter to the restoration of batta to the troops; but with my present view of the case I am not prepared to express an opinion that this could ever be a suitable measure. Whatever is to be done should, I think, take some other form. I am disposed to say that the restoration of batta is not the step to be taken. I trust that Government will do nothing which may be seen in the remotest degree to compromise or weaken its authority. The danger of this, and its probable evil consequences, are greater than those which could arise even from a hard and unbending course of procedure.

"Your observations regarding Afghanistan appear to me to be perfectly just. There is a wide difference between disaster and disgrace. Our reverses may have been most signal, and are most deeply to be regretted, but I trust and believe it will be found that no dishonour attaches either to General Elphinstone or to the army under his command.

"You may rely upon my taking care of Captain Orr when he joins, and I hope that the other Artillery officer whom you select may be active and intelligent. We have so few officers in the Nizam's service, that we can ill afford to have bad ones. One of the young Infantry officers recently given to me has proved not of the least use, for he

¹ Assistant Adjutant-General of the Subsidiary Force.

devotes to the brandy-bottle the time that should be occupied in studying his profession and the Hindustani language.

"May I beg *sans indiscretion* to know whether you have heard any thing from Lord Auckland on the subject of Mr. Strachey's admission into the Nizam's Army? This young man left a tolerably good staff appointment which I gave him at Jaulnah to come down and take the command of my escort, but he is alarmed that his Regiment may be removed out of the Nizam's country, which would involve his removal also. A vacancy will almost immediately occur in the Nizam's Cavalry. In the event of this appointment being left open till Lord Ellenborough has assumed the reins, I shall take the liberty of requesting the amiable Bishop of Madras, who is interested for the Stracheys, to be so good as to favour me with a note to his Lordship which I may forward to him at the same time that I report the vacancy. Heaven knows, however, whether this will be of any use, for I we know that Governors are dreadfully tormented with applications. One of the things which I certainly do not envy them is their patronage."

Both by the Government of Madras and from the Government of India the highest credit was given to General Fraser for the judicious measures he had taken to deal with "the disturbance among the Native troops of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force", and for the firmness and promptitude with which he had acted. A letter dated the 19th February 1842, conveyed to the Resident "the cordial thanks of the Government of Fort St. George to Major-General Fraser for having so readily undertaken the responsibility of the unlimited discretionary power vested in him", and furthermore stated that "the result has borne out the previously formed opinion of the Government of Fort St. George that such authority could not have been delegated to anyone more entitled to their confidence".

"The judgment displayed throughout by Major-General Fraser during the crisis, the temper, decision, and energy by which he acted upon the judgment so correctly formed, are beyond all tribute of approbation which this Government can record."

In the last letter which General Fraser received from Lord Auckland before his departure from India, dated "Calcutta, 21 February 1842", the retiring Governor-General says:—

"I have to thank you for your several communications upon the subject of the refusal of a large portion of the men of the Subsidiary Force at Hyderabad to receive their pay, unless with an allowance batta, and upon the proceedings which you had adopted in consequen

And I have, in the first instance, to inform you that the Government entirely approves of those proceedings, and that we all regard with admiration the firmness, the prudence, and the discretion which you have exhibited upon this most difficult occasion. We feel that we have been well justified in the confidence which we placed in you for dealing with this question."

These commendations were publicly confirmed in General Orders, issued both at Madras and Calcutta in April 1842, when the proceedings in these matters were finally concluded. But notwithstanding the official and public approval of his conduct and proceedings, General Fraser was much disappointed and mortified by the determination of the newly arrived Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough, not to carry out the recommendation which the Resident had made, in conformity with his promises on parade to the Sepoys, that there should be a careful inquiry into their grievances and their claims. This determination was conveyed to him in the following private letter from Lord Ellenborough, the first that he received from that Governor-General.

"Government House,

"Calcutta, March 17th, 1842.

"GENERAL,—My predecessor, Lord Auckland, left Calcutta on the 12th inst., and your letter of the 9th inst. was, by his desire, opened by me. It enclosed a copy of your letter of the same date to Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Madras, in which you renew the expression of an opinion already communicated in favour of the appointment of a 'Committee to investigate the nature of the Sepoys' complaints, with a view to the grant of such a measure of relief as the case might require'.

"I cannot but observe to you that if Committees of officers be appointed to investigate the nature of the Sepoys' complaints, with a view to the concession of what they ask, the next step will most probably be to form Committees of officers to investigate their own complaints, with a view to the concession of whatever they may think themselves entitled to claim; and the result will be an Army without subordination, and its inevitable result, the ruin of that Army and of the Government it serves.

"It is the duty of a Government to do justice to its Army, and justice shall be done; but the dignity and authority of the Government must be supported, and the discipline of the Army must be strictly maintained, or we shall be unable to preserve what we now hold in India.

"Whatever may be done must proceed from the Government alone. We have not in India a wholly independent Government, and it is to those upon whom we depend in England that we must refer the ultimate decision of this question.

"I have been much struck by what you say of Lieut.-Col. James of the 1st L. C. You observe that he is a very excellent officer, much beloved by the whole of his Regiment, and you add that when his Regiment were informed of the recent insubordination of the 4th L.C., 'they volunteered to return to Secunderabad, from whence they had just marched to Sholapore, and to serve here upon pay, without extra batta, as ordered by the Government.' When you consider this conduct on the part of Lieut.-Col. James's Regiment, and advert to the opinions entertained by him, as expressed in his letters enclosed in yours of the 9th inst., I think you cannot but come to the conclusion that the discipline and good conduct of a Regiment depend mainly upon the discretion and ability of their officer in command.

"I hope you will favour me with the same confidential communications which you have hitherto addressed to Lord Auckland.

"Yours faithfully,

"ELLENBOROUGH."

It was obviously a misstatement of what General Fraser had proposed, to say that "Committees of officers were to be appointed to investigate the nature of the Sepoys' complaints, *with a view to the concession of what they asked*". The Committees were intended to ascertain whether there were any grounds or not for those complaints, and only in the event of those complaints appearing just, then to suggest concession. But the General felt most acutely that he was forced by the Governor-General into a position of bad faith towards the Sepoys. He had not gone beyond the unlimited discretionary powers, entrusted to him, and yet, after he had publicly pledged himself that inquiry should be made, the Government made him seem to repudiate his promise by peremptorily refusing to allow a Committee to be appointed. Lord Elphinstone, as will be seen from the following letter, fully sympathised with the General's disappointment and dissatisfaction on this point.

"Chingleput, 30th March 1842.

"MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—Your letter of the 27th instant has this moment reached me. I was very sorry to learn that the Government of India disapproved of the Committee of Inquiry. I am still in hopes that your letter to Lord Ellenborough may induce his Lordship to alter his

opinion—if, indeed, he may not already have been led to do so by some extracts from your private letters to myself, which I took the liberty of inserting in a Minute which I recorded about a fortnight ago. Meanwhile, the delay is much to be regretted; and unless it is resolved to take some steps *without inquiry*—which I really should almost regret, as it is tantamount to an acknowledgment of the injustice of of the measure which gave rise to the late disturbances, and of our consciousness of the hardships which it entailed upon the men,—I fear that there will be risk of great discontent, and perhaps further mutinous conduct.

“I feel, too, that it is due to you that an inquiry should take place. When you told the Sepoys that you would recommend such an inquiry, you had it in your power to restore the batta, if you judged it necessary: and surely, having exercised those extensive powers which were committed to you with so much moderation and discretion, your recommendations ought to carry with them the greatest weight. But I hope that they will yet be attended to.

“I consider the question, of course, as entirely taken out of the hands of the Madras Government. After the official despatch of the 16th instant, it seems to me that we can only wait until we see what effect may have been produced by our despatch in answer to their previous one (which I have not by me to refer to, but I believe it was dated the 3rd instant), which must have been sent to Bengal a few days after their orders of the 16th were despatched.

“Believe me, my dear General, most truly yours,

“ELPHINSTONE.”

In another letter on the same subject, dated the 10th March, Lord Elphinstone says:—

“The Supreme Government do not wish that a formal inquiry should be made just now, and suggest that a private and preliminary one should be instituted. I think that they cannot be aware how many such inquiries have been made. Sir Peregrine Maitland and Mr. Sullivan, if I recollect aright, each gave the data collected by such a private inquiry, and the result was that the Sepoy had barely enough to subsist upon at Hyderabad without batta: since that, he gets 10 per cent. more upon the exchange, however.

“It was considered that it would be of no avail to recommend the appointment of a Line Adjutant at Secunderabad for sanction, but for the present Captain Scotland’s appointment has been confirmed. The Supreme Government properly notice the little acquaintance which the European officers appear to have had of the feelings of the Sepoys, and observe that they cannot have much knowledge of their men until they

are conversant in their language. I do not mean to undervalue the study of Hindostanee, which I think ought to be made an indispensable qualification to every officer (I would oblige every one to pass within three years after his arrival in the country, on pain of forfeiting his appointment), but I cannot but be struck with the fact that Lieut. Brown, one of the two officers who seem to have had the most influence with the men, is a very bad Hindostanee scholar.

"I believe that twenty or thirty years ago, when the Native languages were even less studied than they are now, the European officers possessed far greater influence with their men than their successors do with the present generation. I fear that the cause lies deeper, and that we are too apt to jump at a plausible reason, without considering how far it is borne out by experience."

And here is Lord Elphinstone's reply to the Resident's letter of the 16th February.

"Guindy, 20th February 1824.

"MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—I have not time to thank you as I should wish to do for your letter of the 16th instant, but I must endeavour to answer some of the points on which you require information. The decision of this Government (as far as it goes) which has been adopted regarding the disposal of the prisoners, and on the subject of the late manifestation at Hyderabad, will reach you as soon as this letter. I, therefore, need not go into that subject, but I may tell you privately, that if it had depended upon myself alone, you would have heard of it nearly a week sooner, and that I entirely agree with you in thinking that Government should do nothing which may tend in the remotest degree to weaken its authority, and that the dangers and evils of any measures which would have this effect would far more than counterbalance any temporary convenience which might be expected from them. I have heard nothing of disturbance at Vellore. There is a fanatical Mussulman population there, and I know that the most seditious doctrines are preached by Fakirs and others, some of whom actually eat the salt of the Circar; but I do not expect that they will succeed now in causing a disturbance, although the coincidence of the Moharrem with the evil tidings from Afghanistan, and the discontent evinced by the troops at Hyderabad, is unfortunate. I have been threatened with a refusal to embark, on the part of the Regiment under orders for China, but I trust that the men will maintain the credit of the Coast Army, and will cheerfully go on board ship. The small alteration (which has been in force now for three or four years) in pensions can only be viewed as a pretext for their unwillingness, and I suspect that there is some evil more radical than that which has been produced by these alterations, either of batta or pension. The second

officer whom I proposed to Lord Auckland for the Artillery was Lieutenant Balmain, and who appeared to me a very intelligent, gentlemanlike young man. He has passed in Hindostance. Orr speaks it after a fashion, though I suspect badly. I trust, however, he will do well. He has a very good, soldierlike feeling, besides a most amiable disposition in private life to recommend him, and I feel much interested in him. His brother of the 23rd is now in Shah Shoojah's service (if, indeed, such Shah or service exists), and is at Jellalabad. I have seen a letter from him, dated the 21st of January, which Orr received this morning. He gives no additional news, but many details. If I could get a copy made in time I would send his letter, but I fear I must defer it at all events till to-morrow. Several officers have been heard of, and a party of several officers and men had been offered for ransom by one of the tribes in the neighbourhood of Jellalabad, but they had not agreed upon the terms, which probably was prudent, as they might expect the same price (a lakh of rupees) for every small detachment; and I hope and believe that many such will be found scattered through the land, if, indeed, the main body have not been made prisoners in a mass, which perhaps would be the best thing that we can now expect. They had plenty of provisions and sufficient ammunition at Jellalabad—had made the town quite secure against an Afghan attack, and appeared to be in the highest spirits. I fear, however, that it will cost us some brave men to hold this miserable post until it can be relieved. It is, however, the only bright spot in the gloomy horizon of Afghan prospects at the present moment.

"I have not heard from Lord Auckland upon the subject of Mr. Strachey, whose name I brought to his notice some months ago, and whose interests, in the strongest manner I was able, I endeavoured to advocate. I do not know who the other officer you allude to is—who has not conducted himself to your satisfaction—but I hope he was not of my recommendation. Lord Auckland has more frequently appointed officers to the Nizam's service of his own choice than of my suggestion. Believe me, my dear General Fraser, in great haste,

"Most truly yours,

"ELPHINSTONE."

The next letter from Lord Elphinstone refers to the disasters in Afghanistan, as well as to the objections of Lord Ellenborough to have any inquiry made into the Sepoys' grievances.

"Chingleput, 31st March 1842.

"MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—I have just received your letter of the 28th instant with its enclosure (Lord Ellenborough's letter), which I return. The only letter besides the copy of your reply to Lord Ellen-

borough, which came in your letter of the 27th, received yesterday, was Major Cunningham's, which I also beg to return. I have written to Lord Ellenborough, and I am still in hope that when he has seen the further letters to which you allude, and has received the strong recommendation of the Madras Government in favour of the appointment of a Committee of Inquiry, he will be induced to reconsider the subject. Meanwhile, of course, no steps can be taken. I trust that there will be no recurrence of misbehaviour on the part of the troops. In the event of such a contingency, I would rather trust to your judgment and discretion in doing whatever the circumstances may appear to require, than hamper you with any instructions or prescribed line of conduct. You cannot be more averse to measures which involve the loss of life and of all harmony and good feeling between the different branches of the Service than I am; and I am sure you will at all events do your utmost to avoid this extremity, whatever may arise. But I trust and hope that the troops may be quiet, which will not only relieve us from any such painful necessity as you have hinted at, but will best serve their own interests.

"Believe me, my dear General,

"Yours most truly,

"ELPHINSTONE."

A few months later another letter from the Governor of Madras refers again to the final decision still required on the subject of the withdrawal of batta.

"Madras, 29th June 1842.

"MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—It is a long time since I have written to you, but I have had little or no news of public interest. From a private letter which I received from Lord Fitzgerald, the President of the Board of Control, I should infer that the Home Government would order an inquiry to be made on the subject of the batta reduction, but I have not heard one word on the subject from Lord Ellenborough, either privately or officially. The appointment of Lord Tweeddale to the double office of Governor and Commander-in-Chief is put on the ground of the expediency of uniting the authority of both in the hands of a single person, but it is not in this that the real difficulty lies. The Local Government is deprived of all power of independent action; and, moreover, the present number in Council is a radical error, which arose from the accidental absence of the Commander-in-Chief, and will be rendered permanent by the new arrangement. It does not, however, become me to criticise the new *régime* before it has been tried; and I only hope Lord Tweeddale will escape the inconvenience which I own that I apprehend from it.

"Having already written to you very freely upon the subject of the

imputations cast upon my late relative, General Elphinstone, and having always expressed my firm conviction that he would be found not to deserve them, you will not be surprised at my returning to the subject, which, amidst other matters of more immediate interest, I have allowed somewhat to drop. I have received the most full and complete confirmation of what I then ventured to assert. I think I must have sent you copy of a letter from Major Pottinger to Colonel Elphinstone (General [E.]'s brother), written from Tazeen after the General's death, but I had several copies (perhaps half a dozen), which I have sent to relations and friends, and I know not whether I sent one to you or not. If not, and you would like to have one, I shall be most happy to send you one. The papers which I now enclose are lithographed *fac-similes*—one, of the last letter I received from the General, dated 26th July last; the other, of an extract from a long letter, dated the 24th and finished the 28th of December 1840. One cannot believe at first that they are written by the same person; but when the second was written he had lost the use of his right hand from rheumatism in the wrist. They tell their own story, and clear him of the only blame which (after Pottinger's and his other fellow-prisoner's testimony) can attach to him, viz., his having accepted a command for which he was unfit, and retained it after he felt himself physically unequal to perform its duties. It is clearly proved that he did not seek the command, but accepted it when offered from a sense of duty; and that he did not wish to remain at Cabul an hour after he felt himself disabled. But I have to apologise for taking up your time with these, to me, painfully interesting particulars.

“Believe me, my dear General,

“Yours most truly,

“ELPHINSTONE.”

The first of the *fac-similes* enclosed in the previous letter is the following “extract from a letter from General Elphinstone to Lord Elphinstone, dated Meerut, December 24th and 28th, 1840.”

“I yesterday heard from Lord Auckland that I am to succeed Cotton in the command of the troops in Afghanistan. He wrote to me some time ago, before the surrender of Dost Mahomed, to ask if I had any objection; to which I replied I was ready to serve wherever required or he wished. I do not like the change from this, as there are more troops here, and an opportunity of practising the moving of them. The climate, I hear, is good, and there is some additional pay; but in the present state of things I think I should have preferred staying here; but we must go when ordered. It is a long march, but will have novelty to recommend it.”

The other *fac-simile* is the "copy of a letter from General Elphinstone to Lord Elphinstone", the contents of which explain the reversed slope and tremulous character of the handwriting.

"Cabul, 26th July 1841.

"MY DEAR ELPHINSTONE,—I have been prevented writing to you since I came here by almost incessant severe illness. I arrived on the 30th April, and on that day had an attack of fever, followed by rheumatic gout, which laid me up till the 24th May, when I got about for fourteen days; but on the 6th June I was again ill with fever, followed, as before, with gout and rheumatism, by which I have been confined, frequently to bed, ever since, and with little prospect of recovery. I am worse to-day than a month ago. My right wrist is so painful I cannot move it, and am obliged to write with the left hand. My medical attendants tell me I cannot recover in this country, and that I ought to leave it, as it is most unfavourable to rheumatism (from which many have suffered since they came here), and therefore to gout too. They also say that the repeated severe attacks I have had in my hands, knees, and ankles, frequently all at the same time—and I have it now in the wrist, knee, and ankle—will leave my joints weaker every time. If this opinion is borne out by the Medical Committee which assembles next month, I shall apply to Lord Auckland to be relieved. I shall deeply feel being obliged to give up a command I should have liked, had I been possessed of health to perform its duties. It is one of interest and excitement, requiring great activity, mental and bodily; but my stay would be useless to the public service and distressing to myself. I must try to get to Bombay, and thence home. I hope I may be able to do so. I will dwell no longer on my wretched prospects, but come to the object of my writing to you to-day, which I otherwise should not have done. I, to-day, heard from Havelock of his appointment to the 14th, and if you have not named his successor as your Military Secretary, I beg in the strongest manner to recommend my A. D. C., Major Thain. He is the best man of business I ever met with; thoroughly conversant with everything connected with troops, having been constantly on service ever since 1813, when my acquaintance with him commenced. In all matters connected with the affairs and military arrangements of this country, his judgment and opinions I have found most sound; and he has greatly assisted me in the various and voluminous correspondence I have had since I came here, and which, without him, I hardly know how I could have got through. Believe me when I say this is no attempt to palm off my A. D. C. on you, but a wish to serve a most honourable and deserving man, whose merits I am sure you would soon appreciate.

"I was happy to hear you had appointed Boyson to an acting office,

which I hope may lead to a permanent one, for which, as one of his patrons, I have to thank you. I hope to write you a better letter shortly. This country is much, as it has been, and will be for some time—frequent insurrections till reconciled to the new order of things. I get on well with Macnaghten, and am much pleased with Burnes.

“Yours affectionately,
“W. K. E.”

The following private letter to Colonel (after General Sir Mark) Cubbon, Commissioner of Mysore, offers additional proof that General Fraser never went beyond the recommendation—not the appointment—of a Committee of Inquiry, and that he never contemplated an apparent submission to the Sepoys' demands by restoring the batta.

“Hyderabad, 18th May 1842.

“MY DEAR CUBBON,—I daresay you will have heard exaggerated accounts of some disturbance we have recently had in the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, but the accompanying copies of my letters to Government on the occasion will show you pretty exactly what has occurred, and that we are now quiet. I trust we shall remain so, but I have recommended in private letters, both to Lord Auckland and Lord Elphinstone, a Committee here for the purpose of ascertaining the real nature of the case as regards the pay of the Sepoys, and of proposing such relief as in justice shall seem due. No proposition for restoring the batta ought now, I think, to be entertained. I should not wish the head-quarters of any of the corps here to be removed. Their reputation is yet untouched, and they ought not to be disgraced for the fault of the guilty portions of those corps which I have sent away. Neither should the general arrangements of the Government, with respect to the particular Regiments that were to form the Subsidiary Force, be marred or unnecessarily altered. If this were done, the malcontents would have so far gained their object as to be enabled to boast of a sort of victory over the Government.

“I do not apprehend any ultimate injury to the public interests from what has occurred, if the Government pursue the course I have taken the liberty of suggesting to them. For the consequences that might arise from the advice of ignorant Secretaries, and the weakness of any of the members of Government, Heaven forbid that I should be responsible.

“Pray show the papers to any person to whom you think it prudent to entrust them; but perhaps it may be as well not to communicate them to all indiscriminately, as they might not be properly understood,

and might give rise to fear and conjectures as to the future, for which I really believe there is no ground.

"Believe me, my dear Cubbon, sincerely yours,
"J. S. FRASER."

Lord Elphinstone and General Fraser continued to be of one opinion, as the next letter will show, regarding the method that should have been adopted for finally setting at rest the seven questions raised by the disturbances in the Subsidiary Force.

"Madras, 11th April 1842.

"MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—Late last night I received the Supreme Government's reply to our reference on the subject of the disposal of the prisoners at Bellary. The views of the Supreme Government have undergone but little alteration, as you will perceive by the official papers which accompany this letter, and which I send by express, as I am anxious, after the delay which has been unavoidably incurred, that the decision should be known as soon as possible. I am glad that the 4th Light Cavalry are not to be disbanded, but I am not quite satisfied that the amnesty granted to the 32nd and 48th Regiments is altogether prudent. I trust that there will be no difficulty in carrying into effect the views of the Supreme Government as to their location, and their replacement at Hyderabad by the troops of the Nizam.

"No notice is taken of our recommendation that a Committee should be appointed, but from a few words in a private letter I received the same opportunity from Lord Ellenborough, I perceive that he intends to refer the whole subject to the Duke of Wellington. His decision, I doubt not, will be satisfactory, as he knows the wants of the Madras Sepoy, and the dearth of rice in the Deccan. Many allusions to the subject are to be found in his admirable Despatches. If the reference did not involve a delay of five or six months, probably it would be the most expedient course; but delays are dangerous, and I wish that Lord Ellenborough had been content with less weighty and more immediate authority. I will send you, if I can get a copy in time, the answer which we sent to the despatch upon the receipt of which the Committee was countermanded.

"Believe me, my dear General Fraser, most truly yours,
"ELPHINSTONE."

From Lord Ellenborough's *Indian Administration*, edited by Lord Colchester, we learn that the Governor-General wrote these terms to the Duke of Wellington on the 21st March 1842:

"My great difficulty has been in dealing with the question of allowances to the Madras troops. The Government there was in

state of great apprehension,—all the military men I saw were. At Hyderabad, though the Resident put down the mutiny, he and all his officers took the part of the men—that is, in feeling, and in the expression of that feeling.

“All is at present quiet. All the Regiments have taken their pay without batta, but they have done this in the expectation that the batta would be restored, and this expectation was encouraged and engendered by the Resident, and especially by the appointment of a Committee of officers to inquire how far the complaints of these men were well founded.

“Upon this point I send you a letter that I addressed on the 17th instant to the Resident, General Fraser.

“It was imprudent to begin changes in the allowances of the Sepoys. I believe the making of this change was for several years postponed by Lord Auckland under the impression of its impolicy; but this is a question to be decided at home now, as it was before. To me it was quite new. I had never heard of it. Indeed, at Hyderabad, it came lately for the first time into operation.”¹

The Committee of Inquiry, countermanded by the Supreme Government before it could be assembled, was not appointed by the Resident, but by the Government of Madras. The Duke of Wellington's views on the whole subject are very sufficiently indicated in the following extracts from a memorandum dated 25th May 1842. After showing that he has a full recollection and knowledge of the origin and merits of the Madras Sepoys' claim to batta, and of that claim being equally strong in quarters at Hyderabad as on the march there, and referring to the uncertainty with which this allowance had been given and withheld, the Duke says:—“It is not astonishing that a regulation so capricious in its operation and effect should excite dissatisfaction and even resistance, and that authority should more than ten times have found itself under the necessity of making concessions and of altering this regulation. There is nothing which soldiers, particularly the Natives of India, bear so unwillingly as injustice, or those hasty and changeable decisions regarding their pay which have the appearance thereof.”

When we reflect upon the extraordinary fact that the stoppage of batta was considered by the Government of India, under Lord

¹ Lord Ellenborough's *Indian Administration*, edited by Lord Colchester (Bentley, 1874), p. 178.

Auckland and Lord Ellenborough, by the Government of Madras and by the Duke of Wellington, to be impolitic, imprudent, capricious, and unjust, and was viewed, surely with good reason, by "all the military men" on the spot and in Lord Ellenborough's vicinity, with "great apprehension", it is almost impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Resident who, in Lord Ellenborough's words, had "put down the mutiny", came to a sounder judgment when he recommended a Committee of Inquiry, than the Governor-General—to whom the question was "quite new"—when he countermanded it. General Fraser "took the part" of the Sepoys only in confidential communications with superior authority, and there were no grounds whatever for saying that he had "engendered or encouraged" their expectations. He had been from first to last most cautious in protecting the dignity and authority of the Government, and in abstaining, though fully empowered, from giving any pledge or promise as to concessions.

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CHAPTER V.

Lord Ellenborough's Circular to his Political Agents—Untoward Affair at Murchair—Letters from Captain Gresley and Colonel Fitzroy Somerset—Increasing Financial Disorder in Hyderabad State—Death of Venkata Rao—Chundoo Lall, unable to borrow, tenders resignation—Mission and Intrigues of Rusheed-ool-Moolk and Ram Buksh—Sooraj-ool-Moolk as the Nizam's Agent—The ex-Minister's complaint against the Resident, and remittances to Calcutta—Lord Ellenborough's recall.

WITHIN two months of Lord Ellenborough's arrival at Calcutta to assume the reins of Government, he issued a very important circular to all the Political Agents in India, from which, as mainly but not exactly harmonising with General Fraser's notions regarding the scope and limits of his duty as Resident at Hyderabad, some extracts may usefully be given here. The circular is dated "Allahabad, the 26th April 1842". The Governor-General enjoins "the utmost personal respect for the several Native Princes with whom" his Agents "may communicate"; that they "will consider themselves to be placed near those Princes as the representative of the friendship as much as of the power of the British Government, and will be mindful that even the necessary acts of authority may be clothed with the veil of courtesy and regard." It then proceeded as follows:—

"You will distinctly understand that the further extension of its dominion forms no part of the policy of the British Government; that it is desirous on all occasions of respecting the independence of Native States; and that, satisfied with the extent of its own rule, it has no other wish than that every State within the limits of India should freely exercise its rights as recognised by Treaty, and contribute, by the maintenance by its own means of peace and good government within its dominions, to the general happiness of the whole people."

The Governor-General, alluding to the successes of Generals Nott and Pollock and the recapture of Cabul, said that he had

"advisedly selected the moment of victory for laying before his Political Agents, for their guidance, these principles of justice and moderation". "They are," he continued, "the principles upon which his policy will ever be founded, adopted upon deliberate reflection, and as little liable to be changed by reverses as they have been by success."

This circular despatch was accompanied by a Persian translation, which each Resident or Agent was directed to communicate to the Princes and Chiefs to whom he was accredited. "The strict application to the Nizam's country of the principle laid down here", wrote General Fraser to Lord Elphinstone on the 17th of May 1842, "will, I am afraid, keep us in rather an unsatisfactory and unimproving state, but it may, however, be said that a partial interference here would not perhaps do much good, while a more complete and extensive exercise of authority might not be justifiable on the ground of any of the Treaties at present subsisting between us and the Nizam."

In June 1842 the Resident fully explained to the Supreme Government the "glaring defects" in the system of collecting revenue and in the administration of civil and criminal justice, and the ever-growing financial embarrassments of the Hyderabad State, together with the utter impossibility of extracting from Chundoo Lall anything like a clear or full account of what were the debts and pecuniary liabilities of the Nizam's Government; and urged that it was "in vain to expect the establishment of a more promising state of affairs, without a more direct interference on our part than has yet been authorised." The re-establishment of British superintendence, as in Sir Charles Metcalfe's time, would certainly be at variance with existing treaties, unless the Nizam's consent were obtained.

"As a more practical measure", and the only one available, "short of removing Chundoo Lall altogether from office", the Resident renewed the suggestion he had made on several previous occasions, of affording some efficient Native aid to the Minister, especially in the finance department. On the last occasion of discussing the subject with the Minister, General Fraser had gone the length of mentioning the name of the person whose assistance he had thought would be most valuable, and the Minister had assented to his recommendation. This person was the Brahmin

Vencata Rao, who had been Minister at Travancore, and was then special Assistant to Colonel Cubbon, the Commissioner of Mysore. General Fraser describes him as "a man of great ability", whose administrative talents, especially in affairs of revenue and finance, were of "a first-rate order". "I have not as yet", said the General, "had any communication with him on the subject of his coming here, nor do I know whether, at his advanced age, and in his independent circumstances, it would have suited his views or wishes to enter upon so new and difficult a scene of labour." With reference to this plan, the Resident addressed Colonel Cubbon.

"Hyderabad, 14th July 1842.

"MY DEAR COLONEL,—Lord Ellenborough seems to be paying some attention to the affairs of the Nizam's country, and it is not improbable, I think, that means may be taken for endeavouring to improve its present condition. In this case it is impossible that anything could be done without either removing the Minister Chundoo Lall from his office, or at least giving him such aid as appears indispensably requisite, especially in the revenue department of the State. Should anything of this sort ever be proposed, will you be so kind as to let me know, in confidence, whether you could spare Vencata Rao; and if you are of opinion that he would like to serve here, as well as whether you think that his faculties are still clear and unimpaired, and that he is as capable as I formerly knew him to be of discharging his public duties?

"Believe me, very truly yours,

"J. S. FRASER."

Colonel Cubbon entirely concurred with General Fraser as to Vencata Rao's character and capabilities, and, though sorry to part with him, would not stand in the way of his accepting a more important place in the service of the Nizam. Many months, nearly a year, in fact, elapsed before official sanction was given from Calcutta to the assistance of this able Brahmin being proffered to Rajah Chundoo Lall with the distinct and explicit recommendation of the Government of India. It was then, as will be seen, too late for that assistance to be rendered.

In June 1842 one of those disturbances took place in a southern district of the Nizam's dominions, that were constantly occurring in the lawless days before the period of administrative reform under the late Nawab Sir Salar Jung. Such disturbances may

be said now to have entirely ceased.¹ It at once illustrates the great share that was taken by the Contingent for many years in maintaining peace and in the gradual establishment of good order, and proves the sound judgment of General Fraser in urging, almost from the time of his arrival, the dispersion and deportation of all wandering parties of Arabs and Rohillas.

In June 1842 there was a dispute between the Hyderabad Government and one of its great landlords, the Rajah of Murchair, regarding some alleged arrears of revenue. The Minister threatened coercive measures; and, taking advantage of the alarm and excitement thus caused in the neighbourhood, Siddee Yakooob, the chief of a small band of Arabs, just then out of employ, took possession of the fort of Murchair, plundered several villages, committing several atrocities in order to procure money and supplies, and set up a local reign of terror. Then, and subsequently, he represented himself as acting in the Rajah's interests and under his orders; but the zemindar's connivance, though much suspected in the early stage of the outbreak, was not proved. After the usual application from the Minister to the Resident, a detachment of the Nizam's Contingent from Muktul, the nearest station, was ordered to the disturbed district, with orders to take the fort and capture the insurgents. Unfortunately, in the first attack on Murchair, the troops met with a check. An escalade was attempted, but a well-directed fire from the Arabs caused the storming party to commence firing in return instead of mounting the ladders: a cry was raised that the ladders were too short, and, in spite of all the efforts of their European and Native officers, who are said by all accounts to have behaved most gallantly, the Sepoys retired in disorder. Another attack on one of the gates of the fort, meant merely to draw off the attention of the garrison, succeeded. The gate was forced open and one of the bastions occupied; but, on the failure of the principal assault, this position had to be abandoned, and the failure appeared complete. Only three of the Arabs were killed, and about twenty of the Nizam's troops. The insurgents, however, were not elated with their success, and Siddee Yakooob immediately sent several messages proposing to capitulate on favourable terms,

¹ It is observed in the Annual Report of the Resident for 1869-70 that "the Hyderabad Contingent had not fired a shot, except in its parade-grounds, since the Mutinies"

to which Captain Gresley replied, insisting on an unconditional surrender. Such an impression was made by Captain Gresley's determined preparations for a second assault, that, "in the evening at about eight o'clock", in the words of his private letter to General Fraser, "the Siddee came to my tent, threw himself at my feet, said he and his garrison were ready to do whatever I ordered, and that I might cut off his head, and so forth. I went down to the gate with a party of Sepoys; and the Siddee, who had preceded me, came out with thirty-three men unarmed, and they delivered themselves up as prisoners. I said that they should be tried by the laws of the country, and that I would undertake that their women and children were allowed to come safe out of the fort, and were not ill-treated; and that if they did not like these terms, or imagined that I had given them any *kowl*,¹ they might go back again, and fight as long as they liked. I then put a strong guard at the gate, which I have not taken away yet. However, I shall report my own proceedings to you officially as soon as I have made over the fort to Shahamut Khan, which I expect to do to-day. I shall send off the prisoners to-day. Another man was seized, while trying to escape the next day, by Booden Khan's people. He had secreted himself in the Pettah² somehow or other. All I am afraid of now is the fellows escaping, for, having no irons or handcuffs, all we can do is to have a lot of sentries and orderlies round them. Luckily the nights are moonlight. I hope to leave this to-morrow, for we are losing numbers of people from cholera."

It was ascertained that at the time of the attempted escalade there had only been forty-two armed Arabs in the fort—three were killed, four managed to escape, and thirty-five were made prisoners.

Lord Ellenborough's Military Secretary, Captain Fitzroy Somerset, in the following letter to the Resident, remarks on the lesson in tactics to be derived from this affair.

"Allahabad, July 4th, 1842.

"MY DEAR SIR,—I return Captain Gresley's letter, with many thanks from Lord Ellenborough and myself. The account is most interesting, and well told. Captain Gresley must be a good soldier, and seems to

¹ Quarter, or promise of pardon.

² Walled village outside a fort.

have his heart in the business. It is a pity they did not adopt the plan, I believe first brought into practice by Major (now General) Sir George Napier at Ciudad Rodrigo. He led the storming party, and would not allow his men to *load*, so that when they faltered and tried to fire, as at Murchair, their muskets snapped, and they had nothing for it but to carry all at the point of the bayonet, or be shot down like dogs—and they succeeded.

“Yours faithfully,

“A. W. FITZROY SOMERSET.”

Three days after the occupation of the fort, Captain Gresley writes to the Resident from his own cantonment, to which the prisoners had been removed.

“Muktul, 25th June 1842.

“MY DEAR GENERAL,—I mentioned in my letter to you yesterday that I intended to take down the depositions of the Arabs and of the Jalahudjee¹ ryots, but upon second thoughts it occurs to me that you will probably consider our part of the business to be over. My notion is that we have nothing further to do beyond making over the prisoners to the Nizam, stipulating that they are to be tried by the Mohammedan law. If he or his officers choose to see that the law is properly administered, well and good. If he connives at their escape, it is no fault of ours: we are not the responsible party; but if we begin to conduct the investigation, we shall be considered as such. It is a pity the brutes were not all put to death at Murchair. I dare say they will now get off, for the villagers will shirk giving evidence against them, and—as you have no doubt frequently observed—there is a jealousy on the part of the Nizam’s Government, from Chundoo Lall down to his chobdars, against us, which prompts them to thwart any affair which we take in hand.

“Yours sincerely,

“FRANCIS GRESLEY.”

A judicial officer, named Karamut Ali, was sent from Hyderabad to conduct an investigation into the Murchair insurrection, and to try the prisoners. Captain Gresley’s next letter mentions this person’s appearance on the scene.

“Muktul, July 7th, 1842.

“MY DEAR GENERAL,—Karamut Ali arrived here yesterday, and proposes to commence proceedings forthwith. The old gentleman seems to have rather a *juld mizaj*, as the natives say.² I have given

¹ A village which had been plundered with circumstances of great cruelty.

² A quick temper, as we say.

him a brief statement of the case, and told him what witnesses will give evidence on certain points, and that I am ready to give my own evidence whenever he calls upon me. Of course, I shall abstain from all interference or advice during his further proceedings. It is of no use my writing to any of the Talookdars or Zemindars hereabouts, or the Government issuing *ahkâms*¹ to them, to assist in seizing persons connected with this affair. They will not do it; and if I could get intelligence, and were to send a party of troops to apprehend anyone, it would be 100 to 1 that they would not effect the capture, for the inhabitants and officials are all inclined to protect such delinquents. We must, in fact, always expect to meet not merely with unwillingness to assist us, but also with underhand opposition, from Chundoo Lall down to the lowest Government *piadah*,² in any affair of this kind which we attempt to settle. This Murchair business has had one good effect in bringing the petty Rajahs in this region to their senses. It was fortunate we moved upon Murchair so rapidly, for I have been assured that, had Siddee Yakoob been aware of our intentions a week sooner, he would have collected from Raichore, Gungawatty, and various other places, at least 300 or 400 of these Arab adventurers, who, though nominally in Government service, are ready to join in any villainy; and we then could not have reduced the place without a large force and a regular siege, while the country all round would for weeks or months have been at the mercy of these brutes of Bedurs, Kolies, and other professional robbers, who plunder both friend and foe. It is to be regretted that Siddee Yakoob's *vakeel*, Bheemuna, escaped, with all his papers. The Siddee declares that these papers would have exonerated him from all blame in this affair. We shall see whether he will speak out on his trial.

"Yours sincerely,

"FRANCIS GRESLEY."

Another letter from the same officer throws more light on the relations between the Residency and the Hyderabad Durbar, arising from the services of the so-called Nizam's Contingent being afforded only at the discretion and pleasure of the British Resident.

"Muktul, July 3rd, 1842.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,—Malcolm³ sent me yesterday the Minister's *ahkam* to Boodun Khan, directing him to take possession of the Murchair talooka. The Rajah objects most strenuously to this measure,

¹ Orders.

² Messenger—lit., footman.

³ The Assistant Resident, and afterwards Resident at Baroda.

and not, I think, without reason. Next to putting him to death, it is the heaviest punishment which can be inflicted upon him. The Minister does not understand our English maxim, that a man must be considered innocent until proved guilty. Chundoo Lall would be delighted to pounce upon the zemindaree with our assistance. If this order is attempted to be carried into effect, either by Boodun Khan or Bheekoo Meean, it is probable that the people who at present hold the villages under the Murchair Rajah will resist, and as they have several strong ghurries;¹ this would lead to our troops being called out to dispossess the Rajah's retainers, who would not oppose *us*. Thus the whole responsibility would be thrown upon us, which I take it is what Chundoo Lall is driving at. The Rajah is a poor wretch, and declares he was never consulted, and was kept under restraint by the Arabs. Like Kistnapa Naik, and most of the zemindars round about, he has always been under the control of some of his own household. His mamoo,² who was his chief manager, and is now in irons here, will probably turn out to have been the prime mover in resistance to the Government, but may very likely have had no power whatever over the movements of the Arabs. But whether the charges against him and against the Rajah be true or false, it would be but fair to let the poor creatures have an opportunity of clearing themselves before condemning them or confiscating the estate. What I wish to suggest is, that the Minister should be moved to defer putting into execution so very severe a measure until after Karamut Ali has investigated the affair, and reported as to the degree of blame to be attached to the Murchair Rajah. I was rather amused at the Minister writing that he had given the talooka to Boodun Khan as a reward for his good services! I believe the old man is in reality coquetting with Bheekoo Meean, who wants the talooka, has been trying to get it for a long time, and is probably prepared to come down with a nuzzurana for it, if the Rajah can be turned out.

“Yours sincerely,

“FRANCIS GRESLEY.”

Eventually the Rajah of Murchair and his relatives were acquitted; the leaders and chief delinquents among the Arabs, seven in all, were sentenced to death, and the others to various terms of imprisonment; but, as will be seen shortly, the capital sentences and their execution were deferred for several months.

Here is a characteristic and interesting letter from Lord Ellenborough, with some very judicious remarks on the check of the Nizam's Contingent troops before the fort of Murchair.

¹ A village fortification.

² Maternal uncle.

“ Allahabad, July 10th, 1842.

“ GENERAL,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th ultimo, and I am much obliged to you for the perusal of the enclosures, which I return. I remain of the opinion I have already expressed, that it would be unadvisable to have a public inquiry into the conduct of the troops at Murchair. If such inquiry involved the conduct of the officers towards their men, it would be still more objectionable.

“ I believe no Native Regiment ever misconducted itself which had confidence in and was attached to its officers, and that few ever behave well where that confidence and attachment do not exist. I know nothing more important than the selection of officers to serve with the Nizam's Regiments. I regret exceedingly whenever they are called away to serve with their own Regiments, as I know the inconvenience and mischief of any change where there are so few. I must endeavour to find a remedy for this, and for other evils in our present system.

“ While I deem it to be a matter of conscience to appoint only such officers as are likely to be really useful in the Nizam's Force, I deem it to be incumbent upon me, likewise, to take measures for relieving that Force from the presence of any officer, however brave he may be in the field, who does not by his general conduct towards his soldiers conciliate their confidence. I shall be obliged to you if you will furnish me from time to time with a confidential report with respect to the officers of the Nizam's Army.

“ In the present instance, I think you would be quite right in writing very seriously to the officers who were present at Murchair, and in informing them that you should transmit a copy of your letter to me.

“ An officer by risking his life upon a glaciis affords no compensation to his country for the risk he may have brought upon its interests by neglecting to win the confidence of his soldiers, and so occasioning a reverse.

“ We cannot bear many reverses.

“ I have the honour to remain, General,

“ Very faithfully yours,

“ ELLENBOROUGH.”

On the 23rd August 1842 the Resident writes to his friend Major Edward Armstrong¹:—

“ I wish I could anticipate the pleasure of seeing you again at Hyderabad, and still more, that we could by any means have the benefit of your valuable services in the regulation of this embarrassed Government. But I do not learn that any scheme is in preparation which

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 56

would give civil employ to European officers in the Nizam's country, and, though I have written a good deal lately on the subject of the evils which require to be corrected, I do not think Lord Ellenborough appears very much disposed to adopt any decided measures, at least until he can disengage himself from his present entanglement in Afghanistan."

In a letter to Lord Elphinstone, dated 29th of August 1842, General Fraser gives his general impression as to the progress of his plans for the benefit of the Nizam's country under the government of Lord Ellenborough.

"I must have appeared extremely remiss in not having sooner replied to your kind and obliging letter of the 29th June last, but as I have been in constant communication with the Supreme Government respecting the affairs of this Government, and have taken the liberty of suggesting a number of important measures which would, I think, remove a great deal of existing evil, although not perhaps placing matters on the very best possible footing, I was anxious to be able to inform you how these propositions had been received, and what likelihood there was that any events of interest might occur—one in particular that I have long been anxious for, and have often made the subject of suggestion to the Supreme Government, the removal of the Arabs, who have acquired an overwhelming force and influence in the State. Lord Ellenborough seems fully to concur in the necessity of something being done, but he is terribly afraid of any movement being made until his own hands are liberated from the embarrassment of the Afghan war, and we have all our military force to support us again in the interior of India. He seems a good deal alarmed, too, at the prospect of my getting into a war in the Shorapore country, the Rajah of which has just died, probably by poison. The regulation of affairs in that district is, however, as I told him would be the case, progressing quite quietly, and I have got military occupation of the only parts of it in which I anticipated any difficulty. Lord Ellenborough does not seem to realise that we have quite force enough here to contend against any opposition we might meet with in the execution of the measures we might think it necessary to carry into effect for the benefit of the Nizam's Government, and appears to imagine that our reverses in the North-west have produced a greater and more adverse influence than they really have. I do not participate, myself, in any of these apprehensions, and think that we are quite strong enough here for anything that could occur,—or at all events that we shall be strong enough when the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force is replaced on its former footing. Lord Ellenborough talks of his being free to act in the course of a few

months, from which I conclude—and it is the only means I have of forming this opinion—that he is meditating a withdrawal from Afghanistan. In this he may be right. I do not pretend to judge, nor have I the means of forming a decided opinion on the subject. But so far as I can see, and so far as my own personal inclinations bring me, I would rather have seen the views that Lord Auckland apparently entertained carried out, and the Afghans taught to feel and to acknowledge the superiority of our power, if not permanently as a conquered nation, at least until we should have found it convenient to bid them farewell and to leave them to themselves.

“General Elphinstone’s letters which you were so kind as to send me fully establish the inferences you draw from them, and I have no doubt that his memory will be fully vindicated from the calumnious aspersions which have been cast upon it by the slanderous writers in the *Englishman*. I have taken the liberty of sending the copies of General Elphinstone’s letters to Captain Orr at Hingolee, with permission to show them to the excellent officer who commands that division, Brigadier Onslow, and I hope you will not think that I have transgressed the bounds of discretion in doing this. You have not mentioned to me whether you wish these copies to be returned, but I shall be prepared to do so on their coming back from Captain Orr. You have never sent the letter to which you allude, written by Major Pottinger to General Elphinstone, but I should very much like to see it, if you can favour me with a perusal of it.

“I have not heard a syllable further from the Supreme Government respecting our Secunderabad disturbances in February last. In the meantime the troops here are quite quiet, and seem to be quite benumbed, if I may use the expression, by the treatment they met with. I wish, notwithstanding this apparent success, that some inquiry may be made into their complaints, both on their merits, and in redemption of the implied word I gave them. If another mutiny were to occur, and I went on parade, I should expect to be shot forthwith; at least, this, I conceive, would be the natural impulse of the men, who must necessarily believe that I lied and deceived them most shamefully on the former occasion.”

In a letter dated the 25th of June 1842, General Fraser again explained to the Governor-General the impossibility of obtaining from Chundoo Lall anything but a fictitious account of the debts and liabilities of the Nizam’s Government. He returned also to the subject of the virtual prohibition of all intercourse between the Resident and the Hyderabad notables. “The city of Hyderabad,” he said, “is but a large prison where all persons above the

lower class are kept under strict surveillance, and prevented from quitting the precincts of their own houses, and having any social, or still less any political, connection with each other, or with the Resident."

"The Minister has, no doubt, persuaded the Nizam of the advantage of maintaining this system, as a means of preventing intrigue, and of maintaining the permanence of His Highness's own authority."

"It must be recollected that the Minister was originally raised, and has since been upheld by our power; and that the Nizam considers him as a creature and friend of the British Government, whom, therefore, it would be dangerous on his part to quarrel with or resist."

"If," continued the Resident, alluding to the views prevailing at Calcutta, "in consequence of the extreme age of the Minister, and the valuable and acknowledged services which he has long rendered to the British Government, we are to abstain from being parties to his removal from office, it only remains to apply such expedients for the temporary removal of existing evils as may appear best suited to the several cases that arise."

The most important step was to obtain financial statements "on the authenticity of which reliance could be placed"; and although it was useless to expect the Minister voluntarily to furnish any such information, the Nizam himself, the Resident was assured, would be perfectly willing to adopt such measures as might conduce to that object, "either by the appointment of an individual or of a Commission of inquiry". The Nizam was "understood to be extremely anxious on the subject of the liabilities that had been incurred", and also to "consider the Minister, or his family after his death, personally responsible for many of those debts which the Minister professes to regard as exclusively of a public nature, chargeable against the State."

On the 13th of July 1842 General Fraser observes that "it remains for the Government of India to determine whether matters shall be allowed to go on as at present, with the few changes that may now and then suggest themselves as being of practicable execution, without affecting the general constitution of the Nizam's Government, or whether recourse shall be had at once to the more decided measure of proposing the removal of the Minister Chundoo Lall from office, and the appointment of another Dewan, whos

first and indispensable duty it should be to furnish a correct account of the financial liabilities of the State."

There were difficulties undoubtedly in the way of adopting such a strong measure at once. "This was not, perhaps, the most fitting time for trying experiments in the heart of India, and at a Mohammedan Court, when we were engaged in so many external wars as to have removed a large portion of our army, and to have weakened to a certain extent our assurance of continued peace in the interior of the country."

Then there was the special difficulty, so often mentioned, of making inquiries, and forming a fair estimate, as to the disposition and capacity of the several candidates for office. "The Minister Chundoo Lall is," the Resident admitted, "the warmest and most devoted friend we have throughout the whole extent of our dominions in the East, because he knows that his very existence is bound up in the maintenance of our authority. What might be the principles and feelings of another Dewan towards us, it is impossible to say."

Among all the persons whose names had been put forward at any time as possible successors of Chundoo Lall,—his son, Bala Pershad, Shums-ool-Oomra, Iqtidar Jung, Bal Mookund, and Sooraj-ood-Dowla,—General Fraser was inclined, on the whole, to consider that the last mentioned, a son of the former Minister, Mooneer-ool-Moolk, was the most eligible, and the most likely to find favour in the Nizam's eyes. Under the higher title of Sooraj-ool-Moolk, he became Minister some years later. In July 1842 General Fraser believed that the Nizam not only had made no choice of a future Minister, but that "notwithstanding the assurances he has received to the contrary, he supposes the choice will depend less on his personal judgment and wishes than on the suggestions of the British Government".

On the 14th of July 1842 the Resident writes privately to Lord Ellenborough:—

"Improvement here is, I am afraid, hopeless, if we are to retain Chundoo Lall in his present office.

"The Minister is so slippery and so false, and so reckless of everything but the acquisition of money, an object which he effects by the most ill-judged and ruinous means, that perhaps the only effectual mode left to us of doing justice to the country is to propose to the

Nizam the retirement of Chundoo Lall on a handsome pension, and the appointment of another Dewan. We could not well propose to the Nizam to appoint anyone who was not a subject of his own; but I certainly should be very glad, if it were possible, to obtain in some way the services of Vencata Rao, the person mentioned in my letter to the Supreme Government of the 25th ultimo. I should have every confidence in his ability, and in his power to aid in bringing about a radical reform. It was after conversing with him for an hour or two that Lord William Bentinck remarked it was such men who might be placed with advantage in the Supreme Council of India."

But neither for pressing on the Nizam the removal of Chundoo Lall, nor for the minor measure of strongly suggesting the nomination of a commission of financial inquiry, could the Resident obtain during the year 1842 the sanction or support of Lord Ellenborough's Government.

Some notes from the Minister and from the Nizam himself, disputing and rejecting advice given by the Resident, led General Fraser to express his fear that "His Highness had misunderstood the purport of the Governor-General's circular letter under date 26th April last,¹ and that he regarded it as placing him in an absolutely irresponsible position." The General more particularly reiterated the caution with regard to the Contingent that he had given in 1840.²

"If the Nizam is permitted to retain this impression it is not improbable that, beside other evils which may arise, we shall experience one of very considerable magnitude in a proposition on the part of His Highness for the disbandment of the Contingent, to which he is known to be averse, and of which neither the continued maintenance nor the original organisation is provided for by any existing Treaty. In the year 1833 His Highness actually stated his objections to the continuance of the Force; and the expense attending it has ever been a source of complaint from the Minister."

This at once called forth a direct letter from Lord Ellenborough to the Nizam, dated 1st October 1842, from which the following extracts will be sufficiently significant:—

"I am sorry to learn that the Minister of Hyderabad does not act according to the counsels of the Resident, as he has done hitherto."

"It is expedient that you direct the Minister to attend to the

¹ *Ante*, p. 152.

² *Ante*, p. 90.

wishes of the Resident. It is a great pity if anything contrary to the former friendship and concord between the two Governments should occur."

General Fraser pointed out at this time that the reduction of the number of Arab mercenaries in the Hyderabad territories, and the deportation of the more turbulent bands among them to their own country, could not with justice be carried out until their arrears were paid up, while the Arab claims, though urgent, only formed one item in the liabilities of the State of which it was impossible to induce the Minister to furnish an accurate statement.

With a view to this initial and indispensable step being taken, General Fraser suggested that it should be "urged upon His Highness to appoint some individual of his Court altogether independent of the Minister, or a Commission of three or more persons possessing this advantage, and that the course of their proceedings should be subject to the superintendence of the Resident, or of such person as may be appointed by him, or by the superior authority of the Government of India."

Without this decided measure, the whole question would be left "in its present state of darkness and confusion".

General Fraser then proceeded to observe that it did "not appear to be in the contemplation of the Governor-General to propose the removal of Chundoo Lall from his office, but merely that provision should be made for a successor in the event of his death". "Many circumstances combined to give rise to this policy, in which successive Residents at Hyderabad, as well as the authority at Calcutta which they represent, have alike participated."

"But upon a calm, dispassionate view of the case", continued the Resident, "and setting aside all considerations of mere indulgence and humane forbearance, it may be doubted how far the policy is right which leads us to maintain a person in this high office who is daily becoming more incompetent for the discharge of its duties, and whose administration will ever continue to act as a clog to any possible improvement in the state of the country."

After a long private interview with His Highness on the 13th of December 1842, General Fraser again recorded his opinion that "the Nizam would not object to any plans which might be proposed for the improvement of his country if he thought them practicable. But the great obstacles to improvement and to the

adoption of any system of essential reform, under the present constitution of the Nizam's Government, and as long as the existing Treaty remained in force and unmodified, would be found", the Resident urged, "in the Minister's age and incapacity, and in those pecuniary embarrassments, so often mentioned, which could never be removed without such decided measures of relief as the British Government alone could afford, either directly, upon territorial or other security, or by means of a loan negotiated under our guaranty." On this occasion the General states, "His Highness's manner throughout was kind and friendly. He was apparently frank and sincere in his communications. No one but he and myself was present in the room where he received me."

Captain Meadows Taylor, mentioned in the following letter to Lord Ellenborough—well known subsequently as author of *Confessions of a Thug*, and several other works—was one of the local officers of the Nizam's Army, and had been, at General Fraser's instance and with the Minister's consent, placed in charge of the small State of Shorapore, tributary to the Nizam, which had fallen into confusion during the minority of its Rajah, and under the disputed guardianship of his step-mother.

"Hyderabad, 7th January 1843.

"MY LORD,—I beg to send your Lordship four private letters from Captain Taylor, which may perhaps aid his official ones in giving a correct idea of the state of affairs at Shorapore. I am quite satisfied with the manner in which Captain Taylor is conducting his proceedings there, and I shall not now hesitate in the execution of measures for reducing the Rance of Shorapore to obedience, and to oblige her to render an account of her past administration. The Shorapore business is sufficiently illustrative of the general state of confusion and disorganisation of the whole of the Nizam's country. It is upon a small scale what the latter is upon a large one; and the same remedy would be found equally efficacious in the latter case as in the former.

"If it is the intention of the British Government to maintain the system of non-interference in the affairs of this and other native States, we must look for frequent commotions and disturbances of one kind or another throughout India. If, on the other hand, it is our object to establish a well-regulated and uniformly organised government, maintaining peace and good order in every part of the Empire,

with the hope, if not the immediate realisation, of great improvement, then instead of non-interference our best policy may be one of interference, by which I mean the imposition of our advice, guidance, and support, to the utmost limit which good faith and adherence to existing treaties will allow. Any essential or permanent change for the better in the Nizam's country is quite hopeless under the present constitution of affairs; for as long as Chundoo Lall remains in the office of Dewan, he will never cease to retain, or endeavour to retain, in his own feeble grasp, the exclusive power of the Government.

"Unless we cancel our actual treaties with the Nizam, we cannot propose anything like the Mysore system, and place the whole country under the charge of British officers; but I cannot perceive any sufficient reason why we should not, on principles that, I think, could easily be shown to be justifiable, explain to the Nizam the evils existing here, and sufficiently obvious for years past, and recommend him the appointment of a younger and more capable Dewan than Chundoo Lall, to be assisted by such persons, natives of India, and, if practicable, His Highness's own subjects, as should be required for the superintendence of the different departments.

"Any less comprehensive and decided measure would leave matters in the same state as before throughout one of the finest parts of India, leaving open a fertile source of constant petty interference, as at present, which, from want of any certainty of information, is frequently attended with doubt as to the justice of the course adopted, and never leads to any permanent or general amelioration.

"Under the impression that your Lordship might perhaps propose some change in the Nizam's country, and anxious, as I formerly mentioned, to obtain in that event the assistance of Vencata Rao, at present employed at Mysore, whose services would have been invaluable, especially in the Revenue Department, I requested General Cubbon some time ago to let me know, without any direct communication on the subject with Vencata Rao himself, whether, with your Lordship's permission, he thought that Vencata Rao would be willing to come, and whether increasing age had impaired his faculties. General Cubbon had no means of ascertaining the wishes of Vencata Rao without a confidential communication with him, and I now take the liberty of enclosing for your Lordship's perusal General Cubbon's reply, as well as the letter to his address from Vencata Rao.

"I remain,

"Your Lordship's very faithful and obedient servant,

"J. S. FRASER."

Here is Lord Ellenborough's answer, dated—

“Camp, three marches N. of Delhi, February 2nd, 1843.

“GENERAL,—I thank you for the perusal of Captain Taylor’s letters, and of those of Major-General Cubbon and Vencata Rao, all of which I return.

“If Vencata Rao would go for six months to Hyderabad in the manner proposed, and reside there privately, having no apparent intercourse with the Residency, other than such as must necessarily result from his holding an office under the Government of Mysore, he might manage to acquire a great deal of information as to things and persons which an European would hardly be able to obtain; and his being put forward hereafter as Dewan may be for future consideration. It must be kept perfectly secret that there exists any idea of ever putting him forward as Dewan. The public letter addressed to you a few days ago will have put you in possession of my general views. I must adhere to the plan of doing one thing at a time, and I must wait till all is ready for action before I act.

“I shall be in the neighbourhood of the Nizam’s dominions myself in January next, as I am going as far as Jubbulpore.

“I have the honour to remain, General,

“Your very faithful friend and servant,

“ELLENBOROUGH.”

There was here a slight misapprehension on the part of Lord Ellenborough. General Fraser did not propose that Vencata Rao should be Dewan, but only that he should be financial adviser to the Dewan, at the most a sort of Chancellor of the Exchequer. In the following letter the Governor-General tells of the very inadequate substitute for the lost batta that was bestowed, without any further inquiry, upon the Madras Sepoys.

“Camp, Purtallao, February 23rd, 1843.

“GENERAL,—I issued a G.G.O. to-day granting compensation to the troops at Jaulnah, Secunderabad, and Kamptee, when the price of rice is above 30 seers the rupee, at the rate of two seers a day to each man. Here compensation is given when the price of attah¹ is above 15 seers the rupee, and one seer of attah is considered equal to two seers of rice.

“I am glad to find by your letter that you think you have made some way with the Nizam in your interviews with him. It is a great object to obtain that degree of influence which may enable you to lead his mind gently and to make him seek your aid; but great tact must

¹ Wheat flour.

be used in bringing this about. A very delicate hand must be applied to a man educated as he must have been.

"It is a painful appeal to read, that made by Captain Taylor on behalf of the State and the people of Shorapore. I shall be very much pleased when things have assumed a quiet regular course there, and the threats cease which are now used to compel the payment of money. It is not a position of a very dignified or conciliatory character that we are in there; but there is no helping it at the present moment.

"I have the honour to remain, General,

"Your very faithful friend and servant,

"ELLENBOROUGH."

The extracts given in the following letter, from Mr. Charles May Lushington, Member of Council at Madras, convey the impression that the Home Government was very soon convinced of its own mistake in having stopped the Sepoys' batta. The letter, written from Madras, but undated, must have been sent in June or July 1842. The writer's brother was General Sir James Law Lushington, the Chairman of the Court of Directors.

"MY DEAR FRASER,—As you will naturally be anxious to know what they think in England of your outbreak at Secunderabad, and as there is nothing yet published on the subject, I send you an extract from my brother James's letter—first premising that everything *you* have done is highly approved of. You will, of course, understand that this communication is between ourselves.

(Extract.)

"I have read with great attention all the papers connected with the unhappy outbreak at Secunderabad. The policy of the Governor-General in Council in awarding punishment to the discontented, has been a mistaken policy; and next month I am not without hopes that despatches recommending a more lenient course to be adopted may be sent out. Under the peculiar circumstances of the case, and feeling that the discipline of the Army must be wholly left to the decision of the local authorities, with whom the responsibility must rest, we can only recommend, not order. I am in hopes, also, that at the same time authority will be conveyed for retaining the old rates of pensions for the families of those Sepoys who may lose their lives in the Chinese expedition.'

"The overland mail arrived yesterday. There seems to be very little news in it. The Marquis of Tweeddale will, I imagine from my letters, soon be here.

"We are off, God willing, in January next. You must let me know where to find your children, and I will go and see them.

"Believe me, my dear Fraser,

"Yours very sincerely,

"C. M. LUSHINGTON."

On the 28th of February the Resident received the following brief note from his Assistant, Captain Malcolm, with enclosures of considerable interest, pointing to a crisis in the Minister's career that now could not be far off.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,—You will see by the enclosed that the proposal you have so long anticipated has at last been made—whether in sincerity, or as an attempt to intimidate the Nizam, time will show. I incline to the latter supposition. The old man was most earnest with me to keep this matter secret, which has led me to give you the enclosed in the shape of a letter in my own abominable hand.

"Yours very sincerely,

"28th February 1843.

"D. MALCOLM."

"MY DEAR GENERAL,—In the course of the afternoon yesterday I waited on the Minister, in compliance with your request, to offer him and his son your condolence on the occasion of the death of his daughter-in-law, and I have now the pleasure to convey to you in this form a general outline of the conversation which occurred during my interview, and the substance of a proposition for the settlement of his affairs, which the Minister earnestly requested me to communicate to you.

"On arriving at the Palace I was received at the entrance of the Dewan-khana by the Minister, his son Bala Pershad, and his grandson, a youth of seventeen, with whom we adjourned to an inner apartment, sufficiently removed from the crowd of guards and attendants, who usually throng about the Minister's person, to admit of conversation being carried on in an undertone without being heard.

"After the delivery of the messages of condolence with which I was charged, and the exchange of the usual civilities, the Minister addressed me a number of questions regarding the proceedings and probable future movements of the Governor-General. Many of these were frivolous in the extreme, but others, which I had not the means of answering, showed that he had been kept well informed of passing events in the North of India, and indicated a considerable degree of anxiety in regard to the fate of the King of Delhi, whose removal from

that city has for some time past formed a topic of general conversation among the Natives of this place.

"Several questions were also addressed to me in regard to the state of our relations with the Sikhs, and though I assured the Minister that I believed they were on the most satisfactory footing, he did not appear to be able to reconcile my assertion with the fact, to which he repeatedly referred, that no exchange of visits had taken place between the Ruler of the Punjaub and the Governor-General during the sojourn of the latter at Ferozepore. It would be useless to attempt giving even an outline of the conversation which the Minister afterwards maintained with me for about half-an-hour. Many portions of it I could not understand, from the indistinct manner in which he spoke, and others were of so puerile a nature as to lead me to conclude that a considerable change for the worse had lately taken place in the intellect of the feeble old man with whom I was conversing.

"When I was on the point of taking my departure, the Minister, who had previously been silent for a few minutes, turned suddenly round, and, laying his hand on my arm, requested me to listen attentively to what he was going to say. He then commenced with a long narrative of his faithful services to the Nizam's Government and his attachment to that of the British, whose interests he had always advocated and supported to the utmost of his power; and that the time was now come when he had nothing to support him but the hope that we would come forward to extricate him out of his difficulties. He then began to describe the embarrassed state of his affairs, which in his usual plausible manner he ascribed chiefly to the decrease of revenue entailed on the country by the introduction of civil interference by Sir Charles Metcalfe, and the increased expenses incurred of late years on account of the Contingent. His liabilities he estimated at 75 lakhs of rupees, exclusive of the amount claimed by Poorun Mull (32 lakhs), which he did not intend to take into consideration, as the document on which Poorun Mull founded his claims had been given to him merely *as a trick* to suit a particular purpose. The possession of 75 lakhs, he said, would enable him to decrease the number of his irregular troops, and altogether to introduce such measures for the amelioration of the country that, to use his own words, when we saw what he had done we would overwhelm him with praise.

"The Minister then reverted to the mode in which, when the claims of Messrs. Palmer and Co. were pressing upon the State, the British Government had come forward with assistance by advancing upwards of a crore of rupees in redemption of the *peishcush*,¹ and that what he

¹ The tribute payable to the Nizam by the Honourable Company for the Northern Circars, redeemed in 1823 at about seventeen years' purchase.

had now to propose was an arrangement of a similar nature. As I did not exactly understand what the Minister had said, I observed that as there was now no *peishkush* to redeem, I did not see how a similar arrangement could be effected. 'That is true', replied he, 'but we can cede districts, and my wish is that the British Government should advance me 75 lakhs of rupees, for which lands yielding 450,000 rupees per annum would be ceded in perpetuity, the choice of the cession, either in the Raichore, Beer, or Berar country, being left to your selection.' I asked him if he had consulted with H.H. the Nizam on this subject, as it appeared to me improbable that H.H. would have recourse to the extreme measure of selling a portion of the dominions inherited from his ancestors, to relieve the exigencies of his Government, when it was well known that he had ample means of doing so with the funds now lying idle in his coffers. To this the Minister replied that it was useless communicating with the Nizam on the subject till the sentiments of the British Government were known, when he would undertake to gain his consent to the proposed arrangement; that the Nizam had refused lately, on all occasions, to afford him any pecuniary assistance, and that, so far as he was himself concerned, he would prefer meeting the present exigency in any way rather than by trenching upon the Nizam's private funds. To the Minister's repeated and earnest entreaties to assist him in gaining the object in view, and questions as to how it would be received by Lord Ellenborough, I could only return replies of a general nature, and shortly afterwards took my leave, receiving to the last the most earnest assurances that on the success of the proposed measure depended all his hopes of extricating this Government from the difficulties with which it was surrounded, and an earnest appeal to you to further his wishes.

"Before leaving the Minister's house I procured from Bala Pershad a Persian memo., which I now enclose, embodying the heads of the proposal above referred to. I was led to adopt this precaution from having found from experience that when matters do not take the course he wishes, the Minister's memory in regard to what has occurred during a personal interview is not always to be depended upon.

"The Minister's mode of managing the affairs of this Government is so crooked, and differs so much from the course of ordinary men, that it is extremely difficult to form any definite opinion as to the object he has in view, but in the present instance I think it will be found that his sole aim is, by placing himself in communication with us in the present instance, to work upon the fears of His Highness,

and intimidate him into yielding a supply of money sufficient to satisfy the demands of his more clamorous creditors.

"I may be mistaken in this supposition, but I could not help remarking that while the Minister, with apparent sincerity, was urging me to allude to the proposition he was making to no one but yourself, he assumed so loud a tone that his words must have been heard by his attendants and guards. On my mentioning this to the Minister, he desired them to fall back, but in a few minutes they were allowed to resume their former position.

"In the course of the interview an opportunity was offered to me of inquiring what steps had been taken to induce Bin Shams's discharged Arabs to proceed to their native country. The Minister at first stated that several of them had left; and on my replying that I did not think more than five or six at the utmost had gone, he told me that he supposed they were collecting their debts, and would go away in time. As the subject appeared distasteful, I did not press it any further; but from the manner in which the Minister afterwards spoke of eventually discharging only 500 Arabs on receiving the anticipated relief from the British Government, I conclude no further steps are likely to be taken to procure the removal of any Arabs to Bombay.

"Yours very truly,

"D. MALCOLM."

Translation of the Persian Memorandum written by Rajah Bala Pershad, in the presence of Captain D. Malcolm, on the 27th February 1843.

"A *peishcush* of seven lakhs of rupees was formerly paid to the Hyderabad State by the British Government. A debt of one crore and sixteen lakhs of rupees was due to the firm of Messrs. Palmer and Co. by the Nizam's Government. Sir Charles Metcalfe paid the aforesaid sum on the part of the British Government to Messrs. Palmer and Co., and to others, and in lieu of it received a release for the *peishcush*. At the present moment this Government is in difficulty, and if the same assistance as was formerly extended to it could now be given by the British Government, the embarrassments of the State would be relieved.

"This is the mode in which it can be done, viz., by the British Government having the kindness to advance seventy-five lakhs of rupees, and receiving in lieu of it country yielding an annual revenue of four lakhs and fifty thousand rupees. In this manner the difficulties of the State, and the pressing demands of the bankers and people holding assignments will be removed; a reduction of the supernumerary

troops shall also be effected; and hereafter the receipts and disbursements shall be made to correspond.

“ List of Reductions.

“ Sikhs	1,000
“ Arabs	500
“ Rohillas	500
“ Ali Gol	1,000
“ Men of various descriptions	1,000
<hr/>				
“ Total	4,000

“ (True translation) D. MALCOLM.”

On the 1st of April 1843 General Fraser addressed a very important letter to the Governor-General, describing the last struggles of Chundoo Lall to retain power in spite of the desperate condition of his finances and the utter stoppage of credit, and mentioning his recent proposals for a territorial cession.

“ The financial difficulties of the Nizam’s Government have at length induced the Minister to determine on applying to us for pecuniary assistance, and he talks of asking for an advance of 60 or 70 lakhs of rupees. I doubt very much whether the double of this would clear the Circar of debt, and I therefore think it possible that the Minister may be merely desirous of liberating himself from his more immediate and pressing difficulties, rather than of obtaining such a complete discharge from heavy debt and exorbitant interest as would be consistent with a large reduction of establishments and a thorough reform of administration. He proposed at first, in a private communication, to make a permanent cession to us of any part of the Nizam’s country we might prefer in compensation for the amount we may now advance; and upon my observing to the Vakeel whom he sent to me on this subject that so important a proposal would require the assent of H. H. the Nizam before I could submit it to the Supreme Government, the Vakeel remarked that if we agreed to give the money the Nizam’s assent would necessarily be given to the remainder of the arrangement. I stated, however, that I should require more distinct information on this point before I could take any official step, and in the course of a day or two the Minister sent another message by his Vakeel to inform me that the proposition had been made to the Nizam, and that he had refused to agree to it. I believe it is now the intention of the Minister to propose that if the required loan be advanced by us, it shall be gradually liquidated, with interest, by assignments on the territorial revenue of the country. I have informed him that, whatever he does, he must act with

honesty and candour, and furnish me with an authentic account of the liabilities of his Government; and I have suggested to him to address me on the subject without delay, if he intends to do so at all, in order that the case may be submitted to the Supreme Government. These private communications, and anything like a secret negotiation going on between the Minister and myself, are productive of mischief, for they are rendered subservient to the purposes of intrigue; and are made use of especially to lead the Nizam into a belief that there is so intimate and cordial an understanding between the Resident and the Minister as to be perfectly irresistible, and thus to keep the Nizam's mind in perpetual bondage. The Minister, with his usual habit of delay, states that he will inform me more fully on the subject when he meets me at a party at one of his garden houses to which I am invited on Wednesday next. If I find him at all serious, I shall try to keep him to the point, and above all, press him to be perfectly open as to the amount of public debt.

"I have invited Vencata Rao to pay me a visit at Hyderabad, and have just received a letter from General Cubbon informing me that Vencata Rao will leave Bangalore in a few days on leave of absence for six months. General Cubbon adds that this will be ostensibly a visit of friendship to me, not of duty or business, and that all the arrangements for his journey, and the care of his family during his absence, have been made with a view to conceal his real object, and to preclude the suspicion that he is to be employed at Hyderabad.

"Although his visit to me is to be regarded as a private one, I would request your Lordship's permission to introduce him to the Minister, and to allow of his entering on unofficial communications as to the financial condition of the State, provided this can be done, as I believe it can, without any objection on the Minister's part. If, indeed, the Minister's perfect consent cannot be obtained, Vencata Rao's visit here will hardly be attended with much advantage, for Chundoo Lall has the ability and power to shroud himself and his concerns, when he pleases, in a veil of mystery, which neither Vencata Rao, nor any other person, could ever penetrate without the Minister's permission. His introduction to the Minister, however, as I hope to arrange it, will, I have no doubt, soon enable him to throw much light on financial affairs, and pave the way, without violence or friction, for his future employment in the service of the Nizam, in whatever capacity may seem hereafter most advisable.

"I am happy to say that we remain perfectly quiet in every part of the Nizam's country, and that I hear of no tendency to commotion or insurrection of any kind. With your Lordship's sanction, and under your guidance, I have little doubt that much might be done to ame-

liorate the condition of this country, but we shall look in vain for decided measures of improvement if we forego the aid of European energy, and trust to an exclusively Native administration."

This was Lord Ellenborough's reply :—

"Agra, April 11th, 1843.

"GENERAL,—I have just received your letter of the 1st with its enclosures.

"I see no objection to your making Vencata Rao acquainted with the Minister. I shall be very glad if he should be enabled, through the Minister, to obtain any real insight into the financial administration of the Nizam's territories.

"The smaller question relative to Shorapore is merged in the greater question which is opened by the Minister's proposition. Upon that proposition I can give no opinion until it assumes a definite shape, and comes before me with the sanction of the Nizam's authority.

"You will abstain, of course, from intimating any opinion with respect to it until it has been so submitted to me.

"In the meantime I should be happy to receive any information you may not have already communicated, relative to the financial difficulties, to the present amount of revenue, and to the administration of the Nizam's dominions.

"I remain, General,

"Your very faithful friend and servant,

"ELLENBOROUGH.

"I return Captain Taylor's letter to you."

The crisis was now close at hand, in which Rajah Chundoo Lall was at last brought to feel, by the utter impossibility of any longer borrowing money, even on the most ruinous terms, to meet current expenditure, that he had come to the end of his tether. Unless he could extend the range of his financial expedients, and gain time, by obtaining material assistance from the Honourable Company, he knew that the clamour of unpaid and half-starving servants of the State, mostly with arms in their hands, around his palace and throughout the city, would soon assume the aspect of a riot, if not of a revolt. The arrears due to the Contingent, moreover, were growing beyond the extreme point of endurance, and would soon compel some action on the part of the Resident. Relying still on his old credit, on the favour with which he had long been regarded as a friend of the English, and on the intimate connections he had somehow established and always kept up in

Calcutta, Chundoo Lall seems to have hoped that a hint of his probable retirement would open the heart and the purse of the Supreme Government, give him a new lease of office, and secure the succession to his son. But he neither understood the integrity and strength of General Fraser's character, nor the Resident's policy of looking to the improved administration and increased prosperity of the Nizam's dominions as a greater gain to the Empire than the subserviency of a Minister or the subjection of the Nizam in matters of questionable equity. Chundoo Lall could not be got to acknowledge, even in his hour of direst need, the full extent of the State's indebtedness, and this was enough to confirm General Fraser in his conviction that the Minister's removal was the first step to reform. He was not likely, therefore, to let slip any opportunity of encouraging the Nizam to take that important step.

On the 21st of April 1843, the General writes to Lord Ellenborough :—

“It is difficult even to guess at the financial embarrassments of this Government. One or two of the more respectable Soucars¹ here have remarked that upon a rough estimate it would probably require two crores of rupees to clear the Circar of its debts, if the task were undertaken by us; but that if left to the Minister he might, perhaps, by compromises and other means, effect the same object for a crore. I am disposed, however, to doubt this more cheerful view of the case, especially if we include the arrears due to the mercenary troops all over the country, which must be paid before they can be discharged, a measure on which we ought, I think, to insist, for as long as any body, however small, of these remain, it will serve as a nucleus and a gathering point for their reassemblage, and for a revival of all that is objectionable and perilous in their constitution and practices.

“In the Minister's memorandum sent up with my official despatch, your Lordship will observe nine lakhs of rupees as being due to ‘Arabs, including Omar bin Awud’. This refers entirely to money *borrowed* from the Arab Jemadars, and has nothing to do with the arrears of pay, which it will be necessary to liquidate as each body is discharged.

“In the last item of this document, wherein he alludes to ‘arrears of pay to the Bolarum troops’, the Minister means to intimate his intention of paying up the arrears due to the Contingent. These troops are generally four and sometimes five months in arrears; and it will

¹ Bankers.

certainly be desirable, if it can be conveniently done, to pay them, so as to place them, in this respect, on a footing with the Company's troops. I sometime ago reported to the Supreme Government that I had proposed this to the Minister, and that he had assented to my wishes ; but the arrangement failed in consequence of his finding it impossible to raise the requisite funds.

"For the last eight or ten days the Nizam has been very unwell with fever, arising, I am told, from the irritation of a local disorder. He sent to me two days ago for some quinine, with which I of course furnished him immediately, with a memorandum of the way in which it should be administered. It is said that he has an objection to medicine in general, and that he is very impatient with the ignorant native doctors in his service.

"No orders, I believe, have ever been given by the Supreme Government as to the event of the Nizam's sudden or unexpected death ; but I do not much regret the absence of instructions on this point. I might better, perhaps, be guided on such an occasion by immediate and local circumstances than by any previous directions, pending a reference to the Supreme Government as to its assent in the important matter of a succession to the Musnud. The Nizam has two sons, the elder being about fifteen years of age. He is well spoken of, but I have never seen him ; nor was it likely that I should have done so, as he remains almost entirely confined to the Harem."

After much vacillation on the part of the Minister, and many changes in the terms of the proposal, in April 1843, the Governor-General in Council had at last under formal consideration a despatch from the Resident, conveying an application from the Minister for a loan of a crore of rupees, to clear off the debts of the Hyderabad State, and offering an assignment of territory yielding seventeen lakhs of rupees of annual revenue as security for the payment of principal and interest. The Government of India declared in reply that it could not advance money as a purely financial transaction, but only with a political object. The Government insisted very properly on full and detailed information as to receipts, disbursements, and liabilities, and was inclined to attribute the financial embarrassments of the Nizam chiefly to the unnecessary expenditure of nearly a crore of rupees per annum on the maintenance of useless irregular troops. The most serious danger to be guarded against was that of the pay of the Contingent under British officers falling into much greater arrears. Such an event would almost compel our intervention, for the purpose of

providing the necessary funds, "for the only means we have of preserving peace in the Nizam's dominions are those we derive from the presence of these troops". No reliance, it was added, can be placed in troops not receiving their stipulated pay. The Governor-General apprehended that the embarrassments of the Minister might lead to the non-payment of that portion of the Nizam's Army commanded by British officers. Under such circumstances it might become necessary to adopt the course of advancing money for the payment of some portion of the arrears due to those troops. Such an advance the Resident was only to make in a case of emergency, and ample security for its recovery was to be taken by requiring the entire management of a district sufficient to produce the interest and to repay the principal in five years, to be made over to the British Government.

Some notion of the considerations which led the Governor-General to hold aloof at this period from the reforming policy suggested upon him by General Fraser, may be gathered from the following private letter, which arrived almost on the same day with a despatch, of which a summary has just been given.

"Agra, May 2nd, 1843.

"GENERAL,—I received yesterday your letter of the 21st ult., and I return the letter from Captain Taylor, which you enclosed.

"I have not yet seen Captain Taylor's official letter. I had very much rather manage Shorapore in the name of Pid Naick than in our own, if in some manner we must manage it, which I regret; and if he is so well disposed, and so ready to do what he is desired to do, I cannot see why the matter should not be so arranged.

"The affairs of Shorapore bear from the trait given me much annoyance. We are in a false position there. We should not act towards that State on our own part, as we do on the part of the Nizam; and our Government is impaired in character by acting thus in subordinate co-operation at Shorapore with a Government we are understood to control.

"With respect to the more important question opened by the communication from the Nizam's Minister, we are really not ready to act.

"I want to do only one thing at a time. We must first settle Scinde. The Punjab is tending to internal commotion. It is hardly possible that affairs should remain there in their present state long. Our own affairs require a little fostering. What I want in the Deccan is *time*.

We must prevent any outbreak there; but that being done, I had rather keep things as they are than attempt to improve them with insufficient means to effect my purpose.

“I remain, General,
“Your very faithful friend and servant,
“ELLENBOROUGH.”

General Fraser's hopes of introducing reforms into the Nizam's administration, beginning with revenue and finance, by means of a few well-chosen Native officials of tried qualifications, were rudely shaken by the illness and death of the able Brahmin, Vencata Rao, who had formed the centre and mainstay of the plan. On the 10th of May 1843, the General writes to Lord Ellenborough:—

“Vencata Rao, Assistant to the Commissioner in Mysore, arrived here a few days ago, but in a suffering state from dropsy, a malady which had begun to show itself even before he left Bangalore. He became worse, and as he wished to be with his family in the event, which seems inevitable, of its being necessary for him to undergo an operation, he left Hyderabad yesterday evening on his return to Bangalore. It is his declared intention to return here as soon as he gets well; but I am very doubtful of his recovery at his advanced age. I let him understand in general my wishes as to his future employment here, but did not lead him to expect any particular situation. He spoke of the desire he had entertained for some time past to retire from public life, but stated his willingness to assist me in so great a work as improving the Nizam's administration, provided that I could assure him I was not thinking of going home, for that nothing would induce him to act under any English officer to whom he was a stranger. I satisfied him that I had no thought of quitting India, and I believe he has gone away with the full determination of returning as soon as he possibly can, bringing his family with him.”

On the 13th of July he writes to the Governor-General:—
“Vencata Rao died soon after his return to Bangalore, and this is a cause of much regret to me. I had hoped to receive great assistance from him here, and the two or three interviews I had with him before he left Hyderabad, led me to believe that my expectations would not have been disappointed. The British Government has lost in him one of the ablest native servants that it has ever been my lot to meet with during my career in India.”

Vencata Rao's death made the relief of the Hyderabad State

from the incurable stagnation of Chundoo Lall's rule more essential and urgent than ever, and in the letter to the Governor-General of the 13th of July 1843, which has just been quoted, the Resident, very doubtful of its reception at Calcutta, mentions for the first time the Minister's proposed resignation.

"The financial embarrassments of this State have reached that crisis which must necessarily lead to some immediate result. The Contingent are nearly six months in arrears, and my urgent demands upon the Minister for the payment of at least two months have induced him to apply to the Nizam for assistance on this account, as well as for the loan of other large sums of money for the liquidation of those debts which press upon him most strongly. In the event of the Nizam's refusal the Minister has tendered his resignation. But the Nizam will neither advance him the money nor accept his resignation. There seems not to be a very cordial feeling between them at present, nor has there been, by all accounts, for some time past, which is not surprising, when there have been importunate demands for money on the one side, and obstinate refusals and general dissatisfaction on the other. In these personal matters I do not interfere, leaving the two parties to pursue their mutual recriminations, foreseeing clearly that some decided result must very soon be attained.

"The Minister yesterday sent his Vakeel to me for the purpose of explaining the failure and the inutility of his applications to the Nizam for assistance from his private treasure, concluding with two propositions for my consideration.

"The first was that he should borrow the money more immediately wanted for the Contingent from Soucars, who were prepared to advance it upon my countersigning the bonds; and the Minister added that the amount so advanced should be repaid to the lenders in two or three months at most. To this I at once objected, and informed him that I could on no account be a party to such a transaction. If I were to countersign the bonds, I should be making the British Resident responsible for the money, which could not be thought of for a moment without ample territorial security, besides other conditions.

"The other proposition was then brought forward, which was that I should write direct to the Nizam, to acquaint him of the impossibility in which the Minister was placed to comply with my demands, and to request that His Highness would himself adopt such measures as were necessary for the removal of these difficulties.

"I immediately assented to this, as it was, in fact, what I had previously resolved upon doing, as a preliminary to the ultimate and extreme step of advancing the money for the Contingent myself upon

bills to be drawn on the Presidencies, and of demanding the surrender into my own hands of a sufficient extent of territory to cover the repayment of the money within a certain time. I added, moreover, that, to avoid a recurrence of the same difficulty, I should solicit from the Nizam not only the means of extrication from our present embarrassments, but the adoption of such measures as might exempt us from them in the future.

"The Vakeel, at the end of his visit, communicated to me as a message from the Minister that he understood the Nizam was about to send me his confidential Moonshee, Rusheed-ool-Moolk, for the purpose of complaining that money was not forthcoming, either for the payment of the Contingent under my orders, or for the maintenance of his own household; and he begged that I would not reveal to Rusheed-ool-Moolk this forewarning of his mission. I said that I should comply with his wishes in this respect as far as possible.

"I this morning received a note on the part of the Nizam, stating that he desired to send Rusheed-ool-Moolk to wait upon me on Saturday next—the day after to-morrow—to which, of course, I immediately assented. The Minister is so little candid and straightforward in his usual proceedings, that I shall take no step in the business till I learn the exact nature of the Nizam's message. After seeing Rusheed-ool-Moolk, I shall give him such a reply as the tenor of his mission may require, but I do not apprehend that its purport is in the least likely to enable me to dispense with the communication, as above explained, which I propose making to him. I shall, no doubt, have occasion to write officially in the early part of next week, but I have thought it right to give your Lordship without delay this slight sketch of what is going on here at present."

The visit of Rusheed-ool-Moolk to the Resident on Saturday, the 15th of July, took place as previously arranged, and the message which he bore proved to be one of great importance. The confidential Secretary of the Nizam, after recapitulating the pecuniary embarrassments under which the army, the household, and the several departments of the State were suffering, made a distinct and plain request on behalf of His Highness, that the Resident should communicate to the Minister the Nizam's desire that regular payments should be at once resumed, or that Rajah Chundoo Lall should resign his office.

The Resident replied that without having ascertained the Governor-General's views he should not like to interfere in a matter so important as the removal of the Minister. He also sug-

gested the expediency of making arrangements for a successor to the Dewannee, in the event of its being abruptly vacated, and expressed a hope that His Highness had already thought of some competent person to succeed to that high office. He reminded Rusheed-ool-Moolk that he had several times made that suggestion before, merely with reference to Chundoo Lall's advanced age.

Rusheed-ool-Moolk replied, that on receiving the Minister's resignation the Nizam would for the present assume the executive administration himself, and added that His Highness had not yet made up his mind as to the selection of a Dewan, but would consult me about it.

After a long conversation with Rusheed-ool-Moolk as to the finances, and the expenses of the household, in which His Highness claimed to have been very economical, General Fraser became convinced that the Nizam was afraid of adopting any measure, or committing himself to any course, even to the examination of accounts, as long as the Minister remained in office; and that with regard to the Minister's removal he was very averse to act without having the direct support of the Resident, and desired General Fraser to become a party to that step by sending a message recommending it.

As General Fraser hesitated as to the propriety of his thus taking the initiative in the removal of the Minister, the Nizam's confidential agent observed that His Highness did not propose that the order should be conveyed to Chundoo Lall as emanating from the British Resident, but that it should be sent from the Residency as His Highness's order.

Just before Rusheed-ool-Moolk rose to take leave he told the Resident that he believed it was the intention of the Minister to tender his resignation voluntarily. It was, indeed, he added, extremely probable that at that very moment the Nizam had received it. General Fraser immediately asked why His Highness could not accept the resignation, and why he should ask for the Resident's mediation? Rusheed-ool-Moolk simply replied, "He wishes it to be done through you."

Rusheed-ool-Moolk called on the Resident the next day, and informed him that the Minister had tendered his resignation, which the Nizam had refused to accept. He said once more, "He wishes the order to resign to be sent through you." General Fraser again

explained that in a matter of so much importance it was necessary to ask for instructions from the Governor-General, and that he should do so at once. In the meantime he desired strongly to urge upon His Highness that either a Dewan or a Commission of Government should be appointed, to enter upon the executive administration immediately on the acceptance of Chundoo Lall's resignation. The Resident referred to the danger of tumult arising from the numerous bodies of irregular troops in the city, to whom large arrears of pay were due, and from whom some personal inconvenience to His Highness might arise, in the event either of the Minister's death or sudden withdrawal from office.

Rusheed-ool-Moolk replied that he did not apprehend any danger. He called to the Resident's recollection the exact words which the Nizam had used at a private interview a few months before, viz., that whatever difficulties might arise would be surmounted with the General's assistance, and that the Nizam would consult him as to the selection of a Dewan.

General Fraser expressed a strong conviction that the Governor-General should avail himself of this opportunity of getting rid of Chundoo Lall, "that nothing should be either said or done to throw any obstacle in the way of that resignation, which seemed to have been spontaneously and simultaneously tendered by the Minister and proposed by the Nizam." The Resident suggested that the Government of India might express its assent to the Nizam's acceptance of the Minister's resignation, on account of his advanced age, and his wish to retire from public labour to the repose of private life. "No offence", General Fraser added, "ought to be given to the feelings of the aged Minister, who has certainly proved himself during his long career a warm and cordial friend of the British Government. Every requisite provision should be made for his future maintenance, in the propriety of which there is no doubt that the Nizam would fully concur;" and "a kind and complimentary letter from the Right Honourable the Governor-General" might be sent to Rajah Chundoo Lall, "in acknowledgment of his long and valuable services."

One of the most embarrassing points, General Fraser observed, was the selection of a suitable Dewan. "The Minister", said General Fraser, "has succeeded in maintaining in so low a state of political thralldom and degradation the whole of the upper Moham-

medan and Hindoo classes of Hyderabad, and in keeping them so isolated from the Resident, that I am unable at this moment to indicate the name of any person whom I consider entirely competent for the high office of Dewan." "Everything in this respect must be left for future inquiry and consideration, and for the guidance which may be derived from the opinions and judgment of the Nizam himself."

A short extract from a private letter to Lord Ellenborough, dated the 17th July 1843, will give an instance of the ill-kept promises with which the Minister strove to put off the day of reckoning.

"The Minister, alarmed, I suppose, with what he hears to be going on, and which has probably assumed a more decided aspect than he anticipated, has just sent me a note to say that he is prepared to pay in hoondces and cash for the Army and Appah Dessaye's chout."

Lord Ellenborough sent the following private answer to the Resident's important letter of the 13th of July, announcing Chundoo Lall's impending resignation.

"Barrackpore, July 31, 1843.

"GENERAL,—I have to thank you for your letter of the 13th instant, which I only received to-day, as it was sent to Allahabad. I do not know that I have anything to add to the official communication made to you a few days ago, on the receipt of your despatches, except that I should wish to receive as soon as possible a statement of your views as to the best mode of administering the country, if it should be made over to us. I really know not where to find the number of able administrators who would be required. Everything would depend upon individual ability, zeal and tact.

"I very much regret the death of Vencata Rao. I heard of it on the very day on which your last despatches arrived here.

"I have the honour to remain, General,

"Your very faithful friend and servant,

"ELLENBOROUGH."

There was not much here in the way of either instruction or support, and the expectation expressed, as also in the public despatch to which the Governor-General refers, that "the country might be made over to us", was not warranted by anything that General Fraser had at that period ever proposed or contemplated. The official despatch announced, in the first place, that, "under all the circumstances", with regard to "the financial embarrassments

of the Nizam's Government, and the state of Chundoo Lall's health, the Governor-General in Council could not hesitate to acquiesce in the retirement of that Minister from the conduct of His Highness's affairs". The Resident was authorised to make a communication to that effect to the Nizam; strongly urging on him at the same time the immediate nomination of an efficient Minister, and the payment of all arrears to the Contingent and other troops from His Highness's private treasury.

The Governor-General anticipated, however, that His Highness would not "be induced to advance from his private treasury, if indeed he should have the means of doing so, the sums required to meet the present emergency", and that he would "feel it necessary to ask aid of the British Government". The Governor-General in Council was "not disposed to refuse the aid so asked", but it would only be granted on terms giving "ample security for the repayment of the sums to be advanced, and for the future good government of His Highness's dominions." And then, with somewhat startling stringency, the Governor-General in Council declared that "these objects could not be obtained otherwise than by taking the whole administration of the Nizam's dominions under British management". As the sole alternative to be offered, in the event of the Nizam being unwilling or unable to produce funds for paying off all arrears due to troops, and other pressing debts, a draft treaty was enclosed, providing for the advance of one crore of rupees by the British Government, and for the delegation "to the British Resident as Dewan, or to such other person as the British Government may from time to time select, of the whole administration of His Highness the Nizam's dominions, until such time as the sums so advanced shall be repaid with compound interest at five per cent. per annum, and until the British Government shall be satisfied that His Highness, his heirs and successors, can conduct the government of the said dominion in such manner as to avoid the recurrence of embarrassments similar to those which now prevail."

Under one article of this draft treaty the Governor-General in Council agreed to make a "regular monthly payment for the support of His Highness and his household; "but his Lordship", it was explained to the Resident in the despatch, "would not consider himself justified in taking upon the British Government an

obligation at the present time so onerous, without securing the prospective advantage of appropriating, to the general purposes of the British Government, any surplus of revenue which may hereafter accrue from the improved management of His Highness's dominions under our administration."

Under an additional draft article, therefore, it was stipulated that, "in consideration of the monthly payment" (amount left blank) "for the support of His Highness and his household being undertaken by the British Government, any surplus of revenue which may arise shall be appropriated as the British Government may direct."

General Fraser did not think it necessary or advisable to place this alternative proposal, which would most assuredly never have been accepted, before the Nizam. And it may as well be explained here, that the Home Government by no means endorsed the singular condition proposed for appropriating any surplus revenues that might arise during our management of the Nizam's territories. In a despatch dated the 3rd of April 1844, the Court of Directors pass in review the transactions of the Government of India with that of the Nizam during the previous year. They comment upon the draft Treaty, which was to have been offered to the Nizam if he applied for a loan, with particular reference to the stipulation it contained for "the prospective advantage of appropriating, for the general purposes of the British Government, any surplus of revenue which may hereafter accrue from the improved management of His Highness's dominions under our administration."

"We have already", the despatch said, "in our letter of the 30th May 1843, stated to you that should a financial crisis hereafter compel the Nizam or his Minister to apply for our assistance, the good offices of the British Government must be afforded on the express condition that it shall exercise complete control in administering the affairs of the country on the part of, and for the behoof of His Highness, and if the administration of the territory should in such case be undertaken by us, His Highness must clearly understand that it will not be relinquished until our Government shall be satisfied that the Nizam, or his successor, will be found competent to form suitable arrangements for the efficient administration of the country. So far, therefore, you only followed out the instructions which we had laid down for your guidance.

"We cannot, however, approve of the conditional provision which you were desirous of making for the appropriation of surplus revenue to the general purposes of India. No surplus revenue could, of course, exist while any debt remained unliquidated, and the stipulation, therefore, could apply to no case but that of our retaining the management after all our advances had been repaid with compound interest. This, under the proposed Treaty, we could only do on the ground of our not being satisfied that the country could be properly governed by the Native authorities; and this ought not to be presumed beforehand, nor ought we to adopt a provision which would wear the appearance of a preconceived determination not to relinquish the management.

"You will therefore take care not to insert in any future Treaty with the Nizam's Government the stipulation in question, nor any other of a similar nature."

The Resident's hopes that a Minister would be appointed, and that the private treasury would be opened, were still deferred. Chundoo Lall was evidently still struggling to retain power, and the unaccountable delays in accepting his resignation were discovered to be caused by the secret intrigues of Rusheed-ool-Moolk, who was a mere creature of the Minister, and sold to the support of his views. It turned out that all Rusheed-ool-Moolk's importunate suggestions that a formal proposal for the Minister's retirement should be sent from the Residency, and that the Nizam's orders on the subject should be sent through the same channel, were dictated by Chundoo Lall himself, in order to form the foundation for a future claim on his part—perhaps when extreme financial pressure had been relieved by the British loan which he hoped was coming—that both the Nizam and himself had been acting under compulsion, and that his resignation had been extorted by the Resident's menacing demeanour.

When this exposure took place General Fraser promptly wrote to Chundoo Lall, still at the head of affairs, refusing to hold any further communication with Rusheed-ool-Moolk, and requesting that either Sooraj-ool-Moolk or Iktidar Jung might be sent to confer with him. The Nizam immediately acceded to the wish thus expressed, and directed Sooraj-ool-Moolk to wait on the Resident. This was on the 18th of August, and, after a conference of more than an hour, this nobleman, destined, after many more delays, to be

Minister of the Hyderabad State, left upon General Fraser the impression that he was "a man of some capacity, and possessed of sufficient intelligence and enlargement of mind to receive in a discerning and independent spirit any future communications that might be made to him".

The negotiations dragged on slowly for some weeks. The Nizam could not be persuaded to instal a Minister with full powers. Sooraj-ool-Moolk was appointed His Highness's Vakeel, and Rajah Ram Buksh, a nephew of Chundoo Lall, but on bad terms with his uncle, was made Peshcar, or Financial Secretary. The Resident was assured that although Sooraj-ool-Moolk was only made His Highness's Vakeel or agent "as a temporary measure", he was fully empowered to represent the Nizam's views, and to convey his decisions. On the 3rd of September Sooraj-ool-Moolk stated that the Nizam had treasure ready for the liquidation of the public debts, and that he proposed to pay them off in succession as each demand was inquired into, and its exact amount determined by a committee of five financial experts.

Both Sooraj-ool-Moolk and General Fraser were agreed on one essential point, that until Chundoo Lall's resignation was formally accepted and recorded, the Nizam's mind would remain in a fluctuating condition with regard to every decisive measure that might be proposed. Powerful intrigues were still at work, Sooraj-ool-Moolk said, to maintain the Minister in office, or to secure the succession to his son.

As no one else would act, and as Rajah Chundoo Lall, though still nominally in office, had not only tendered his resignation, but had practically resigned his functions into the hands of Sooraj-ool-Moolk and Rajah Ram Buksh, General Fraser, with a view to putting an end to this unintelligible and intolerable period of procrastination, wrote to Rajah Chundoo Lall on the 6th of September, telling him with all possible courtesy that from that date the British Resident could no longer recognise him in the capacity of Minister. In a private letter to Lord Ellenborough he thus describes the situation that was produced:—

"Hyderabad, 7th September 1843.

"MY LORD,—I had the honour to receive your letter of the 31st of July, in which you desire to receive from me a statement of my views as to the best mode of administering this country if it should be made

over to us. As I am disposed to think that it might be governed by Native agency, under the decided and efficient control of the Resident, or Dewan acting under the Resident's guidance, instead of having recourse to a regular and graduated train of British officers, as in Mysore. My views are almost equally applicable to our assumption of the country, had that event taken place, and to what I think ought to be the system of administration, in the other case of its remaining, as it will now do, subject to the Nizam. It may be difficult to get able Native subordinates, but they should be sought for; and under a vigilant management a capacity for service may be created which perhaps does not now exist. I should think it desirable, upon grounds of general policy, no less than those which more peculiarly affect the Nizam's country, to endeavour to bring forward the Natives into such employment as they are fit for, and especially to find something for the Mussulmans to do besides hatching treason and plotting against our Government.

"Matters are now progressing here as well as I could wish. I yesterday morning pronounced the final discontinuance of my official relations with Chundoo Lall, and the incubus is thus thrown off of an incapable Minister, who has just had wit and cunning enough to serve his own purposes by shackling his master, the Nizam, and the noblest and highest, as well as the meanest, of the State, and a succession of British Residents, and by his corrupt and selfish policy, and total want of patriotism, to retain the country under his management in a state of backwardness and constant deterioration, instead of giving it a forward impulse towards that infinitely higher place which it might take among the component parts of the Indian Empire. I think that we have found a much abler man in Sooraj-ool-Moolk, and if he does not possess the energy and executive strength which will be required, the fault will be my own if I do not apply an immediate remedy to the evil, or report the case as so hopeless as to demand the direct intervention of the Government of India.

"The Nizam seems much pleased to see his country emancipated from the chains of the Minister, for he is fully sensible of the mischief occasioned by his maladministration, and would long ago have thrown off the yoke had he not feared us, and the danger he might incur by any endeavour to remove a man whom he supposed to be exclusively a creature and *protégé* of ours. He first began to acquire a little courage from the private interviews I had with him in the course of last year. But the old feeling has been so strong with him, that Sooraj-ool-Moolk, with whom I had another interview yesterday, stated that during his last visit to me the Nizam was in an agony of apprehension that the length of our conference implied some disposition

on my part to bring back Chundoo Lall into power; and that as soon as he returned to his own house, after his interview with me, His Highness sent him an emphatic message to inquire if 'all was well'.

"I cannot yet speak positively, but I think it likely, from what I perceive, that the Nizam will confer the office of Dewan upon Sooraj-ool-Moolk in the course of a short time. He has called for various papers, and as he is dissatisfied with the imperfect revenue memoranda furnished by the *dufturdars*,¹ I am myself preparing for him a clear and comprehensive tabular statement of the present revenue management and managers. I am assisted in this by Mr. Dighton, who has much ability and experience, and whom I should be happy to see more largely employed, and with a higher degree of executive power, in the revenue department. He is in the Nizam's service, and I conclude the Court of Directors would not deem it objectionable that his services should be rendered available in whatever manner they should be found most useful to His Highness's Government.

"The Nizam holds a Durbar to-day, in which he proposes to give orders on the important matter of proceeding immediately to investigate the pecuniary liabilities of the State. He very properly intends to discharge, in the first place, the claims of such troublesome and ill-disposed persons as he particularly desires to dis sever at once from their connection with the Circar, and of those who have *jaedads*, or assignments on the territorial revenue, which he is anxious to resume, so as to leave the talooks² free. Sooraj-ool-Moolk assures me that he has certain information of the revenue of some of the talooks having been forestalled for three years, or up to the Fuslee year 1256 inclusive.

"In my public letter to the Supreme Government of the 4th instant, I mentioned that secret reasons had been given to me for the Nizam's wishing to appoint Rajah Ram Buksh to the office of Peshcar. One of these reasons, which I did not wish to advert to more particularly in a public letter—as it would have been certain of transpiring through the channel of office writers—was that this person has assured the Nizam that his unlimited access to the *dufturs*, on his being nominated to that office, will enable him to prove against Bala Pershad, the Minister's son, the undue acquisition of no less than seven crores of rupees,³ obtained by corruption and exaction, and which Rajah Ram Buksh alleges to be now actually in the possession of Bala Pershad. This may be an exaggerated estimate, but Ram Buksh declares that he can prove its accuracy.

"The Nizam continues to send me the most friendly and compli-

¹ Record keepers.

² Districts.

³ About seven millions sterling—hardly credible, and not subsequently confirmed.

mentary messages, and I do not think he at all distrusts the sincerity of my assurances that I have nothing else in view but the welfare and improvement of his country. Your lordship may be surprised that I do not more frequently see him personally. There are two reasons for this. With the best possible disposition on His Highness's part, a visit to the Nizam is attended with much ceremony and inconvenience, and the observances required from the Resident on these occasions, which have been customary ever since our first connection with this Durbar, are of a description that I do not think quite consistent with his representative character in the now relative position of the Supreme Government and the Native States of India. I have never thought, however, of making these matters the subject of remonstrance, or by any proposed deviation from ancient usage to frighten the Nizam with the idea that I wish to diminish his dignity, and thus deter him from attending to affairs of much greater importance than outward forms and etiquette. The Minister has always done all in his power to keep the Nizam and the Resident apart, but I hope that more frequent and familiar intercourse may be gradually introduced.

"It will occur to your Lordship that I am presenting you only with crude and indefinite views. But it is difficult to avoid this appearance. We are now in a transition state here, amid much of confusion and uncertainty. Affairs will, by degrees, I hope, be reduced to order, and I shall then be able to offer a more clear and better defined sketch of our proceedings and prospects than I am as yet able to do.

"At the end of this month the Contingent will be six months in arrears, but I am putting myself forward as one, among other claimants, on His Highness's bounty, and have given in a memorandum of my wishes to have between nineteen and twenty lakhs of rupees for the Army, which will be due on the 30th instant, and about six lakhs on account of the arrears of Appa Dessaye's chout, and the family of Mohiput Ram, making a total of about twenty-six lakhs of rupees.

"I have the honour to be

"Your Lordship's most faithful and obedient servant,

"J. S. FRASER."

This was Lord Ellenborough's answer:—

"Barrackpore, September 19th, 1843.

"GENERAL,—I had the pleasure of receiving last night your letter of the 7th, communicating the cessation of your official intercourse with Chundoo Lall, and your general views upon Hyderabad affairs.

"I cannot but regret that Chundoo Lall was definitively put out of office before all arrangements had been made for the appointment of a successor of whom you approved, and for the payment of the more

pressing debts of the State, including the arrears due to the troops. Chundoo Lall having gone with your consent, I fear the chief hold upon the Nizam is gone too; and that, relieved from the incubus, he will trifle and delay, and do nothing in the way of reform.

"Your expectations that Sooraj-ool-Moolk will be made Chief Minister seem to be just; but I should have been more satisfied had he been actually appointed Minister at once.

"My opinion certainly is strongly in favour of most intimate communication between the British Resident and the Nizam and his Minister; and I should gladly see all matters of importance decided upon only with some previous concurrence.

"With respect to the Resident's interviews with the Nizam, I should think that private interviews at the Minister's house might possibly be substituted for public interviews, if there be, as you state, objectionable formalities attending the latter, but this must depend upon localities, and other matters of which I am ignorant, or the interviews might be put upon the footing on which they are at Lucknow, which cannot be one of *gêne*. In these things it is very easy to make a change if the Nizam be willing. If he be *not*, it is perhaps hardly worth while to press him—and certainly not worth while to do so while we have greater matters in hand. I shall be very glad to hear that you have got the arrears for the troops, and some other debts paid. This will be the true test of good intentions on the part of the Nizam.

"I have the honour to remain,

"Yours faithfully,

"ELLENBOROUGH."

It will be observed that something very like dissatisfaction is expressed by the Governor-General at the actual removal of Chundoo Lall from office, as brought about by the Resident's refusal to deal with him any longer. Permission had been given at the last possible moment, and with evident reluctance, for the acceptance of the old Minister's resignation, but General Fraser had been unable to extract from the Government of India that decided expression of its wishes on the subject, addressed directly by the Governor-General to the Nizam, which he recommended as the best means to move and encourage His Highness to dismiss Rajah Chundoo Lall. The Resident had even furnished the drafts of letters from the Governor-General to the Nizam and to the Minister, but these were not adopted in the council-chamber of Calcutta. No letter was to be sent to the Nizam on the subject, and no letter to Chundoo Lall until the fact of his actual retirement

was officially communicated. Everything was unfortunately done and left undone to promote those doubts as to the real wishes of our Government, which explain the course taken by the Nizam after the Minister had tendered his resignation.

In a private letter to Lord Ellenborough, dated the 27th October 1843, the Resident says :—"The mischievous and mercenary party who surround His Highness tell him the most incredible falsehoods ; and it is supposed here that much of his late hesitation in taking a decided part may be attributed to the delay which occurred in transmitting your Lordship's farewell note to the ex-Minister, which they succeeded in making the Nizam believe implied a reluctance on the part of the Supreme Government to accept of Chundoo Lall's resignation, and a consequent possibility that he might return to his former office."

Shortly after the Resident had established regular official intercourse with Sooraj-ool-Moolk, the Nizam declared his ability and willingness to afford the necessary aid to the Government from his private treasury. A crore of rupees was actually brought for that avowed purpose from the Fort of Goleonda, in addition to to which eighty lakhs of rupees in gold were also said to be available in the Palace at Hyderabad, while Sooraj-ool-Moolk held out hopes that orders would soon be given for the disbursement of these funds in reduction of arrears and debts. But still the days dragged on without any good result.

When General Fraser at last cut the Gordian knot by refusing any longer to recognise Chundoo Lall as Dewan, a warm letter of compliment and condolence was sent by the Governor-General to the ex-Minister, which, if it had been sent in due season, and in the measured terms suggested by the Resident, would have been efficacious, but which was now only calculated to strengthen the veteran intriguer in his last endeavour to maintain his influence at Court. He was unquestionably buoyed up by hints, and more or less accurate information he received, as to an official party at Calcutta which still believed in him as the best friend of British power at Hyderabad, and which connived at protracting the proceedings connected with his resignation until he could, at the least, arrange for the succession of his son, Rajah Bala Pershad.

Certain it is that the ex-Minister responded to the Governor-General's valedictory communication in a very remarkable manner.

On the 16th of November 1843, Lord Ellenborough received by post from Rajah Chundoo Lall the following extraordinary letter. The original was in Persian, but this is the official translation.

“From Maharajah Chundoo Lall Bahadoor to the Rt. Honble. the Governor-General.

“Dated 9 Shawwal 1259 H., corresponding with
30th October 1843.

“After compliments,—I have been honoured by the receipt of your Lordship's kind letter. Its contents have rejoiced me extremely, and have afforded me much encouragement. I cannot adequately express my feelings of gratitude for the kindness evinced towards me by your Lordship.

“I beg to inform your Lordship that there are two circumstances under which, on the general plea of bodily infirmity, I have considered it expedient to resign the office of Dewau—first, on account of several weighty matters which formerly happened, and in consequence of the agreement in Sir Charles Metcalfe's time, making a yearly reduction of thirty lakhs of rupees, whereby the State has been a loser to the amount of crores of rupees, and because no further loans can be procured to defray the current expenses of the Government. The second reason is that General Fraser and Captain Malcolm have entered into a plot with Sooraj-ool-Moolk for the purpose of ruining me.

“These gentlemen applied for a private audience with the Nizam, and being admitted into the presence, accused and spoke disparagingly of me, and recommended that Sooraj-ool-Moolk should be appointed Dewan in my room. To this advice the Nizam was pleased to make answer, ‘Chundoo Lall has now for many years been conducting the duties of Dewan. On what grounds should he be dismissed from his post, or why should Sooraj-ool-Moolk, a man who shows by his being in debt some twenty-three lakhs of rupees that he is incapable of managing his own private affairs, be considered able to discharge the duties of Dewan?’

“General Fraser and Captain Malcolm, on hearing these words, were silenced. They are, however, bent on my ruin, and I have, therefore, thought it better to tender my resignation. These gentleman have, furthermore, recommended my expulsion from Hyderabad; and to this recommendation the Nizam has been pleased to reply that ‘now that Chundoo Lall has voluntarily resigned, he remains in his own house; and on what ground should he be turned out of the city?’

“How can I adequately return thanks to His Highness for the kindness thus evinced in my behalf?

“Finally, General Fraser, acting under the instigation of Sooraj-ool-

Moolk, will listen to no representations of mine, but endeavours to incense the Nizam against me.

“(True translation) W. EDWARDS,
“Under Secretary of the Government of India.”

This letter was dated the 30th of October, and was received at Calcutta on the 16th of November. On the 5th of December 1843, Rajah Chundoo Lall's original letter was sent back by the Government of India to the Resident, with a request that it should be “returned to Rajah Chundoo Lall, and that he should be informed that no communication on the subject treated of in it can be recognised or received by his Lordship, unless forwarded in the usual and prescribed channel, through the Resident.”

General Fraser, in a letter dated the 24th of October, had pointed out to the Government of India the real nature of the obstacles that had so long existed to the proposed arrangements for a reformed administration at Hyderabad. Referring to the difficulty he found in persuading the Nizam to appoint a Dewan, “with a view to give immediate effect to arrangements for the future better government of His Highness's dominions”, he said:—

“I am not aware that he is decidedly and unchangeably opposed to this measure, but he seems to have been hitherto prevented from adopting it by some fear that Chundoo Lall's influence, and the protection he has usually met with from the British Government, might procure his restoration to office.”

In this letter, and in a private letter to Lord Ellenborough, the Resident pressed on the Governor-General's attention a subject referred to hereafter (pp. 199 and 307), which may well have given grounds for reflection and inquiry to the Governor-General in Council at that period, but which I purposely omit canvassing now for many reasons, of which some are identical with the suggestions of the following note just received from an old friend very conversant with the Hyderabad affairs of that period, and in whose judgment I have great confidence.

“London, 28th November, 1884.

“MY DEAR HASTINGS,—You ask me what effect the publication of the letters of 1843, connected with the subject your father mentioned

“Hyderabad, 28th October 1840.

“MY DEAR SIR,—I am much obliged by your kind communication of a copy of your letter to Colonel Sutherland on the affairs of Afghanistan. It is, I think, very useful that officers in political situations should be kept apprised, not only of the current incidents of the time, but also, in so far as may be convenient, of the general intentions and policy of the Government. This must tend more to effect a general union of purpose and an effective co-operation, than the simple issue of occasional orders and a blind obedience to them. The whole question of the extension of our arms towards the north-west is of immense importance, and one upon which no individual can form a correct opinion without such a knowledge of the ulterior views of Russia as I for one cannot pretend to possess. Letters which I received from one or two of the Directors soon after I came to Hyderabad expressed considerable and anxious apprehensions of the consequence of our passing the Indus. But in these I never participated, because, though personally unacquainted with the probable intentions and policy at that time of either Persia or Russia, I was quite sure that Lord Auckland possessed better information, and that he certainly had not without ample *connaissance de cause* given effect to measures which necessarily involved the risk of dangerous results, both proximate and remote.

“The late defeat of Dost Mahomed was a happy circumstance in reference not only to Afghanistan, but to the rest of India; and the Brigadier and troops by whom it was achieved deserve all our gratitude. I fear the interior much more than the exterior of India. The ultimate success of our arms in the field can never be doubtful against such enemies as we have now to contend with; but the slightest temporary check produces a reaction in the minds of our own subjects, which requires to be vigilantly observed, and is attended with perhaps the only real danger we have to dread. Major Clibborne’s defeat was a source of great exultation among certain parties at Hyderabad, and messages were sent by persons of high rank and consequence to the Nizam himself that our *Iqbāl*¹ was on the wane, and our *Dowlut*² departing. It gave me, therefore, great pleasure to be able to communicate to the Circar officially the intelligence of our victory over Dost Mahomed, which was received by the Nizam with expressions of satisfaction that I have no reason to believe feigned, and with an order for the immediate firing of a royal salute, which came most opportunely to quench the hopes of the disaffected who had been speculating on our downfall. They are so very ignorant, that they appear to have no more conception than children of the real nature and source of either our strength or weakness.

¹ Fortune.

² Dominion.

in public or private communications, to those passages in General Fraser's correspondence.

With reference to this peculiar incident, an old friend, who at that time held a high position on General Fraser's staff, writes to me as follows, in a note dated in March 1881 :—" About the money said to have been sent to Calcutta by Chundoo Lall, your father wrote Lord Ellenborough privately,—no answer. If my memory serves me right, it was the Nizam who drew your father's attention to it." * * * * *

"I have no doubt the Berar districts will be restored when the Nizam comes of age, as was done at a former accession, after Metcalfe's time. Without doubt it was Chundoo Lall who destroyed the finances of the State, and Salar Jung who set them right again."

For want of the decided and open support of the Governor-General, promptly and directly addressed to the Nizam, which General Fraser had repeatedly requested, the secret influence of Chundoo Lall still operated against measures of reform, and against the nomination of his successor. So long as the office of Dewan was left open, there was a chance of its falling to the ex-Minister's son. And meanwhile, nothing came from Calcutta but repeated reflections that it would have been better not to have got rid of such an able Minister as Chundoo Lall, until provision had been made for filling up his place, and for paying the public debts,—Chundoo Lall being in both cases the great obstacle, as the General had often explained. He protested against these reflections, and against the inaction of the Supreme Government, in a letter dated the 18th November 1843. After declaring the incapacity of Rajah Ram Buksh, his want of influence, and his avowed inability to act as Minister with the title of Peshcar, the letter continues thus :—

"Chundoo Lall has certainly possessed hitherto that power over the Nizam, which cunning and a grasping ambition, and the arts of intimidation might easily obtain over a Prince long under restraint, but to the possession of ability, in the correct or at least usual acceptation of that term, I cannot concede to him the slightest claim. He has possessed but the ability of maintaining himself in office for five-and-thirty years by an apparently subservient acquiescence to the wishes of the Resident at this Court, without ever really or seriously adopting one single measure of reform for the improvement of the Nizam's country, and by disbursing a great part of the revenues of the State among all persons who would sell themselves to the support of his views, and the

maintenance of that unlimited power he had contrived to acquire, but which has been rarely, if ever, employed to the only purpose for which it ought to have been possessed, that of ameliorating the condition of the country and its inhabitants.

"In the 7th paragraph of your letter now under acknowledgment, the regret of the Supreme Government is reiterated that the retirement of Chundoo Lall was assented to before sufficient arrangements were made for carrying on the future administration of the country.

"I have already had the honour of observing, and beg respectfully to repeat in a few words, why I assented to Chundoo Lall's retirement. His retirement was an essential point, the *sine quâ non* to the adoption of a single step towards the effecting of arrangements for the continuance of the government of the country. The Government had, in fact, ceased its functions. It was bankrupt, and had stopped payment. The Minister himself had acknowledged this, and his acknowledgment is on record. But while he remained vested with the authority and name of Dewan, and was supposed to be so strongly supported by us, that his final removal was an event rather to be wished for than anticipated, no arguments could induce the Nizam either to appoint another Dewan or a Peshcar, or to produce his private treasure.

"Under these circumstances I assented to his retirement, and the immediate consequences were the appointment of Sooraj-ool-Moolk as Vakeel, of Ram Bukhsh as Peshcar, of the transmission of a large amount of treasure from Golconda to the city, the issue of orders for the settlement of the Soucar accounts, and a few other matters that seemed to the Nizam most to require his attention.

"It is true that I expected he would appoint a Dewan. He subsequently informed me in a note, transmitted by me to the Supreme Government, that he considered the Peshcar, Ram Bukhsh, as vested with all the powers I required. But that note was, no doubt, written at the secret instigation of the creatures of the ex-Minister, for the purpose of preventing or deferring the appointment of Sooraj-ool-Moolk as Dewan, which would for ever have excluded the chance of Chundoo Lall's return to office, or of its devolving on his son, Bala Pershad.

"It was here that I wished the voice of the Governor-General to be heard, as I feel satisfied that it would at once have dispelled all the mischievous fears or other influences which were pressing on the Nizam, and would have led him to the policy we desired.

"The Supreme Government apprehend that the tone of language I recommended, and the letter which I proposed to be written to the Nizam, would have failed to produce their effect, unless we were determined to support by arms the line of policy we were pursuing.

"From this view of the case, with every respect for the superior

judgment of the Government of India, I entirely dissent. The measures proposed would, I am persuaded, have been amply sufficient; and I believe this is the concurrent idea of every respectable person at Hyderabad who, from his knowledge of local circumstances, is capable of forming a correct opinion on the subject.

"This is a weak and subdued Government. Its character is that of timidity and subserviency. Hesitation on our part might inspire the Circar for a moment with the semblance of boldness, and with a desire to escape control; but I have not the slightest apprehension that any protracted resistance would ever be offered to the expressed will and resolution of the Government of India.

"The Governor-General in Council anticipates from the present state of things at Hyderabad, increased mis-government, and all its consequent evils.

"I fully concur in this opinion, and find it difficult to imagine that the present system will exist for even a few months.

"The Nizam is rarely accessible even to those by whom he ought to be seen every day. Sooraj-ool-Moolk possesses no inherent authority; and the helplessness of the Peshcar, Ram Bukhs, I have sufficiently described. I believe that nothing but fear of being immediately coerced by our troops prevents disturbances in many parts of the Nizam's dominions.

"In reference to this part of the subject, and to the employment of the troops under my orders, I beg to transmit the copy of a note, and of its enclosures, which I lately received from Sooraj-ool-Moolk, and of my reply. This correspondence refers to a demand made upon me for the services of the Contingent at two separate places, and I shall be glad to be favoured with the instructions of the Supreme Government as to the correctness or otherwise of the principle by which I propose to be guided when called upon by the Nizam's Government for the services of the troops.

"I shall bear in mind the instructions conveyed in the 16th paragraph of your letter, "to insist, in terms not to be misunderstood, upon the punctual payment of the Army." I shall also endeavour, as I presume this will not be disapproved by the Government of India, to obtain the liquidation of the four or five months' arrears, usually due to the Contingent."

The authorities at Calcutta, the officials of the Secretariat, could see nothing worthy their attention but the pay of the Contingent. Lord Ellenborough saw the urgent need of large measures of reform in the Hyderabad State, but, in spite of all General Fraser's assurances, could not conceive the possibility of their being intro-

duced without some degree of military coercion. Such is the purport of the next letter.

“Barrackpore, February 27th, 1844.

“GENERAL,—I am quite aware of the inconvenience which would attend Captain Malcolm’s removal from Hyderabad, and unless in an extreme case, I should be very unwilling to desire him to join his Regiment in Scinde.

“With respect to the point to which the latter portion of your letter of the 15th instant relates, I can only draw your attention to the present demand for troops in Scinde, and to the necessity which exists, and must exist for some time, of vigilantly watching the Sutlej. I will never, if I can help it, undertake two things at the same time; and I will never, if I can help it, undertake anything without having at my disposal, in the event of force being required, so large an amount of force as may preclude all ordinary risk of failure.

“I know very well that the present state of affairs at Hyderabad is not what it ought to be. There is a great deal to do in the Nizam’s country, but I must now attend to more pressing demands upon me. I shall settle matters at Hyderabad and everywhere else *in time*, but I must have time and choose my own.

“I have the honour to remain, General,

“Yours very faithfully,

“ELLENBOROUGH.”

The Resident writes once more, privately, to the Governor-General, on the 15th February 1843, to the same effect as his public letters about that time.

“Nothing particular has occurred here since I last addressed the Supreme Government. A set of three or four vicious and corrupt intriguers, instigated and advised by the ex-Minister, Chundoo Lall, have got possession of the Nizam, and exercise over him a mischievous influence. It is impossible to say how long matters may go on in this way. In many respects they have been proceeding thus for thirty or forty years, with irregularity and anomaly on every side, and complaints from various parts of the country addressed to the Resident, which he has no other means of noticing than by simply telling the complainants that they must address themselves to the Nizam’s Government. This total want of arrangement and just administration may still, perhaps, be protracted for a considerable time; and, in fact, the present state of things does not seem much worse, and perhaps really is not so, than what we have been accustomed to for many years past. It is for your Lordship to determine whether it is either just to the

Nizam's subjects, or in conformity with the interests of India in general, that this state of things should be allowed to continue. The remedy for the evil, if it is to be corrected at all, rests with your Lordship. I have already taken the liberty of expressing my opinions on the subject to the Supreme Government, and I am now quietly awaiting either the result of events at Hyderabad, or further orders from Calcutta."

And here is an extract from what seems to be his last private letter to Lord Ellenborough, dated the 7th of May 1844.

"We remain here in much the same state as when I last addressed the Supreme Government. I am myself doing nothing, because without a Dewan, or my own possession of inherent authority, I could do nothing to any good purpose. My most important communications now with the Circar are the usual periodical ones for the purpose of obtaining the pay of the Army.

"The connection between the Nizam and the ex-Minister has, I believe, nearly ceased, or at least is not so intimate as formerly. There have been some warm scenes between them, and it is thought that the Minister no longer hopes to retrieve his lost power. Short of our own assumption of the country, and the conduct of its administration by British officers, I still perceive no other chance of improvement but the appointment of a Minister who would act in real, not fictitious, co-operation with the views of the British Government expressed by their Resident here. I think, too, that this is the opinion which is entertained by every respectable native at Hyderabad without exception. General, or rather universal, opinion points to Sooraj-ool-Moolk as the Dewan. I do not hear the name of any other person advocated, or hinted at."

Lord Ellenborough's removal from the office of Governor-General was announced to General Fraser in the following letter from the Foreign Secretary, Mr. (afterwards Sir Frederick) Currie.¹

"Calcutta, June 19th, 1844.

"MY DEAR SIR,—By to-day's *Gazette* you will see that the Court of Directors have removed Lord Ellenborough from the office of Governor-General of India. By Monday's post you will receive the copy of a brief circular to Political officers in important positions, impressing upon them that they are not to consider this measure as indicative of any change in the policy of the Government, more especially as respects

¹ Subsequently Resident at Lahore, Member of the Supreme Council, and Member of the Secretary of State's Council.

its foreign relations; and that they are not to allow such a notion to be entertained by others.

"Sir Henry Hardinge is on his way out; he will be here by the middle of next month; he comes out fully prepared to continue Lord Ellenborough's policy, and to carry out his views. In the meantime, all is to be carried on in the spirit of the instructions that have been hitherto issued.

"Lord Ellenborough was prepared for this—not so the world in general; it has made a great stir in Calcutta.

"Believe me, my dear Sir,

"Yours faithfully,

"F. CURRIE.

"P.S.—The guns are at this moment firing Mr. Bird into his officiating appointment."

Mr. William Wilberforce Bird, the Senior Member of Council, was Governor-General until the arrival of Sir Henry Hardinge.

About the same time—the letter is not dated—he had received the following valedictory communication from his old friend, Charles May Lushington, then about to leave Madras for England, having retired on a pension at the end of his five years' term as Member of Council.

"MY DEAR FRASER,—If you have any commissions get them ready,—we are off in the *True Briton* on the 28th,—and if I do not execute them to your satisfaction 'I am a soused gurnet,' be they what they may. You are almost the only true, old and valued friend I leave in India, where I have been so long as almost to have worn out three sets of acquaintances.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

"C. M. LUSHINGTON."

CHAPTER VI.

Finances of Hyderabad but little improved in 1845—Minister not appointed—Contingent more deeply in arrears—Sir Henry Hardinge's Letter of Warning to the Nizam—Refractory Zemindars—Sooraj-ool-Moolk granted full powers as Minister—His memorial Letter unanswered—The Resident's Remonstrances badly received at Calcutta—Letters to two Directors—Visit of Commander-in-Chief—Lord Hardinge's departure.

THE hopes that had prevailed just before Lord Ellenborough's departure of a great improvement in the finances of the Hyderabad State, were very imperfectly realised in the first year after Lord Hardinge's arrival. The Nizam still showed strange reluctance to appoint a Minister with full powers, a reluctance quite unaccountable except as an unwonted feeling of relief from the absolute domination of Chundoo Lall, and an unwillingness to run the risk of falling into similar thralldom under a new Dewan. His Highness may possibly not have wished any one of his servants to acquire too soon the confidence and support of the British Government, or to learn reliance on the Resident rather than on the Sovereign. Having hitherto been debarred from taking any real share in executive government, he may naturally have somewhat overrated his own capacity for personally directing the course of administration. The error was very natural. In June 1845, the Resident writes:—"Rajah Ram Buksh, the Peshcar, has not been able to provide for the payment of the Contingent, without allowing it to fall more than four months in arrears, as despatches from me will have informed you, and his pecuniary difficulties will inevitably increase, instead of diminishing.

"It is true that the Nizam has disbursed, as he alleges, about a crore and twenty lakhs of rupees from his personal treasury, in payment of certain creditors of the State; but whether the dis-

bursement of this large amount has been done in a judicious manner or not I cannot at present say."

In April 1845, just eighteen months after his retirement, Rajah Chundoo Lall died, but the appointment of his successor was still delayed.

Further advances from the British treasury having become necessary, to prevent the men of the Contingent from suffering extreme distress, General Fraser was instructed that although the Government of India had no wish "to treat the Nizam with anything like rigour," His Highness must be made aware that when "a fair time for the repayment of advances" had elapsed, the prescribed terms of obtaining territorial security would be enforced. At the same time the Governor-General addressed the Nizam the following letter.

"From the Governor-General of India to His Highness the
Nizam of Hyderabad.

"Dated, Fort William, 11th April 1845.

"After compliments,—In addressing Your Highness as one of the most steadfast Allies of the British Government, I should have been most happy if my duty would have permitted this letter to have contained solely those assurances of regard and friendship which Your Highness's estimable personal qualities are so well calculated to inspire.

"I should, however, not fulfil the obligations which the public interests impose upon me, nor be a sincere adviser of Your Highness, if on this occasion of addressing you I were to conceal the important fact that the state of Your Highness's financial affairs is such as to give rise in my mind to the most serious and anxious reflections.

"I cannot give Your Highness a stronger proof of my confidence and solicitude than by frankly disclosing the grounds on which I have arrived at this conclusion.

"For a considerable length of time Your Highness's financial difficulties have increased to such a degree of distress that the payment of the troops has been frequently in arrears, and retrenchments in the Military and other expenditure, admitted to be indispensable for the relief of this financial pressure, cannot be made because there are no means of paying off the very heavy arrears which are due.

"Your Highness's own dignity and happiness are so interwoven with the welfare of your subjects; and the British Government, exercising the Paramount Power of the Indian Empire, is so deeply concerned in the prosperity and contentment of the people at large; that in the

event of this state of things leading to serious and unhappy consequences, the British Government will not consent to put down by force of arms, troubles and opposition to Your Highness's authority, manifestly caused by the oppression under which the people suffer, in consequence of the maladministration of Your Highness's dominions. I have also to draw Your Highness's attention to one subject which no longer admits of delay.

"I cannot permit that the troops of the Contingent, commanded by British officers, shall at any time remain more than four months in arrears of their pay. I have therefore directed the Resident, if any future failure in paying these troops should occur, to advance, on account of the British Government, the sums which may be necessary for this purpose, and to explain clearly in writing to Your Highness the terms required for the repayment.

"This aid may enable Your Highness to put a stop to the irregularities which have occurred in the payment of the Contingent; but as regards the disorganised state of the finances generally, consequent upon the maladministration of affairs, and the injurious effects produced upon the prosperity of Your Highness's subjects, I trust that Your Highness will adopt the resolution of extricating yourself from this state of distress by exercising the utmost prudence, vigour and economy in the conduct of affairs.

"I cannot give Your Highness a stronger proof of regard than by frankly declaring the truth, and of giving to Your Highness timely notice of the consequences which will follow if this friendly warning be disregarded.

"In conclusion, etc., etc.,

"H. HARDINGE."

During the rest of 1845, and the early months of the next year, the attention of the Governor-General may well have been absorbed in the Sikh war, memorable for the battles of Moodkee, Ferozshah, and Sohraon, with the preparations preceding and the negotiations that followed that arduous campaign, in which, it may be remembered, Sir Henry Hardinge chivalrously assumed a secondary position in the field under the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Gough.

In June 1846, just a year after the Governor-General had given his "friendly warning" as to the pay of the Contingent, the Nizam was testifying to the great value he set upon that Force by applying for its services in order to coerce five refractory Zemindars, who were accused of entertaining bands of Rohillas and of plundering the country. The Resident was obliged on this occa-

sion to remind Sooraj-ool-Moolk, still acting as Wakeel to the Nizam, without the full powers of Minister, that "the troops of the Contingent being, as usual, four months in arrears, His Highness will of course be aware that they could not reasonably be expected to move upon the service now in contemplation without a month's pay in advance beyond their ordinary and current payment, which, in the event of the movement being at all a general one, will amount to about three lakhs of rupees".

General Fraser also summoned each of the accused Zemindars—of course in communication with Sooraj-ool-Moolk—to appear and answer to the charge made against him. British passports were furnished to them all by way of safeguard, and sanctuary promised, during the inquiry, within the precincts of the Residency. At the same time, the Resident distinctly apprized the Nizam that he would have "nothing to do with the expulsion of the bands of Rohillas", a matter with which the alleged misconduct of the Zemindars was complicated, "until the whole of their claims had been previously investigated and adjusted".

This was done, as in all similar cases, in accordance with the established custom that the troops of the Contingent should never be moved against any rebel or defaulter on the requisition of the Nizam's Government "until the reality of the offence had been ascertained". This rule was adopted in harmony, and in the same terms, with Article 17 of the Treaty of 1800, applicable to the Subsidiary Force, and was evidently calculated to operate as a most salutary check on arbitrary or oppressive administration. The subsequent proceedings led to the peaceable submission of all the refractory chiefs except one, who was brought to obedience, without actual bloodshed, by the appearance of a detachment of troops in his neighbourhood.

In reporting the settlement of these troublesome affairs in September 1846 to the Government of India, General Fraser begged "to renew the recommendation he had offered in the year 1843 that the Supreme Government should urge the Nizam to the immediate appointment of an able and efficient Dewan".

"I explained", continued the Resident, "at the time above alluded to, that we had an undoubted right to do this, derived from the promise of the Nizam himself that he would appoint a Minister immediately on the removal of Chundoo Lall from office,

and without which promise I should not have assented to the proposed measure of accepting his proffered resignation.

"My recommendations to this effect were as strongly urged as was in my power, but they were not acceded to by the Supreme Government, in consequence, I believe, principally of its attention being then occupied by foreign wars, and other considerations deemed more pressing than the affairs of Hyderabad. But peace now prevailing generally in India, and the state of the Nizam's country becoming worse every day instead of better, I again beg to bring to the notice of the Right Honourable the Governor-General the expediency of our requiring from the Nizam the appointment of a Minister able to govern the country, and to rescue it from the impending bankruptcy and ruin with which it is threatened.

"The time, too, has, I think, arrived when we should demand from the Nizam security for the repayment of the thirty-eight lakhs of rupees he is indebted to us, besides four months' arrears of pay, a standing debt due to the Contingent, for the ultimate payment of which by the Nizam we are responsible."

A direct exhortation came from Calcutta, in response to the Resident's frequent suggestions, in the form of a letter from the Governor-General to the Nizam, dated the 7th of September 1846, strongly urging the immediate appointment of a Minister, and concluding with the following sentence:—

"The large debt due by your Highness to the British Government on account of advances made for the payment of your Highness's Army is a serious matter, and I have given the Resident instructions as to the communication I desire should be made to your Highness on this important subject."

Even at this period, although General Fraser had never given the least hint that he felt himself deficient in material strength on the spot, the same unhappy impression seemed to prevail at Calcutta, that serious pressure could not effectively be brought to bear upon the Nizam, nor large measures of reform undertaken, without the support of actual menace or military demonstration. The Resident was told that "military operations on a large scale during the ensuing cold season in the Deccan would be very inconvenient. A portion of the Madras Army has been detached to the Saugor and Nerbudda territories, and cannot at

present be spared. A great part of the Bombay Army is in Scinde ; and the Bengal Army, with a large British garrison at Lahore, and with its disposable force concentrated on the North-West frontier, is not in a condition without inconvenience to detach a force to the Nizam's frontier."

Fortified by the Governor-General's letter to the Nizam, the Resident now took up the matter of reformed administration with vigour, and as the result of several personal interviews with His Highness, full powers were at last conferred on the Nawab Sooraj-ool-Moolk on the 2nd of November 1846.

On the 9th of October the Resident had addressed a long and well-reasoned letter in Persian to Sooraj-ool-Moolk, intended for the Nizam's perusal, a few extracts from which will give an idea of the peculiar arguments that had to be met before the appointment of a Dewan was finally settled. It was urged in the Durbar that Rajah Chundoo Lall had never actually been installed as Dewan, he having been originally appointed Peshcar, and deputy to Mooneer-ool-Moolk, the titular Dewan, who, by special stipulation, took no active part in affairs, and that even on the death of that nobleman no change was made in Chundoo Lall's title. The Resident said in reply :—

"The deceased Minister, Maharaja Chundoo Lall, may not have had the official designation of Dewan, but he had the full and unlimited powers of a Dewan, and exercised all the functions of that office. He was always designated by the British Government as "the Minister", a word which in the English language is synonymous with Dewan, and his capacity and firmness of purpose were sufficient to render unnecessary any higher appellation than that of Peshcar in his relations to the Nizam's Government and His Highness's subjects.

"The disturbances of Lahore and Gwalior cannot be ascribed to the fact of there having been Dewans attached to those States, though they, perhaps, may be partially due to the Dewans being incapable and unsuitable for the time.

"His Highness, it is true, has exercised executive rule over this country for three years, and has disbursed two crores of rupees from his private treasury ; but His Highness must pardon me for saying that, with the kindest and most benevolent intentions, he has not succeeded in putting a stop to the sources of disorder and dissension in every part of His Highness's dominions. With respect to the employment of the two crores of rupees, I almost fear to make a remark, but I have never

yet learned in what manner that great sum has been appropriated, or what advantage to the State has arisen from its disbursement.

"No one is more desirous than myself to do what may be agreeable to His Highness, but I should be acting as his bitterest enemy rather than his warmest friend, if I led him to anticipate success from any other arrangement whatever than the immediate appointment of an able, faithful and efficient Dewan, in conformity with the Governor-General's wish.

"The accumulation of debt, and the existence of disorder generally throughout the country, which have prevailed during forty years, may possibly be attributed, as His Highness observes, to Maharaja Chundoo Lall; but if so, it was to the existence of errors and faults on his part, not to the simple fact of his being possessed of the powers of Dewan.

"The appointment of a Dewan is the preliminary step which must precede any other or more general arrangement for the future better regulation of the affairs of the State."

At an interview which took place on the 2nd of November 1846, those present being, besides the Nizam himself, his confidential secretary, Rusheed-ool-Moolk, Shuuns-ool-Oomra (a nobleman of the highest rank, closely allied with the reigning family), Rajah Ram Buksh the Peshcar, and Sooraj-ool-Moolk, the immediate question being the appointment of the last-mentioned to the office of Dewan, General Fraser, observing that the Nizam still hesitated, did all that was in his power to dispel certain misgivings which he knew had prevented the decisive step being taken.

"As I had been informed that evil advisers had laboured to poison His Highness's mind regarding Sooraj-ool-Moolk, and to induce him to imagine that my object in proposing his appointment—if eventually I should do so at all—was to give him an opportunity of ultimately surrendering the country to the British Government, I took occasion to observe to His Highness that he must be aware that the insinuation was utterly false and groundless; and that in the event of Sooraj-ool-Moolk being invested with the office of Dewan, if ever he forgot that his first duty was to his Sovereign, and that the primary object of his future life was to be that of maintaining intact the honour and independence of his country, I should myself be the first to denounce and abandon him."

The decisive effect in inducing the Nizam to nominate a Dewan produced by Lord Hardinge's letter to His Highness, proved how sound was the Resident's unavailing requisition, repeatedly made to Lord Ellenborough, for the transmission of a letter of that pur-

port, and how just was the Resident's complaint, that three years had been lost by the delay. "The Nizam has acquainted Sooraj-ool-Moolk in private", wrote General Fraser in November 1846, "that with regard to the appointment of a Dewan he was waiting only until I should myself bring forward the subject, and propose the name of a person whom I considered capable of fulfilling the duties of the office."

"This increases the very deep regret I cannot but entertain, that the Supreme Government declined the recommendation which I took the liberty of offering three years ago, and which, for the numerous reasons explained by me, I considered so extremely desirable.

"One of the most prominent of these reasons was, that the influence of Rajah Chundoo Lall was then supposed to be still supreme in the palace—an influence which you remark has been removed by his death. His influence at that time was of the most mischievous nature, being directed not to the good of the country, but solely to the possible fulfilment of his own hopes of recovering his lost office. It was with this object in view that he did everything in his power to blacken the character of Sooraj-ool-Moolk in the estimation of the Nizam, and to throw obstacles in the way of his nomination.

"The removal of this dangerous influence was my particular object when I recommended to Lord Ellenborough, in both my official and demi-official communications, to insist promptly and decidedly upon the appointment of an efficient Dewan in succession to Chundoo Lall.

"I do not presume to place my judgment in opposition to that of the Supreme Government, but I must acknowledge that I never understood the policy then adopted, of which the result has certainly been an increase of the debts of the State, and the loss of three years, which might have been devoted to the improvement of the country."

In the same letter, General Fraser brings up again the question of measures to be taken for the gradual reduction of the number of foreign Arabs employed in the Nizam's military service, "his views on which point", he observed, "were entirely at variance with those taken by the Supreme Government."

"I allude to the removal of the Arabs from this country, not to their forcible expulsion, a measure which it is not in my recollection that I ever contemplated. Force could never have been, nor will be, necessary, as the commands of the Nizam's Government, and the payment of their just demands, will be quite sufficient to induce the Arabs to withdraw quietly.

"The expression that has been used of Arab 'colonies' was never

less applicable than to the foreign Arabs in the Nizam's country, and it is only this class whose removal I ever thought desirable or intended to propose. So far from colonising, the great mass of these men are in constant movement backwards and forwards between India and Arabia. Their Jemadars and Chieftains usually remain here, and by means of the common soldiery, their devoted adherents, whose attachment and unbounded obedience are secured by their high pay, their privileges, and an almost unbounded license of conduct, they have gradually assumed a mastery in many quarters of the City and districts of the land.

"I consider the removal of all the foreign mercenaries now in this country, and especially the Arabs, an indispensable step in the restoration of order; and as the present Dewan entertains, I believe, precisely the same opinion on this subject, I beg to be permitted to express a hope that the Governor-General will not oppose the gradual execution of the measure.

"I may safely take upon myself the responsibility, assuring his Lordship that no military operations will be necessary with this view. The measure will be carried out gradually, in such a way as to render it perfectly safe, and with every due regard to the just demands of the Arabs, and the satisfaction of all their reasonable claims."

It is eminently worthy of notice that in complete harmony with the character of the negotiations carried on by Rusheed-ool-Moolk with reference to the retirement of Chundoo Lall,¹ before the appointment of Sooraj-ool-Moolk was settled, there was a constant endeavour on the part of the Hyderabad Durbar to make the nomination of that nobleman proceed from the Residency, or at least to extract from General Fraser a distinct avowal that Sooraj-ool-Moolk was the person whom the British Government would prefer, and in whom it placed the highest confidence. His Highness the Nizam, in a letter to Lord Hardinge dated the 12th November 1846, thus describes his grant of the office of Dewan to Sooraj-ool-Moolk during the interview with General Fraser on the 2nd of that month.²

"I said to that undoubted well-wisher of the nobles of this Court, Major-General James Stuart Fraser Bahadoor, 'Whom do you consider qualified for the appointment of Dewan?' This undoubted well-wisher spoke highly of the capacity of that exalted in dignity and rank, that receptacle of courage and excellence, that faithful and wise servant, Sooraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor, as adapting him for that office. I, there-

¹ *Ante*, p. 189.

² *Ante*, p. 210.

fore, having assented to this, and considering it proper, have elevated the aforesaid Bahadoor to the dignity of Madar-ool-Muham,¹ and have removed the Rajah Ram Buksh Bahadoor, who was in office. Of a certainty, the aforesaid Bahadoor, taking into consideration the extent of my kindness, will always remain faithful, obedient, and submissive to me, and will cause the friendship between the two Governments to increase, and strive by every means in his power to promote the welfare and interests of this Government and the peace and prosperity of its subjects."

On several occasions previous to the installation of Sooraj-ool-Moolk, General Fraser had observed, in the course of conversation with the Nizam, that the allowance hitherto given to the Dewan or Chief Minister, of one anna in the rupee, or one-sixteenth of the gross revenue collected, was an excessive and unreasonable remuneration, and such as the finances of the country could not afford. Although His Highness at the time made no observation except that such was the ancient custom, the Resident's advice was effectual, for, on the appointment of Sooraj-ool-Moolk, the Nizam fixed his salary at 25,000 rupees per mensem, and notified to the General that this reduction had been made. This very large salary, which, as reduced, was rather larger than that of the Viceroy of India, was not, as General Fraser explained, so inordinate as it might appear, since it was required to cover many charges and expenses for the maintenance of the Minister's dignity and authority that might well be considered indispensable and of public importance.

The Government of India did not fail to take notice of the Nizam's apparent wish to record a sort of imputation that the new Dewan, Sooraj-ool-Moolk, was our nominee, and that the late arrangement was due to our dictation. "In His Highness's khureeta", observes the Governor-General, "the suggestions of the Resident with regard to Shums-ool-Oomra and Sooraj-ool-Moolk are somewhat prominently stated." Lord Hardinge's reply was, therefore, advisedly so worded as to fix the transaction on His Highness, adopted by the advice of the British Government. Undoubtedly, if the late arrangement had been considered as forced upon the Nizam by British interference, the difficulties of Sooraj-ool-Moolk would have been much increased; and in the

¹ Dewan or Minister.

event of the failure of his administration, the Nizam would have been able to attribute some part of his embarrassments to the agency.

Chiefly in consequence, no doubt, of the engrossing urgency of Punjaub affairs, before and after the Sutlej campaign, the Resident received few private letters from the Governor-General, and such attention as was given to Hyderabad affairs at headquarters appears, from internal evidence afforded by the official documents to have been given more by the Members of Council and Secretaries than by Lord Hardinge himself. Here is one letter of the period from the Governor-General:—

“ Simla, August 23rd, 1847.

“ MY DEAR SIR,—I have received your letter of the 22nd July, relating to Captain Newbold. If, as I hope, I can do anything this autumn for Captain Newbold, the nephew of a most distinguished officer of the Bombay Army, I shall have much pleasure in leaving the selection of his successor to you, but in these days of reduction I am anxious to avoid making any augmentation involving expense. Captain Newbold seems to be an officer of merit, and of great personal energy. I return his letter.

“ I move from Simla the end of October, so as to be at Cawnpore the first week in November, and thence by Lucknow to Calcutta.

“ On this frontier everything is perfectly quiet. The Maha-Ranee behaving ill at Lahore in every respect: and as the Boy² is now past eight years of age, I must separate him from the evil example and tuition of such a mother.

“ I am, my dear General,

“ Yours very faithfully,

“ HARDINGE.”

The period immediately following the installation of Sooraj-o-Moolk as Minister, after much persuasion and pressure from the Resident, was, of course, a period in which the clear and manifest approbation of the Supreme Government of India to the early measures of reform and economy attempted by the new Administration would have been invaluable, and was, indeed, almost indispensable to give it a fair chance of success. Some expressions of marked approval and sympathy, some words of hearty encouragement, and some promise of support, in a form that could be appropriately communicated to the Durbar, was earnestly solicited

¹ The Maharajah Dhuleep Singh.

by the Resident, and anxiously expected both by him and the Dewan. Only by thus making it known in the circles where intrigue and rivalry prevailed, that the new Minister would be at least as warmly sustained by the Supreme Government as Chundloo Lall had been, could the opposing forces begotten by forty years of corruption be kept within bounds, and prevented from thwarting every beneficial innovation. But partly by the settled practice of the Calcutta authorities, partly by an accident, negligently and tardily treated at headquarters, no such message of goodwill and approval came in good time to help the Resident and the Minister in their earliest and most critical proceedings.

The Nawab Sooraj-ool-Moolk had been appointed Minister on the 7th of November 1846, and in conformity with precedent had addressed a *khurecta*, or letter of ceremony, to the Governor-General, announcing his appointment. To this no reply was vouchsafed, and no explanation of the apparent breach of etiquette was given. This omission, as General Fraser urged in a letter dated 11th July 1847, soon became "publicly known, and was most detrimental to the Minister"; for, as the Resident went on to explain, "this Durbar narrowly watches for signs of approval or disapproval by the Government of India, and has drawn an unfavourable augury from the withholding of the usual compliments on Sooraj-ool-Moolk's installation." "Moreover", added the Resident,—

"Any obvious want of support and countenance on the part of the British Government is likely to be more especially injurious to him in his financial transactions with Soucars; as the least apparent instability in the office he holds, and any apprehension, either of his removal, or of his being forced by circumstances to resign, would naturally render those persons cautious of engaging in financial operations under a Government like this, where it by no means follows that each Administration takes upon itself the responsibility of the conduct and acts of that which has preceded it."

In August 1847, just eight months after the date of Sooraj-ool-Moolk's *khurecta*, came the explanation, in a despatch dated the 4th of that month, of the delay in acknowledging and answering that complimentary address. The reasons given may be considered as perfectly sound and sufficient, and if they had been promptly and privately communicated to the Resident, the style and terms

of the Minister's epistle, to which exception was taken, could easily have been modified, the original withdrawn, and a corrected form substituted. But the substantial mischief was done by delay, and the long delay prevented the formal rectification. This is what the Government wrote on the subject:—

“The reasons for withholding this compliment were not personal to the Dewan, although it was considered that the style of address to the Governor-General, of whom he declares himself ‘*the friend and well-wisher*’, was not quite befitting the station occupied by the writer. The circumstances of India have greatly altered since his predecessor, Meer Allum, received the address forty years ago, which is now cited as a precedent; and the relative position of the Governor-General of India and the Minister of Hyderabad renders it no longer advisable that the representative of the British Government should be addressed in terms approaching equality by the Minister of a protected and subsidised State.”

With singular inaccuracy, the Hyderabad State is here said to be “subsidised”, when, in fact, it had never received any subsidy, though it did for many years receive tribute from the East India Company, but had always paid for a Subsidiary Force, so that our Government was the “subsidised State”. But with this exception the political argument of the despatch is quite reasonable, and had already been admitted by the Hyderabad State, and acted upon in 1829 at the accession of the Nizam Nasir-ood-Dowla, who was still on the throne in 1846. Up to his installation, in consequence of the independent sovereignty of the Nizam and the tributary relations of the East India Company, dating from their earliest connection, the Governor-General had styled himself “*nizāzmunī*”, or “petitioner”, in his correspondence, while the ruler of Hyderabad adopted the term “*ma bu Dowlat*”, or “our royalty”.¹ These terms were very properly changed at this convenient opportunity into terms of perfect equality, and there can be no doubt that at the same time a more appropriate style of correspondence for the Dewan ought to have been settled. Owing to the fact, however, that Rajah Chundoo Lall, though vested with full powers, had

¹ During the reign of Secunder Jah, it was proposed to give the style of “Royal Highness” to the Nizam, and considering that this is allowed to a Grand Duke in Europe, it would not be an unreasonable distinction for the Sovereign ruler of ten millions of subjects.

never received the patent of Dewan, and had, therefore, never assumed any higher dignity than that of Peshcar, this was overlooked. The rectification could easily have been made, and the matter placed on a right footing, if a demi-official communication had been made to the Resident when the objection first arose; but the mistake, with mischievous consequences, was made of neither offering nor demanding any explanation, and leaving the Minister's letter for more than half a year unnoticed.

General Fraser's painful experience throughout his long occupancy of the post of Resident was, as in this instance, that, except where the pay and permanence of the Contingent were involved, the Government of India could not be roused to take any interest in Hyderabad affairs, or to give any serious aid, even by its counsels, to the internal reform of that important State.

The Government of India apparently disbelieved in its own moral influence, hankered after material force, and, in spite of General Fraser's assurances that force was not the remedy required, avowedly waited for leisure and opportunity to intimidate or to coerce. "The Punjaub is in commotion,"—"we are really not ready to act,"—"one thing at a time,"—such, as will have been seen, was the staple of the objections made to the Resident's proposals for opportune admonition, or for prompt support and encouragement, in the form of letters from the Governor-General to the Nizam, or to his newly-appointed Minister. But not only was there this hesitation to resort to distinct and specific acts of persuasion and advice at the proper moment, so that several inestimable opportunities were thrown away,—not only were the pay of the Contingent, and any method for securing it, the only points on which a lively interest was manifested at Calcutta,—but the means, both administrative and personal, for the improvement of the Hyderabad State and country, devised and sought out by General Fraser, were usually neglected until it was too late, or were absolutely rejected.

For example, although the Nizam, his Minister, and his confidential advisers, had the greatest aversion to anything like the actual supersession of His Highness's rule by European administration, even in the mitigated form of Assistants or Superintendents, responsible only to the Resident, as established for some years by Sir Charles Metcalfe, they had no rooted prejudice

against the employment of English gentlemen in positions of authority and trust, so long as they were distinctly servants of the Hyderabad State, and only informally connected with the Residency. The special qualifications of English engineers and experts in various departments had always been recognised under the Nizam's Government, as in the present day; and in such matters the advice of a Resident who, like General Fraser, had made himself personally popular, and had gained the confidence of the Durbar, was, within the limits just mentioned, almost conclusive. From the time that General Fraser had taken charge of the Residency in 1838, he had always derived much information as to Hyderabad affairs, the mode of administration, and the condition of the people, from Mr. Henry Dighton, a gentleman who had been engaged in banking and mercantile pursuits in the Nizam's dominions for more than twenty years, was a proficient in the Persian and Hindustani languages, and enjoyed the respect and esteem of all classes, both English and Native. Mr. Dighton, the son of a General Officer in the Bengal Army, well bred and well connected, had always been well received at the Residency. He had come originally to Hyderabad as an assistant in the house of Palmer and Co., but left them before their controversy with Sir Charles Metcalfe began, and set up in business on his own account. He had frequently been employed by the Nizam's Government in special offices and contracts, and was thoroughly acquainted with the revenue system and the various tenures of land. In his despatches and private letters to headquarters, General Fraser had frequently mentioned his confidence in Mr. Dighton, and his obligations to that gentleman for timely and useful intelligence. In the projected reorganisation of the revenue, police, and judicial system, the General was extremely desirous, with the full concurrence of Sooraj-ool-Moolk and the Nizam, that the Hyderabad State should have the great advantages of Mr. Dighton's services.

Under Article VI of the Treaty of 1798, "no Europeans whatever" were to "be admitted into the service of the State, or permitted to remain within its territories, without the knowledge and consent of the Company's Government." By virtue of this Article, the Government of India was empowered to forbid the employment of Mr. Dighton as Zillahdar, or Commissioner of one of the Nizam's provinces, and the appointment was forbidden. The

Resident had hoped that, with his advice and support, and under Mr. Dighton's management, this one province might become a model for the reform of the whole country. By the refusal to sanction this experiment, the whole scheme of reform was unhinged, and the influence and authority both of the Minister and the Resident were grievously shaken, from their obvious inability to command the support of the Government of India.

Of course, the reasons given for this refusal in despatches from Calcutta were plausible enough, and in conformity with precedent, but their insufficiency must surely be clear in presence of the fact that the Sovereign, the Minister, and the British Resident were all of one accord as to the expediency of employing Mr. Dighton. It may here be mentioned that eventually Mr. Dighton was employed, with the sanction of the next Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie. When the ostentatious, undeviating, and indiscriminate support of Chundoo Lall for more than thirty years is considered, the following plea for not openly supporting Sooraj-ool-Moolk can hardly appear sound or consistent.

"The Governor-General will at all times be ready to give his cordial support to an upright Minister, but you are aware that it is not politic to make too public a display of partiality or protection towards the Minister of a Native Prince. The Nawab Sooraj-ool-Moolk has himself declared to you that the artifice used by his opponent to dissuade the Nizam from appointing him to be the Dewan, was by insinuating that he had no other object in view than to introduce English institutions into the country; and his Lordship desires that you will bear in mind the principle already laid down by my predecessor, and that you will be cautious not to alarm the suspicions of the Nizam by your appearing to be the author, and his Minister the instrument, of great innovations in His Highness's territories, and more especially as the Dewan owes his appointment to your recommendation."

Here is, in fact, a prohibition against the use of British influence for the promotion of reforms. Sooraj-ool-Moolk's "opponent" was dead; his "artifices" had been exposed; the Nizam's "suspicions", far from being "alarmed", were set at rest. All this was the laborious result of General Fraser's patience, tact, and judgment, and he was forbidden to turn it to account for the benefit of the Hyderabad State and of a people numbering more than ten millions.

"The same observation applies with equal force to your advocacy of Mr. Dighton's merits, your urging his appointment to be the Zillahdar

of a large district, and your recommending the Governor-General to reconsider the orders he has given respecting Mr. Dighton's exclusion from employment. His Lordship has no reason whatever to doubt that Mr. Dighton is all that you represent him to be, and a gentleman whom, under ordinary circumstances, it would be expedient to invest with large authority in the Nizam's territories; but there exists on the records of Government a distinct order against his employment, not directed personally against him, but applicable to any other British subject similarly situated; and even if this order did not exist, his intimacy at the Residency would be an obvious objection, a sufficient bar to his employment in a situation under the Dewan, and still more so in the highly responsible situation which it was proposed to confer upon Mr. Dighton.

"These allegations of intimacy, which his Lordship hesitated to receive as perfectly true, have now been confirmed by your own admission, and by your earnest appeal on behalf of Mr. Dighton."

How General Fraser could be justified in recommending for a responsible and important situation any person beyond the official circle with whom he was *not* intimately acquainted, is not by any means clear. Mr. Dighton's intimacy at the Resident's house meant that he was a gentleman by birth, manners, and education, and that his character was unimpeachable.

The despatch concluded with the following complimentary remarks, which, including as they did a reiterated rejection of all interference with the Nizam's administration except in what was evidently suggested would be some extreme crisis demanding military coercion, can hardly have been satisfactory to the Resident.

"The Governor-General desires that you will adhere to the instructions in which you are informed that if the interference of the British Government shall be imperatively required, you will receive your instructions from the Government. His Lordship is confident that in carrying into effect a line of policy which confessedly has its difficulties, from the peculiar nature of our Treaties with the Nizam, that its execution cannot be entrusted to abler hands than yours, his Lordship having had the satisfaction on various occasions of expressing his approbation of your conduct under circumstances which called for the exercise of much discretion."

Although General Fraser deprecated the notion of military force being required for the introduction of improvements in the Nizam's

administration, he was not slow to give the aid of the troops at his disposal for the preservation of good order, or for its restoration when it was disturbed. Singularly enough, his proceedings met with a somewhat cold reception by the Government of India on the solitary occasion during his long tenure of office when he gave the aid of the Subsidiary Force, in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty, to maintain the Minister's authority when threatened by a mutiny in the City of Hyderabad.

On the 4th January 1847, Sooraj-ool-Moolk writes to the Resident explaining that he is about to discharge more than 6,000 of the irregular troops, after paying up their arrears. "The monthly pay of the Bolarum troops" (the Contingent), he observes, "is on an average 335,000 rupees." "Whatever reductions I have made, or purpose making, have reference to the understanding that the troops of the Contingent are now protecting the territories of this Government, and will continue to do so. From an inspection of a map of this country, it appears that the cantonments of the troops in question in Berar are well situated, but towards the East there are none. It, therefore, appears necessary that a cantonment of Cavalry and Infantry should be established in the Wurrungul province, in some vicinity which may be selected by you." In reporting this matter to Government, the General says:—

"It will be observed that I have consented to station a regiment of Infantry and a squadron of Cavalry at Wurrungul. The Nizam pays forty lakhs of rupees per annum on account of the Contingent, and he may not unreasonably expect, especially under the circumstances of the great reductions now made in the number of his own irregular troops, that the services of the Contingent should be rendered available for the maintenance of tranquillity throughout the whole of his dominions."

In May 1847, there were nearly 10,000 half-disciplined troops in the City of Hyderabad, called the "Bar" or "Line", and the Minister had made all his arrangements for the discharge of 6,000 of these men. On the 1st of May, the Minister informed the Resident that the men to be discharged refused to take their pay, or to give up their arms, and that they had been joined by all the rest of the "Line", who had placed their own Commandants under arrest, and insisted on all being equally paid up their arrears of pay, when, they said, all, if required, would take their discharge.

On the 3rd of May, the mutiny being still unabated, and the Minister's own life having been threatened, he applied for military assistance. The Resident at once ordered a force, consisting of four companies of H.M. 84th Foot, two regiments of Madras Native Infantry, and a detachment of Madras Artillery with four nine-pounder guns, first to a spot called the Foundry, about a mile and a half from the City walls, and after an ineffectual endeavour to bring the "Line-wallahs" to reason through messages to their Commandants, who were held by them in durance, the General took possession of the Delhi gate of the City, "an excellent situation", he reported, "in a military point of view, for I might have held it not only against the mutinous battalions of the Line, but, if necessary, against the whole City of Hyderabad."

The General was prepared, after two days of inconclusive negotiations, to march upon the mutinous troops in their central stronghold, and took care to have them apprised of his determination. This led to their submission and return to obedience on the 7th of May; the measures of reduction were carried out; and the troops of the Subsidiary Force withdrawn to the cantonment of Secunderabad on Saturday, the 8th of May 1847.

After a long correspondence, in which the Government of India maintained for some time its doubts as to the necessity for the brief occupation of one of the City gates by the Subsidiary troops, a final approval was at last given to the Resident's proceedings.

Tired out at last, and I may say provoked, by the apathy and obstruction with which all his efforts for the good of the Nizam's dominions were received at the official capital of India, very strong and indignant language was used by General Fraser in some of his official communications. In the course of a despatch dated the 11th of July 1847, and extending to no less than 136 paragraphs, he observes that the Government "seems to anticipate failure and disappointment".

"This failure", he says, "is all but a moral certainty, if Soorajool-Moolk meets on one side with nothing but the vacillation of his own Sovereign"—a vacillation caused, of course, by his doubts as to the Resident's influence at Calcutta,—“and on the other with the disapproving judgment and feeble or reluctant support of the Government of India.” In another letter, dated the 18th of August, he complains that he is "placed in a position in which

he must fail in working out any object of real utility, either to his own Government or to that to which he is accredited."

Naturally, the authorities at headquarters could not allow remonstrances of this character, however unanswerable, to pass unrebuked. The Resident was told that he must attend "to the orders he had already received". General Fraser, just at this period, explained his perplexities, and his very natural doubts as to the real intentions of the Government of India, in letters to two friends in the Court of Directors, Sir James Law Lushington, the Chairman, and Major Oliphant. To the former he wrote a very long letter, dated the 25th of October 1847, from which I shall give some extracts.

"Improvement in Hyderabad has not progressed. I lament that such should be the case, as there is no inherent necessity that it should be so. A little decision on the part of the Supreme Government, and its assent to the measures I have recommended, would have been sufficient. It is to this subject I wish to attract your attention, and to obtain, if possible, the assent of the Court to some policy of their own devising, if not of mine, which may correct the evils of this Government, in the shame of which I may perhaps be made to participate, though I do not deserve it. I wish to induce the Court either to act with some vigour in this matter, or to acknowledge that they do not care to save the Nizam, and that he must be considered as bearing the exclusive responsibility of the ruin to which the Hyderabad State is hastening. The proceedings of the Resident here, to that extent only which has hitherto been sanctioned, cannot be of any use. A higher tone must be adopted to be of service. A continuance of its present course by the Supreme Government will involve this country in the fate of Mysore.

"We are bound under the obligation of Treaties to maintain the independence of this and of several other Native States; and until the Treaties are infringed by the Princes themselves, or the safety of our own provinces is in danger, we are bound to uphold them. All I wish is that this should be done effectually,—and in such a manner as to be at once consistent with the prosperity of the Native State, and with the general advancement of the Indian Empire in the path of good order and reform. It is not possible that so large a portion of India as the Nizam's country should be in a bad way, without the adjacent districts being injuriously affected. We can adhere to our Treaties in perfect good faith, and yet insist at the same time that the sustained independence of Hyderabad shall not impede the equally sacred obligation under which we are placed, not to allow our military protection of

the Nizam to involve as a necessary consequence the misery and helplessness of his people. We must not allow a barrier to be raised against the advancement of India in general in the ill-regulated condition of this particular State. In the measures I have continuously proposed, the ulterior object has not only been a better administration for Hyderabad, but beneficial results for our own territory. Unhappily in almost all instances, I have been prohibited not only from active interposition, but from interposition at all. I need not enter into particulars. The evils of the Hyderabad Government, and the state of disorder generally prevailing through the country, must have been sufficiently well known to the Court of Directors when I was first sent here by Lord Auckland. These evils remain as they were to this day. Can it be the intention of the Court of Directors that they should remain so until some crisis arrives which may afford a pretext for placing the Nizam's country under a Commission, with our train of English Judges and Collectors? I cannot believe this to be the intention of the Court, and if not, surely means ought to be adopted which may avert these consequences. Correction becomes more difficult by every day that we remain inactive. The Government of India has in general expressed its concurrence in my views and wishes regarding the Nizam's affairs, but not in the measures which I have recommended alone likely to accomplish those views. If my suggestions are deemed objectionable, let others be brought forward. Let me be favoured with commands, which I promise to execute, but let not the only command be—to do nothing. This deliberate inaction appears to me to be dishonourable to us as it is injurious to the Nizam.

"I know not whether I am altogether right in addressing you in my private letter on this subject, considering your official position, and perhaps I ought not to expect any reply to it. If you send me an answer, I shall attribute your silence to no other cause than official propriety. But if it be possible for you to let me know, or even to give me a hint, however faint, of what really are the intentions of the Court of Directors with regard to this important State, I shall be infinitely obliged. I know that much useful work ought to be done, and can be done here; and I know that its accomplishment would be attended with no extraordinary difficulties, were I not forcibly restrained and obliged by distinct orders, to remain in a state of unprofitable inactivity.

"On the 18th of August last I addressed a letter to the Supreme Government, recommending a certain communication to be made to the Nizam; and a few days ago I received a reply which contains the following words:—'It is not necessary for the Governor-General to pass in review the reasons which of late years have influenced the Court of Directors and the Government of India to decline the adoption of your recommendations, nor at the present moment to enter into lengthy c

cussions of the policy to which, probably at no distant period, it may be advisable to resort. His Lordship will merely observe that the financial embarrassments of the Nizam may, in spite of the warnings given to His Highness, and the liberal aid afforded, bring about a crisis which may render our interposition necessary; in which event you will receive your instructions from the Government on what, in his Lordship's opinion, would be a much more important consideration than maintaining the independence of the Nizam, if the oppression of the people should, by increasing acts of tyranny, become so intolerable as to expose the British Government to the just reproach of not fulfilling its obligations to the subjects of His Highness which they have a right to expect from the Paramount Power."

And here it is absolutely necessary for me to remark that neither had the Resident reported "increasing acts of tyranny" or "intolerable oppression", nor were there any signs or symptoms whatever of "the people", "the subjects of His Highness", expecting or invoking the intervention of "the Paramount Power". Strangely enough, this is virtually admitted in the very next sentence.

"It does not appear, however, from your recent communications that the misgovernment of His Highness's dominions has as yet been productive of such extortion and cruelty as to render the immediate interference of the Government necessary. At this peculiar moment, therefore, when the head of the Government will not remain in India a sufficient time to superintend the introduction of any new line of policy which circumstances might render it advisable for the Government to adopt, there appears to be no urgent necessity for any modification of the instructions which you have already received, and to which you are desired to conform."

"I quote this paragraph," continues General Fraser, "in order specially to notice the expression 'in spite of the warnings given to His Highness'. Now, I assert that sufficiently decided warnings *never have been given* to the Nizam, and it was to supply this want that I recommended to the Supreme Government the communication to His Highness, of which a draft was sent with my despatch of the 18th of August above mentioned."

To Major Oliphant he wrote as follows:—

"Hyderabad, 7th October 1847.

"MY DEAR MAJOR OLIPHANT,—The favourable disposition towards me, which I have reason to believe you have sometimes done me the favour

to express, and the concern you naturally take in the affairs of Hyderabad, prompt me to write a few lines to thank you for the former, and to state my regret that the latter are not such as I should wish them to be, or such as for some time after my arrival here I fully expected they would be, very long before the expiration of the nine years during which I have been unprofitably contending against the corruption of this Durbar and the opposition of my own Government. I must not presume to censure the Government, but its policy has always been at direct variance with what I have recommended, and still continues to be so. I should rather say its management and course of procedure, for its policy and its views are *professedly* the same as my own, viz., the maintenance of His Highness's independence, and the reform of His Highness's administration.

"It would be in vain for me to enter here into the particulars of my fruitless recommendations, as my public correspondence on these matters occupies many volumes. I must be satisfied with saying that I have been pressing upon my own Government the adoption of a more firm and decided tone with the Nizam, so as to save the State from utter downfall and ruin by measures for the amelioration of his Government, and to bring about, as a matter of course, a superior degree of happiness and prosperity for the people of the country. But my Government has always insisted upon stopping short of the determined language in which I wished the Nizam should be addressed. Different reasons for this have been given by different persons at different times. At first, from motives of humanity and old connections, they desired to wait until that impracticable old man, Chundoo Lall, should quit this mortal scene. On Chundoo Lall's resignation, the next Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough, though he approved generally of my intentions, was too much occupied with his own enterprises in the North-West, Scinde and Gwalior, to attend to the affairs of Hyderabad, and acquainted me with his desire to wait for a more convenient time. This principle of action, or rather of inaction, he carried to so great an extent as even to prohibit my demanding the discontinuance of the horrible rite of Suttee, which I could have carried into effect at least three years before this was actually done, had I been permitted to do so.

"In the same way the expulsion of the Arabs and other foreign mercenaries, whose presence here has been so injurious for a long series of years, might have been accomplished, if I could have inspired the Government of India with the requisite determination and energy on this subject.

"Everything else that I had planned might in a similar manner have been done, and the Hyderabad country might at this moment have

been progressing *pari passu* with Mysore, or any other well-regulated State, and long ere this a general system of reformed administration might have been established. But the Governor-General, as I have said above, was otherwise occupied, and I could not prevail on him to act, or to attend to Hyderabad affairs. He thought that force alone was requisite, and told me that his troops were engaged elsewhere. It was in vain that I assured him they would not be wanted. No military force would ever have been required; but even if it had been, I had in the Contingent and the Subsidiary Force more than enough to overcome any resistance that could possibly have been offered anywhere. I repeat, however, that such a contingency was not for one instant to be apprehended.

“The present Governor-General, deterred, perhaps, by the fear of counteraction at home, or by some other motives I cannot fathom, pauses and hesitates when we ought to be moving on. He permitted me, after I had been urging the point for three years, to insist upon the appointment of a Minister. But the advantage of the appointment of a Dewan has been nullified by the same hesitating and undecided spirit of which I have already complained. He is not supported by the Supreme Government, but quite the reverse; and with every corrupt agency in active operation at Hyderabad to put him down, besides the unfavourable disposition of the Supreme Government to contend against, it is utterly impossible he should succeed. The determination of the Governor-General to allow the Nizam to have his own way, leaving him to glide down the slope that leads to destruction, I will not venture to dilate upon, because I could hardly avoid being disrespectful to the Government I serve; but I may at least be permitted to say that I know not how to reconcile the instructions of Government with its declared wish to maintain the independence of the Hyderabad State. While professing to uphold Treaties that subsist between us and the Nizam, resolutions are adopted by the Bengal Government which must necessarily produce a disruption of our present relations with the Nizam, and the downfall of his independence.

“I hope that the Court of Directors will do me the justice to form a judgment of my proceedings here from my own despatches, and not from the malignant representations that I know are sent from here to the India House, or which find their way into the newspapers.

“I am quite ashamed of inflicting so long a letter upon you, though I have abstained from going into details or explaining particular points. All my counsels have had but one object and one tendency, the maintenance of Hyderabad as an independent State, with ameliorated forms and rules of administration. If I might be permitted to adduce one case that has affected me most painfully, it would be the recent pro-

hibition of the Supreme Government to the official employment of Mr. Dighton.

"Under all the circumstances and special causes that led me to consider his employment desirable, and the particular conjuncture of events which induced to advocate his employment and to ask for the sanction of Government, the refusal of Government is a matter that I cannot sufficiently regret. The case is, I believe, under reference to the Court of Directors. It may seem to that authority but a small matter in itself, and the Court may decide on adhering to the rule determined by Lord William Bentinck many years ago regarding the non-employment of any other than the Company's covenanted and commissioned servants. I can only say that if the case is thus disposed of, the chances are much increased that we shall soon be under the necessity of having recourse to Lord William's alternative, and be obliged to call for the services not of one but of twenty covenanted servants, or in other words, to take the whole country under British administration. I have wished to avoid this, because I consider it to be in opposition to existing Treaties, and that no case has yet occurred to justify their abrogation. The Government of India have professed to entertain the same views, but its practice will lead, I fear, to a directly opposite result. I have endeavoured to do my duty, and if the hopes I entertained when I first came to Hyderabad are baffled, I shall have the consolation of reflecting that the fault has not been mine, and that I have failed from the pressure of a superior authority which it was impossible for me to resist.

"I remain, my dear Major Oliphant,

"Yours very sincerely,

"J. S. FRASER."

There was some little excitement and interest at the Nizam's Court in the month of October 1847, on the occasion of a visit, in the course of a tour of inspection which embraced the cantonment of Secunderabad, from the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, Sir George Berkeley. Many years had elapsed since any Commander-in-Chief had attended one of the Nizam's Durbars, and there were great searchings of heart as to the forms to be observed, the ceremonial presents to be made, and on our side, as will be seen from the following letter, as to the disposal of those presents by the dignitary to whom they were to be offered.

“Umritsur, November 23rd, 1847.

“MY DEAR GENERAL,—I am afraid that you have been waiting a reply to your letter of the 7th ultimo, and that the occasion has already passed, on the subject of which you wrote to me. I have only just returned to Camp after a tour in the Hills, and found your letter waiting my arrival.

“The Governor-General says there is no objection to the course usual up here being followed upon the occasion of Sir George Berkeley’s visit to the Nizam, which means that everything that is presented to him must be carried to the credit of Government, and nothing whatever retained by the Commander-in-Chief, unless he chooses to purchase it.

“The Governor-General presumes that a visit of ceremony only is contemplated, not one of business, as that he could not sanction.

“Believe me, yours very sincerely,

“H. M. ELLIOT.”

And so, amid the consideration of solemn trifles of this description, the rule of Lord Hardinge terminated, and in January 1848, his brilliant successor, the Earl of Dalhousie, entered on his memorable term of office.

CHAPTER VII.

Arrival of Lord Dalhousie—Illness of the General's Daughter—Six Months Leave to Sea and the Straits—Letter to the Governor-General's Military Secretary and his Answer—General Fraser's Marriage in 1826—Growth of his Family—Letters to the Rajah of Mysore and Travancore—Routine of Work and Daily Life at the Residency—Interview of Mr. Dighton with Lord Dalhousie, and Letter to General Fraser—Colonel Low at the Residency—Letter from Sir James Law Lushington—Reply of Colonel Low—Return of General Fraser—Letter of Colonel Low from Calcutta—Financial Difficulties insurmountable—Opposition to Sooraj-ool-Moolk—Conflicting Views as to the Contingent.

WITH Lord Dalhousie's arrival there almost necessarily followed a brief period of uneventful suspense, while the new Governor-General may be supposed to have been making himself master of the situation, and of all personal details and pending debates in the various regions and principal departments of the vast Imperial administration over which he was called to preside. Moreover, within two months of Lord Dalhousie's installation, General Fraser was obliged, for the first and only time in fifty years, to apply for leave "on urgent private affairs." Chiefly on account of his daughter's health, who required change of air after a serious illness, he obtained six months' leave to "sea and the Straits", and left Hyderabad on the 3rd of March 1848, to embark from Madras; Colonel John Low being appointed to officiate as Resident during his absence. On the day of his departure the General wrote the following letter to Lord Dalhousie's Military Secretary, Colonel Armine Mountain.

"Hyderabad, 3rd March 1848.

"MY DEAR SIR,—It has not been usual for the Resident here to send up to the Governor-General the review and inspection returns of the Contingent, though I did so once or twice in Lord Hardinge's time with respect to the cavalry brigade.

"But as Lord Dalhousie may be desirous of knowing the present

condition of this branch of the Army, and that these are the first reports I have received from Brigadier Beatson, I do myself the pleasure of sending them to you in order that you may take any favourable opportunity of submitting them to Lord Dalhousie.

"It is gratifying to me to have this opportunity of recalling myself to your recollection, as I had the pleasure of being introduced to your acquaintance at Bangalore previously to the expedition into Coorg; and if I may be allowed to hope the favour of a few lines from you during my residence at the Straits, I would request you to be so good as to let me know at the same time whether Lord Dalhousie will have any objection to my returning to Hyderabad by way of Calcutta, with a view to my paying my respects in person to his Lordship. I leave Hyderabad with my daughter this evening, and much regret that anything should oblige me to absent myself even for a day, under the actual circumstances of the Government. But the case is an imperative one, and it has been impossible for me to act otherwise. I have applied for six months' leave of absence, but I intend to shorten the period as much as I can, and to return to Hyderabad as soon as the termination of the hot, dry weather at this place, and the commencement of the rains, will admit of my doing so without injury to my child's health, it being supposed by her medical attendants that she is suffering from an affection of the lungs, or at least is threatened with it.

"I remain, my dear Sir, yours very truly,

"J. S. FRASER.

"Colonel Mountain, C.B., etc., etc."

The answer came after some little delay.

"Government House, Calcutta, March 24th, 1848.

"MY DEAR SIR,—I had the pleasure to receive your packet of the 3rd instant, and I should have replied to your letter immediately, but that I took it for granted that considerable time would elapse before you would reach the Straits; and until I got your Military Secretary's note, I was uncertain whether to direct to Penang or Singapore.

"In respect to the packet of reports, I mentioned to his Lordship that you had sent them, and will lay them before him at his earliest leisure. In the meanwhile, let me say for myself that I am very glad to have the opportunity of looking them over.

"The Governor-General has been what the people call at home "so thronged" ever since Lord Hardinge's departure, that it is difficult to find the time for all he has to do.

"I well recollect, my dear Sir, having had the pleasure of making your acquaintance at Bangalore in 1834, and recollect also the regard which my then Chief, poor Lord William, entertained for you.

"The Governor-General desires me to say that he regrets the cause

of your absence from Hyderabad, and will be happy to see you, should it suit your convenience to return to your Residency, as you propose, *viâ* Calcutta.

"I will write again after the Governor-General has looked over the reports, and in the meanwhile, hoping that your daughter may be benefited by the voyage, remain,

"My dear Sir, yours very faithfully,

"ARMINE H. MOUNTAIN."

This brief interruption in my father's long and continuous charge affords a convenient opportunity for a retrospective mention of his marriage, the increase of his family, and for some description of his daily life and regular occupations in the Hyderabad Residency.

Lieut.-Colonel Fraser, then British Commissioner at Pondicherry, was married at Cuddalore on the 18th of July 1826 to Henrietta Jane, daughter of Captain Stevenson, Admiralty Agent on the Eastern Coast of India, and a grand-niece of General Stevenson, who, in command of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force and the Nizam's troops, co-operated with the Hon. General Arthur Wellesley in 1803, in the campaign of Assaye and Argaum. I have often heard my mother mention the circumstance of having been taken, while a girl at school, under the care of Miss Black of Kensington, to see the Duke of Wellington, who used to pet and fondle her as the relative of his old companion in arms.

General Fraser's married life in India was diversified by the inevitable joys and sorrows of a large family, as well as by the special incidents of an Anglo-Indian household,—the shipments of little children "home" in charge of their mother, their long sojourn in the old country and eventual return of my mother to Hyderabad, the arrival of grown-up sons and daughters from England, their settlement and advancement in the world. There are some apposite allusions to matters of this description in the following two letters to the Rajah of Mysore, placed somewhat in advance of the date at which our narrative has arrived.

"Hyderabad, 7th June 1850.

"YOUR HIGHNESS,—The receipt of your letter of the 25th of May is peculiarly gratifying to me, and I beg to assure you in all sincerity, that so far from the duties of my present office having obliterated you from my memory, they have produced quite an opposite effect, and have

rendered more vivid the recollection of your kindness, and the cordial and friendly feeling with which Your Highness honoured me.

"You have now written to me on a very happy and pleasing occasion, and I beg to unite with all my family in our sincere congratulations on the nuptials of your two grand-children. May these marriages be productive of every future happiness to the parties immediately concerned, and prove a source of continual satisfaction of Your Highness.

"My wife and the only grown-up daughter who is now with me, Mrs. Bell, whom Your Highness once designated as 'the little *Moofsid*,'¹ unite with me in offering our most respectful regards to yourself and all your family, and our hearty wishes for your welfare and prosperity. My eldest daughter, whom you may remember by the name of Harriet, is married, and at present residing at Madras with her husband. I have recently lost the youngest; she was with me at Mysore, and whom Your Highness may perhaps recollect to have seen, when you used kindly to call my children into your Palace, from their usual walk on the ramparts of Mysore. Her name was Agnes. She had returned to England to complete her education, and left that country in the highest health, and full of bright anticipations of future happiness. But it pleased God to remove her to a better world. She was attacked on her passage out by that fatal malady called consumption, and arrived in India only to die in her parents' arms. I do not apologise for referring to these personal and family matters, for I am fully convinced that you will take an interest in them.

"Mrs. Fraser and my daughter request that the Ranees and your daughter Poothoyee will accept their cordial regards, and I beg that you will believe me always to be, with great respect,

"Your Highness's sincere and faithful servant,

"J. S. FRASER.

"His Highness the Maharajah of Mysore,
etc. etc. etc. etc."

"Hyderabad, 27th March 1851.

"HIGHNESS,—I have had the pleasure to receive your letter under date the 15th instant, communicating the happy tidings of the birth of a daughter to your eldest grandson, on the morning of the 13th instant. Permit me to offer you my sincerest congratulations on this event, and to express the gratification I experienced in your having so kindly thought of giving me early intimation of it. I need scarcely, I trust, repeat on this occasion the assurance of my always taking a

¹ Rebel.

warm and sincere part in Your Highness's happiness and welfare, and in all that concerns the interests of your family.

"I have now to inform Your Highness of a similar occurrence in my own family, Mrs. Fraser having presented me with a little daughter on the 28th ultimo.

"My daughter Maria (the *Moofsid*) is now residing with me, the Governor-General having kindly given her husband an appointment in the Nizam's Cavalry. My eldest son, Hastings, to whom, in common with all the other children, Your Highness was always so kind when we were at Mysore, is now a tall, stout young man, and has just arrived with his Regiment from Jubbulpore; and my second son, Charles, whom Your Highness may also, perhaps, recollect, is on his way to India as a Cavalry Cadet. He was offered a writership, or appointment in the Company's Civil Service, but could not be persuaded to study for it as the Regulations required, and preferred the clattering of a sword to the scratching of a pen.

"We remain at Hyderabad in much the same state as when I last wrote to Your Highness. I am heartily wearied of the office I hold here, and should quit it with great pleasure if I only had to consult my own inclinations in the matter.

"Mrs. Fraser and my children unite with me in cordial and respectful regards to Your Highness and your family, and I remain,

"Your Highness's very sincere and faithful
friend and servant,

"J. S. FRASER.

"To His Highness the Maharajah of Mysore,
etc. etc. etc."

A letter to the Rajah of Travancore may very well be brought in here, though also a little in advance of its proper place.

"Hyderabad, 10th October 1850.

"HIGHNESS,—Though I have allowed a longer time to elapse than I ought to have done in replying to your amiable letter of the 9th of July last, owing to a great pressure of public business, I beg you to be assured that I was not insensible to the value of that communication, and that I was deeply gratified to find that I still live in Your Highness's recollection. I entertain a lively remembrance of the agreeable days I passed in Travancore, feelings sadly contrasted with those which a residence in the Deccan has inspired.

"It was a source of great grief to me to receive intelligence of the death of your most excellent brother, whom I both respected and loved. You are a worthy successor to his rank and dignity, and you will, I am sure, succeed to the esteem in which he was held. You and your

brother have strikingly exemplified the advantages of an English education,—advantages which are, unfortunately, not enjoyed by the Sovereign and nobles of this country; and, in consequence, though my office here may be considered higher and more important than that I held in Travancore, my life is far less agreeably spent, and I often sigh over the recollection of the time when I was Resident at your brother's Court. I often think, too, of my poor friend Soobaram and his family, and that warm friend to whom I was so affectionately attached, Caldecott—both gone.

“It affords me pleasure to learn that you have obtained so excellent a tutor for the two junior members of your family.”

I must interrupt the letter here to explain that the tutor of these two young Princes, who successively sat on the throne,—the reigning Maharajah, Rama Vurma, being the younger of them,—is now Sir T. Madhava Rao, K.C.S.I., who subsequently became Dewan of Travancore, was afterwards Minister for some years to the Maharajah Holkar of Indore, and more recently Minister of the Baroda State during the minority of the Maharajah Gaekwar. It will be seen also by the following sentence that Sir Madhava Rao is nearly related to another Brahmin gentleman frequently mentioned in a previous part of this book.

“His father, Runga Rao, was a truly good and honest man; and with regard to the head of the family, poor Vencata Rao, I shall never cease to respect his memory. He came, upon my invitation, to Hyderabad, and I fear that his death may in some measure have been occasioned by the fatigues of that journey.

“I am very happy to find that you are on such friendly terms with your Resident, General Cullen. I am sure that on all occasions of difficulty you will find a safe and trustworthy guide in his friendly counsels. Mrs. Fraser was highly sensible of the kind message you were so good as to convey to her, and desires me to present in return her very respectful compliments. I often speak to her of Travancore, its beautiful scenery, and the invariable kindness I experienced from yourself and family; and the conversation generally ends with her saying, ‘Well, let us go and take up our final abode there.’ As far as I am concerned, nothing would make me happier, but I fear that I am tied down by public duty for some time longer to this less agreeable place.

“I shall be infinitely gratified if Your Highness will continue to favour me with a few lines now and then to assure me of your health

and welfare, and I beg that Your Highness will believe me always to be, truly and sincerely,

“Your faithful friend and servant,

“J. S. FRASER.

“To His Highness the Maharajah of Travancore,
etc., etc., etc., etc.”

It must not be supposed from General Fraser's frequent complaints of everything standing still in Hyderabad, and of nothing being done, in consequence of the indifference and inaction of our Government, that the Resident found the time hang heavily on his hands for want of something to do. The ordinary routine business of the Residency was quite enough to make up more than a good day's work for anyone. In the first place, the Resident was virtually the Commandant of the Contingent, or Nizam's Army,—about 9,000 men, with ninety English officers,—and while all questions of its movements and active employment had to be settled by him, in communication with the Nizam and his Minister, all matters of expenditure, discipline, and internal economy were decided personally by the Resident, except in the matter of first appointments, without the intervention of any Department or Secretary. The Nizam's Army, in those days, was assumed to be entirely the Nizam's concern. The Nizam paid for all, or, it was well understood, would be made eventually to pay, even when our advances for the Contingent had risen to a very heavy amount. There was no effectual check of previous estimate or subsequent audit at Calcutta. The Resident was Auditor for the Nizam. Even in matters of patronage and promotion, the Resident's initiative and influence, though not openly recognisable, went very far, and entailed an enormous amount of private correspondence with the Governor-General and his personal Staff, with the Governor of Madras, and with all the parties interested or affected.

Then, besides the constant negotiations and transactions with the Minister on ordinary and current affairs, fiscal and judicial, relating to criminal offences, the escape and pursuit of offenders, disputes as to custom and transit duties, and frauds on the revenue, on both sides of long and interlaced frontiers, all of which had to be settled in some way, there were—as will be readily understood from what has passed—constant conferences and correspondence as to financial disorder and faulty administration, suggestions and

plans of reform to be explained and discussed. Nor must it be supposed that the long-continued exhortations and instructions of General Fraser were completely fruitless, or that the intermittent efforts of Sooraj-ool-Moolk's two spells of office—though “feebly and reluctantly supported”, as the Resident complained, at Court and at Calcutta—were entirely barren of good results. So much was actually done, the foundation of so much was laid, and the outline of so much more sketched out, in combination, by General Fraser and Sooraj-ool-Moolk, that it may fairly be said that the measures of administrative reform carried out by Sir Salar Jung, in quieter times, were constructed on their lines and under their directions.

The times were quieter under Sir Salar Jung because General Fraser, during the Ministry of Sooraj-ool-Moolk, had, by a firm, skilful, and judicious use of the Contingent Force, established good order throughout the country, broken up bands of plunderers, and destroyed the strongholds that harboured them, and reduced to obedience, by even-handed coercion and concession, chieftains and tribes that had been from time immemorial quite unmanageable.

Although General Fraser's proposal for sending the hordes of foreign mercenaries out of the Nizam's dominions was deferred as a whole, and very partially enforced,—chiefly owing to the belief of the Supreme Government that a great military occupation was required,—the abuses and excesses of Arab power and influence were so curbed and subdued by the measures he adopted, in concert with Sooraj-ool-Moolk, that the Arabs became by degrees quite endurable as denizens, until at last their good qualities quite gained the ascendant. The chief characteristics of the Arab soldiery were thrift and faithfulness to their “salt”,—implying not only allegiance to the chieftains of their own blood, but to the Power or the person who engaged them, and supplied their pay, by time or job,—whether it were the Minister who enlisted them by the thousand, the Talookdar who entertained a hundred, or the Hindoo banker who took half-a-dozen into pay for the protection of his cash-chest. Their great fault was that they acknowledged no law but their own, as administered by their own leaders. Sober, steady men, for the most part, and earning good pay, they lent their savings, at what we should call usurious interest, to borrowers of every rank and class, through the medium of their Jemadars or superior officers, who undertook to collect and administer the

fund, and to give each man his due. Their process was a summary one. If the defaulter, whether for principal and interest, or arrears of pay, was evidently acting in bad faith, and it was likely that anything could be got out of him, an armed execution was put in. A landed estate or a district was occupied in force, and the Jemadar in possession collected the rent or the revenue for the benefit of his band. If the debtor was a private person, the mode of recovering the money was by distraint or imprisonment. When Sooraj-ool-Moolk assumed executive authority in 1846, there were, as he reported to General Fraser, upwards of 300 persons confined in the Arab jails within the City of Hyderabad. Chundoo Lall had hardly proposed, except in a few extreme cases, to interfere with the lawless jurisdiction claimed and exercised by the Arab Jemadars. While General Fraser was Resident the Arab practice of seizing districts and occupying forts for the purpose of realising what they declared to be due to them, was put down sternly and signally by the well-directed action of the Contingent. Immediately on Sooraj-ool-Moolk coming into office, all the prisoners held by the Arabs were set at liberty, and the Arab jails closed. This was the first great step towards the abolition of the privileges, immunities, and exemptions claimed by these tribes and their leaders. As the Arabs were gradually made amenable to the law, the main objects aimed at in their proposed removal were sufficiently attained; and it may be mentioned here that in the crisis of 1857 Sir Salar Jung found the most effective and trustworthy force at his disposal to be the Arabs in his pay, and it was mainly by their agency that he restrained and suppressed the mutinous and fanatical elements in the Nizam's territories.

In a communication dated the 29th of May 1847, the Resident had also forwarded to the Government of India copies of letters and orders by the Minister, Sooraj-ool-Moolk, explaining the administrative and judicial reforms already instituted and in progress. Instead of districts being any longer handed over to farmers of the revenue called Talookdars, who paid a large nuzurana to the Prince or the Minister, and, residing themselves, in many instances, in the City of Hyderabad, employed deputies to screw as much as possible out of the ryots, each district was placed under a salaried Zillahdar, who had to remain at his post and to

account for his collections and expenditure. In every district, also, judges and magistrates were appointed.

Many other minor operations and administrative improvements were set on foot by the Resident, and carried out under his direction, with the consent and at the cost of the Nizam's Government, which were of great public utility, though they entailed little expense, and made no great show at the time. Such were statistical inquiries and returns, relating to agriculture, commerce, and the condition of the people, and topographical surveys, chiefly conducted by officers of the Contingent. In June 1847, General Fraser asked the sanction of the Governor-General to his recommendation to the Nizam's Government of Captain Doria, "an extremely active and intelligent officer of the Contingent, who has been long engaged, under the Commissioner of Mysore, and also in Malabar, in the construction of roads", with a view to his being employed in "the same very important duty in these territories". For this work, the General added, Captain Doria was "perfectly well fitted, not only by the circumstances of his previous experience, but also from his having already acquired a considerable knowledge of the Nizam's country in consequence of having frequently traversed it in almost all those directions where roads will now be required."

Captain (now Lieutenant-General) Richard Andrew Doria, of the Madras Army, was occupied for several years in making and maintaining roads in the Nizam's dominions; and in his frequent movements across country was always a welcome guest at the Residency. The information he was constantly able to give, as to what was going on in districts not often visited by Europeans, was often of great use. He became, as it were, an additional member of the Resident's Staff, and was always very much in the General's confidence. Eventually he commanded one of the Cavalry Regiments of the Contingent.

In reviewing my father's public and private correspondence, it would really seem as if he allowed nothing to escape his observation; and he certainly lost no opportunity of commending the merits and advancing the interests of even the youngest officers under his authority. For example, in a letter dated the 29th of December 1847, to the Military Secretary to Government, the Resident begs "to bring to the notice of the Right Honourable the Governor-General, the accompanying report upon a peculiar

description of double cylinder metallic fuse suggested by a very able and zealous officer, Lieutenant Olpherts, of the Bengal Horse Artillery, at present attached to the Nizam's Army."

"I hope," he concludes, "it will be considered to need no apology that I have brought this excellent invention to the notice of the Governor-General, and that I take the liberty of recommending Lieutenant Olpherts to his Lordship, as an officer who is remarkable for zeal in his profession, and who will doubtless continue to deserve those high encomiums which he has already had the honour of receiving from some of the most distinguished officers of the Bengal Army."

General Fraser's forecast has been singularly verified in this instance, for the Lieutenant William Olpherts of 1847 was the Major Olpherts to whom General Sir James Outram wrote, under date 28th March 1858, when "the old 1st Division was about to be broken up", to express "the admiration with which I regard both you and your noble fellows, and the regard which I entertain towards you personally." "I shall ever remember with pride, pleasure and gratitude to yourself, the six months we have been companions in arms, and especially the three months we stood together in the plain of Alambagh. 'Bravery' is a poor and insufficient epithet to apply to a valour such as yours, and 'zeal' and 'energy' are terms of too common application to convey my sense of your entire and successful devotion to the Service."

For the gallantry, "ingenuity and resource"—in the words of Lord Napier of Magdala—with which he captured two guns from a party of the enemy strongly posted, in the advance on Lucknow under Sir Henry Havelock, Major Olpherts received the Victoria Cross, and the Companionship of the Bath for his services in the campaign. He is now a General.

Among the private letters of which copies were kept, I find, in addition to those addressed to the Rajahs of Mysore and Travancore, and Princes of the latter family, letters almost every month to Native gentlemen at Bombay, Madras, Bangalore, Mysore, Trevandrum, the capital of Travancore, and Mercara, the chief town of Coorg. He seems never to have forgotten an old friend or a deserving subordinate. There are many letters on astronomical and mathematical subjects to the Government astronomers

at Madras and Bombay ; on philological and bibliographical points of Oriental literature to Mr. Fitzedward Hall of the Royal Asiatic Society at Calcutta ; on scientific and economical subjects to Dr. Edward Balfour of the Madras Army, now retired as a Surgeon-General ; letters conveying information on the statistics and geology of the Deccan to Colonel Sykes, M.P., Director of the East India Company ; on historical matters to Sir Henry M. Elliot ; letters to and from Captain Waugh of the Bengal Engineers (afterwards General Sir Andrew Scott Waugh), then engaged in the great Trigonometrical Survey of India, on measuring arcs of the meridian, and other scientific problems. In one letter from Captain Waugh, dated "Mussooree, August 10th, 1842", he mentions a very eminent man, still happily among us, a patriarch of Indian statesmanship, Sir George Russell Clerk,¹ who since those days has held numerous offices of the highest importance,—among others, those of Joint Secretary of the Board of Control, Governor of Bombay, and Member of the Indian Council,—and has always consistently upheld the faith of Treaties and the fair treatment of our protected Allies as the true safeguards of our Indian Empire. Captain A. S. Waugh writes :—

"I had the pleasure a few days ago of meeting Mr. Clerk, the Governor-General's Agent on the North-West Frontier. He informed me that he considered General Pollock's Force the finest equipped one that ever left our frontier. Such an opinion appears inconsistent with the long halt at Jellalabad, a most unfortunate measure from military as well as from political considerations ; but we, who are at present in the dark, can form no fair criticism on passing events. I am sure you would greatly admire Mr. Clerk. He is deservedly celebrated for his peculiarly graceful deportment and engaging manners. There seems to be no difference of opinion anywhere as to the brilliancy of his talents, but the clearness of his judgment is the quality for which he is most distinguished. Underneath the garb of a Civilian he harbours the brave spirit of a soldier, and it is a sad pity he does not wear our cloth."

My father was, to say the least, quite as fortunate as most officers holding high positions in India generally are, more fortunate than many, in having been able from time to time to receive some of the junior members of his family, occasionally several of us at once, under his own roof at Hyderabad. I have a

¹ Father of the former and recent Guardians of H.H. the Nizam, Colonel John Clerk and Captain Claude Clerk, C.S.I.

full recollection, therefore, myself of his daily life and habits, a subsequent experience has enabled me more fully to appreciate the onerous nature of his official duties. He was an early riser and betook himself at the first moment that was possible to study, devoting himself to his favourite pursuits of literature and science till the hour of family prayers, which he always read himself to the whole household.

I may here also mention that it was the General's regular custom, when there was no clergyman, to officiate in the little church at Chudderghaut, to take the service himself in the large saloon at the Residency on Sundays, when all members of the Staff, minor officials, clerks, and Native Christians were welcome to attend.

After morning prayers he proceeded with the members of his family through the long corridor to what was called the breakfast room, where were assembled all the messengers from the Ministers and other noblemen who were entitled to the *entrée*, bringing them complimentary offerings of fruit and flowers—called *dālees*—and wishing the General and his family “good morning” on the part of their masters: a very graceful mode of greeting, against which objections that appear to me very absurd have lately been raised. In the adjoining grand saloon of the Residency was laid an ample breakfast for all comers; as, in order to save time, General Fraser permitted only to receive visitors at that time every day, being ready afterwards to give a private audience to anyone who really had business to discuss. By the time that breakfast was comfortably over, with a few minutes for cheerful conversation, the gong sounded the hour for business to commence, and the Resident leaving his guests with the ladies, proceeded to his Office, where he passed three or four hours with his Staff, hearing and reading letters and reports, and dictating replies and orders. So clear was General Fraser's head that I have frequently heard him dictate two or three letters on different subjects to as many clerks. Having got through the morning reports and ordinary correspondence, the General retired once more to his own study, where he continued his official labours requiring more thought and consideration, such as despatches and private letters for Calcutta. At this time a confidential clerk was always in attendance, and likewise a Persian Moonshee. At this work he generally continued until the tin

arrived for the evening drive or ride, in which he was accompanied by Mrs. Fraser or his daughter, and always escorted by two troopers.

After the drive came dinner, which almost always included a tolerably large party, the Staff always joining it when they felt inclined, and generally a few officers and their wives from the cantonment of Secunderabad. There were also many large dinner parties and evening entertainments, at which the Ministers and nobles from the City frequently made their appearance. Except on great occasions, the General usually retired at about half-past ten o'clock.

During the General's visit to Singapore he received the following letter from Mr. Dighton, who, having gone to Calcutta on business, had asked for an interview with Lord Dalhousie, with the express object of appealing against the order of the Government of India which forbade his public employment in the service of the Nizam.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,—I have had a most satisfactory interview with Lord Dalhousie, and as a clipper leaves this to-morrow for Singapore, I sit down to give you the particulars of it. He commenced with my own affairs, but I shall conclude with them, as the other subjects of our conversation were far more interesting. The despatch from the Court has arrived, and Lord Dalhousie regretted that he understood he could not have the pleasure of seeing you before August. Two or three days previous to my visit I had received a letter from the Khan Sabib, in which he mentioned, on Mrs. Fraser's authority, that you would be here about the 10th July. I mentioned this date to his Lordship as that on which you would probably arrive. He was glad to hear it, as he did not wish to finally adjust Hyderabad affairs before seeing you, adding, at the same time, that he spoke himself as a public man, and that he should, if similarly situated with yourself, feel greatly disappointed that measures to be carried out by you were commenced on by another, and, therefore, nothing would be finally arranged about Hyderabad till he had seen you. I think you will find that your policy is now that of the Court and of Lord Dalhousie. He put many questions to me regarding Hyderabad, saying that he had heard such conflicting accounts of its mismanagement, and that he knew not which to rely on. I told him that the country was splendid, the State in debt not two years' revenue, and that six years of proper management would make it the finest country in India. He then spoke of Soorajool-Moolk, and of the Nizam wishing to join Ram Buksh with him,

which he did not seem to fancy at all. Sooraj-ool-Moolk, he remarked, seemed honestly to contemplate reforms. Here I remarked that, with regard to his honesty, I believed that he had not provided for any one of his adherents from the coffers of the State—a proof that he had some regard for economy of the revenues; and with regard to the remaining reforms promised by him, I believed that most of them would have been completed had he met with support from the British Government. He (Sooraj-ool-Moolk) candidly admitted that without it he could not overcome the foolish prejudices instilled by a factious set of vagabonds into his Master's mind—that faction consisting of individuals who lived on ill-gotten gains which would cease could he open the Nizam's eyes to their real characters. Lord Dalhousie remarked that nothing would give him greater satisfaction than to see the Nizam's country in a thriving state, that he did not want to possess it, but that it must be properly ruled.

“On the point of independence given to Native States by Treaties, his lordship remarked that those Treaties were chiefly made by Lord Wellesley, than whom no one could have been more dictatorial to the different Sovereigns, whether as to the appointment of their Ministers or to the conduct and management even of members of their families. I then remarked that it had surprised me that when the Nizam had Ministers who did not go willingly into the measures recommended by the Resident, no interference could be greater than that exercised then by the British Government; and now, with a Minister really anxious to work with the Resident, he, the Minister, to use a vulgar expression, was dropped like a hot potato. He holds the system of *uzzuranas* in utter abhorrence. Lord Dalhousie asked many questions regarding the different troops with the Nizam, the growth of cotton, produce of opium, —all of which I answered as concisely as possible. I must now tell you about myself. Lord Dalhousie told me that he regretted the Court of Directors had confirmed Lord Hardinge's arrangements with regard to me; that it was on public grounds, and not from any personal objection to me; and that, as I might like to have the Court's opinion on this matter, he would give a copy of the paragraph to the Resident. I pointed out, what he had already observed, Lord Hardinge's strange contradiction of himself. I added that I considered myself harshly treated, and that I firmly believed I had been so treated on the strength of private correspondence. I remarked that the son and the nephew of Wm. Palmer had been permitted to be employed by the Nizam's Government; that there were various other ways in which I was certain the Nizam's Government would wish to employ me; and whenever it might so express itself to me, I should report the nature of the demand to the Resident, with a request that it might be forwarded to his Lordship. He replied that he should be happy to receive it and

give it his best attention. This was at the beginning of our *moolayat*,¹ which lasted an hour; and on going away he thanked me for all the information I had given him. I am sure you will like the Lord Sahib very much. He keeps his secretaries at their work, and does his own himself, which I do not think they greatly admire. I omitted to mention in its proper place that, when describing the subject of opium, I remarked that the Nizam's Government felt aggrieved that its opium—I supposed in consequence of its being a monopoly of the Company—was not allowed to be exported on the five per cent. duty being paid. He remarked that by Treaty it was clearly liable to no other tax. I replied that the Nizam's Government thought so too, and had in consequence made the demand during Lord Hardinge's administration; but, as it had not been granted, some hitch in the matter must have taken place. I hope you have received my last letter—the date I do not recollect—but it was written after my arrival here. It is possible you may have left Singapore before this reaches you, and I have, therefore, left a copy with Jardine, Skinner, and Co., to be given to you on your arrival. I return to Madras in the *Bentinck* on Saturday morning, the 3rd. If you write to me, pray address your letters to the care of Binny and Co., Madras. I shall probably remain there for a month, for the benefit of sea air, and then travel quietly to Hyderabad. Your movements may be quicker, and you may be there before me. I cannot tell you how truly rejoiced I am at our having overcome Lord Hardinge.

I trust your daughter is quite well again. Pray give her my kindest regards, and

“Believe me, my dear General,

“Most sincerely and faithfully yours,

“H. DIGHTON.

“Calcutta, 30th May 1848.

“P.S.—In my letter by the clipper yesterday I omitted to tell you that Lord Dalhousie made inquiries as to the characters of the Nizam and Sooraj-ool-Moolk. I gave my opinions freely, which you well know, so I will not go into a repetition of them. He was quite aware of the high rank of the family of the latter.

“31st May 1848.

“H. D.”

During General Fraser's absence on leave his place was occupied, as already mentioned, by Colonel Low, afterwards General Sir John Low, G.C.S.I., K.C.B. Colonel Low had been one of Sir John Malcolm's Assistants during the whole period of the disintegration and downfall of the Mahratta Confederation. Soon after the battle of Mahidpore, in 1818, Lieutenant Low, with instructions

¹ Interview.

from Sir John Malcolm, persuaded Bajee Rao, the last of the Peishwas, to surrender. He was Resident at Lucknow in 1837, and negotiated the Treaty of that year, which he saw repudiated by Lord Dalhousie in the process of annexing that friendly and faithful State. He found much that was quite new to him at Hyderabad, and much that seems to have at once made a very painful impression on him. The bent of his reflections during his first visit of a few months at Hyderabad was evidently much influenced by an important letter which he received from one of the East India Directors, General Sir James Law Lushington, a copy of which he left at the Residency for General Fraser's information. The letter is dated "London, 24th April 1848."

"I think you will perceive, from the tenor of the Court's late despatches, that we are anxious, if possible, to set matters right by friendly interference rather than by assumption of power, and to sustain the Nizam in the sovereignty, in preference to making him entirely subservient. The great difficulty is the state of the finances; and something must be done to afford relief, or the severe pressure must end in ultimate ruin. I have for some time been of opinion that we have ourselves been the cause in a great measure of this difficulty; and have made exactions from the Nizam we were not entitled to do by any Treaty. By the 12th Article of the Treaty of Hyderabad, of the 12th of October 1800, the Nizam bound himself to furnish, *in time of war*, 6,000 Infantry and 9,000 Horse, which went under the name of a Contingent Force. This Force was furnished on the requisition of the Resident in 1803, and appears, in the campaign against the Mahratta confederates, to have acquitted itself very well, and to have done good service.¹ The Force furnished in the following year was so inferior, both in number and efficiency, that a proposition was made by the Resident for the formation of a regular body of Horse in the Nizam's service, under the command of British officers. In 1807, a plan of reform was sanctioned and carried out, and further reforms were ordered in 1812, 1813, and 1816; and by a return in April 1846 the Contingent Force then amounted to—

Cavalry	2,592
Infantry	6,835
European officers		95

entailing a charge upon the Nizam's Government of forty-two lakhs of Hyderabad rupees per annum! This demand swallows up nearly one-third of the revenue of the country; and the consequence has been that

¹ Appendix B, "The Nizam's Military Co-operation."

the Nizam is now in debt to the British Government for sums advanced for the payment of the Contingent Force.

“Considering all these circumstances, I certainly am of opinion that the disbandment of the Contingent is a measure the propriety of which is worthy of the most serious consideration; for it cannot be denied that neither its continued maintenance, nor the original organisation, is provided for by any existing treaty.”

Colonel Low left also, for General Fraser's information, the following long extract from his reply to the above letter:—

“Hyderabad, the 24th of June 1848.

“You have my sincere thanks for your very kind and most interesting letter of the 24th of April. If I had access to some of my old demi-official letters (now in Calcutta with baggage that I had sent out *via* the Cape) I could show you by a copy of one written to Mr. Colvin, Lord Auckland's Private Secretary in 1838, how entirely my opinion coincides with your own respecting the cruelty, as I may well call it, that we have been guilty of towards the Nizam's Government in keeping up for so many years the continued drain upon the revenues of this country of no less than forty lakhs of rupees per annum for the pay of the Contingent,—in other words, for purposes of our own, not of the Nizam! Ever since 1819 there has been profound peace in the Deccan, and therefore, as it is only during ‘war between the contracting parties and any other power’ that we can claim to be ‘joined by 6,000 Infantry and 9,000 Horse of His Highness's own troops’, we have had no right by Treaty to demand a single rupee for a Contingent during the whole of that period, upwards of twenty-eight years. In the course of that time, however, we have actually drawn from the Nizam's treasury (not reckoning forty-two lakhs now due to us for advances to the Contingent) the enormous sum of *eleven crores and twenty lakhs* of Hyderabad rupees, of which a large portion has gone permanently out of the Nizam's territories for ever, through the remittances and savings of the officers and sepoy, two-thirds of whom are from Oude, Rohilcund, and other parts of Hindostan, who annually take away their savings in hard cash to their distant homes,—so that this huge drain not only exhausts the Nizam's treasury, but tends to impoverish his people by diminishing the amount of specie in his dominions.

“I am aware that there are some plausible arguments for making the Nizam keep up an efficient Contingent at all times, especially as portions of it are occasionally used for His Highness's own purposes; but I don't think that any sensible man who knows this part of India—even among those who honestly think that the arguments alluded to are sound—can deny the fact, which I remember to have pointed out

to Mr. Colvin in 1838, that since the year 1819 a Contingent of half the strength, costing twenty lakhs of rupees a year, would do precisely the same service to the Nizam's Government as the present Force does, which costs forty lakhs. Large bodies of the Contingent have never been used for a great many years; and, moreover, the Nizam is entitled by Treaty to the use of the Company's troops of the Subsidiary Force for any service such as the Contingent has been or could be employed upon. Now let us look at what would have been the effect if since 1819 a twenty-lakh Force had been kept up. The difference to the Nizam's Government would have been simply this—we should up to this date have drawn fully five crores of rupees *less* from the Nizam's treasury than we have drawn. That would have been the difference to His Highness. Well—what difference would it have made to the East India Company? In my opinion, the only true answer to this is that it would have made no difference whatsoever, because we have never since 1819 employed the Contingent out of the Nizam's territory, except now and then small parties of Horse, which could as easily have been spared from a twenty-lakh as from a forty-lakh Force. In short, it is a melancholy fact that the only people who have gained by what I now—with reference to what I have said above—call the *unnecessary* half of the Nizam's Contingent, are the officers and men who have composed that half; and no doubt those Governors-General, and Residents also, who have had the nomination of officers, have derived some gratification from the exercise of that patronage; but the gain and gratification of these individuals have, since the year 1819, cost the Nizam's Government the huge sum of five crores of rupees!

“What more need be said as to the main cause of this Native Government being, as it is now, almost at a standstill in consequence of its heavy debts and empty treasury? And yet the whole amount of its debts, of all sorts and all descriptions, does not reach quite three crores and fifty lakhs of rupees. But, then, it has no credit, and so the revenue is always taken before it is really and justly due; it has not the means of paying up arrears to any large body of troops, even when it may wish to do so.

“But I must not let you suppose that I think there would have been no debt if there had been no Contingent. I am far from thinking this. It is a loose, irregular, and ill-managed Government; and I have no doubt it would have been in debt even if we had disbanded at least half of the Contingent, as we ought to have done, in my opinion, more than twenty years ago. But it would not have been nearly so much in debt as it is now to its own subjects, and it would not have been in debt to us at all—whereas it now owes us forty-two lakhs of rupees, and the debt is now increasing almost every month, besides the interest

running on, from the utter inability of the Dewan to procure so much ready money for us in addition to the other calls upon his resources.

"A small Contingent would be very little, if at all, prejudicial to the Nizam's interests, because we do allow parties of the Contingent to be employed to put down marauders in a way that we would not allow the Company's Subsidiary Force to be employed; and, therefore, the existence of a small Contingent enables the Native Government to manage with a somewhat smaller body of its own troops than if there were no Contingent at all. But such arguments are no longer sound when applied to a large body of Infantry and Artillery such as would be required to take a fort, or even to coerce a powerful Talookdar in rebellion; because in every such case, where we would employ the Contingent, the Nizam would be entitled by Treaty to the services of the Company's own troops; and we don't allow a single man of the Contingent to be employed excepting upon the same condition on which our own troops can be called out in these dominions—namely, that the Resident shall be the umpire or judge between the Nizam and his subjects as to the cause of the quarrel. Under all these circumstances, I know my assertion to be a correct one, that a Contingent costing twenty lakhs of rupees per annum would be to the full as useful to the Nizam as the present one costing forty lakhs. My plan would be to annul that part of the Treaty requiring the Nizam to join us in time of war with 6,000 Infantry and 9,000 Cavalry, and instead of it to bind him to keep up at all times a Force that would cost twenty lakhs per annum; and if I could get a cession of territory for the payment of the Contingent, I should think that so great an advantage that I would be quite satisfied with lands that yielded seventeen or eighteen lakhs only, making the Contingent of a corresponding strength. This would put an end to the continual pressure upon the Durbar for money—'Give, give, and give more,' is the word perpetually in the Resident's mouth here, and it tends much to destroy his influence in all other matters.

"But you talk of 'disbanding'. Now, much as I detest this drain upon the Nizam, I would never advise the sudden breaking up and dispersing of the Contingent. I would not do so for the sake of His Highness, or rather for the sake of his people; for although we are very chary in affording the use of the Contingent, as I explained above, yet the Talookdars think that if they were to be guilty of rebellion, they would assuredly be punished by those very troops, known, as they are, to be ready for service at all times, and posted in five or six different parts of these territories. Their presence, therefore, operates as a check against insurrection. Take away that check suddenly, and you have immediately some powerful Talookdars withholding revenue, others openly setting the Government at defiance, while others again would, in all probability, be fighting with each other, to the great

injury both of the Nizam and his subjects. According to my notions, this Contingent has been so long established, that its reduction ought to be gradual—that it ought to be brought down gradually to whatever strength may be decided upon for its permanent establishment, and I think that a plan might be devised for the required reduction in a very few years, perhaps not more than three. I shall endeavour by the next mail to give you my ideas as to the way by which the reduction might be managed without seriously injuring the interests of any present incumbents, and without causing mischief to the Nizam's Government. I have not sufficient time to do this by the present mail, for this is the latest safe day, and I have also inflicted, I am sure, enough of my bad handwriting upon you for one packet."

And here is Colonel Low's second letter on the same subject, dated "Hyderabad, July 14th, 1848".

"MY DEAR LUSHINGTON,—I mentioned to you on the 24th ultimo that I thought the Contingent Force might be reduced in the course of about three years to half its present cost, without materially affecting the interests of any present incumbents, but from all the information that I have gained since that time, I have reason to fear that I was mistaken in that notion.

"2. One of the chief modes by which I then thought that a large reduction could be speedily effected was the transferring Hindostanee men of the Nizam's Cavalry to our Bengal corps, instead of filling up our vacancies by raw recruits. The horsemen so transferred would receive less pay than they do here, but, on the other hand, they would become entitled to pensions, so that, perhaps, in the long run they would not be worse off. The five Regiments of Nizam's Cavalry cost His Highness nearly half the whole expense of the Contingent, and I thought, and still think, the Cavalry service required could be as well performed by about half the present number of men. There would have been a saving of about nine lakhs of rupees per annum by transferring half the troopers in the manner above indicated. Some of the men to whom the offer might have been made might have preferred being discharged, but that would have relieved the Nizam equally.

"3. But I now find there are many practical difficulties in the way, of which I was not aware. I find that the Bengal Irregular Cavalry has been lately, and is now being, reduced very much in numbers, and that a great number of young men, not entitled to pensions, who have been discharged with a few months' pay, are now waiting as hangers-on to their relatives in each corps, looking out for vacancies, and hoping to take service again; so that there would be a very strong opposition made, very naturally and rightly, by the European officers of the Bengal Regiments, to admit the Nizam's troopers into their ranks.

"4. I think that opposition would be successful with the Governor-General. Thus a great part of my scheme, which last month seemed quite feasible, now seems to me to be good for nothing.

"5. With regard to the Nizam's Infantry, I still think that a considerable reduction of expense might be made by transfer. At least 150 men from each of the eight Regiments of Infantry might easily be dispensed with—that is to say, we might reduce 1,200 men, and give them the option of being drafted into the Bengal Regular Army. Almost all the Nizam's Infantry are Hindostances. They are admirably drilled and disciplined; and, I think, most commanding officers of Bengal corps would rather have them than raw recruits. Those corps have not many young men waiting about for vacancies, and have to send to a distance for recruits.

"6. Prospectively, all sorts of reductions would, of course, be quite easy. For instance, why not immediately stop all recruiting until the Cavalry regiments are down to 300 sabres, and the Infantry regiments to 460, rank and file, keeping up the regular number of Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, but having only an English Captain Commandant, a Second-in-Command, an Adjutant, and an Assistant Surgeon to each corps, Cavalry and Infantry, the number allotted in other Contingents?

"7. There are, also, various expenses in this Contingent which might well be abolished, such as Mess allowances, cost of building Mess rooms, the allowance to Senior Surgeons, Medical storekeepers, etc.

"8. Then the number of Brigadiers and Staff in the Contingent is quite preposterous. For 10,000 men we have five Brigadiers, five Brigade Majors, and several Paymasters.

"9. In my opinion two Brigadiers for the whole will be quite enough: one for the Cavalry branch, and the other to command the Artillery and Infantry.

"10. There should be only one Paymaster for the whole Contingent.

"11. These reductions might be made as the present incumbents retire, or are removed by death or promotion.

"12. The whole of the local officers might be pensioned on liberal terms; but I would give the poor fellows at least twelve months' warning, for they all seem hitherto to have calculated on remaining in the Nizam's service as long as they pleased, and many of them have families to maintain, and are, I regret to hear, in pecuniary difficulties.

"13. If all the local officers were pensioned there would just remain about the proper number of officers, three to each corps, on the reduced strength; and there would be a decided gain in discipline and cordiality of spirit in having all the officers from the Company's Army exclusively, instead of their being mixed up with local officers.

"14. Such arrangements, allowing the local officers pensions on the

same scale as given to Company’s officers, would ultimately prove a saving of at least twelve lakhs per annum.

“15. The reduction of numerical strength would also cause a proportional saving in clothing, military and medical stores, etc.

“16. Before closing this letter, let me repeat what I mentioned to you in my letter of last month, that in my opinion there ought to be no large sudden reduction, because, however unfair I consider this heavy drain of forty lakhs per annum to be upon the Nizam’s revenues, yet these troops are of long standing in the country.

“17. The bad part of the population stands in awe of them, and, for the sake of His Highness’s interests, I would deprecate a sudden and extensive disbandment, believing, as I do, that it would be the indirect cause of turbulence and confusion in many parts of these territories.

“18. There are other reasons also, if you have made up your minds in the Court to order an extensive reduction, why you should not specify any particular time within which that reduction shall be made, one of which is this, that it is impossible at present to say what our position in the Hyderabad country may be a couple of years hence.

“19. For the sake of our own good name among the Native States of India, I sincerely hope that Hyderabad may be kept up as a Native Government, and it is undoubtedly possible that it may be so kept up, *if the Nizam and his Minister will act according to Fraser’s counsel in the principal arrangements of the Administration*; and in that event it is particularly advisable to lessen as much as possible the present enormous drain of forty lakhs annually for this Contingent, which the Native Government cannot make use of without the consent of the Resident, who, when he gives that consent, is obliged also to interfere in some matter of internal administration. That circumstance alone naturally makes the Native Government extremely averse to disbanding many of its own troops, because the latter can be employed in any way the Circar chooses, without consulting a foreign Power.

“20. But if the Nizam and his Minister should not (as is but too probable) attend to the counsels of the Resident, and should not act with common sense in their management of affairs, the wheels of the Government may come almost to a standstill at the capital, and such confusion may arise in other parts of the country as may induce the Government of India to place the whole of the Nizam’s dominions under the management of European officers for a series of years, upon a plan similar to that which is now in force under Cubbon in the Mysore country; and, if so, a Contingent Force, commanded by European officers, of the extent of the present one, would not be in the least too large, because in the case supposed we should, of course, discharge the whole of the foreign mercenaries in this country, and also a very large portion of the Nizam’s own troops, an undisciplined rabble, worse than useless

to us, if we were in charge of the Administration. Indeed, considering the great extent of the Hyderabad country, it is possible that in such an event as that to which I have alluded, that we should require a larger Contingent than that which we have now. I repeat, therefore, that any large reduction should be gradual, and that a large discretionary power should be left to the Government of India regarding all details. If Hyderabad can be kept up as a Native State, I am decidedly of opinion that the cost of the Contingent should be reduced to an annual sum not exceeding the half of its present cost; but even if I felt quite sure that this Government were to remain constituted as it is now, I should advocate a gradual, in preference to a sudden, reduction.

"21. Fraser will be here in eight or ten days. I mean to have a copy of this letter made for him, in order to give him an opportunity of suggesting to you anything that he may think erroneous in my notions, or wanting in my explanation of the subject. He knows this Government and country better than I do, and from every point of view it is right that he should see what I have written on the subject of the Contingent, so that he may write to you on the subject, if he sees any occasion for it.

"22. I think I had better not advert to any other matters, either public or private, in this already too long letter. So adieu, and believe me, my dear Lushington, to be always

"Yours very sincerely,

"J. Low.

"To Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. L. Lushington, G.C.B.

"P.S.—In reading over what I have written, I observe that in the 19th paragraph I have said that I hope this Government may be kept up as a Native one 'for the sake of our good name among the Native States of India', so I had better give you some explanation of what I mean by that expression. I feel quite confident that Lord Dalhousie will never assume the direct management of the Hyderabad country if his Lordship does not honestly think the measure to be absolutely necessary, but our Native allies—indeed, Natives generally—at a distance will never believe that there was any such necessity. They judge only by events, and they have no means of knowing all the various and minute causes which produce those events. They know that there has been profound peace in this part of India for at least eight-and-twenty years. They know that this reigning family have been quite subservient to us for several generations; and if they shall ever hear of our reducing the Nizam and his Minister and nobles to ciphers, and of our managing the whole country and collecting its revenues by instruments of our own selection, made responsible exclusively to English officers, our allies will most assuredly ascribe the whole proceeding to our

ambition and our supposed innate aversion to all Native Sovereigns in India. And hence there will be no trifling increase to the suspicion, and fear and dislike of us that now exist in the minds of a great many Chiefs in other Native States, while the Nizam, and almost all the families of high rank in his country, and most of the military classes among his subjects, will, of course, most cordially detest us. Even some of those classes who will really and truly be relieved from oppression by our assumption of the Government will, after a short time, feel no sort of gratitude to us for that relief. They will forget their former miseries, and remember only the vexations they will be subject to under our rule; for the Natives of this country are, after all, not different in one respect from the inhabitants of all parts of the known world, in that they like their own ways better than those of foreigners.

“J. Low.”

The same opinions that had been expressed, and the same advice that had been given in his letter to Sir James Law Lushington, had also been officially given by Colonel Low in a letter to the Government of India, dated 20th July 1848, in these words:—

“It is still more grievous to reflect that a considerable portion of these pressing pecuniary difficulties of the Nizam’s Government has been indirectly brought upon it by our own annual demand upon his revenues, for forty lakhs of rupees per annum for the pay of the Contingent Force.

“It is really painful to me to mention all these facts and circumstances connected with the Nizam’s Contingent; but I have observed since I arrived here the pecuniary embarrassments of the Government to be so extensive that I have considered it an imperative duty to state my opinion candidly for submission to the Governor-General in Council; and upon the same principle I now close the report by expressing my opinion that immediate steps ought to be taken for reducing the expenses of the Contingent to a sum not exceeding twenty lakhs of Hyderabad rupees per annum at the utmost; because, whatever may have been the case formerly, it appears to me quite manifest that the Hyderabad Government cannot now afford to make the large ready money payments that are required by us for the maintenance of that Force. I am convinced that, if that constant drain were kept up for three years longer, it would cause a very serious increase to the confusion and distress of this capital, and that it would probably bring the whole machinery of the Administration to a standstill.”¹

¹ *Papers relating to the Nizam* (234 of 1859), p. 8.

I need add nothing, I am sure, by way of comment, to emphasise the importance of these letters. They unquestionably produced a marked effect at the time, though not, perhaps, exactly what was intended or expected by the writers themselves, and they must be left to tell their own story now. To make the series complete, a letter written by Colonel Low from Calcutta, General Fraser having resumed charge of the Residency on the 22nd of July, must here be added.

“Calcutta, September 13, 1848 (too late for
this evening’s dawd).

“MY DEAR FRASER,—Your long and acceptable letter of the 20th ult. only reached me yesterday afternoon, consequent on its having first travelled to Madras, where it probably arrived but a few hours after we had left it.

“As the official letter from Government, which I now enclose, is addressed to me in my capacity of Officiating Resident at Hyderabad, as the tenor of it relates only to affairs of that Residency, and lastly, as it is (if I recollect rightly) the only letter that was addressed to me which conveys approval of my proceedings while I was at Hyderabad, I would rather it should remain on the records of the Residency (to which it really belongs) than that it should continue in my possession, so pray oblige me by making it over to the official custody of Mr. Charles.

“I have only seen the Governor-General twice during the week that I have been here. The first time, I had a long conversation with him (very little of it about Hyderabad affairs), and the second time, being at dinner, I had no private conversation with him at all. At the first meeting I learnt to my regret that he had not yet sent any instructions to you. He showed me, and I read through, the Court’s despatch, directing him to give ‘decided support’ to Sooraj-ool-Moolk.

“I am still in the dark about myself. Lord Dalhousie told me that he had full confidence in my qualifications for the charge of Rajpootana, which, he said, he considered of *very great importance*, but added that Lieut.-Colonel Sleeman had applied for it, and by appointing Colonel Sleeman to it, other changes and modifications in the civil and political duties of that part of India could be effected, which some men, for whose opinions His Lordship has great respect, believed would be of advantage to the State; and that until he should have fully considered the plans that had been submitted to him as to those modifications, he would not decide,—but under any circumstances, he hinted that I should not be long without being again in harness. I replied that the public interests and conveniences were the first objects for him to attend

to, and that I am perfectly willing to wait till a convenient opportunity shall offer for posting me; and thus our confab ended. I have little doubt, or rather, I should say that I have no doubt, that I shall get either Rajpootana, Lucknow, or Nagpore. I would choose among those three, in the order in which I have now written them, but I shall be thankful to be fixed in any of the three positions. My experience in Europe of the last five years has done me good in this respect—that I know the value of all such situations much better than I formerly did, and appreciate, far more highly and justly than I used to do, my own good fortune in holding a situation of such respectability and so handsomely remunerative. When one thinks of the continued pecuniary difficulties and struggles of thousands of men at home of first-rate education and talents, one learns to feel how fortunate we are who hold high offices in John Company's service.

"I have only to add that I gave Lord Dalhousie as broad a hint as I could that he ought not to delay any longer furnishing you with his decision on the Nizam's appeal, whatever that decision might be; he said that he hoped to get the despatch off to you next week. What that decision is likely to be I really don't know—he did not tell me—and I made a point of not asking him. He is to start for Umballa about 12th proximo; and my impression is that he will place the administration of the Punjaub during the minority of the Rajah much more under the direct management of Europeans than it has been; not from any notion that the mass of the population will be more happy under us than they are under Native Chiefs, but because in that country he considers such a change necessary for our own safety. It seems that the Native Commandants of the various Sikh corps have distinctly informed Mr. Frederick Currie that their men were not to be trusted in being sent against Moolraj—that they (the men) would be more likely to join Moolraj than to oppose him!

"Don't be surprised if you don't even now get your instructions for a fortnight. Lord Dalhousie is still not quite well; he is overwhelmed with arrears of business in all Departments, I am told; and I hear that he has Lord William Bentinck's foible of doing too much in the way of drafting letters with his own hand. I make a point of not going near the Government House people for fear they should fancy I was trying to pump them about my own destiny. Even if I thought they knew His Lordship's intentions, I should not ask them any questions; but they don't know my determination to ask no questions, and might suspect me of seeking a convenient opportunity of picking up information from them. Moreover, I strongly suspect that none of them know his intentions positively on any question of patronage in high offices, not, at least, until his selections are ready, cut and dry, for submission to his colleagues in Council; and then, I am told, he likes to

communicate such nominations himself to the parties most concerned and hence, I imagine, the first 'pucka' information (as the Bengalees say) that I shall procure about my fate will be by a note from His Lordship.

"Mrs. Low joins me in kindest regards to Mrs. Fraser and the young ladies, and Mrs. Low will write to Mrs. Fraser when our fate shall be decided.

"Believe me to be,

"Yours very sincerely,

"J. Low.

"P.S.—On reading over this very long screed (the latter part of it written at night, and very fast), I see that I have omitted one thing that Lord Dalhousie said about Hyderabad affairs. He mentioned it himself, without anything from me that led to it. He said he thought we are entitled, by a fair construction of the Treaty, to a Contingent, but that he agreed with me in thinking it unfairly large and too expensive in its arrangements; and he again (as he did to you, I think you told me) had a slap at the 'five Brigadiers'. I merely said that it had, for many reasons, been *very vexatious* to me to write as I did about that Contingent, when he interrupted me by saying every public man should give his opinions honestly, whatever they are; and, he added, 'besides, I feel sure we shall have opinions very different from yours before us on that subject, so that we shall have full opportunity of judging correctly at last,' or words to that exact purport. And now you have a full report of my conference with the Governor-General, which, for once in a way, will not, I trust, be unacceptable to you.

"J. Low.

"N.B.—Of course I trust to your avoiding all allusion in your correspondence with Lord Dalhousie to anything in this letter. He did not say to me, 'I am speaking to you confidentially'; but still he would be vexed if he thought that his conversation was reported to anyone. I have done so to you, because it may possibly be useful to you to know what he said to me.

"J. Low."

On resuming his duties at the Hyderabad Residency, General Fraser at once found himself confronted with a most vexatious difficulty. Some indications had been remarked while Colonel Low was officiating as Resident, but they became gradually more frequent and marked throughout the third quarter of 1848, until in September His Highness distinctly stated his desire and intention of dismissing the Dewan.

The original and fundamental difficulty of Hyderabad adminis-

tration was, in fact, beyond Sooraj-ool-Moolk's unaided strength. The annual expenditure exceeded the receipts, and there were no resources from which arrears of pay due to troops, or debts at heavy interest, could be paid off. The Government counselled economy and reduction of establishments, but would neither afford relief by a loan on easy terms, nor set an example by reducing the Contingent. The excessive costliness of the Contingent was admitted on all hands, yet the irreducible burden was perpetually augmented by those monthly advances at interest which bore testimony to the value our Government set on its maintenance. In this question of reducing establishments our Government, represented by the civil and military officials most nearly concerned, and the Government of the Nizam, were pulled in opposite directions by identical motives. We wanted to keep up the Contingent because it was a valuable source of patronage and local influence, while its disbandment or reduction would deprive the Indian Army of many prizes, and harass the Government with a host of grievances. The Nizam, in the same way, objected to any large reduction in his "Line", and the other corps on his own list, because they were at his command, whereas he had to solicit the Resident, with full explanations, for the use of the Contingent; and also because, if any considerable number of troops were discharged, he would be exposed to the clamorous demands of a great number of persons having hereditary and personal claims on his consideration, and for whom he had hitherto provided by appointments in his Army. A body of troops under the immediate patronage and control of the Prince forms, as may be easily conceived, an essential portion of the administrative and social system of a State like Hyderabad. Besides purposes of royal pomp and ceremonial, there have always been many minor military and police requirements, demanding immediate action, for which the routine of the Contingent and the rules of the Residency were far too deliberate. Sir Henry Willock, one of the Court of Directors, in a Minute, dated 19th November 1851, fully acknowledged that by the gradual transformation of the Nizam's best Irregular Troops into the well-disciplined Contingent, "completely under our control", the Prince was "deprived of the services of those who had been his personal guards, and who constituted the force relied upon by the collectors of revenue and

officers of police, to maintain peace and order in the country", and was thus "necessitated to organise another and very objectionable force, composed of Pathans, Rohillas, and Arabs, to enable him to carry on the administration, and support his own authority."¹ The same views were supported at the same period in the Court of Directors by Colonel Sykes, Major Moore, and General Caulfield, the latter summing up the case in the following words:—

"We impose an unnecessary expense of 42 lakhs of rupees annually upon the Nizam in maintaining a Contingent organised, disciplined, and officered by us, to perform those duties which by Treaty devolve upon the Subsidiary Force, and we have withheld its services from the Nizam on grounds that cannot be defended, thereby rendering it necessary for His Highness to maintain at a heavy charge a large and inefficient force, with a view to avoid vexatious interference, and to afford employment to those of his adherents who have no other means of living."²

Lord Dalhousie said to Colonel Low, with regard to the oppressive nature of the expenses caused by the Contingent, "I feel sure we shall have opinions very different from yours before us on the subject";³ and so there were, likewise, very different opinions on the subject in the Court of Directors. The majority of the Court supported the ordinary official views that found favour at Calcutta, and that had regard solely—and, as I believe, very superficially—to what seemed to be our own gain and advantage. Some of the Directors, including several of the most able among them, unquestionably well disposed towards the Nizam,—Major Oliphant, Messrs. Cotton, Dent, Whitman, H. T. Prinsep, and Robert Campbell,—expressed views very similar to those consistently held by General Fraser, to the effect that the Contingent was in itself, though open to retrenchment, a reformed and model establishment, and that "with equally beneficial results, similar agency might be employed, in concert with the Nizam's Minister, for the reform of the civil administration of the country"; when, as "disorder and misrule ceased", "the necessity of keeping up so large an army would no longer exist", and "turbulent bodies of retainers would be gradually discharged". "The services of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force would, according to Treaty, be avail-

¹ *Papers Relating to the Nizam* (234 of 1859), p. 7.

² *Ibid.*, p. 21.

³ *Ante*, p. 258.

able should any emergency arise.”¹ General Fraser never deviated from the opinion that reduction ought to commence with the inefficient and turbulent Irregulars, against whom on so many occasions the Contingent had been obliged to take the field, and that their disarmament would be one of the measures that would facilitate a diminution in the heavy charges of the Contingent itself. In a Memorandum, dated 25th September 1849, there are full details of account and muster-rolls relating to the Line and other troops, which it is needless to reproduce here, but the following extracts will give the general purport, and will fairly represent in this respect the Resident’s opinion.

“The Contingent is the only effective body of troops belonging to the Nizam’s Government, and even that cannot be paid with regularity, except with the assistance of the British Government. It has been argued that these troops are too heavy a drain on the Nizam’s resources, and that the expense ought to be reduced. Such a measure would be highly impolitic. These troops are equally effective as the Honourable Company’s, and are kept at a cheaper rate. A reduction of expense, therefore, must mean a reduction of numbers, and that would very seriously affect the efficiency of the remainder. The Nizam could not do without them, and in the proportion they might be reduced, I will venture to assert that he would be obliged to entertain double or treble their numbers, increasing the charge, and diminishing the efficiency. These troops are the only troops of any real service to the Nizam in keeping his country quiet, and they actually cost him much less than would the Contingent he has stipulated by Treaty to keep up. The Irregular troops, in nominal numbers, amount to about 35,000, independent of the Pagah, under Shums-ool-Oomra. Five or six thousand of these are Horse, and the remainder Infantry and Artillery. Both Horse and Foot are entertained under Jemadars, who command parties varying in numbers, according to the Nuzzuranas they may have given for employment. I do not believe there is a single party under any Jemadar that is kept up in number as contracted for, or paid by the Jemadar, at the rate at which it is entered and charged in the Government books. With the exception of the Arabs and Pathans, these men are, for any military purposes, perfectly useless. Yet their annual cost is upwards of seventy-three lakhs of rupees, or nearly double the cost of the Contingent.

“The Pathans I suppose to be about 4,000 in number. The Arabs muster about 6,000, about one-half of whom may be genuine Arabs; the other half are men of the country, shaved like Arabs, and taught to sing

¹ *Papers Relating to the Nizam* (234 of 1859), p. 20.

their cry. The remainder are, as I have already observed, nothing but rabble.

“Sooraj-ool-Moolk turned his early attention to reduce this useless expense, and incurred much odium on the occasion. He discharged about 10,000 of them; or, I should rather say, reduced the charge by the pay of 10,000 men, for probably not more than one-half that number of living men were discharged. If this measure of reduction had really been carried out it would have saved the State ten lakhs of rupees annually.

“Sooraj-ool-Moolk had matured his plans for reducing this worthless expenditure by twenty-five lakhs of rupees more, when the discussions commenced which led to his removal, and consequently paralysed all his efforts during the few months he afterwards remained in office.”

With views very much in accordance with these, and still with a hope that financial relief might be afforded in the form of a loan to assist in the discharge of useless troops, General Fraser, immediately on his return to the Residency, addressed the following letter to the Governor-General.

“Hyderabad, 24th July 1848.

“MY LORD,—I arrived at Hyderabad the day before yesterday, the 22nd, and have lost no time in causing a copy of the correspondence to be prepared, which refers, more or less directly, to the loan of a crore of rupees which, under certain circumstances, we should have made to the Nizam’s Government in the year 1843. Your Lordship will observe that Lord Ellenborough would not have acceded to any application from the Nizam’s Government to this effect, unless the whole administration of the Nizam’s dominions had been transferred to British management, and that, in this case, the amount advanced by us was to have been repaid, with compound interest, at 5 per cent. per annum.¹ These papers will, perhaps, be worthy of your Lordship’s perusal, for it may be doubted whether the Nizam’s Government will be able to maintain itself, unless we either aid it with a loan, direct or guaranteed, or that it adopts such a vigorous system of administration, and especially reduction of unnecessary expenditure, as I fear we can scarcely look for from Native rule, under whatever shape it may present itself.

“I find that my friend Colonel Low has written a good deal about a partial reduction of the Contingent, but I would fain hope that nothing will be decided on this subject without the consideration which it demands. It is easy to recommend a reduction to the amount of twenty lakhs of rupees per annum, but it would be just as easy to bring it down at once to five lakhs; or, if that strict justice is done to the Nizam for

¹ *Ante*, pp. 179, 180, 187, 189.

which some persons contend, to abolish the Contingent altogether. We must recollect that the disbandment of the greatest part of the mercenary and other Irregular troops, who are under the exclusive control of the Nizam's Government, can be effected only on condition of my undertaking to secure the internal tranquillity of the country by such a distribution of the present actual Contingent as I may think proper.

"I beg to be allowed this opportunity of presenting my respectful compliments, as well as those of my daughter, to Lady Dalhousie, and remain, my Lord,

"Your very faithful and obedient servant,

"J. S. FRASER."

In August there was a slight appearance of an improved understanding between His Highness and the Minister, to which the General refers in the latter part of the following letter to Lord Dalhousie.

"Hyderabad, 30th August 1848.

"MY LORD,—I beg to transmit for your perusal a private letter, with the enclosure to which it gave cover, from Captain Meadows Taylor, the officer in charge of Shorapore, as they refer to a matter which I do not propose to make the subject of an official communication to the Government of India, unless Captain Taylor insists upon it, or that your Lordship thinks I ought to do so. Captain Taylor wishes to have a military force stationed in Shorapore for the purpose of overawing his Bedur population; but I think I have already sufficiently guarded against any danger from these men by the regiment of Cavalry at Goolburga, with its detachments at Ufzulpoor and Ferozabad, besides the regiment of Infantry at Lingasoogoor with a detachment of Artillery, and two companies of Infantry permanently stationed at Muktul, while, in case of any outbreak in Shorapore, every necessary reinforcement might be rapidly sent from Bolarum or Secunderabad. I do not feel at all disposed to have a military force permanently placed within the district of Shorapore. Independently of the immense inconvenience of our sparing troops for that purpose, I wish Captain Taylor to accustom his Bedurs to be kept quiet by moral influence rather than by military coercion. He is, by his disposition and qualifications, better suited than any other man I know to effect this object, and think that his present suggestion arises in a great measure from a needless distrust of his own powers of control.

"I fear the reports I am sending up regarding the state of affairs at Hyderabad will not tend to simplify or facilitate the drafting of those instructions with which I am to be furnished. The turn which things

have taken lately removes much of the ground for a severe lecture to the Durbar, that might otherwise have been advisable. Your Lordship will, however, perceive that I hesitate to anticipate any extraordinary advantage from the reconciliation between His Highness and the Minister. It will either not be a lasting one, or if it be, it must, to do much good, generate a greater degree of energy than has ever yet been exhibited. In all these difficulties I am glad, notwithstanding, to be able to inform your Lordship, though it is but a very negative species of consolation, that we are quiet throughout the whole of the Nizam's country, and that no disturbance is on foot, or anticipated anywhere, so far as I am aware.

"It was a matter of deep concern to me to learn from Mr. Courtenay that your Lordship was suffering from indisposition. A change from the hot, damp climate of Calcutta to the cooler one of the North-West, with a temporary relief from the burdensome details of the Bengal Government, would afford, I think, the best assurance of renovated health and strength. I hope your Lordship will be induced to try the efficacy of this remedy, for sickness is not to be trifled with in India."

In a private interview with the Resident, in September 1848, the Nizam requested that the Governor-General might be informed of his wish to remove Sooraj-ool-Moolk from office, and to replace him by the Peshcar, Rajah Ram Buksh, who had offered a muzzurana of fifty lakhs of rupees on his appointment, which the Nizam proposed to accept as a voluntary contribution for public purposes.

On receiving this communication from the Nizam, the Governor-General desired the Resident, in a letter dated the 7th October 1848, to inform His Highness that he had received it "with surprise and regret, since his Lordship bears in mind that Sooraj-ool-Moolk was appointed Dewan by His Highness readily, and with apparent satisfaction, when his name was suggested by the British Resident, whose advice was solicited by His Highness; and since that time the Governor-General has had no reason to suppose that the Dewan had shown himself unworthy of the distinguished position in which His Highness had placed him. His integrity is called in question by no man. He attends to the duties of his high office. He has shown every desire to labour for the accomplishment of those great measures of improvement which have been so frequently urged upon His Highness as indispensably necessary in order to set his Kingdom free from the serious financial embarrassments under which it labours."

"If the affairs of the Circar are in a condition unsatisfactory to His Highness, if the finances of the country are exhausted and the credit of the Government gone, these difficulties must not be attributed to the Dewan, but to the obstructions which have prevented his reducing that expenditure on public establishments which is daily dragging the country down towards poverty and disorder.

"The Governor-General is unable to perceive any grounds for the displeasure which His Highness has manifested towards the Dewan, nor any good reason for the wish expressed by His Highness to dismiss him. His Lordship does not know by whom Sooraj-ool-Moolk could be advantageously succeeded in his office.

"The incompetency of Rajah Ram Buksh has already been proved in past years. And if any further proof were required of his ineligibility for that post, it would be found in the offer of a nuzzurana of fifty lakhs of rupees on his appointment, which His Highness states the Rajah has made. When the Rajah proposes to make his entrance into office by the pursuance of a mischievous custom which leads directly to practices of oppression and corruption, the Governor-General can never view with approbation the selection of such a person to be the first Minister of the Ruler of the Kingdom of Hyderabad.

"The Governor-General does not desire to dictate to His Highness the person whom he shall employ in his service as Dewan. His Highness the Nizam is an independent Sovereign. The British Government desire that he should continue to be so, and will rejoice to see his country made happy and his people prosperous. But the Governor-General is desirous of impressing upon the mind of His Highness the grave importance of the circumstances in which he is acting, and the fatal consequences to His Highness's dignity and realm which may be the result of his acting unwisely at so critical a time.

"The State of Hyderabad is oppressed with heavy debt. The advances made by the British Government for the payment of troops are largely increased.

"The Governor-General desires clearly and distinctly to warn His Highness, that within a short space of time his treasury will be bankrupt, and his whole Kingdom in disorder and confusion.

"The Governor-General warns His Highness that if he pursues the course he is now following, his country will soon cease to be either prosperous or peaceful. In such event, the British Government, having regard to the tranquillity of its own territories, and to the interests of its own subjects, could not permit the existence, in a neighbouring State, of turbulence and disorder, when these have become injurious to its own interests and safety.

"In such a state of things the British Government would probably feel itself compelled to exercise a peremptory interference in the internal administration of His Highness's dominions, in order to avert from its people the inconvenience and the injury which the disordered condition of the neighbouring State must needs inflict upon them. The Governor-General sincerely trusts that His Highness will give heed to these friendly words, and that regard for the honour and interests of his own realm will induce him so to act as to avert the adoption of such measures by the British Government as must tend to lower His Highness's dignity and to reduce his power."

Unfortunately, this letter, though certainly not deficient in strength, was more irritating than persuasive, and its mingled warnings and assurances were balanced against each other in a manner decidedly undiplomatic and inconclusive. The Nizam was reminded that his Kingdom was "oppressed with heavy debts"; and more especially that "the advances made by the British Government" for the Contingent had been very largely increased; but not a hint was given, not a hope was held out, either that the expenses of the Contingent would be diminished, or that relief would be afforded to the overburdened credit of the Nizam by that loan from the British Government of a crore of rupees, at moderate interest, which for more than five years had been held out by the Resident and the Minister, from time to time, as the means of re-establishing a financial equilibrium.

None of the expectations raised by Sooraj-ool-Moolk were realised, and no inducement to his retention as Minister was offered by the Resident or by the Government of India. Thus, in immediate connection with the heavy disappointment as to a loan, came a practical disparagement of the reforming and economical agency by which that loan was to have been arranged. "The Governor-General does not desire to dictate to His Highness the

person whom he shall employ in his service as Dewan. His Highness the Nizam is an independent Sovereign."

Nothing could be more sound or more just than this acknowledgment, but at the exact moment of its transmission it was rather too significant and too suggestive. The dismissal of Sooraj-ool-Moolk was, it is true, deprecated, the qualifications of Ram Buksh were cried down, and the system of nuzzuranas on entry to office was very properly deprecated. But it was, confessedly, an urgent question of ways and means. The Governor-General warned the Nizam "clearly and distinctly" that "within a short space of time his treasury" would "be bankrupt". This impending catastrophe was evident enough. It was equally evident that Sooraj-ool-Moolk could not avert it with a loan from the British Government. In default of this tantalising loan, why not accept the nuzzurana proffered by Rajah Ram Buksh? The retention for a few years longer, until the finances were set right again, of the royal prerogative of receiving nuzzuranas, was better than bankruptcy, disorder, and sequestration by the British Government, which proposed no relief or remedy. Such may well be believed to have been, as rumour conveyed, the simple train of argument by which the Nizam and his confidential advisers justified themselves in persisting in the dismissal of Sooraj-ool-Moolk, and in the restoration of Ram Buksh as Peshear.

At length Lord Dalhousie's answer came to the two letters from General Fraser that have just been given, and in it the Governor-General also notices the recent official correspondence on Hyderabad affairs.

"On board the *Sonamookkee*,¹

"October 17th, 1848.

"MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—During the first two months after we parted, I had, unfortunately, too good an excuse for silence in the affairs of Hyderabad in the state of my health, which unfitted me entirely for the transaction of any business which was not indispensable at the moment. For the last six weeks I have had only the excuse—which you will probably not hold to be a valid one—of having more important business in another quarter pressing on me, and occupying very much of my attention and time.

¹ The *Sonamookkee* (*Anglicè*, "Golden-faced"), a highly ornamented State galley for the Governor-General's use on the Ganges, the use of which is now quite superseded by steamers and railways.

"Before I left Calcutta, a week ago, I signed a despatch to you on the affairs of His Highness.

"I am aware that, with the very decided opinions which you entertain of the hopelessness of any measure for the redemption of the State of Hyderabad, and its restoration to solvency, still more to prosperity, excepting the assumption of the administration directly by ourselves,—opinions which, I perceive, have been confirmed and strengthened by what you have observed since your return,—the instructions which you will now receive will not be satisfactory to you. They do not authorise any assumption of authority by any British officer, and do no more than warn H.H. once more of the certainty of his kingdom being brought to that position, unless his present course be altered and amended. These warnings, you will say, have been given for forty years, and will no more be attended to now than they have been in any of the forty years before. I think, however, that the intimation of what must come is conveyed in language somewhat less courtly, and somewhat more precise and plain-spoken, than heretofore, and I am not without hope that it may have its effect.

"One thing, at all events, is certain, that to attempt to sustain Sooraj-ool-Moolk as Dewan, after the repeated manifestations of deep-seated antipathy on the part of H.H., and of that entire discrepancy of sentiment which you recognise as existing between them, would be only labour lost and folly.

"We have strongly represented the Dewan's claims and fitness, expressed the satisfaction of this Government with the services he renders his Master, and counselled his continuance in office. It is vain to go further than this by seeking to make the Nizam retain him, either by compulsion, or by such an exercise of our influence as, in the relative positions of the two States, would virtually be compulsion. No good could come of it, and we should furnish the Nizam with a plea in his own favour, and with a grievance against us.

"If, then, H.H. chooses to take advantage of the power which we recognise him to hold, and, disregarding our counsel, should take some other incapable person to be his Minister, he must bear his fate when it comes. But whatever may happen, or may not happen, the Government of India can undertake no great political reforms, can neither organise nor instruct a great political revolution in the Kingdom of Hyderabad, until the war with the Pnajaub is concluded, and the affairs of that part of the country are settled. If the Nizam chooses to precipitate his crisis in the meantime, he must go to the dogs his own way, for the Government of India has no time just now to take care of him—unless, indeed, he has a mind to have a war too, in which case, no doubt, we should be able to attend to him. My own opinion as to the affairs of that kingdom remains as it was when I had the pleasure of

to the very wide, and, as it proved, irreconcilable, difference between the principles and the method for dealing with the difficulties and the defects of the Nizam's Government recommended by the Resident, and those adopted by the great Proconsul whose decision was conclusive. It is impossible for anyone to shut his eyes to the fact that the attitude and tone assumed, from the very first, by Lord Dalhousie, were not really considerate or friendly towards our faithful though weak Ally; and I shall show, moreover, that there was a latent misunderstanding as to the exact nature and limits of the measures proposed by General Fraser, which was never fully visible to either of the correspondents, and which has never hitherto been properly explained.

Strange to say, with full appreciation of those grounds for hopefulness which the Resident laid before him, Lord Dalhousie was hopeless as to any reform of the Hyderabad administration by the moderate application of British influence in aid of internal resources and Native capacity. "Full examination of past representations and of despatches up to the present time", writes Lord Dalhousie, "compels me to feel that the state of the country from any supposed oppression or misrule is not such as to warrant an interference of the British Government at present. I remain of opinion that an interference will become necessary, but I think that the necessity will be brought about by a financial catastrophe, and not by any popular outbreak, or by any disorganisation of the Army, or of the administration of the Government in the provinces, such as it is."

That phrase, "such as it is", is enough to show that the Governor-General quite recognised the improvements required in the administration, but was not inclined to give that measure of help, in any form, which General Fraser, with his long local experience, assured him would be quite sufficient. When Lord Dalhousie spoke of "interference", he meant—though the Resident was not aware of it,—interference to the extent of complete suppression of local government by an influx of highly salaried English officers, in the style of the Mysore Commission, as it is enforced still in the Nizam's provinces of Berar. Any interference, short of this, Lord Dalhousie considered would not be advantageous or profitable to the British Government. He thought that interference would be made necessary by "a financial catastrophe", but he wished to wait for it. He wished to wait for a pretext; and he wished, also, to wait till the

war in the Punjab was over, that his hands might be free to act. He would not accept General Fraser's assurances that all the pressure demanded by the occasion was moral and persuasive, if rightly directed, and that there would be no call for coercion. Now, it is true that both Lord Ellenborough and Lord Hardinge, swayed by the prejudices of Calcutta, were equally convinced that nothing could be done at Hyderabad without some degree of military coercion, and used the wars in Scinde, Gwalior, and on the Sutlej as pleas for deferring those firm remonstrances and definite counsels which the Resident suggested.¹ But their language was not offensive or menacing. The Earl of Dalhousie at the earliest moment revealed to the Resident his anticipation of coercive measures becoming necessary, and his perfect indifference as to the consequences that might fall upon the Hyderabad State. The Nizam "must bear his fate when it comes". "If the Nizam chooses to precipitate his crisis in the meantime"—that is, before the Punjab war is over,— "he must go to the dogs his own way, for the Government of India has no time just now to take care of him—unless, indeed, he has a mind to have a war too, in which case we should be able to attend to him."

It is not easy to distinguish here the note of friendly consideration for a State and a dynasty with which we had *never* been at war, and which had stood by us in every time of need and of trial while British power was being established in India.

Lord Dalhousie expected "a financial catastrophe". He thought that we were not "free of blame in respect of the footing on which we maintained" the Contingent. He admitted "the extravagant costliness of this Force and its appendages". Yet he would do nothing to diminish that "extravagant costliness" which was the main cause of the Nizam's financial difficulties.

Lord Dalhousie judged rightly that the official instructions conveyed at the same time with this letter would not be "satisfactory" to General Fraser. The whole spirit of the Resident's policy and proposals were misunderstood and, as it were, perverted. The Governor-General spoke of the Resident contemplating "administration directly by ourselves", and "assumption of authority by British officers". But while the Governor-General, in using these terms, was thinking—to use his own words again—of "organising

¹ *Ante*, pp. 201, 202, 209, 210.

a great political revolution", of setting aside the Prince, the Minister, and all the local dignitaries, and of flooding the country, as he did at last in Berar, with English officers, General Fraser had no such intention and no such suspicion, at this period, of Lord Dalhousie's revolutionary views. General Fraser from the very first deprecated any repetition of the Mysore sequestration; having declared that "the permanent assumption of any portion of that country would be a stain upon our good faith and national character".¹ All that he asked for was explicit and straightforward support of the Resident and the Minister, so that their influence over the Hyderabad Durbar should be established beyond all dispute, and that they should be able to work uninterruptedly in concert. Then, however direct and however strong British influence might be in the administration of Hyderabad, it could be applied without public scandal, or dishonour to the Prince; there would be no "organised revolution" or sweeping displacement of the higher Native officials. General Fraser's plan, repeatedly propounded, was to employ no more than three English gentlemen in the Civil administration, and those not, strictly speaking, "British officers", that is to say, not in the Queen's or Company's service. They were Captain Meadows Taylor and Mr. Henry Dighton, whose names I have already had occasion to mention, and Captain Commandant Bullock. Captains Taylor and Bullock were local officers of the Nizam's Army; Mr. Dighton was, as we know, a merchant and a banker. All three, while really subordinate and responsible to the Resident, would have been in the service and pay of the Nizam.

Above all, as will be seen more in detail hereafter, it was General Fraser's firm conviction that if ever the extreme measure of formally assigning a portion, or the whole, of his dominions to the management of the British Resident should be pressed on the Nizam, the assignment should be made for a special number of years—five years being, in his opinion, quite a sufficient period for the firm establishment of a reformed administration in every department.

The very positive and peremptory rejection of his advice by Lord Dalhousie did not convince General Fraser, or convert him to the policy of letting the Nizam "go to the dogs". Lord Dal-

¹ *Ante*, p. 28.

housie in this letter professed great aversion to anything resembling "compulsion". General Fraser knew that there need be no compulsion. There was so even a balance in the counsels of the Durbar, that one firm word would have turned the scale in favour of the Dewan and the Resident. But when the Governor-General, to whose orders and instructions the Resident was bound to conform, declared that to insist on the Nizam retaining Sooraj-ool-Moolk in office would be "*labour lost and folly*", there was nothing more to be said for the time in any direct communication. It is ill arguing with the master of twenty legions. General Fraser's labour was indeed lost.

CHAPTER VIII

A Church Riot—The Portuguese Patriarch and the Vicars Apostolic—Bishops and Priests under Military Interdict—Letters to and from Lord Dalhousie—Letter to Major Moore—Intrigues against Sooraj-ool-Moolk—His early Efforts to Diminish Feudal Tenures and Hereditary Jurisdictions—Dismissal of Sooraj-ool-Moolk—Letters from Lord Dalhousie—Subsidiary Force against the Goolburga rebels—Letters to and from Sir Henry Pottinger—E. B. Eastwick.

THE Roman Catholic Bishop's case, mentioned in Lord Dalhousie's last letter, was, indeed, as he said, an "untoward and awkward affair".¹ It was one of a long series of disputes and disturbances arising out of the ecclesiastical pretensions of the Portuguese Archbishop of Goa and Patriarch of the Indies, which for nearly half a century gave much trouble to the civil and military authorities in British India, and plenty of work to the police and the courts of justice. The Archbishop, nominated by the King of Portugal under an ancient Concordat, claimed certain metropolitan powers over the entire Continent of India, which were not acknowledged by the Vicars Apostolic, directly appointed by the Pope, exercising episcopal functions over a great number of Roman Catholic missionaries, and over the priests acting as military chaplains to the troops in our cantonments. Hence arose frequent disputes as to cure of souls between the Goanese and the European priests, which in many cases assumed the concrete form of a conflict for the possession of a chapel. The Native Christians, and the mixed race calling themselves Portuguese, widely spread through India, naturally sided with the priests of their own country and complexion; while our soldiers, as naturally, preferred the Irish and French missionaries. Without hazarding any opinion on the merits of a controversy quite beyond the sphere of my judgment, I may add that after having been carried on for many years, both in our Courts and in the Roman Curia, the dispute has

¹ *Ante*, p. 269.

been, to all intents and purposes, decided against the Patriarch of Goa, both by ecclesiastical and municipal jurisdiction, under protest, however, from both Church and King in Portugal.

In 1848, one of these contests for the possession of a chapel arrived at the acute stage in the cantonment of Secunderabad, forming a vexatious and unintelligible puzzle for the military magistrate and the officer commanding the Force. While the matter was yet *sub judice*, circumstances led to a collision between the Goanese and European priests, with whom the coloured Catholics and the Irish soldiers respectively took sides, and at last something like a riot took place, in which no very serious acts of violence were committed beyond the wrecking of the chapel the possession of which was in question. Some soldiers of the Queen's Regiment and of the Company's Artillery had taken part in the riot, and one or two Irish priests were accused of having incited them to violence by words spoken at the altar; while the Vicar Apostolic, Bishop Murphy, was blamed for not having, as the military authorities alleged, either previously forbidden or subsequently blamed the violent words and acts of his curates and his flock. After a long inquiry and much correspondence, the Government of Madras decided that the Irish Bishop and priests could not be allowed any longer to remain in contact with our soldiers at Secunderabad; and the Brigadier in command having summarily expelled them from the cantonment, called upon General Fraser, in pursuance of orders from Madras, to deport them from the Nizam's dominions. This, as will be seen from the following extracts of a despatch on the subject, dated 11th September 1848, the Resident hesitated to do without explicit instructions from the Government of India, to which he was immediately subordinate. It will be seen also that the General appreciated the singular encroachments on the spiritual field to which the Madras Government was committing itself, and the inextricable complications in which we might soon be involved.

“Under common circumstances I should, of course, not hesitate to give effect to any application I might receive from the Government of Fort St. George; but on an occasion of so much importance as the present one, wherein I am entirely unacquainted with the proceedings of the recent inquiry at Secunderabad, and can possess, therefore, no assurance that the Governor-General in Council will assent to the very

strong measure of removing the Right Rev. Dr. Murphy and others from His Highness the Nizam's dominions, I have deemed it better to apply for the instructions of the Government of India before I proceed to give effect to the resolution of the Government of Fort St. George.

"It is not my intention to offer any opinion with regard to the expediency or otherwise of the measure now in question, being quite ignorant, as above stated, of the details of the inquiry on which it has been founded; but it may not be irrelevant on my part to state that Dr. Murphy, who is Bishop of Philadelphia *in partibus*, and Vicar Apostolic of a very large diocese, including Hyderabad, has been about ten years at this station, and that during the whole of this time I have never witnessed any improper or indiscreet conduct on his part, or heard him spoken of by anyone otherwise than as a person of the most gentlemanly and conciliatory demeanour, and undeviatingly characterised by the most humble and unassuming deportment.

"Viewing the question as one affecting a violation of the rights of property, or as one of military discipline, I have no remark to offer; but if the Government of Fort St. George makes the selection of a Roman Catholic priest to administer to the spiritual wants of the Catholics of H.M.'s 84th Regiment, dependent on the exclusive judgment of the Commanding Officer of that corps,—as would seem to be the case on reference to the Minutes of Consultation now forwarded,—a serious error, as it appears to me, will be committed if the person so selected belongs to the Portuguese Church of Goa, since the Archbishop of Goa and the priests belonging to his diocese are expressly prohibited by the Court of Rome from exercising spiritual jurisdiction within any of the Vicariats Apostolic of India, or anywhere except in those places where Portugal possesses territory and political power. It may be, and doubtless is, entirely right that we should exercise as little interference as possible in Roman Catholic religious questions of this kind; but it is more especially clear that we should not exercise any such interference as would involve and encourage a direct opposition and act of disobedience to the spiritual authority of that power which all Roman Catholics are bound to obey."

To Lord Dalhousie he wrote privately, as follows.

"Hyderabad, 12th September 1848.

"MY LORD,—I must advert to the late disagreeable events at Secunderabad, and the Resolution of the Madras Government in consequence, which were the subject of an official communication from me under yesterday's date to Calcutta.¹

¹ Lord Dalhousie himself was then in camp, on his way to the Punjaub, so that the case might have escaped his notice, and have been settled in ordinary routine by the Council at Calcutta.

"It was not without a somewhat anxious consideration of the matter that I determined to defer acting in compliance with the application from Madras, until I should receive the instructions of your Lordship's Government. It seemed to me that the removal from his diocese of a Bishop hitherto so highly and so universally esteemed as Dr. Murphy, was an extreme measure which at least required previous submission to the Government of India. It will be seen that in my reply to the Madras Government I offered no opinion, still less presumed to comment on its proceedings; but I cannot refrain from observing that the measures determined at Madras appear to me to be extremely severe, or from expressing a hope that the ultimate decision of the Supreme Government will be well considered, not only with reference to the intrinsic merits of the Madras Resolution, but also with some thought of the clamorous discussion which the enforcement of that Resolution will inevitably raise at home, and perhaps throughout the Roman Catholic world. Dr. Murphy is held in high respect and regard, as I have reason to know, both at Rome and by all the Bishops and members of his communion in India; and his summary and peremptory removal from his diocese will, I imagine, be an act almost without a parallel in English history since the Reformation, certainly since the Revolution of 1688. It will assuredly attract much attention, and I doubt if it will be considered justifiable, in the relative positions of the Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches, by any party in Church or State, unless some very strong and urgent reasons, of which I have heard nothing, can be advanced in favour of it.

"I have given official intimation to the Officer Commanding the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, that as far as regards the removal of the Right Reverend Dr. Murphy and certain of his priests from the Nizam's dominions, I have referred for the instructions of the Government of India; but I have abstained from making any remark to him regarding his execution of any orders he may receive from Madras regarding the expulsion of these parties from the cantonment of Secunderabad.

"I have the honour to be, my Lord,

"Your very faithful and obedient servant,

"J. S. FRASER."

Here is Lord Dalhousie's reply to this and other letters from the Resident :—

"Ghazee pore, November 4, 1848.

"MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—In my last letter I omitted to return to you Lord Ellenborough's letters, which you sent to me in original. They are now enclosed.

“The Government of Madras sent to us the papers relative to your Roman Catholic Bishop shortly after we received your letter. The question was a *ticklish* one in every way, and I took time to consider it. The despatch will have shown you that we concurred in your view, that the removal of the Bishop from the territories of the Nizam was not only a very strong measure in itself, but a much more violent one than the circumstances of the case would justify. Bishop Murphy was, however, in my judgment, greatly to blame in the matter; and it is, in my opinion, quite necessary that it should be made clear that neither priest nor Bishop can be permitted with impunity to incite men to commit outrages against the law, or to interfere with military discipline. I have no doubt that the Bishop, being the discreet, sensible person you describe him to be, will keep himself within bounds, and hold a tighter rein over his subalterns. If not, I shall not hesitate to adopt very decided measures.

“With regard to the present case, I have no doubt that the Ecclesiastical authorities will recognise the necessity of moving the priests altogether away from Hyderabad, and spare the Government of India the disagreeable duty of taking steps for compelling them to go.

“In respect of the proposal made by Captain Taylor for the establishment of a Force in the district of Shorapore, I am quite willing to be guided by your opinion, which at present is so clearly adverse to the proposal. The present time is in itself unpropitious for such a proposal; since our own wants towards the North will compel us to draw heavily on the Bombay and Madras Presidencies for aid in troops. But in truth I can see nothing advanced by Captain Taylor which goes to prove the necessity for the measure he recommends. Doubtless the presence of British troops would increase the security and ensure the tranquillity of that country; but I see no reason to doubt that it might be kept tranquil without them; and under these circumstances, and fortified by your opinion, I would advise you to discourage Captain Taylor from making such an application, unless subsequent events should give you reason to change the opinion you at present entertain. I return his letter and enclosure.

“I cannot bring myself to believe that there is any cordiality, or likelihood of endurance in the professed reconciliation between the Nizam and his Dewan. I therefore did not think it the least necessary to do otherwise than to reply directly to the official complaints His Highness addressed to me, without taking notice of the apparent reconciliation, of which he had said nothing to me, either by himself or through you. I augur no good from the apparent patching-up of relations between them.

“The debt to us has had a terrible lift by your last report, and is,

as I always thought, more likely to bring about the crisis than any other circumstance. But all good powers avert it just now !

"I hope to be on the frontier in three weeks.

"Believe me, yours very truly,

"DALHOUSIE."

And so Bishop Murphy was not expelled from his diocese, but was forbidden to enter its principal town, where were situated his cathedral church, the principal schools, and charitable institutions under his charge. For two years he could obtain no release from these anomalous and unmanageable conditions, and was obliged to seek redress in London, taking with him a letter to General Fraser's old friend in the Court of Directors, Major Moore.

"Hyderabad, 7th January 1851.

"MY DEAR MOORE,—This letter is to recommend to your courtesy and kindness a friend of mine, the Right Rev. Dr. Murphy, Bishop of Philadelphia, *in partibus infidelium*, and Vicar Apostolic of Hyderabad, who was removed from his diocese by order of the Madras Government, about two years ago, in consequence of a religious dispute, in which some of the men of the 84th Foot took a part, but who was afterwards permitted to remain within his diocese, though excluded from Secunderabad. As, however, his cathedral or principal church is there, this was almost equivalent to suspension from the functions of his office.

"I do not presume to express any opinion on the merits of the case, as I have had no official or private cognisance of the papers connected with it. Of the personal qualities, however, of Dr. Murphy I can speak with confidence, as I have known him for at least ten years, and a man of milder disposition and temper, and of more gentlemanly and unassuming deportment, I have never known in my life.

"He is going home to endeavour to secure reinstatement in his former position and place of residence, but my only object, as I began this letter by saying, is to beg that you will do me the favour to receive him with that civility and kindness which are habitual to you.

"Believe me, my dear Moore,

"Very sincerely yours,

"J. S. FRASER."

Eventually, by instructions from the Court of Directors, the military interdict was raised, and Bishop Murphy returned from London, invigorated probably by the change of air, to resume the full exercise of his episcopal functions in Secunderabad.

All through the latter half of 1848 intrigues were in progress

against the Ministry of Sooraj-ool-Moolk, whose reforms, and whose rumoured projects of reform, were by no means acceptable either to those who had thriven on the abuses of Chundoo Lall's rule and hoped for their revival, or to the higher class of Chieftains and Nobles, who stood by the ancient ways and feared—with good reason from their point of view—every innovation. The greatest ambition of the courtier or successful functionary at Hyderabad was always that of obtaining the grant of a service Jaghire, or landed estate, on the feudal tenure of maintaining so many troops. Much of the land revenue was thus alienated, by favour or influence, to very little purpose, with the additional objection that by old custom the Jaghiredar exercised the powers of magistracy and police within his own estate, which constituted a serious obstacle to administrative reform. The late Nawab Sir Salar Jung, during his long and useful career as Minister, was constantly occupied in breaking down, as occasion offered, that same system of military tenures and the right of maintenance, with the usual accompaniment of hereditary jurisdiction, which it was the great object of so many English enactments to abolish, in the period from Edward I and Richard II down to Henry VII, who at last succeeded in putting them down for ever. But in pursuing this policy Sir Salar Jung was only carrying out the process that had been sketched out by his uncle, Sooraj-ool-Moolk, and to a limited extent brought into action under the advice and influence of General Fraser.

In a Memorandum respectfully submitted to the Nizam in November 1848, by Sooraj-ool-Moolk, immediately before he gave over charge to his successor, the Dewan thus mentions an investigation into service tenures as one of the measures which he had been prevented by opposition from carrying out, but which he still urgently recommended for His Highness's consideration:—

“It is necessary that an inquiry should be made regarding personal Jaghires, and those for which services are required; and also regarding the pay of the troops who are in the service of the Jaghiredars, on what account it has been allowed; and whether the Sunnuds of the Jaghires are for life or otherwise; and whether the persons to whom the Sunnuds were originally given are alive or dead.”

The dread of such an investigation as this, and the secret remonstrances to which it gave rise, were among the most effectual causes of Sooraj-ool-Moolk's temporary lapse from the Nizam's favour, and

dismissal for a time from office, at the end of 1848. No British loan being obtainable, no relief or mitigation secured of the monthly demand for the Contingent, there was nothing to prove that the Dewan had any support from our Government, or enjoyed anything like the consideration that had been accorded for so many years to Rajah Chundoo Lall. All the Munsibdars, all the Talookdars, all the Jaghiredars, actual and expectant, were encouraged to raise their voices, if only in a whisper, against the Minister and the Resident, who were, according to their views, combined against them, and bent on their degradation. Attempts were made at this period, but without success, to persuade the Nizam not only to insist on removing Sooraj-ool-Moolk from office, but to make a formal complaint to the Governor-General against the Resident, in the hope of obtaining his removal also. The Nizam is understood never to have entertained this wild proposal, but that it was pressed upon him there is no doubt. In a letter to the Governor-General, dated 11th December 1848, the Resident refers to this particular form of intrigue, which was promoted also by some offensive articles in one of the Madras newspapers.

“I submit for your Lordship’s perusal a private note that I received two or three days ago from Sooraj-ool-Moolk, and which I thought it right to abstain from sending up officially. Sooraj-ool-Moolk’s information may possibly be biassed by his feelings under his removal from office; but I have many special reasons for relying on the accuracy of his facts. Your Lordship will perceive that much mischief is here attributed to Mr. ———, and it is evident that this gentleman is contravening the positive and repeated orders of the Court of Directors, that he should hold no intercourse with the Nizam’s Government or its officers except through the channel of the Resident. It might be difficult for me, however, to prove these clandestine visits of his to the City; and even if they could be prevented he would, no doubt, find means to continue the communications with his confidential friends there through the medium of secret emissaries. In the event of these intrigues becoming more mischievous, and more distinctly traced to him, I should perceive no effectual remedy but that of expelling him from the Nizam’s country; and as this would perhaps be a measure of too severe a nature for the British Government to have recourse to, and might occasion more noise and discussion than the matter is worth, I shall say nothing about it officially unless in your Lordship’s judgment I ought to do so.”

Lord Dalhousie's reply was prompt and very much to the purpose.

"Camp Loodiana, December 26th, 1848.

"MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—I have to acknowledge your letter of 11th instant with its enclosure. I have no inclination to doubt that a great deal of Sooraj-ool-Moolk's intelligence to you is correct, including the interference of a particular gentleman who is named. But there is evidently no proof at present. Assuming that there were, it would be a very questionable exercise of power to *deport* under such circumstances, and one that should certainly not be resorted to without reference to the Court.¹ I am not disposed to attach much political importance to his interference, especially if the tenor of his communications is to any such effect as that reported, regarding the Governor-General immediately removing you, or any other Resident, on the mere complaint of the Prince to whom he is accredited. If H.H. sends any impudent letters of that kind to me, I will make his knuckles so smart as never Nizam's knuckles smarted before.

"I shall be curious to see the course of events for some time to come.

"The Bombay troops have at last arrived at Mooltan, and operations were to be renewed yesterday. They have now an army of nearly 18,000 men and sixty siege guns, which should surely be enough.

"Believe me, yours sincerely,

"DALHOUSIE."

It was during an interview with the Resident, at which Sooraj-ool-Moolk was present, on the 10th of November 1848, that the Nizam, after a long discussion, finally declared, in the manner thus described by General Fraser, his determination to dismiss the Dewan:—

"The conversation ended by the Nizam acquainting me that he was dissatisfied with Sooraj-ool-Moolk, and that as this sentiment appeared to be mutual, he would remove him from his office, and appoint another Dewan.

"As I had no instructions to press the claims of Sooraj-ool-Moolk on the Nizam's favourable consideration, and it appeared contrary to the tenor of the Governor-General's instructions that I should do so, I merely bowed to His Highness's determination, and expressed a hope that he would inform me of the name of the person whom he might think proper to select.

¹ The Court of Directors.

"In the course of conversation, and during one of its pauses, I took an opportunity of mentioning to the Nizam that the Supreme Government had reduced the rate of interest upon the debt due by him to the Company's Government, on account of the advances made for the pay of the Contingent, from 12 to 6 per cent. per annum. The Nizam listened to this remark, but made no reply to it."

The immediate successor of Sooraj-ool-Moolk was named Anjud-ool-Moolk, apparently a person of no great capacity, and who only remained in office for about a month. The Nizam then nominated the Nawab Shums-ool-Oomra, a nobleman of the highest rank, of unimpeachable honour and universally esteemed, but who was not, in General Fraser's opinion, as well inclined towards a reforming and economical policy as Sooraj-ool-Moolk. Although still, in conformity with the latest instructions received from the Government of India, he made no remonstrance against the Nizam's free choice of a Minister, the Resident spoke his mind to the Governor-General, from whom he received the following letter referring to the installation as Dewan of Shums-ool-Oomra.

"Camp Ferozepore,

"January 29th, 1849.

"MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—I have received your letter of the 8th with the public letter to which it refers. I will send no reply for some days, as you wish that an interval should be allowed to elapse before it is answered. I do not think, however, that there will be any use in your absenting yourself from this man's investiture, since there is nothing definite against him, although there is as little definite in his favour. If so, I fear we shall go on vetoing Dewans for ever. But I quite concur with you in thinking that care must be taken that it is clearly understood there is no *approval* of this officer, although we consent to his appointment.

"Certainly, if the Nizam asks for the assistance of troops against the Rohillas, I would move the Contingent. It is just one of the services to which they should be applied; and if they are called into action, I conceive they will do a service to humanity if they should exterminate wretches capable of such deeds.

"You read the papers, and will, therefore, judge of what is passing here. I am neither grumbler nor croaker; but with the past before my eyes, I can't conceal from myself that there is room for some anxiety as to the future. Under ordinary circumstances I should, with such an army, have no anxiety at all. The Mooltan Force—12 or

13,000 of them—are now on their march to join the Commander-in-Chief.

“The troops, on the whole, behaved very well on the 13th * * *¹

“Believe me, yours sincerely,

“DALHOUSIE.”

During the year 1848 there had been several occasions for calling out the Contingent for the suppression of minor disturbances; but in one affair of greater importance, where the delinquents were the hereditary custodians of a Mohammedan shrine and place of pilgrimage of great reputed sanctity at Goolburga, the Resident found it more convenient, and thought it more advisable, to set the Subsidiary Force in motion. The duty was quickly performed, without bloodshed, by a detachment under Colonel Blundell, C.B., and the holy men of Goolburga, who had completely set the Nizam's authority at defiance, were brought in as prisoners to Hyderabad. Some question was raised by the Government of Madras and the Government of India as to this employment of the Subsidiary Force, more especially as expense had been incurred, whereas if the Contingent had, as usual, been sent out, all the charges would have been debited to the Nizam's Government.

On this subject he writes to Lord Dalhousie, under date the 24th of November 1849.

“In the Goolburga affair it was a part of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force I employed, and no part of the Contingent, excepting the Cavalry Regiment which is permanently stationed at Goolburga. I had ample reasons for this, but as I observe my proceedings on the occasion have been commented upon, I have prepared a Memorandum on the subject, a copy of which is herewith enclosed. I should be glad to know your Lordship's sentiments regarding the employment, as a general principle, of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force or of the troops of the Contingent. I am disposed to think that this question should be left very much to the discretion of the Resident, who will be guided by local circumstances, which cannot always be foreseen, and cannot, therefore, be made the subject of positive rule.

“I have observed it mentioned in the papers that the movement of the troops I ordered from Secunderabad cost 25 or 30 thousand rupees. If it did this, which I can scarcely believe, and if even so small a part of the Subsidiary Force as I required cannot be moved for a few days

¹ At the battle of Chillianwalla.

without involving so great an expense, I cannot consider that it is kept up, as it ought to be, in an efficient state, ready for immediate service; for heavy expenditure attending its employment detracts from its efficiency, inasmuch as it would make me reluctant to have recourse to its services.

"I should be loath to incur the risk of involving the Government in so great an expenditure as what is above mentioned, without an indispensable necessity for so doing."

In the Memorandum forwarded with this letter, after giving details as to distances from the scene of action, and disposable numbers at the several stations of the Subsidiary Force and Contingent respectively, the General explains that "part of the field force ordered to Goolburga being Europeans of Her Majesty's 84th Regiment, it seemed preferable that the whole detachment should be furnished from the Subsidiary Force and commanded by one of its superior officers, rather than that the two Companies of Europeans should be placed under the orders of an officer of the Contingent."

"Viewing the matter in a more general point of view, it may be observed that with reference to Article V of the Subsidiary Treaty of 1798, the peculiar and special duty of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force is that of 'overawing and chastising all rebels or excitors of disturbance in the dominions' of the Nizam. Whereas, strictly speaking, the Contingent, if viewed as a Force organised in lieu of the six thousand Infantry and nine thousand Horse referred to in the 12th Article of the Hyderabad Treaty of 1800, and for the purpose of being employed on the service for which the Nizam agreed to furnish those 15,000 men, should rather be considered as intended to assist the British Government in its external wars, when engaged in them conjointly with the Nizam, than to maintain the internal peace of His Highness's dominions.

"On the whole, it would appear the more desirable arrangement to leave the selection of any force required for service, whether from the Subsidiary Force or from the Contingent separately, or from both in conjunction, to the discretion of the Resident, who would be guided by the circumstances of each case."

Eventually all the proceedings in this matter were approved, and the general principles laid down by General Fraser were accepted by the Government of India.

Some correspondence between the General and Sir Henry Pottinger, Governor of Madras, in the early part of 1849, present

some features of interest. On the 24th January 1849, after a few words on business regarding the appointment of a medical officer to the Nizam's Army, the Resident makes these remarks:—

"I regret to say that matters have not improved much at Hyderabad since I had the pleasure of enjoying your hospitality at Madras. The Supreme Government seem averse to talk decidedly to the Nizam, though nothing could have any effect but a plain, determined, and decided mode of addressing him. Intrigue, corruption, and mismanagement are not to be corrected by whispers and soft, unmeaning phrases. One reason, however, of the Governor-General's not having taken more decided measures in this quarter is that he is so much occupied in the North-West, and certainly he has a great deal there to engage his attention.

"I am glad to say that I apprehend no disturbance in the part of India where I am, and at all events it is extremely unlikely that any should arise which I could not put down myself.

"The Marquis de Coislin and Captain Puysségur are still with me, and I regret to say that the Marquis has been extremely unwell. I am much pleased with his society and conversation, and consider his visit here quite a piece of good fortune. He is a man of higher rank than I was at first aware of, being a Duke and Peer of France, which titles, however, he chose to leave in abeyance during the Government of Louis Philippe."

He writes to the same on the 13th March 1849:—

"We have now a new Dewan at Hyderabad, Shums-ool-Oomra, with whom I have not yet had sufficient conversation, or transaction of business, to enable me to form anything like a fair opinion of his ability.

"Lord Gough has at length gained something like a real victory, but we have yet to learn the final results of this war. There is no doubt that matters have been much mismanaged in the whole of this Punjab war. You justly observe that the molehill has been allowed to increase to a mountain, and I can scarcely dare to hope that the ultimate consequences will not prove injurious to the interests of our Empire in India."

On the 28th of February Lord Dalhousie had written a letter to General Fraser from "Camp, Ferozepore", in which were the following observations on that same crowning victory of Lord Gough over the Sikhs at Goojerat.

"The action of the 21st at Goojerat came in good time, but not a bit too soon. It was a smasher. The Sikhs were supposed to have had

fifty-nine guns in the field. We have already secured fifty-three, and, I hope, may account for the balance. They lost all their camp, baggage, stores, and immense quantities of ammunition, and fled in complete rout. Large bands of them are gone across the Jhelum. General Gilbert, with 12,000 men, has gone after them, and to drive the Afghans out of Peshawur. The Afghans have already evacuated Bunnoo, and I should not be surprised if those at Peshawur went off without a fight. If they stand one, I have no sort of doubt as to the result.

"The campaign has been an anxious one, as you may well imagine. I hope it is all right now, and that we may look, under Providence, for early and complete success.

"Believe me always, sincerely yours,

"DALHOUSIE."

On the 16th of November 1849, the General writes as follows to Sir Henry Pottinger, at the time when the Sultan had refused to give up the Hungarian and Polish refugees to the Emperor Nicholas.

"Our next news from Europe will be very interesting, as we shall probably learn the result of the important question which has arisen between Russia and Turkey. I lately received a letter from a French gentleman who stayed with me for about a month at Hyderabad, the Duke de Coislin, who is a great friend and partisan of the Duke of Bordeaux, and is now on a visit to the Duchess of Berry at Gratz. He tells me that the aspect of affairs in Europe is still very threatening. He states, also—though, perhaps, the wish may be father to the thought—that the present Government of France is approaching to its downfall, and that efforts are being made, in which he himself is a strenuous co-operator, to effect a coalition between the two branches of the House of Bourbon.

"I shall say nothing of the Nizam's country. Affairs remain pretty much in the same way as they have been for fifty years past; so that matters here have but little novelty, or any other charm, to recommend them. If it were not for the good pay, which I cannot afford to give up, I should be happy to bid adieu to-morrow to the office I hold at this Court."

In a letter dated 11th June 1850, General Fraser mentions having been much interested in a recent publication, *Dry Leaves from Young Egypt*, which had very much modified his views as to the conquest of Scinde, and asks Sir Henry Pottinger if he knows the author of that book, to which he receives the following reply.

"Guindy, 20th June 1850.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,—I have to thank you for your acceptable letter of the 11th instant. I only await a reply I ordered to be made to Mr. Whitelock before disposing of the vacancy which I presume his decision will cause at Kurnool. He is most fortunate. My letter of the 4th instant will have given you all the news that I got from England by the last mail.

"*Dry Leaves from Young Egypt* was written by Captain Edward Eastwick (brother of the Director¹), who is now among the Professors at Haileybury College. He is an exceedingly talented, conscientious man, and you may rest assured that every syllable of his work is minutely correct. The seizure of Scinde without a just plea was a monstrous act of injustice, and one on which I have never hesitated to express my sentiments. If I may be allowed to use the expression, the spoliation has long since *revenged* itself on us by an outlay exceeding by some millions sterling the whole of the revenue. Truth is great, and will always prevail, which has been strongly exemplified in my case. I wrote privately to a friend from China, expressing my ideas about Scinde. This friend, Major Del Hoste, who had been there with me as Surveyor to my first mission, inconsiderately showed my letter to an Editor at Bombay. It was copied,—that part in which I had spoken of Scinde,—sent home, and appeared under my signature in the *Morning Chronicle*. This brought on me the combined wrath of Her Majesty's Ministers, the Duke, and all the Ellenborough clique, and I should have been left in poverty, with fine titles and honours, had not my friend Joseph Hume, to whom I was then personally unknown, taken up my cause, and carried a vote of an annuity of £1,500 a year through the House of Commons, in spite of all the opposition of Sir Robert Peel, aided by the Duke and the men in power. When the Whigs wanted a Governor for the Cape, they begged me to go, and this was followed up by my unsolicited appointment to Madras. On that taking place, my kind friend, Sir James Lushington, wrote me that I should have to forfeit a portion of my salary here equal to my annuity; but on the question being referred to the Queen's Law Officers, they pronounced that it was a pension from the country, not a grant from the Queen, and that it could not be interfered with except by another Act of Parliament, which, of course, was never thought of. Every one of the

¹ Edward Backhouse Eastwick, subsequently our Envoy in Persia, a C.B., and for some years M.P. for Falmouth. He died in 1883. His brother, Captain W. J. Eastwick, "the Director", afterwards Member of the Indian Council, warmly espoused the lost cause of the Scinde Ameers, and has ever since, notably in the cases of the proposed annexation of Mysore and the second Afghan war, always been found a wise adviser in Indian affairs, and the constant advocate of justice, clemency, and Imperial honour.

Directors individually expressed to me his perfect concurrence in my sentiments regarding Scinde; and even the Iron Duke has been pleased to make the *amende* by giving my eldest boy a commission in his regiment, the Grenadier Guards, to which he was gazetted on the 8th of April last, five days before his eighteenth birthday. This, I hear, is really an extraordinary act of favour, as numbers of young men of the highest rank were on the list; and my gratitude to the Duke is in proportion to the great kindness he has, after the eleventh hour, conferred on me.

"I sent off my *Travels in Beloochistan* by banghy¹ some days ago. In reading them, you must please remember that I wrote them at twenty years of age, wholly unassisted, when I was a subaltern of Pioneers. Just before they went home I was appointed Assistant to my revered master, Mountstuart Elphinstone, from whose example I learned all I know in this Indian world. You will join with me in saying that I could not possibly have had a better master.

"I am sure you will excuse this dissertation on self, but I wished you to know my feelings about Scinde and the unhappy Amcers.

"With my kindest regards to your daughter, I remain, my dear General,

"Yours very sincerely,

"HENRY POTTINGER."

In his reply to this letter, dated the 17th August 1850, mentioning that he had just returned by parcel post the work on Beloochistan, the General says:—

"I was still more interested in the slight sketch you gave me in your last note of some of the principal events of your public life. I need not dwell on the impression it left on my mind, because it could not possibly have been otherwise than it has been, nor differ from that which the rest of the world entertains.

"Private letters from Simla mention that the Governor-General and Sir Charles Napier are upon bad terms, and that the latter gives violent and very indecorous expression to the anger with which he is inspired.

"Neither my public nor private letters from the Governor-General lead me to suppose that any particular or marked steps are contemplated with respect to the Nizam's country, excepting the simple enforcement of payment, by the end of the year, of His Highness's debt to us, which now amounts to sixty-four lakhs of rupees. The Nizam, however,

¹ Parcel post, established in India fifty years before it was adopted in Great Britain and Ireland.

asserts that he will be able to pay this himself before the prescribed time."

During the brief Ministry of Amjad-ool-Moolk, and the somewhat longer though still brief incumbency of Shums-ool-Oomra in 1849, it may be said that nothing worthy of record was done for the improvement of the country, and that no progress whatever was made in reducing the heavy debt claimed by our Government on account of advances made for the pay of the Contingent. The Government of India, while refusing, as we have seen, to give direct and decided support to Sooraj-ool-Moolk, or to take any step that might have the effect of dictating to the Nizam the choice of a Minister, had plainly expressed its dissatisfaction at the change that had been made, and sanctioned General Fraser's proposal that he should indicate that dissatisfaction in a way that would be generally understood, by absenting himself from the Durbar of investiture when the new Dewan was installed in office. At the end of 1848 the Nizam was expressly reminded, by order of the Government of India, that "the debt due by His Highness on account of the Contingent has been increasing, and now amounts to a very large sum." The Nizam was told that "the payment of the interest of this debt must be made regularly, and that no arrears whatever will be allowed in the payment of the Contingent Force by His Highness's Government"; and also that "His Highness will no doubt see the propriety of instructing his Minister to provide, without any prolonged delay, for liquidating the principal of the debt."

"His Highness will clearly understand", it was added, "that in the event of these demands not being attended to with regularity, the Governor-General will feel himself under the necessity of taking such measures as shall be effectual, both for ensuring those objects for which the faith of this Government is virtually pledged, and for maintaining the security of its own interests."

No reduction in the debt, no greater regularity in the monthly pay of the Contingent, having appeared in the interval, Lord Dalhousie reiterates, in the two following letters, his determination to enforce a financial settlement at no very distant period. The marked contrast between the views of Imperial policy entertained by the Resident and the Governor-General appears very distinctly in that passage of Lord Dalhousie's letter in which he totally

declines to "recognise" any "mission entrusted to us to regenerate independent Indian States merely because they are misgoverned". General Fraser did recognise that such a mission was confided to us, and was convinced at once of its practicability, and of the beneficial results that would spring from its being undertaken in good faith.

" Simla, June 6th, 1849.

"MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—I have received your public letter referred to in your private letter of 22nd May. An answer has been sent, intimating that there is no necessity for stopping the construction of roads commenced in the Nizam's territories. Your despatch bears marks of having been written in anger, but the roads is the only topic in it which calls for reply.

"With regard to the remainder of your letter, I can only repeat what I have said before publicly and privately,—I will rigidly act up to the requirements of the Treaty with him. I will give him aid and advice. I will effectually take care that if he chooses to ruin himself in spite of aid and advice, he shall not disturb the peace of British territory, or either injure or play with British interests. But I will not contravene the Treaty on the pretence of protecting the Nizam; and I disavow the doctrine of our having any moral or political obligation to take the Government of his country into our own hands, merely because he mismanages his own affairs; and I recognise no mission entrusted to us to regenerate independent Indian States, merely because they are misgoverned.

"When we are invited, or our own interests affected, I will act decidedly enough.

"The letter reporting Shums-ool-Oomra's professed inability to pay, will probably lead, more or less remotely, to important consequences. I have solemnly warned the Nizam of the consequences of neglecting the removal of the financial difficulties in which he goes on involving himself. Some fine morning he will be rudely awakened by feeling himself suffering those consequences.

"In the meantime I have only to request that you will continue to give the Minister straightforward aid, and that both he and his Master shall be distinctly told, as they seem to doubt it, that I am in earnest in what I have said.

"Believe me, yours sincerely,

"DALHOUSIE."

" Simla, July 6th, 1849.

"MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—I have received your letter of 21st ultimo. I am very sorry that the Nizam is bent on breaking his own

head apparently, but if he is resolved on doing so, I shall provide that the interests of this Government are fully cared for. His Royal brother in Oude is engaged in the same process, and as the two years' probation conceded by Lord Hardinge is drawing to a close, I shall be obliged to act.

"In short, my hands are likely to be full enough of these booby potentates for some time.

"Everything remains tranquil in this quarter,¹ and with vigilance I hope may continue so. The Board is working very well, and the promise is good at present.

"I cannot fancy anything more vexatious to a man than M. de Coislin's position. We are looking out for him here.

"Believe me, yours sincerely,

"DALHOUSIE."

A letter to Mr. Dorin, who, as Senior Member of Council, was President at Calcutta, conducting the details of Government during the Governor-General's absence in the North-West, will give some notion of what Lord Dalhousie called "the perpetual wrestle with the Dewan" for the "pay of the Contingent".

"Hyderabad, 8th April 1849.

"MY DEAR SIR,—I have deferred for two or three days replying to your letter of the 20th ultimo, until I should be enabled to give you some definite information on the subject to which it related. The promise of the Nizam's Durbar to pay me seventeen lakhs of rupees by the 22nd of January last, and the same amount every four months afterwards, has not been in its first part fulfilled, and now appears to have been altogether forgotten. The Minister, Shums-ool-Oomra, has, however, just assured me that he will pay regularly every month the interest of the general debt due to us, and five lakhs of rupees per annum in liquidation of the principal, beginning in April 1850. Payments to this small extent, I do not doubt that he will be able to effect, if he is able to effect anything at all; but as it would require eleven years to discharge the debt, at the rate just mentioned, I doubt whether the Supreme Government, to whom I have written officially on the subject, will assent to the proposal. The Minister, indeed, expresses a hope that he will be able to do more; but I cannot ask the Supreme Government to attach real importance to such vague expressions as this.

"I cannot but feel assured that under a vigorous and decided admi-

¹ Meaning the newly annexed Punjaub.

nistration a reduction of absolutely useless expenditure might be made almost immediately, to the extent of twenty or thirty lakhs of rupees per annum, and ultimately, perhaps to double that amount.

"But neither Shums-ool-Oomra, nor any other Minister, could effect this without the most decided and openly declared support from us. He would be opposed by the whole Court, and I may say by the whole country.

"I shall be at all times happy to have the pleasure of hearing from you when I can be of any use, or give any information you may desire, and remain always,

"My dear Sir, yours very sincerely,

"J. S. FRASER."

Just at this time also the following letter to Colonel (afterwards General Sir Mark) Cubbon, Commissioner of Mysore, alludes to a recent affair in which the Contingent had proved its military efficiency and its usefulness in preparing the way for orderly administration.

"Hyderabad, 16th May 1849.

"MY DEAR CUBBON,—I ought sooner to have acquainted you with the safe arrival of the fine cattle you were so kind as to send me for the Nizam. Pray accept my best thanks for the trouble you were so good as to take on this account, and command my services here in return if ever they can be of use to you. The Nizam was very much pleased with the cattle, as you will see by the enclosed copy of a note from the Dewan, who conveys his Master's sentiments on the subject as well as his own. The expenses of the cattle during the journey, Rs. 476 2 10, according to the memo. furnished by Chunda Hoossain, is lodged in my treasury, and will be brought to your account when you favour me with the whole account of our debt to you.

"And so the Punjab is now fairly annexed to the Empire. Lord Dalhousie will now be able, I hope, to attend a little to the interior improvement of India, as we can scarcely have any enemy now to disturb us excepting as the result of a war in Europe.

"I am assisting the Nizam's Government to get rid of some troublesome Rohillas, or, to speak more properly, Afghans, from this country; and a little affair in Berar, the other day, showed what stern stuff the Cavalry of the Contingent are made of.

"Adieu, my dear Cubbon, and believe me ever, with kindest wishes,

"Most sincerely yours,

"J. S. FRASER."

It would be altogether unprofitable to revive here at any length a discussion that is quite out of date, and no longer liable to recur; but as Lord Dalhousie will be found, from the next letter, to have differed from General Fraser as to getting rid of the "troublesome Rohillas", I may just observe that in the first place the Resident was, in the words of his letter to Colonel Cubbon, "assisting the Nizam's Government" to carry out a measure, by means of the Nizam's own troops, and at His Highness's expense, which the local authorities, the British Resident included, considered essential for the cause of peace and good order. It was to cost our Government nothing, not even by any movement of the Subsidiary Force. In the second place, although Lord Dalhousie tried to draw a distinction, the Rohillas were just as much "foreigners in the Deccan" as the Arabs, while they were far more turbulent and disorderly. In the third place, the objection was by no means admissible that Peshawur was to be made a "Botany Bay" for all the vagabonds of Hyderabad. The Rohillas were not convicts, nor, properly speaking, criminals. They were military adventurers out of service; and at Peshawur, or in its neighbourhood, they would have been at home, not in a penal settlement, but in a region where they could rejoin their own tribes and easily find subsistence. It was impossible for them to settle down in the South of India.

The "very smart and gallant affair" to which Lord Dalhousie refers in another part of his letter, took place on the 6th of May, near the village of Gowree in Berar, under the command of Brigadier Hampton, one of the Nizam's local officers, who was himself severely wounded, besides three English and four Native officers. On this occasion the medical officer of the detachment joined most gallantly in a Cavalry charge, and considered himself to be thereby entitled to special commendation, a claim which Lord Dalhousie, with most judicious discrimination, distinctly declined to award.

"Simla, May 30th, 1849.

"MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—I have to acknowledge your letter of 15th May, and a previous one regarding the Rohillas. I am sorry you have raised the question again; since the very direct decision of the Government of India upon it on previous occasions, and the full approval of the Court of Directors accorded to the decision, leave no course open but a continuance in the views before expressed. The

question of the removal of the Arabs to which you allude, is one which, in my opinion, is more fairly open, since, if there is to be an expulsion at all, it certainly should be of those who are entirely foreigners, rather than of the Rohillas in the first instance.

"But I must say frankly that I cannot concur in the measure you propose now, any more than formerly.

"I cannot assent to the supposed impossibility of disarming, or otherwise restraining from violence and tumult, some 3,000 or 4,000 Rohillas spread over the Kingdom. The attempt has never yet been made, so far as I can see, and I cannot concur in the necessity of a measure so wholesale, and so nearly approaching to an exercise of arbitrary power greater than the British Government usually countenances, until other measures have been fully tried. If these people are either rebellious or tumultuous (as I have said in the public reply), the Nizam's Contingent should be employed against them under your orders, whoever they are, and wherever they are; and they should be sternly dealt with, severely punished, and if refractory, always disarmed. With all the apathy and feebleness that can be imputed to the Nizam's Government, I cannot bring myself to doubt that the force which you have at your disposal, vigorously directed by yourself, would very readily and very quickly put an end to the possibility of so inconsiderable a body of men seriously disturbing the peace or prosperity of a Kingdom. At all events, I can by no means consent, especially after the Court's approval of my previous refusal, to undertake the transport of this tribe bodily to Peshawur.

"I am willing to give every aid to the Nizam which the Treaty enjoins, or which the utmost stretch of friendship could require. But I really cannot recognise any sort of obligation, or any reason, for carrying the complaisance of the British Government so far as to undertake the conveyance of the collective vagabondism of the Nizam's Kingdom in order to deposit it in one of our own Provinces.

"Let the Nizam repress turbulence, as I reassert he can do, with the aid of the Contingent, in his own dominions. If there are offenders, let him banish them, and I will take care that they shall not disturb the peace of the districts under my Government. It is too much to expect that I should agree to take an infinite deal of trouble to save H.H. from it, or that I should volunteer to constitute a British Province to be practically the Botany Bay for Hyderabad.

"With reference to the 800 or 1,000 Rohillas who you say are encamped in the City, I would observe that the Nizam having, as you tell me, 20,000 troops of his own on the spot, I cannot perceive the possibility of its ever becoming necessary to lead British troops against such a handful.

"I beg to impress upon you the extreme inexpediency of engaging

troops in street and house fighting, which such a business would be. A bombardment, of course, could never be used in such a case, except by way of threat, as you employ it in your letter.

"Thanks for copy of Dr. McEgan's letter. I have endeavoured to do justice to the conduct of the troops in this very smart and gallant affair. I did not wish to insert any "wet blanket" remark in a *public* letter, but I do not wish to omit observing to you that Dr. McEgan had no business where he was. His duty is to mend, and to preserve himself in a condition for mending, broken heads, and not to go about breaking heads himself. As luck would have it, he escaped. Had he been himself wounded, he would have sacrificed the detachment under his medical charge, and would have entirely neglected his own duty in order to gratify his personal inclinations. Gallantry is very praiseworthy in itself, but not when the display of it involves neglect of clear *professional* duty. It was his duty to keep himself out of harm's way.

"I say nothing of the debt until the answer of the Minister comes. I may remark, however, that I do not mean to be fencied with by the Minister, or put off till another time. I must have those sixty lakhs—prompt payment.

"Matters are quiet on this frontier, and I hope are not likely to be disturbed soon.

"Believe me, yours sincerely,

"DALHOUSIE."

On the 18th of May 1849, the Assistant Resident, Captain Cuthbert Davidson (afterwards Colonel and Resident), had a long conversation, under General Fraser's instructions, with the Minister Shums-ool-Oomra, which was fully reported to Government, and some passages in which appear necessary to a full comprehension of the now rapidly approaching crisis in the financial relations between the Hyderabad State and our Government.

"The Minister spoke of the amount he would have to pay in eighteen months for the troops of the Contingent up to the 30th of April 1850. The Contingent, he said, had for many years been of the greatest service to the Government in keeping the country peaceable; and they were the only troops, except those immediately about his own person, on whose fidelity the Government could place the slightest reliance. He hoped, therefore, that no reductions would be made in them for the present, as he intended to reduce by discharge those Government troops who were really useless, and also by removing fictitious names from the muster-roll.

"He then referred to the letter from the Government of India of the

28th of April 1849, with a Persian translation of which he had been furnished, and asked if I really thought the Governor-General would make a demand for the repayment '*at once*', or at '*an early period*', of the fifty-four lakhs due to the British Government. I replied that he ought to study the tenor of the letter, and be prepared to pay the money as therein required. He remarked that he had always until now supposed that it had been the desire of the Government of India to build up the Government of its ancient Ally, and not to ruin it irretrievably; and begged I would write down a memorandum of the total receipts of revenue expected for the ensuing year, and then inform him how it was possible for him to make arrangements for such a payment, and yet provide for the whole expenditure of the general Government.

"Shums-ool-Oomra then said, 'His Highness is my nephew by marriage, and in the hopes of restoring order in his dominions, and re-establishing his Government, I alone accepted the office of Dewan, as, at the close of life, I was not otherwise desirous of such an arduous and responsible office When I assumed the powers recommended for the Minister in the Governor-General's khurcata of the 7th of September 1846, I hoped that I was really possessed of the Prince's confidence and support, and that I should have full authority to conduct the affairs of the country. But I am thwarted by secret and private influence, male and female. . . . Sooraj-ool-Moolk, who was a nobleman of ability, had to contend against the same evil influences.' "

Large funds, regarding which he went into detailed explanation, were "squandered", the Minister complained, and "improperly appropriated, without an object, and without even the pretence of any good purpose," and he said :—

"Unless all the revenues formerly apportioned for the general expenditure of the Government were restored to the charge and control of the Minister, and he were really invested with full powers, he would tender his resignation, as without this being acceded to, were he even from his private resources to advance the 54 lakhs due to the British Government, it would be of no eventual advantage to his Master.

"The Minister vaguely alluded to the jealousy that existed regarding a cordial intercourse with Europeans, and said that he knew quite well the Nizam's Government could not be rightly directed or prolonged for any length of time without the friendly advice and co-operation of the Resident in its administration, added to the most energetic exertions of the Sovereign and his Minister."

But this authoritative co-operation of the Resident with the

Minister was what Lord Dalhousie would not prescribe or permit. It is to this confidential interview with the Nawab Shums-ool-Oomra, and a note from him to General Fraser, conveying the same sentiments, that Lord Dalhousie alludes in the following letter.

“ Simla, August 25th, 1849.

“ MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—On the day before yesterday I received your private letter regarding this very unexpected turn in the politics of His Highness. The confidential letter of Shums-ool-Oomra to you has an air of candour and truthfulness which impress one with the belief that he is an honest man, as Ministers go in the East. I have, therefore, readily introduced a few civil words to him into the despatch which goes to you to-day. The rest of it has reference to the debt. There is no use in advising this man, or warning him any more on that head, and I must have the money. Previously I had intimated to him that prompt payment must be made. His own flourish on that subject, which you have reported, has enabled me to take a step which will draw matters to a close. I am in earnest in it; and you may, therefore, feel secure, when communicating the message to His Highness, in employing such earnestness of expression as may let him know that I will infallibly do what I say.

“ Purposely I have avoided specifying any particular measure; but he may make up his mind that there will then be decided action on the part of this Government.

“ We continue quiet on this frontier. We have had at last excellent rains,—a circumstance which is of infinite moment, politically, this year.

“ Believe me, yours sincerely,

“ DALHOUSIE.”

In a letter dated 2nd of July 1849, General Fraser, apologising for seeming to protract the discussion regarding the removal of the Rohillas, pointed out that the Government of Lord Hardinge had sanctioned the procedure he now once more proposed. He wrote privately, because he thought it generally unadvisable and “unbecoming for a public officer to give prominence in his despatches to any differences of policy between successive Governments”. Lord Dalhousie replied as follows:—

“ Simla, August 27th, 1849.

“ DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—Matters of great weight, and demanding early consideration, have occupied all my attention since I received your letter of 2nd ultimo. I have directed to-day a reply.

"I do not perceive the inconvenience you feel in orders now issued being different from those you quoted issued by Lord Hardinge. Circumstances have changed—so must orders.

"Moreover, the orders of the Court, your Masters and mine, have in the meantime been transmitted to me. I must obey them, and in so doing give instructions in accordance with them, whether they are consistent with previous instructions or not.

"I remain, yours sincerely,

"DALHOUSIE."

And here is another letter very plainly stating the Governor-General's opinion as to the exigencies and prospects of the Nizam's Government, but giving no further hope of that friendly but firm intervention to secure the "passive permission of the Sovereign" which General Fraser always maintained would be sufficient to ensure the effectual co-operation of the Resident and the Minister.

"Simla, September 5, 1849.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,—I received some days ago your interesting letter of 12th ult., with enclosures. There seems no especial reason to doubt the correctness of the returns which Shums-ool-Oomra sent you. With such an income, and with so little necessity for expenditure, Hyderabad ought to be a richly flourishing State, and with even passive permission by the Sovereign, very soon would be so.

"There is clearly no reason why, as a creditor, this Government should take pity on His Highness, and most assuredly he shall have no more rope given him.

"This was intimated to you in a public letter lately, and I shall most certainly act up to it.

"Many thanks for your congratulations on the honours they have bestowed upon me.

"Believe me, yours sincerely,

"DALHOUSIE."

On the 31st of July 1849, the Nizam invited the Resident to a private interview, for the purpose, as it proved, of announcing the dismissal of Shums-ool-Oomra from the office of Dewan. No courtier or servant was present after the Resident was introduced.

"His Highness received me with his usual civility and kindness, and after the usual complimentary phrases, upon my making some remark about the state of the weather and the extent to which cholera, I had understood, was prevailing in the City, the Nizam entered into a some-

what lengthy disquisition on the nature of that disease, with the history of which, and of its appearance and prevalence at different periods in India, he seemed well acquainted. He observed that it arose from some peculiar atmospheric change, and that when certain aspects appeared the cholera invariably ensued, and ceased at their disappearance. I asked His Highness whether the narrow and crowded streets of the City and its accumulated filth—of which I had just had sensible evidence on my way to the Palace—might not in some degree contribute to the frequent outbreaks of this disorder. His Highness appeared to be excessively amused at the futility of this notion of mine, and assured me that it was utterly destitute of foundation. He said the streets had been just as they were at present for more than a hundred years, and that their condition could have nothing to do with the cholera. If His Highness had concurred with me I should have taken the liberty of suggesting an experiment in cleaning and paving the streets, and in other sanitary measures; but his very decided mode of ridiculing the idea left me no opening for such advice.

“In the course of his remarks on the cholera, the Nizam quoted a passage from the Koran, and this led him to make a comparison between it and the Christian Gospel. He asked me how far the construction of the New Testament and the time of its composition after the Ascension of our Saviour could be compared with the gradual arrangement and disposition of the sentences of the Koran, and their being openly revealed and imparted from time to time for the guidance of the followers of the prophet Mohammed. I listened without taking much part in this discourse, and he concluded by asking me to procure for him a Persian and a Hindustani translation of the New Testament,—not a printed copy, which he told me he had some difficulty in reading, but in the written *nastāliq* character. His Highness repeated this request several times, and I said that I should have much pleasure in executing the commission with which he had honoured me. I hope the peculiar and unexpected character of this request will render my acquiescence in it excusable, although formally and literally in contravention of the rule against the execution by the Resident of any commissions for His Highness.

“After this His Highness entered on the business for which he had desired my attendance, and proceeded, without any preliminary or introductory remark, to say that he had determined that Shums-ool-Oomra should no longer be Minister.

“He said that about two months ago, when he was at Surroonuggur, Shums-ool-Oomra had tendered to him his resignation of the office of Dewan, or rather, that he had actually resigned. His Highness employed the expression, ‘Guzasht diya’, which means an absolute surrender, not ‘Istifa’, which may signify merely the tender of resig-

nation, to be accepted or not according to the pleasure of the person to whom it is offered.

"He made the same complaint of him that he had made of Sooraj-ool-Moolk, when he first disagreed with that nobleman, that he acted in the affairs of State without His Highness's knowledge. He dwelt strongly on the fact that the agreement of Shums-ool-Oomra to repay our debt by instalments of five lakhs of rupees per annum had been made without either His Highness's knowledge or approval. He stated that had the necessary communication been made to him he could have taken more immediate steps for the payment of the debt. It was a mere question of money, he remarked, which he regarded as of little importance. He made very light of this part of the case; and, from the style and manner of his observations, he seemed desirous of conveying to me the impression that if urged to pay the money he could do so at once."

After describing a very long conversation, in which he defended Shums-ool-Oomra as he had previously defended Sooraj-ool-Moolk, the General says:—

"I then addressed His Highness, and said, 'When I communicate to the Governor-General the circumstances of which you now inform me relating to Shums-ool-Oomra's resignation, is it your wish that I should say anything regarding the debt due by Your Highness's Government to the Honourable Company?'

"To this His Highness replied, 'That will be settled when you receive the Governor-General's reply'."

The Resident could obtain no decided answer from the Nizam as to a successor to Shums-ool-Oomra, nor any clue to His Highness's intentions, except an observation that he "must have a Peshcar,—that it was impossible to conduct the business of State without a Peshcar."

In reporting the retirement of Shums-ool-Oomra to the Government of India, the Resident observed that only five months having elapsed since the appointment of Shums-ool-Oomra, there was hardly sufficient time to judge whether he possessed the capacity and energy of character requisite for the post. "But", continued the Resident, "so far as my own official connection with him during the short time he has been Dewan, enables me to offer any remark on the subject, I deem it but justice to him to say that I have witnessed in him no want of ability, and that I have every reason to believe him to be imbued with honourable principles, and with a sincere desire to forward by every just means the

interests of this country. I may add that his manners and demeanour have ever been such as suited his high rank, and that I have no reason to believe that his public conduct has ever been tainted by duplicity or by any disregard for truth."

It is but just to remark that during Shuuns-ool-Oomra's brief tenure of office the current monthly pay due to the Contingent was paid with punctuality. He received an acknowledgment of the Governor-General's satisfaction at the manner in which he had acted under circumstances of great difficulty.

In September 1849, Rajah Ram Buksh once more received investiture as Peshcar, and assumed charge of the administration, no one being nominated to the high office of Dewan. The prospect of any settlement of the debt seemed more distant than ever, and the monthly payment of the Contingent began to fall off in regularity. Under these unpromising circumstances the Governor-General considered that a fitting opportunity had arrived for fixing a definite period within which the debt must be liquidated in full. The Resident was directed to require "that the whole amount should be discharged by the 31st of December 1850. If, on the arrival of that period, the Governor-General's present expectations were disappointed, his Lordship would feel it his duty to take such decided steps as the interests of the British Government demanded." Those "decided steps", it was well understood, would be the exaction of territorial security for the payment of principal and interest.

To this impending measure of sequestration, and to the administrative disorder which threatened to make its enforcement at even an earlier date advisable, Lord Dalhousie refers in his next letter.

"Camp, Bhyrowal, November 20th, 1849.

"MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—I shall be very happy to meet your wishes regarding Dr. Maclean. Indeed, I have already done so by giving him leave for six months, and intimating that he shall be re-appointed, so as to satisfy the letter of the law. The regulation, which puts medical men on a different footing from other branches of the service in respect of leave, seems to me to be an unmeaning one; but as long as it is extant I think it right to attend to it.

"If the Peshcar, or the Nizam, or both of them (for it seems hard to decide which is the real culprit, and most probable that both are so), should continue to create the obstacles to the regular payment of the Contingent,—which for some time were removed, and are now

being renewed,—they will compel me most reluctantly to anticipate the period which I have fixed as that of interference of the Supreme Government in respect of financial affairs in Hyderabad.

“I do not care much about the liquidation of the principal of the debt, or even about the regular payment of the interest in the intervening period from November 1849 to December 31st, 1850; but I am quite disinclined to recur again to the periodical advance of the pay for the Contingent, implying, as it does, previous inconvenience and hardship upon the troops, as well as a gradual increase of the already existing debt.

“The Nizam will force me, in such a case, to take possession of territory *at once*, whereby the means of paying the Contingent with certainty and regularity will be placed in the hands of this Government, virtually pledged to ensure such payment.

“It would not be expedient yet to make this announcement definitively to the Minister. Its necessity, however, at an early period appears so probable, that I beg to have, confidentially, your views on the particular districts which may be most conveniently *mortgaged*, as it were, for this purpose. Clearly, one adjoining to our territories at some point would be desirable.

“The Duc de Coislin’s view of the future of France seems the only sensible one, and (as far as my very limited knowledge of French affairs enables me to judge) the only one which has any chance of becoming a practical view. Everything that I have heard leads me believe that his estimate of the character of the Duc de Bordeaux is not unduly partial. He *ought* to have now learned wisdom, if ever a Bourbon could be taught that lesson.

“Believe me, yours sincerely,

“DALHOUSIE.”

The next letter, although only referring to some personal changes in the Staff of the Contingent, is not devoid of interest, and throws light on the process by which that part of the Resident’s duty was in those days conducted.

“Camp, Moultan, December 31st, 1849.

“MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—I have received your letter of the 14th. You will have since then received the *Gazette*.

“I do not wish that Captain Mackenzie’s local majority should supersede the commissions *previously* granted to Brigadier Johnston or Brigadier Hampton; but I wish that he should continue posted to the First Class Division, giving him advantage in respect of allowances, but not in respect of military rank.

“I perceive the newspapers hold Captain Mackenzie’s appointment

up as an injustice to the Nizam's officers. I do not admit this. I will not, as long as I am here, recognise any obligation to observe rigidly the succession of seniority in the Nizam's or any other Contingent. I see enough every day of the curse which a strict seniority system inflicts, to decide me against admitting it anywhere but where I am forced to do so. The local officers of the Nizam's service have had their fair share from me; and to recognise Brigadier Johnston's claims as exceeding the distinguished services of Captain Mackenzie would to my mind be absurd.

"Believe me, yours sincerely,

"DALHOUSIE."

Captain Colin Mackenzie, the newly appointed Brigadier, mentioned in Lord Dalhousie's letter, was a very distinguished officer, whose hairbreadth 'scapes and chivalrous conduct in Afghanistan resembled those of some hero of romance, and whose gallantry, when almost a boy, in the Coorg campaign had attracted my father's attention at the time, and had never been forgotten. Although, as will be seen, their official relations were not quite unruffled, General Fraser always regarded him with respect and affection, and it has been a great pleasure to me, having myself known him and loved him well, to see from the recently published memoirs of Lieut.-General Colin Mackenzie, C.B., that his kindly feelings towards General Fraser were uninterrupted and unchanged to the last.¹

Having determined, and announced his determination to the Nizam's Government, that the debt on account of advances made for the Contingent's pay must be entirely liquidated by the last day of 1850, and that in default of a full settlement the assignment of districts "in mortgage", to use Lord Dalhousie's own words, would be exacted, the Governor-General desired to have all the information that could be given him as to the territory most conveniently situated for transfer to British management, with a view, also, to their possible retention, if the Nizam could be induced to give his consent, to ensure the regular monthly payment of the Contingent Force.

In a letter dated Hyderabad, 19th December 1849, General Fraser answers Lord Dalhousie's inquiry as to the best districts to be

¹ *Storms and Sunshine of a Soldier's Life* (Edinburgh: Douglas, 1884), vol. i, pp. 34, 37; vol. ii, p. 108.

appropriated as security for the payment of the debt. He explains the great difficulties he has always experienced in getting accurate and detailed information as to the revenue of the Nizam's dominions; and forwards, as "the nearest approach" he has been "able to obtain to anything like an account on which some degree of confidence could be placed", a sketch map, furnished by Sooraj-ool-Moolk when he was first appointed Dewan, giving "definite limits to each Talook, with a suitable amount of revenue to be collected by each Talookdar, who was to reside in his district, and administer its affairs himself, not living in the City, as had been the usual custom, leaving the administration to an ill-paid Naib or deputy." In selecting districts for our management, the Resident said he would be "guided by convenience of position and facility for the collection of revenue". These advantages were to be found in the two districts of Berar, Payen Ghat and Bala Ghat,¹ and the district of Bassim, the three producing, according to the schedule attached to Sooraj-ool-Moolk's sketch map, an annual revenue of Rs. 39,89,000, while the average annual expense of "the Nizam's Army", or Contingent, was Rs. 38,26,500.

"Berar Payen Ghat is the richest and most profitable portion of the Nizam's dominions, both in an agricultural and commercial point of view, and I have never heard of any particular difficulty existing with regard to the collection of its revenues. I believe there is no part of India superior to it for the production of cotton; and the culture and exportation of this article might, under our management, be extended to a much greater degree than has ever been the case.

"The three Talooks I mention are compactly situated, forming nearly a square or parallelogram, of which the North and North-West boundary would be the chain of hills on which the forts of Narnulla and Gawilghur are situated, adjoining the Company's districts on the Nerbudda, a portion of Scindia's country, and part of Khandesh. The North-East boundary would be the Wurda river, which separates the Nizam's dominions from those of the Rajah of Nagpore.

"It may be observed that several portions of Berar were transferred to the Nizam by the Peishwa, in the Western part of that territory, and by the Rajah of Nagpore in the Eastern part; and it may be supposed that the Nizam would, therefore, be less disinclined to cede this portion of territory to our temporary management than he would with regard of his ancient patrimonial dominions. This may be the case or not,

¹ Below and above the Ghat or range of hills.

but I allude to it as a possible circumstance that we may have to consider in any eventual negotiations."

It will be seen here, and it deserves particular attention, that at this period, when a territorial assignment for the re-establishment of a financial equilibrium in the Nizam's affairs was first discussed, General Fraser contemplated and proposed that this assignment was to be "temporary", and as such it was treated by him, from first to last, *in all his negotiations with the Nizam*, and in his correspondence with Lord Dalhousie and with the Government of India.

After explaining that without more searching inquiries, which could not be made at this moment without raising suspicion, it is impossible to be quite sure whether Sooraj-ool-Moolk's figures represented net revenue or gross revenue, without deducting the costs of collection, he goes on to say:—

"If the net amount were only, as here supposed possible, 35 lakhs of rupees, this would easily be made up by additional adjoining territory. This would also be the more necessary if we added, besides the expense of the Contingent, Appa Dessaye's Chout and the allowance to Mohi-put Ram's family, amounting to Rs. 126,000 per annum, and also the interest due on the Nizam's debt, if not otherwise paid, about Rs. 324,000 per annum. The deficiency on the Contingent and these other items would amount to between seven and eight lakhs of rupees a year, for which it would be convenient to have a suitable portion of the Dowlatabad district. But if the Nizam objected to this, from his probable dislike to transfer to our management that part of his dominions in which Dowlatabad and Aurungabad are situated, we might then demand as much of the upper portions of the Nandair and Kullum districts as would suffice to make up what was wanting.

"Having referred to the trade of Berar as likely to improve and extend under our management, I beg to transmit for your Lordship's perusal, copies of some reports by Pestonjee Meerjee, Esq., and by Mr. Dighton, on the subject of the cotton and opium produced in that district.

"There is already a report in the City of Hyderabad that the Supreme Government has it in contemplation to demand a portion of the Nizam's territory, in liquidation of his debt to us, and for the current expenses of the Contingent. The report is said to have arisen from an article in one of the Madras newspapers, which must have been published at Madras some days previously to the receipt of your Lordship's letter. The newspaper and your letter reached me simultaneously. There could have been no connection, therefore, between

them; and either the Madras article was a mere conjecture of what might happen, or it must have been furnished by certain parties at Hyderabad, who not unfrequently receive information of what is about to be said or done by the Supreme Government, and before I do so myself. I think I mentioned to you personally, what I also stated in writing to Lord Ellenborough,¹ that Rajah Chundoo Lall always disbursed large sums of money for the purpose of obtaining timely information from Calcutta of the intentions of our Government in every matter regarding Hyderabad."

Early in 1850 new proofs were given in quick succession that if the necessity of demanding and exacting territorial security from the Hyderabad State for the heavy arrears and current pay of the Contingent were to be averted, it would not be through the administrative capacity or the commanding influence of the Peshcar, Rajah Ram Buksh. Though nominally at the head of affairs, his measures, frequently adopted with the advice or approval of the Resident, were so constantly thwarted or set aside by direct intervention from the Palace, that he piteously protested, in a note to General Fraser dated the 1st of February 1850, and on many other occasions, against being held "responsible for the disorganisation of the Government". In the above-mentioned note he wrote as follows:—

"I beg to represent that it is highly expedient that the present state of affairs should be made known to the Government of India, but I leave this to your pleasure. I am merely the well-wisher of both Governments, but from such impediments and changes I am altogether helpless and blameless. Without the assistance of the British Government the reorganisation of this Government would be impossible to an angel from heaven. As you are the well-wisher and guardian of this Government, it is absolutely necessary that you should be informed of the way in which affairs are being conducted."

This invocation of British authority in aid of the cause of regular administration, and for the suppression of the caprice and corruption of a Court, made in such terms and in such a tone by the Peshcar, identical with similar complaints and similar appeals made by Sooraj-ool-Moolk and Shums-ool-Oomra, go very far to confirm General Fraser's reiterated assurances that this was in reality "a weak and submissive Government", if rightly treated; and that if the course he recommended were taken with precision and good-

¹ *Ante*, pp. 197, 198.

will, the old abuses of the Hyderabad Court could be held in check and gradually abolished, and the rule of law instituted all over the country, not only without military demonstration or coercion, but with common consent and public acclamation. If it were made known by one of those direct and decisive communications which the General repeatedly drafted, but could never get adopted without some destructive modification, that both the Minister and the Resident had the full confidence of our Government, and would act in concert, no resistance would be offered to their projects of reform. Fortified by that support, Rajah Chundoo Lall had exercised absolute sway during thirty years of loose and lavish rule.

The disastrous results of Chundoc Lall's mismanagement could have been rectified in four or five years if the same support, on broad grounds of Imperial duty and policy, had been given to ool-Sooraj-Moolk, or even to Ram Buksh, under the supervision of the Resident.

In forwarding the note from the Peshcar just mentioned, General Fraser endeavoured to present the procedure he had always recommended under a somewhat new aspect, and with some new and very pointed remarks.

"The utter powerlessness of the present Peshcar is sufficiently illustrated by the recent instance, related by himself in his last private note.

"It is my deliberate opinion, formed after considerable experience of the character of the Nizam, that nothing less than a decided British administration will save this country as long as the present Sovereign remains on the musnud. But nothing has yet occurred which would justify our proposing, and still less insisting upon, so decided a measure as this, under existing Treaties.

"The full and unfettered power of selecting his own Dewan or Minister, under whatever denomination, has already been conceded by us to the Nizam; and in this respect, therefore, we cannot retrace our steps. But the matter appears to assume a different aspect if the Nizam does not confide to his Minister that full power which it was understood by our Government should be the case, when we acknowledged his independence to the extent above-mentioned. And it may, I conceive, under these circumstances, be competent to us, without injustice or violation of good faith, to insist that the Minister whom His Highness appoints shall be charged with *bond fide* full powers to administer the affairs of this important country.

"The British Resident is now placed in the false and undignified

position of being the mere correspondent of one of the Nizam's officers called a Minister, and asserted by the Nizam to possess the power of one, but who, in point of fact, scarcely possesses more authority than the lowest clerk in a Government office.

"We ought, therefore, I think, to guard effectually against the risk of the Minister being thwarted and impeded, although nominally vested with full powers, by this additional proviso, that, in order to ensure the support of the British Government, whose representative at this Court has under his control the only force capable of maintaining peace and good order, the Minister shall act in all cases with the full and express concurrence of this officer, and deviate in no essential point from his advice, which would, of course, always be given under the general instructions of his own Government, and under due responsibility to that authority."

Many complaints having reached the Residency of the inconvenience and delay caused to travellers, and even to military detachments from the Company's territory, in consequence of the negligent manner in which the fords and ferries on the rivers were kept up, and from positive impediments being offered by the local authorities, apparently of set purpose, the Resident was directed by the Supreme Government to ask for an interview with the Nizam and to make a serious remonstrance on the subject. The interview accordingly took place on the 20th of April 1850, and is thus described:—

"After the usual preliminaries of conversation, before giving me time to deliver the message for which I had come, His Highness took the initiative, and commenced a long discourse on the state of his country, and the incapacity of his Ministers, to whom he attributed all the misfortunes and embarrassments of his Government. In proportion as he blamed others he assumed credit to himself, and took some pains to convince me that everything would be right if his Ministers would only obey his orders, and be guided by his judgment instead of trusting to their own.

"He asked me if I had ever known him to do an oppressive act, or whether I ever heard complaints of his own personal proceedings; and after this he spoke at considerable length regarding the relations between his Government and ours, and the advantages we had received from our connection with him, especially our possession of the Northern Circars, the Ceded Districts, and, more recently, the district of Kurnool.

"As soon as he allowed me the opportunity, I observed that there was a subject on which I had a few words to address to him, and that I thought it desirable, if he had no objection, that his Minister should be

present. Rajah Ram Buksh was accordingly sent for, and after standing in His Highness's presence for some time, was desired to sit down.

"I then delivered the Governor-General's message in the precise terms directed in your letter, and although the Peshcar once or twice attempted to interrupt me with explanations, I requested him to be silent until I had finished what I had to say.

"When I had done, the Nizam appeared much irritated with the conduct of the Peshcar, to whom alone he seemed disposed to attribute the occurrences that had given room for complaint, and addressed him for some time in a strain of severe and angry reproach. He enjoined upon him to take every requisite step, and to give every order which might prevent a recurrence of similar complaints; and ended by desiring him to send, if necessary, Munsubdars and parties of troops to the several ferries over the rivers, and other places where the Company's troops and travellers had suffered inconvenience, for the purpose of enforcing these orders.

"The Nizam then turned to me, and assured me most emphatically that no similar cause of complaint should ever occur again, and that if it did so the responsibility should rest upon himself.

"He then again addressed himself for some time to the Peshcar, with the design apparently of impressing on his mind that he must never, on any occasion, act on his own judgment, or by his own authority, but that he was always to apply to His Highness himself for instructions. The Peshcar said little or nothing in reply, but he appeared anxious and disquieted, and was evidently by no means satisfied with the observations of his Master.

"The turn which His Highness's observations had taken indicated a disposition and intention the very reverse of those counsels I had wished to inculcate, and to impress upon his mind. It appeared to me, therefore, that this was not a fitting time to speak to His Highness as I had purposed, and that it would be expedient to postpone this subject to a more suitable occasion."

Certainly the direct requisition on the subject of roads, ferries, and facilities for travelling, pointedly addressed by the Government of India to His Highness in person, would hardly seem to have been a measure calculated to promote the free action of the Peshcar, or to elevate or ingratiate him in the mind of his Master. The incident was unfortunate. On the 30th of May 1850, General Fraser writes to Lord Dalhousie:—

"I was happy to hear that your Lordship had recovered your health, and that the speculations of the Indian papers in this respect were unfounded. A large portion of health and strength will be required to

enable you to fulfil the task that yet lies before you; for the interior organisation and improvement of India are likely to prove a duty still more arduous and onerous than the waging of external wars and the conquest of provinces.

"We are tolerably quiet now in the Nizam's country. I have lately withdrawn two of the detachments that were out in Berar, but retain the third at Mulkapoor, until the authority of the Nizam's local officers there is perfectly established, when I shall withdraw that also.

"Different opinions are entertained here regarding the capability of the Circar to repay us its debt, amounting now to 6,400,000 rupees. From what Shums-ool-Oomra and Sooraj-ool-Moolk told me at different times, I have no reason to suppose that the Nizam still possesses any very large amount of private treasure, except in jewels. But still it seems to be thought that if matters come to extremity, and that the Nizam has to choose between repaying us the debt or yielding up part of his country, he will be able to do the former by means of something from himself, and contributions and exactions from others. In the meantime, the pecuniary exigencies of the State appear to be supplied as far as they are so at all, by a system of nuzzuranas. Every office, every Talook, every command, is sold; though the Peshcar, Rajah Ram Buksh, disclaims having recourse to these objectionable means.

"I have received several private, or, rather, secret notes lately from the Nizam's brother, Mubarez-ood-Dowla, who is confined in the Fort of Golconda,¹ soliciting my interference on his behalf. But he earnestly entreats me not to allow these communications of his to become known, lest his fate should be rendered worse, thus depriving me of an opportunity of taking any step to alleviate his condition; which I might otherwise be glad to do. If a better Government were established here, I should probably propose his liberation, as well as that of most, if not all, of the Moulavees and other persons who were confined at the same time with him in 1839; but upon this subject I will not trouble you further at present. I may have occasion to address Government officially regarding it hereafter."

During the first half of the year 1850, the Resident had much anxious and perplexing work to perform, in consequence of the Nizam's differences with the Nawab Shums-ool-Oomra, which the Resident had to reconcile as best he could, and which had arisen between His Highness and that nobleman, his near relative, the hereditary Commandant of the Household Troops, and in that capacity the ruler, with almost independent jurisdiction, of a very large

¹ *Ante*, pp. 59, 61.

estate.¹ Very soon, moreover, after the installation of Rajah Ram Buksh as Peshear, the Nizam had begun to manifest signs of uneasiness at the manner in which public business was carried on, and several times, in conversation with General Fraser, expressed himself very strongly to that effect, but without the Resident finding it possible, although the opportunity seemed so favourable for such an argument, to persuade His Highness that the best plan would be to appoint a Dewan with full powers, and to place full confidence in him. The Resident gave every assurance within the scope of his instructions that the British authorities would watch as carefully as the Nizam himself could do, over the proceedings of the Minister, and would never tolerate any administrative measure on his part that could be injurious to the State. The Nizam could not be persuaded at this time to part with what he unfortunately conceived to be the substance of personal power, but which, from the impossibility of his controlling, or even comprehending, all the details of executive and financial procedure, was in truth nothing more than the shadow of authority. The Nizam more than once inquired, in the course of these interviews, as if by way of strengthening his own position, whether Mr. Martin, who had been Resident at Hyderabad from 1825 to 1830, had not stated soon after His Highness's accession to the Musnud in 1829, that the Supreme Government of India had fully recognised the Nizam's prerogative of appointing and dismissing his Dewan and Peshear. General Fraser was, of course, compelled to acknowledge, after the many assurances to that effect that had been given to the Nizam, and after Lord Dalhousie's declaration that "it would be only lost labour and folly" to press a Dewan in whom we had confidence on His Highness,¹ that such a right had been conceded by our Government. And on this very unsatisfactory footing, neither the Nizam nor the Resident having any faith in the capacity or efficiency of Rajah Ram Buksh as the nominal head of the administration, the affairs of the Hyderabad State continued to the first week of October 1850.

All that General Fraser could do during the incumbency of Rajah Ram Buksh was to remind His Highness of the expectation

¹ With the permission of the Nizam, however, the command is now divided, and members of the family hold separate divisional charge.

² *Ante*, pp. 268, 273.

AND SEPARATE JURISDICTION.

of the Government of India that the interest of the debt on account of advances made for the Contingent, then amounting to more than half a million sterling, would be paid regularly; and that the monthly payment of those troops, for whose discipline the British Government was responsible, should be regularly provided for, and no more arrears allowed to accumulate. The General was instructed to warn the Nizam that in the event of these requirements not being satisfied, the Supreme Government of India would most certainly not refrain much longer from instituting measures both for its own reimbursement and security, and for protecting the interests of those faithful soldiers for whom its own faith was virtually pledged. General Fraser was, furthermore, directed to express the very deep regret with which the Supreme Government had observed the prevailing disorders of the State, and the still greater perplexity in which they were likely to fall, if the Nizam did not make a wise exercise, without delay, of the authority which belonged to him. General Fraser was desired to report from time to time the effect which these communications might have on His Highness's counsels.

On the 28th of August 1850, the Assistant Resident, Captain Davidson, by desire of the Resident, had an interview with the Peshcar, Rajah Ram Buksh, who stated that he had lately represented to His Highness the Nizam, and wished it to be understood by General Fraser, that "he could only suggest measures for carrying on the Government and renovating its finances, but must not be held responsible if they failed, since he was entirely deprived of the power to give them effect." Ram Buksh reported also that "His Highness hinted that he should shortly pay ten lakhs of rupees in cash for the general debt due to the British Government, and pawn jewels for the remaining amount." "I begged", says Captain Davidson, "that the Minister would inform me to whom His Highness intended pledging his jewels, and if he thought it probable the Soucars would really advance money, taking jewels as security. He replied, 'Not one of them.' I then again asked to whom he supposed His Highness meant he would pledge them, to which the Peshcar replied that he did not know."

After this it soon became evident that Rajah Ram Buksh could not retain much longer the nominal position of Minister. On the 7th of October the Resident was requested by the Nizam to visit

His Highness at the Palace. The interview that took place is thus described. After the usual preliminary inquiries after the Governor-General's health, and regarding the approaching visit of the Commander-in-Chief to Hyderabad, "a considerable pause ensued."

"The Nizam then renewed the conversation. He said he wished to confer with me on the affairs of the country. He commenced, as is not unusual with him, with a history of the relations subsisting between the two Governments; and gave me a long account of the aid afforded by his grandfather, Nizam Ali Khan, in our wars with Tippoo, when he sent down a large force to Seringapatam under command of Secunder Jah; and again, afterwards, in our second and last war with that Prince, when a large force was sent from hence under command of Meer Allum, and assisted in the capture of Seringapatam. He spoke of Lord Harris's repeated acknowledgment of the value of this co-operation.

"He then touched more briefly on subsequent events, and the intimate political connection between the two Governments—it being apparently his object in these remarks to impress upon my mind a full recollection of the friendly and cordial alliance that had always subsisted between them.

"He then proceeded to the subject of Rajah Ram Buksh's administration, which he censured in the severest terms, and told me repeatedly that the Rajah had quite deceived him, and had falsified the promises he had made when he was appointed Peshcar. He alluded to the objection I had then offered to the appointment, and to the personal responsibility he had taken upon himself for the consequence. But the promise to advance sixty lakhs of rupees for the exigencies of the State had been, he said, entirely violated; as was another—the Nizam added—which the Peshcar had made him at the same time, though His Highness had not before communicated it to me, to furnish without fail fifty lakhs of rupees a year for the pay of the Contingent.

"The Nizam then took a note out of his pocket, which he requested me to read. This note conveyed a promise, expressed in few and decided terms, to furnish fifty lakhs of rupees per annum for the pay of the Contingent. His Highness then desired me to look at the seal, which I did, and saw upon it the words 'Rajah Ram Buksh Bahadur'. Upon returning it to the Nizam, I said, 'The Peshcar promises here to furnish fifty lakhs of rupees for the Contingent, but the pay of the Contingent is not forty lakhs of rupees a year.' To this the Nizam replied, 'He meant the pay of the Contingent whatever it might be, more or less.'

"His Highness then continued for a considerable time to descant on

the numerous delinquencies of Rajah Ram Buksh, among which he enumerated particularly his having entertained, without authority, troops to the extent of fifteen lakhs of rupees per annum.

"To what purpose, I asked, were these troops entertained? Was it not for the benefit of the State? 'For his own,' the Nizam immediately replied, with an angry look which indicated the resentment he felt at the injury thus inflicted on his Government.

"The other instance of misconduct he particularly mentioned was his failing either to take any measures for liquidating the debt due to the Company, or for regularly disbursing the pay of the Contingent. Upon this last point His Highness dwelt at considerable length. He stated that he had always considered it of primary importance, as the payment to be first made, and in preference to all others. He observed that Maharajah Chundoo Lall had repeatedly impressed upon his mind the importance of maintaining the Contingent and regularly paying it, as an indispensable means of preserving the peace and tranquillity of the country.

"His Highness spoke warmly on this subject, repeated his sense of the value of the services of this Force, and did not drop the slightest hint that he considered the Contingent either an unnecessary burden upon his finances, or otherwise than a valuable body of troops which ought at all hazards to be maintained.

"He terminated a long explanation of what he considered the misconduct of the Peshear, by informing me that he had determined to dismiss him from his office, and requested me to inform the Governor-General of all that he had said on this subject.

"The Nizam then remaining quiet for some time, I broke the silence by saying, 'Has your Highness come to any decision regarding a successor to Rajah Ram Buksh?' To this he replied, 'I have this subject in consideration, and shall let you know the result.' He mentioned five days as the time within which he might have occasion again to see me on this point.

"I inquired to whom he desired me to address myself on current affairs of business pending ultimate arrangements. He said I might address my notes, as formerly, to Amjud-ool-Moolk.

"His Highness then adverted to the debt due to our Government, and after again blaming the Peshear severely for having deceived him on the subject, he begged me to inform the Governor-General that he pledged his word for the payment of thirty lakhs of rupees in fifty days from this date, and the remainder in two years by gradual instalments.

"I replied that I should not fail to communicate his wishes to the Governor-General, but added that under the intimation of his Lordship's intention, as formerly communicated to His Highness, that the

whole debt should be paid by the end of this year, I could by no means take upon myself to express an opinion that his proposal would be assented to. To this His Highness observed, 'I trust to you. You know the condition of this Government. You are the friend of both Governments, and it is your office to maintain the friendly feeling that subsists between us. I rely with confidence on the representation you will make to the Governor-General.'

"I then inquired whether I was to understand that besides this proposed mode of liquidating the debt due to us, the pay of the Contingent would be furnished without fail regularly every month. To which he replied, 'Certainly, it should be so.'

"His Highness, after this, observed that there was another communication he wished me to make to the Governor-General, namely that he gave his solemn word that in 1,200 days from this time he would so regulate the affairs of his Government that no fault should be found in it; and that if in this respect he failed, we might impose on him such conditions as we pleased, to which he would not demur. He repeated this two or three times, and the particular period specified being rather remarkable, I paid attention to the terms in which he expressed it, which were both 'twelve hundred days', and 'one thousand two hundred days', as if he attached some mysterious or superstitious importance to this particular period. He very distinctly repeated more than once, 'If I do not fulfil my word, you may impose your own conditions. I will acquiesce in them.'

"I took my leave in the usual way, impressed, as I have not unfrequently been on former occasions, with the striking discrepancy between the Nizam's apparent good sense and good feeling in conversation, and the weakness and unreasonableness that frequently seem afterwards to characterise the acts of his Government. And I feel that attributing the disposition and the degree of capacity to the Nizam that I have so often done, it may seem unintelligible to the Government of India that I cannot influence him to act somewhat more in conformity with the judicious tendency of what he says. I must therefore say a few words in explanation of what may seem a failure in my public conduct.

"The Nizam laboured under the defects of a total want of experience of human character, and in the management of public affairs and men, until he came forward for the first time in the capacity of a ruler and administrator after the death of Rajah Chundoo Lall.

"He is absolutely inaccessible to the British Resident at Hyderabad, except upon rare and formal occasions, and he guards with singular and jealous care against all familiar communication between the Resident and the Nobles of his Court. It will appear scarcely credible that although I have been here for some years, I have never once seen,

and much less had any personal intercourse with, most of the persons whose names are constantly mentioned to me, and often appear in my despatches,—as, for example, Rajah Bal Mookund, Iktidar Jung, Meer Imam, the Duftur-wallas, and others, who are known to be the Nizam's most confidential advisers, and whom he sees and converses with most habitually. These persons live in the City, and like most of the other Nobles of the State, never leave it. When I myself go into the City, which I do only to wait upon the Nizam, or occasionally to visit the Minister for the time being, these men are invisible, and seem to be kept carefully out of my sight, for I cannot attribute it to accident that my eye has never yet fallen on them.

“To all this may be added that it is not a small correction here, or a remedy for particular abuses there, or the reorganisation of any particular Department that is wanted, but a total change in the existing system, and substitution in lieu thereof, of a comprehensive scheme of rational administration, for which the Nizam's mind, notwithstanding the favourable qualities I attribute to it, is quite unprepared. He is singularly tenacious of the ancient forms and customs of Government observed by his ancestors, and could not easily be induced to consent to that large deviation from them which the actual circumstances require.”

But although the Nizam, secluded as he was, and fenced round with etiquette, could not be “easily” induced to consent to the necessary changes and sacrifices, General Fraser was always convinced that his consent could have been obtained through the medium of a Dewan, strengthened by the avowed support of our Government, and in constant and authorised association with the British Resident. And the Nizam's good sense and good feeling, and the judicious tendency of some of his remarks on this occasion, were calculated to confirm the views which the Resident urged in vain on our Government.

In the last quarter of 1850 the General had much trouble in settling, by his own authority, aided by the investigations of a Court of Inquiry, and supported by the decisive judgment of the Governor-General, a series of disputes between some of the superior officers of the Contingent at the cantonment of Ellichpore, one of them being his own valued friend, Brigadier Colin Mackenzie. One subject of difference arose out of the expulsion from the town of Ellichpore, by Brigadier Mackenzie's order, of a banker of considerable wealth and high position named Kishen Dass, on the ground of his having given a fraudulent or corrupt verdict as pre-

sident of a Panchayat or jury of arbitration. The Resident reversed this order on appeal, after full consideration of the case on its merits. The Brigadier then claimed, under the regulations laid down for military bazars, the absolute right of expelling any person "of bad character" from the cantonment of Ellichpore. The Resident explained that the regulations for keeping disorderly characters out of military bazars were never intended to apply to persons of the social standing of the banker, Kishen Dass. The Brigadier had taken upon himself to suspend compliance with the Resident's orders, and requested that the whole correspondence might be submitted to the Governor-General. With this request General Fraser at once complied, finding fault at the same time with Brigadier Mackenzie's "disputatious and disrespectful style", and requiring the immediate readmission of Kishen Dass to his house and place of business. It is to this unpleasant affair that Lord Dalhousie refers in the following letter:—

"Camp, October 1st, 1850.

"MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—I am sorry to see that your Brigadiers have begun to squabble. I have replied, fully supporting your decision. Your orders ought to be final on such questions, and I shall at all times desire to maintain them fully.

"I have not adverted to the tone of the correspondence, because your authority should be sufficient to deal with that. Brigadiers must keep civil tongues in their heads, as well as other people; and I have no doubt that you will establish that doctrine in this case.

"Dr. Walker's death makes a vacancy. I have made no appointment till I hear from you, lest I should get into more scrapes. Let me know whether you wish your son-in-law, Dr. Bell, to be named.

"Believe me, yours very truly,

"DALHOUSIE."

Here is the General's answer:—

"Hyderabad, 18th October 1850.

"MY LORD,—I had yesterday the pleasure to receive your Lordship's letter of the 1st instant, and beg to say what, perhaps, I ought to have said sooner, that, if not inconsistent with any other application you may have received, or with any presumed promise, or with any one of the numerous circumstances by which Governors-General sometimes find themselves hampered in the distribution of patronage, I shall be glad to see Dr. Bell nominated to the vacancy occasioned by Dr. Walker's death.

"I most sincerely regret the strange turn which Mackenzie has taken, subversive of everything like even decent subordination; for as I had already every respect for him before he came into the Nizam's Army, so I was fully prepared to act with him in the most cordial and friendly manner. His last letter accuses me of 'illegality'; but Heaven knows wherein the illegality consists. I have been perfectly unable to find it out, as have been equally my Military Secretary, Johnston, and the Judge Advocate, McGoun, who study, perhaps more attentively than I do, the rules and regulations of the Nizam's Army, and the extent of my authority. In directing that the individual named Kishen Dass should be allowed to return to Ellichpore, I merely did what I considered to be an act of justice; and if I had not done so, I should have been handed up *by him* to the Supreme Government, and probably to the Court of Directors. My Military Secretary, who was an intimate friend of Mackenzie, wrote him two or three private letters, suggesting to him a more rational line of conduct than that he was pursuing. But his endeavours were fruitless, and he has discontinued them.

"The Nizam has as yet appointed no Minister, nor does it seem certain that he will appoint one at all. But all is uncertainty, and he may appoint one to-morrow. It is a wretched position in which the Resident is placed here, but there is no help for it. Forcible interference or assumption of power would not be justifiable; and from anything short of it, in the shape of mere advice and suggestions, I have long since abandoned any hope of success.

"I remain, my Lord,

"Your very sincere and faithful servant,

"J. S. FRASER.

"To the Marquis of Dalhousie, K.T., etc., etc., etc., Simla."

The next letter does not indicate much hope in the Resident's mind as to any spontaneous improvement in the Nizam's affairs.

"Hyderabad, 5th November 1850.

"MY LORD,—There is yet no Minister appointed here. It is reported that the Nizam expects the British Government will excuse him the debt he owes us altogether, and Rajah Ram Buksh has sent me a private message that Mr. ——— has lately gone secretly into the City at night, and has had an interview with one of the Nizam's most confidential servants. Perhaps they are asking his advice, for they have a great opinion of his cleverness and power of getting people out of scrapes as well as into them. This poor man is very old, infirm, and almost blind; but he appears to be still as deeply imbued as ever with the spirit of intrigue. What I am now stating to your Lordship privately, it would be my duty, if it could be proved, to report

officially, as the Court of Directors long ago positively and repeatedly prohibited Mr. ——— from having any communication with the Nizam or his Court."

Here is the next letter from Lord Dalhousie, marking the termination of the painful incident in the disciplinary control of the Contingent that has already been mentioned.

"Camp, Hoshiarpore, November 8th, 1850.

"MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—I have directed that Dr. Bell should be put in orders as posted to the Cavalry Regiment.

"Brigadier Mackenzie's conduct is extraordinary and quite unaccountable. He is quite in the wrong as to the merits of Kishen Dass's case, and if he were as right as he is wrong, his mode of advocating his cause could not be tolerated for a moment. I have sent him a most severe censure to-day through you. He shall be written to privately, in order that he may comprehend that he must either guide himself differently or go. He is an excellent soldier and a good man, but he must observe his place if he wishes to keep it.

"Your letters have been most temperate and considerate—indeed, beyond what Mackenzie deserves. I hope you will have no further trouble on this head.

"Believe me, yours sincerely,

"DALHOUSIE."

The correspondence terminated with a letter from Brigadier Mackenzie, dated the 5th of November 1850, which the General, in forwarding it to Government, declared to be "satisfactory, and honourable to the good feeling and calmer judgment of that officer."

The Government and the Commander-in-Chief of Madras were desirous, towards the close of 1850, to reduce the numbers of the Subsidiary Force at Secunderabad in the course of a general redistribution of the Madras Army; but the Resident strongly opposed this measure, as being inconsistent with the terms of the Treaty of 1800; and although the intervention of the Governor-General did not become necessary, the next letter shows that it would have been exercised in accordance with General Fraser's opinion, had a reference been required.

"Camp, Buttala, Nov. 19th, 1850.

"MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—I have received your letter of the 31st ult. You were very right not to let yourself be weakened at present, and I have no doubt the Commander-in-Chief will see the

propriety of your views. Of course I shall do nothing which could possibly render a force necessary or prudent without giving you ample notice.

"On the question of the debt, and the course to be adopted, I shall address you very soon.

"Believe me, yours very truly,

"DALHOUSIE."

As the month of December commenced, there seemed little prospect of the debt due to the British Government being liquidated by the Nizam by the end of the month—the term which Lord Dalhousie had laid down as that which was to be followed, in case of default, by a demand for territorial security. On the 16th of December Sooraj-ool-Moolk waited on the Resident, by desire of the Nizam, to represent the financial embarrassments of the State, as well as the impossibility of obtaining a loan from the Soucars, and to request that some further delay might be allowed in the payment of the debt. He specified twelve lakhs of rupees per annum as the amount that His Highness would stipulate to pay as instalments to clear off the whole debt. The General gave a verbal answer to the effect that he should communicate His Highness's wishes to the Governor-General, but holding out no hope that the Government of India would depart from its resolution.

After some more communications with Sooraj-ool-Moolk, General Fraser waited upon the Nizam in the forenoon of the 22nd of December, at His Highness's encampment on the borders of the Hoossain Saugor tank, or lake, at the distance of about two and a half miles from the Residency. The General says:—

"I waited upon him accordingly at eleven o'clock, and he received me under a shamiyana¹ in front of a large Durbar tent, with the view directly before us of the Hoossain Saugor tank, and the cantonment of Secunderabad on the opposite bank. His reception of me was conducted in a manner never observed before. When I waited upon him in his own Palace in the City, both His Highness and myself are always seated on the floor, but on the present occasion I found that two chairs were placed for us, on one of which His Highness sat, and I on the other, close to him.

"The substitution of chairs for a seat on the floor may, perhaps, have been occasioned by a remark which I made soon after the Com-

¹ A canopy.

mander-in-Chief's arrival here, that if an interview took place between the Nizam and His Excellency, I considered it desirable that the usual mode of my reception, which I thought objectionable in two or three respects, should be departed from in favour of one more suitable to the rank and station of the Commander-in-Chief.

"The Nizam detained me for an hour and a half, and no other person was present. The first half-hour was passed in ordinary conversation; and His Highness then gradually brought forward the subject on which he had desired to confer with me, which was simply that of urging me, by every argument in his power, to recommend to the Governor-General the acceptance of his proposition regarding the mode of liquidating the debt due to the British Government. He dwelt on the long friendship of his family and State, on the immense difficulties with which he had to contend, and on the impossibility of raising any more loans from the Soucars, as had been done in the time of Chundoo Lall. He observed that he had still jewels to the value of one and a quarter crore of rupees; but I, of course, held out no encouragement to him to suppose that the British Government would take any part in any transaction founded on such security.

"I informed His Highness that it would be my duty to communicate all that he had said, but that I had no reason to hope that the Governor-General would recede from the resolution he had expressed; and that, with every wish to avoid taking any step that would be disagreeable to His Highness's feelings, I could not do otherwise, on receiving the instructions of the Government of India, which I had every reason to expect within the next six or seven days, than act in conformity with them.

"His Highness then asked, and in the course of a few minutes repeated the question several times, what other instructions I could receive except that of demanding payment of the money he owed us.

"I replied that I could not tell of what nature my instructions would be, but that immediately on their arrival their purport should be made known to His Highness.

"I told His Highness I was afraid that he was not fully informed as to the real state of his country, and that I must beg permission to tell him that it was in a very disorderly condition, for which I could perceive no other possible remedy than the appointment of an able and active Minister.

"His Highness replied that he was sensible of the truth of what I had said, and that he proposed to appoint a Peshcar, with an understanding, however, that nothing should be done by him without previous communication to His Highness himself.

"When I spoke of the present disorderly condition of the Berar country, the Nizam remarked that this was, in a great measure, owing

to the number of Rohillas whom the British Government had allowed to flock into his dominions from Bhopal and other surrounding districts, and requested me to send an order immediately on my return home to the officer commanding the Ellichpore Division, to move with a party of the Contingent against Gholam Hassan Khan, the present actual holder of the jaghire of Ellichpore, and remove him from the station he occupies, and which he refuses to resign.

"I replied that this had been forbidden by the Supreme Government, in consequence of the Ellichpore dispute having arisen from pecuniary transactions of which the Government could not approve.

"To this His Highness remarked that neither pecuniary transactions nor nuzzuranas had anything to do with the case; but he could not convince me of this, and I therefore avoided pursuing the discussion, and the subject gradually dropped.

"The Nizam terminated the conversation in the same spirit in which he had commenced it, trusting that the indulgence of delay in the payment of the debt would be granted; desiring me to inform the Governor-General that the Sovereign of this country, after the most intimate and friendly connection with the British Government of more than half a century, had been reduced to the necessity of earnestly soliciting that consideration, which he trusted could not be denied him."

In January 1851 General Fraser again strongly recommended that the Nizam should be "urgently pressed, in terms which, though expressed in a friendly tone, would scarcely admit of denial, to appoint a Dewan—not a Peshcar, whose recognised position is entirely different from that of a Dewan—with such full powers as would enable him to enter on the administration of the country, unimpeded by those obstacles which Sooraj-ool-Moolk and Shums-ool-Oomra lately experienced during the short tenure of office respectively held by them."

On the 25th of January General Fraser again had a private interview with the Nizam. His Highness, notwithstanding the confident assurances so recently given, had paid up to the end of December 1850 no portion of the Contingent debt, which then amounted to upwards of seventy lakhs of Hyderabad rupees.¹

The General addressed the Nizam in the plainest and most direct terms, and fully explained to him the actual state of his country, telling His Highness that he was "kept in ignorance of

¹ Exactly, Hyd. Rs. 70,77,416 : 2 : 4.

these facts by the interested persons whom he habitually admitted to his presence”.

“His Highness listened to me throughout with patience and attention, but, I regret to say, not with that advantage which I had ventured, though not very confidently, to anticipate. With respect to the debt, he said it was impossible for him to promise more than he had already done, namely, to pay us twelve lakhs of rupees a year of the capital, besides interest, and occasionally such additional sums as circumstances might enable him to furnish.

“I repeated what I said during our previous interview, that under this arrangement it would require six years to liquidate the debt, which I was satisfied would not answer the purpose of the Government of India, and I adverted to the engagement he had already failed to accomplish, to pay thirty lakhs of rupees within fifty days from the 8th of October last.

“He said that he had been cruelly deceived and disappointed by the Soucars with whom arrangements had been made and, he thought, completed, for a loan at that time; and that he could not take upon himself to pay off more than the twelve lakhs a year.

“I dwelt at considerable length on the absolute necessity of having a Minister at the seat of Government, possessed of ability to rule the country, and of sufficient decision of character to cause His Highness’s authority to be respected.

“His Highness replied, as he did in my last interview on the 24th ultimo, that he would appoint a Peshcar before the end of the month, which, as this is the 22nd of the Mohammedan month of Rabi-ul-awwal, would be within a few days.

“I then told His Highness distinctly, that if by a Peshcar he meant a person whose only duty it was to collect the revenue and look after the finances of State, it was by no means sufficient, and that a Minister was required, vested with full powers, and competent to superintend and command every department of the State.

“‘Whether I appoint a Peshcar or a Dewan’, the Nizam rejoined, ‘he will have the full powers you allude to; but he must inform me of everything he does, and always act with my permission.’

“I then made His Highness clearly understand that this was not what I meant by being vested with full powers; and that if his Minister could act only under the unceasing control of His Highness, and be liable to constant opposition from the self-interested persons who are known to rule His Highness’s counsels, the appointment might as well not be made at all.

“Referring once more to the appointment of a Dewan, the Nizam remarked that the salary of this office was very great, being three

lakhs of rupees a year, or 25,000 rupees a month ; and he seemed disposed to infer that this particular appointment was objectionable on that account.

"To this I replied that, in my opinion, as I had once before stated to His Highness, an allowance of 25,000 rupees was too much, and that I thought 10,000 rupees per mensem would be sufficient remuneration for this office.

"His Highness rejoined that there were many expenses connected with the situation besides those of a merely personal nature.

"I could, in short, obtain no definite or explicit promise from the Nizam on the subject of a Dewan, and it seemed to me that the objects of my interview had entirely failed. I told him so, and begged him that, instead of allowing me to report to Government what had then passed between us, he would give a little more calm consideration, and favour me with a reply in the course of to-morrow, or whenever he judged most convenient, through the medium of Syfe Jung Bahadur, or any other person.

"What is the use of having recourse to these mediums?' His Highness said ; 'you are the best medium.'

"I understood from this that he wished me to consider what he had said as final, and I therefore said, 'I have never had an interview with Your Highness of which I regret the result so much. It has not been satisfactory, and will not be satisfactory, to the Government of India. It has been attended with no advantage.'

"That', replied the Nizam, with a faint smile, 'will depend upon your advocacy. I rely upon it.'

"Your letter was still in my hand, and I said to His Highness, 'This letter contains advice, and a preliminary intimation from the Government of India ; but, unless I greatly err, it will be the last of this character. My next communication will, I am persuaded, contain neither advice nor suggestion, but a resolved decision. I have discharged my duty, and the responsibility of whatever may happen hereafter rests with Your Highness, not with me.' Immediately after this I bowed and took leave."

The "resolved decision" was being prepared for announcement and execution, not without scruples and misgivings in Lord Dalhousie's mind, as will be seen from his reply to the following letter from General Fraser.

"Hyderabad, 30th January 1851.

"MY LORD,—I duly received your letter of the 6th instant, to which I shall reply more particularly in the course of a few days, as well as to the latter part of the official letter under date the 4th instant. In the meantime I send a copy of the little outline map, formerly trans-

mitted, which you mention has been mislaid. I find, upon more minute investigation, that the amount of revenue therein assigned to the different Talooks is much overrated. I shall send up the most correct accounts attainable, both of the revenue as it was under good, or at least tolerable, management, and what it is now, or was in 1258 Fuslee—1848-49. I am still of opinion that Berar Payen Ghât and Bera Bala Ghât will be the best districts for our purpose, but to this we must now add the Circar of Dowlutabad.

"The whole case regarding this country is by no means an easy one, and I shall perhaps consider it my duty to take a somewhat more extensive view of the subject than merely that which is referred to in the official letter of the 4th. If we are to do anything at all for the benefit of this unfortunate Nizam, we must speak plainly—courteously, and in as friendly a tone as circumstances may admit, so as to give no just cause of offence or complaint, but still in such a way as cannot be mistaken.

"I remain, my Lord,

"Yours very faithfully and obediently,

"J. S. FRASER.

"To the Most Noble the Marquis of Dalhousie, K.T.,
Governor-General of India."

Here is the answer :—

"Camp, February 20th, 1851.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,—I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of 30th ult., and the first official letter.

"I will not trouble you now further than to say that you took the right tone in your interview with the Nizam. You say 'we must speak plainly'. We have been doing that surely for a good while past. But speaking, I fear, will do no good; and when we come to *act*, or wish to do so, there is an inconvenient piece of parchment barring the way, which His Highness will not set aside, and which I am not inclined to break through. Hence we are stationary. Undesirable as that attitude may be, I do not see—nor, I think, can you point out—any remedy for it but time, which will bring a cure for this, as it does for all other ills.

"Believe me, my dear General,

"Yours sincerely,

"DALHOUSIE."

In the recently published memoir of General Colin Mackenzie an extract is given of a private letter from Lord Dalhousie, dated 12th September 1852, which harmonises very closely with what is said in the latter part of the above letter. The Governor-General,

referring to the unsatisfactory administration of the Nizam's dominions, says: "As for taking the country, I fervently hope it will not be taken in my time, at least. Treaties can't be torn up like old newspapers, you know."¹

In the following two letters General Fraser explains to the Governor-General what he means by "speaking plainly", but "courteously", to the Nizam, "in a friendly tone", giving "no just cause of offence", but "in such a way as cannot be mistaken". It will shortly be seen how different a "tone" was assumed by Lord Dalhousie,—how far from "friendly", how far from "courteous", how certain to give "offence", and how "mistaken" in its main doctrine.

"Hyderabad, 12th March 1851.

"MY LORD,—As Brigadier Beatson has at length officially announced his intention of returning to England, the temporary command of the Cavalry Division has necessarily devolved upon the next senior officer, Captain Commandant Yates. I enclose an extract from the Confidential Review and Inspection Report of the 5th Nizam's Cavalry, which I have just received from Brigadier Beatson, as it may lead your Lordship to appoint, with as little loss of time as may conveniently be practicable, a permanent successor to this command.

"I have had the pleasure to receive your Lordship's note of the 20th ult., at the end of which you observe that you do not see, nor think that I can point out, any remedy for the difficulties and stationary attitude in which we are now placed at Hyderabad.

"I think that a letter from your Lordship to the Nizam, of the subjoined purport, might be attended with some advantageous result, though I am far from alleging that it certainly would be so. It might be worth while, I think, to make the attempt, and I perceive in it no violation of treaty or good faith, or exhibition of any principle that a British Government need be ashamed to avow.

" 'The disorganised state of affairs in your Highness's dominions has now reached such an extent that your Government is on the brink of ruin, and the moment appears to be approaching when your independence as a Sovereign Prince will be extinguished, not by any foreign enemy or pressure from without, but by the force of circumstances arising from internal misgovernment.

" 'Your country is irretrievably oppressed with debt. Your Irregular Troops are frequently mutinying for want of pay, while many thousands of them continue a useless burden to the State, who might, with the utmost advantage, be disbanded. A long-continued system of mis-

¹ *Storms and Sunshine of a Soldier's Life* (1884), vol. ii, p. 77.

management has diminished the public revenue which once placed Hyderabad on a par with the most powerful and richest States of India, to an amount which does not now suffice for the current expenses of the Government. Commerce is almost annihilated by the weight of those taxes that are imposed upon it, either by the Government itself, or those inferior officers and other subjects of the Government who arrogate to themselves a right to levy taxes which is neither authorised nor ought to be allowed.

“‘Roads and means of communication, the first want of a civilised country, are in a deficient and degraded condition throughout the greatest part of your dominions; for such are the necessities of the State that the amount which it has been found possible to appropriate to their construction or repair is altogether insufficient for the end proposed. The frequency of complaint indicates great defects in the administration of justice, and constant highway robberies afford abundant proof that the ancient Police system of the country has been neglected and discontinued. Your country is overrun with foreign mercenary troops, of whom the Arabs alone are now counted by thousands, who exclude your natural-born subjects from that employment and service under the Government they have a right to expect, and have acquired an influence and authority which is beyond your power to control. The absence of an efficient Executive Government at Hyderabad has produced the inevitable consequence that your authority is but little respected at the capital, and is altogether disregarded in the provinces.

“‘To what can all this lead, or rather to what has it already led, but to the imminent ruin and extinction of your Sovereignty? I entreat you to reflect upon this state of affairs; exercise your own unbiassed judgment, uninfluenced by the false representations of a party and the evil suggestions of those who have not the good of the State, but solely the furtherance of their own interested ends, in view.

“‘I address you as the oldest and most faithful Ally of the British Government in India; as one whose power, political station, and independence I am desirous to maintain, rather than see them undergo that fate with which they are threatened, of being for ever irrecoverably lost. There is but one way in which the object I have thus at heart can be attained, and I propose it to you with a preliminary and explicit understanding that it is competent to you to accede to or decline it. Assent to an act of wisdom is now in your power. In a short time nothing will be left to you but the fatal consequence of having rejected it.

“‘The only certain and effectual way of escaping the danger with which you are threatened will be to place your country, for a certain and defined number of years, under the exclusive management of the

British Government, to be restored at the expiration of that term to your Highness's free and sovereign power.

“ ‘ If at that time it shall appear expedient that a modification of our existing political relations is necessary, with a view to the maintenance of your State, and your position as a Sovereign Prince and Ally of the British Government, and to prevent a recurrence of the dangerous predicament in which you are now placed, that expediency will be rendered the subject of a friendly negotiation, which may lead to the adoption of ulterior measures of arrangement and permanent security.

“ ‘ I beg your Highness to remark distinctly that I perceive no remedy short of that which I have explained which may surely liberate you from your present heavy embarrassments and imminently impending danger. I regard your adoption of the plan I have now placed before your view as the only certain and effectual means by which you may ultimately secure your independence and the recovery of that power which, in the vain attempt to govern the country yourself, without the intervention of a Minister, you have allowed to escape from your hands. I will not deceive you by allowing you to suppose that I consider any other arrangement than that above explained sufficient to attain the object in view, for you have so long disregarded my advice to appoint and maintain in office an efficient Dewan, who might, by a well-regulated system of management, and acting in cordial co-operation with the Officer who represents the British Government at your Highness's Court, have rescued your country from the state of disorganisation into which it has fallen, that I believe your existing embarrassments to be now irretrievable, excepting by the means I have pointed out, and which it depends upon your Highness to adopt or decline as your own unfettered judgment may dictate.

“ ‘ Whatever the consequences of your resolution in this respect may be, they will rest with yourself. I have discharged the duty of a friend.’

“ ‘ This is but an outline, or rough framework, of what might be said, and I have not alluded in it to the important fact of our being on the point of curtailing the Nizam of nearly a third of his dominions, whatever his resolution may be regarding a temporary cession of the whole of them to us ; although this might, of course, be done with advantage, as it would be eminently confirmatory of the other arguments brought forward. What might be said on this part of the subject is more particularly referred to in my public letter of the 4th February last.

“ ‘ Our right to demand a part of the Nizam's country, to repay the debt he owes us, I consider quite undoubted, whether he likes it or not ; and, therefore, I should never think of alluding to his assent to

that part of the question, or to the contingency of his opposing to it anything like positive dissent.

“ I remain, my Lord, with great respect,

“ Your very faithful and obedient servant,

“ J. S. FRASER.”

“ Hyderabad, 14th March 1851.

“ MY LORD,—I concluded my letter yesterday hastily, not to be too late for the tappal,¹ or I should have taken the liberty of adding this further remark, that however unlikely it might be that the suggested proposal to the Nizam should be attended with success, or receive his assent, it might at least be of some use to the British Government itself hereafter, by its proving that we had not absolutely confined ourselves to the security of our own pecuniary interests, but that in doing so we had plainly warned him of the general state of his country, and adopted the only means to save him from the ruin it portended,—a consummation likely to be hastened by the very measure of our securing the repayment of the debt due to us, our right to do which no one can contest. The bare and isolated fact of our merely securing the attainment of our own just demand might still be characterised by the opponents of the Government as being harsh and inconsistent with our profession of friendship for the Nizam, in as far as it obviously tended to precipitate his downfall. The risk of this anticipated objection is removed by our being able to show that we had placed it in his power not only to avert his downfall, but to secure and perpetuate that sovereign independence which nothing had endangered but his own gross misgovernment. If it were said, ‘What measure was this? To avoid a possible contingency, you asked a man to give you up the temporary management of his whole country. And what right had you to expect that he would accede to this with the example of India before his eyes?’ I would reply, The case to be guarded against was much more than a contingency. Its occurrence was inevitable. And with regard to the step taken to warn the Nizam of this very certainty, and the mode of guarding against it, it was the only one that presented itself. It would be for our critical opponents in this case to say what other step could have been taken. For myself, I must plainly say that I see none. I, of course, can never intend to contemplate the violation of a Treaty. But even the modification of our existing Treaties, or substitution of others in lieu of those now in force, would not suffice unless involving, as an initial step, the very one I am proposing to the Nizam’s spontaneous acceptance. That step may appear a very simple one, and doubtless it is so. But complicate it as I will,

¹ Post.

and render it as deeply political, or even Machiavellian, as I may, I can devise nothing better. We are realising the dreadful punishment recorded somewhere of a living body chained to a dead one. Struggle and writhe as we may, the festering corpse is at our side, and we cannot disengage ourselves from it.

"The only possible alternative to the above plan, though a very inadequate one, is the appointment of a Dewan—the best that can be had, probably Shums-ool-Oomra or Sooraj-ool-Moolk—with an explicit understanding that, although ultimately responsible to his Sovereign and his country, he shall be unfettered in the current exercise of his rule, and be permitted to act in concurrence with the British Resident.

"I have, perhaps, to beg your Lordship's pardon for troubling you so much and so frequently on this subject. But my mind is deeply penetrated with a sense of its difficulty, and I cannot but be anxious to afford any light, however faint it may be, which may serve to dispel the darkness of our way.

"I remain, my Lord, with great respect,

"Your very obedient and faithful servant,

"J. S. FRASER."

The General, in a despatch to the Government of India, dated the 4th of February 1851, which has already been published in a Blue Book,¹ made officially the same proposition that he had made in the letter to Lord Dalhousie just given, that the Nizam should be urged, "in such a calm and dispassionate tone as could give no offence", to entrust the whole of his country "to our sole and exclusive authority and management for a definite number of years." He spoke of it as "a proposition only, and by no means an imperative demand, from which His Highness would not be permitted to dissent"; and he dwelt very much on the fact that it would "have reference much more to the interests of the Nizam himself than to those of the British Government".

The General pointed out that the Nizam had not hitherto been able to pay the Contingent regularly, which had been the sole cause of the accumulation of debt to the amount of seventy lakhs of rupees. We were now about to assume "the temporary management of a tract of country yielding from thirty to forty lakhs of rupees per annum",—the letter from the Government of India specified "the allotment of revenue to the amount of thirty-five lakhs of rupees annually for the liquidation of the debt *in three*

¹ *Nizam's Territory* (418 of 1854), pp. 13 to 17.

years",¹—and he could not be expected to pay the Contingent more easily or regularly, "with his financial means diminished to the extent above-mentioned."

The General was convinced that if Sooraj-ool-Moolk, armed with the declared confidence of the Supreme Government, were associated with him, they could persuade the Nizam without much difficulty to consent to such a scheme of British management as would commend itself to the judgment of all those who wished the independence of the Hyderabad State to be maintained; a scheme whereby only three English officers, under the Resident's authority, and without the displacement of any native officials,—except for incompetence or misconduct,—would be employed in the Civil administration. Within a term of three, or at the most five years, the finances would, he believed, be placed in such a condition that the Contingent could be paid every month without fail, and administrative reforms would be so firmly established that there would be no fear of the old abuses raising their heads again.

On the 25th of February 1851, the Nizam appointed as Peshcar a Brahmin named Ganesh Rao, "the great-grandson of Vitto Pundit, known by the title of Rajah Bahadur, who was for some time Dewan to the Nizam's grandfather, Nizam Ali Khan." This person was so notoriously incompetent, and so obviously brought forward as "a mere puppet", that General Fraser felt himself bound, while stating that "His Highness could of course make the appointment if he pleased", "to decline any personal connection or the establishment of official intercourse with Ganesh Rao in the capacity of Peshcar, without the distinct orders of the Government of India."

In a letter dated the 16th of March 1851, the General reiterated the advice he had so often given before, in different forms and on various occasions.

"In several of my recent despatches I have brought prominently forward, as an alternative to our own assumption of the management of the country, the expediency of insisting on the Nizam's appointing an efficient Dewan. I beg permission to recur to this subject on the present occasion, for though the proposition appears simple enough, it is attended, under present circumstances, with considerable difficulty.

¹ Letter dated 4th January 1851,—see *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), p. 13.

"Shums-ool-Oomra and Sooraj-ool-Moolk are the only persons under whose ministerial management I should anticipate the slightest hope of success. I do not believe there are any other equally able men in the State, or, if there are, I am not acquainted with them: and it is an important fact that public opinion never appears to point to any other single individual who might be supposed capable of sustaining the office of Dewan.

"The Government of India has placed it in the power of the Nizam to select whom he pleases for the office of Dewan. The Nizam has greatly abused the power thus conceded, and he should, in my opinion, be taught that he must not thus play with the interests of his Government, and endanger its very existence.

"No man could well succeed in the management of this country who had not the confidence of its inhabitants, and, as a still more essential qualification, who was not known to possess the confidence of the British Government. A defect in the latter point would probably be fatal to those schemes of finance in which any man appointed Dewan would at the very outset of his administration be required to engage."

The Nizam, the Resident complained, repeatedly "brings forward a mere puppet, which he calls a Dewan or a Peshcar, and thinks by these means to fulfil ostensibly our just demands and expectations."

"To consent to be thus deceived and trifled with would be unworthy of us, and cannot, I am persuaded, come within the scope of the views of the British Government.

"Yet, as I cannot take upon myself to act decidedly upon this conviction, as long as I remain ignorant of the precise extent of the concession intended to be made to the Nizam with regard to the appointment of his Minister, I shall be glad to be informed how far the Government of India may have approved, or otherwise, of my having suspended the acknowledgment of any official connection with Ganesh Rao."

On the 31st of March the General again reported that "the transaction of business at Hyderabad was either entirely in abeyance, or in the hands of persons with whom" the Resident had "no official relations", and strongly urged that "His Highness should not only be advised to appoint an efficient Dewan, but that this measure be insisted upon in terms" suitable to the Nizam's "continued and persevering rejection of the counsels of the Supreme Government". "In proportion", said the Resident, "as time is

allowed to elapse without some decided step being taken, difficulties increase."

In the month of April the Nizam recommenced employing Sooraj-ool-Moolk in his former capacity of Vakeel or agent for the transaction of business with the Resident; and General Fraser, though not expecting him to be appointed Dewan with full powers without some very strong pressure from our Government, looked upon the change as a satisfactory one, "as there can be no doubt that Sooraj-ool-Moolk is a man of superior understanding and ability as compared with Syfe Jung", or any of those persons who had lately been put forward. Some private notes from Sooraj-ool-Moolk, which might have been turned to good account at the time, if the Supreme Government had fallen into General Fraser's views as to the promotion of a natural and internal cure for the ills of Hyderabad, were also forwarded at this time to Calcutta.

The Government of India being indisposed to do anything but wait for a financial catastrophe, or for the "crash", as Lord Dalhousie called it, in some shape, was not well pleased with General Fraser's consistent and, as they seemed at Calcutta, importunate efforts to do something besides "securing our own interests",—something for the Hyderabad State, for our faithful Ally, his country and his people.¹ In a despatch dated the 25th of March 1851, the Resident was told that "the course he was to pursue had more than once within the last two years been clearly and explicitly declared", and he was "requested by the Governor-General to be so good as to conform to the instructions already given", "the application he had made for fresh directions appearing to his Lordship to be quite uncalled for."

General Fraser, in his reply, respectfully maintained that he had not urged a question already answered. He had asked whether the Government would ratify, sanction, or approve the ridiculous appointment of Ganesh Rao as Peshcar. And he pointed out as a proof of the readiness with which the Nizam could be induced to conform to advice from the Government of India, if pressed with tact, in the style he had recommended, towards the choice and support of an efficient Minister, that His Highness had sent Ganesh Rao to wait on the General, and had cancelled his appoint-

¹ *Papers, Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), pp. 15, 16.

ment as soon as the Resident had refused to enter into official relations with him.

Lord Dalhousie was at last becoming impatient of General Fraser's adherence to a policy that was calculated to prevent a catastrophe, as will be seen from his next letter, which, being chiefly taken up with another subject, must be preceded by the letter from General Fraser to which it is a reply.

“Hyderabad, 31st March 1851.

“MY LORD,—I forward the accompanying letter, in conformity with the wishes of Brigadier Beatson, who would think I was not doing justice to his ambitious aspirations if I did not submit them to your Lordship. The Brigadier does not reflect on the origin and constitution of the Hyderabad Contingent, when he proposes that any part of it should be sent to the Cape. I have informed him that there are numerous objections to his proposal, and that I have not the slightest expectation of its being acceded to. I have as many Kaffirs to contend with here as Sir Harry Smith has at the Cape.

“I remain, my Lord,

“Your very faithful and obedient servant,

“J. S. FRASER.”

Here is Brigadier Beatson's letter:—

“Mahabuleshwur, 24th March 1851.

“MY DEAR GENERAL,—I have just heard of the insurrection at the Cape, and it appears to me that it would be a good opportunity to volunteer two regiments of the Nizam's Cavalry to proceed immediately in steamers from Bombay.

“If the Kaffirs have not taken Cape Town we should find no difficulty in mounting our Cavalry; but in case we find that place already occupied, and that we are to disembark under cover of the fire of our men-of-war, a large squadron will no doubt be sent immediately to the Cape, if Mr. Cobden and such people have left us a squadron. In that case it would be advisable to take our horses with us, or at least that they should follow as soon as possible. What I would propose, then, is that the men, all ready for dismounted service, should be sent off immediately in steamers, taking their saddles and bridles with them; and that the horses and tattoos¹ should start at the same time in sailing vessels. If we find horses on our arrival we are ready to mount at once; and if we do not, we can act dismounted till our horses arrive.

“This is a splendid opportunity for the Nizam's Cavalry, and I hope

¹ Ponies.

you will propose it to the Governor-General, at the same time asking his Lordship to let me withdraw my resignation, for the purpose of proceeding in command of the Brigade to the Cape of Good Hope.

"I am certain every man in the Cavalry Division would volunteer; so the only difficulty would be in the selection. Whatever regiments you fix on, I will answer for their readiness to go. So you have only to sanction the movement, and I will proceed at once to bring the two regiments down to Bombay, or as many more as the Government of India may consent to send.

"Believe me, my dear General,

"Yours very sincerely,

"W. F. BEATSON."

This was Lord Dalhousie's answer:—

"Camp, April 16th, 1851.

"DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—I return you Major Beatson's letter. His proposal is a silly one. The Nizam's regiments are wanted at home—not at the Cape. I am compelled to say that a comparison of the several letters Major Beatson has written regarding his resignation oblige me to regard his conduct as not quite ingenuous. I did not wish for his resignation. He was welcome to have remained twenty years as Brigadier. But his resignation was made deliberately, and after long notice. His successor was appointed, and set off to join. Several consequent appointments had been all filled up, and I cannot now cancel all this.

"I did not want Major Beatson's appointment, but as he resigned it he cannot expect to be allowed to play fast and loose with the Government as his caprice or convenience may suggest.

"I have been concerned to see in your recent letters to the Government some tartness of reply to instructions which I have thought proper to issue, but which appear to be unpalatable to you. I have much respect for your character and ability, and should be reluctant to say anything calculated to give you pain. But I do not profess to reckon meekness among my personal qualities, and sharp words are likely to meet with very sharp answers.

"I return to you Sooraj-ool-Moolk's notes. His mission and his messages cannot be recognised.

"I remain, yours very truly,

"DALHOUSIE."

Brigadier Beatson followed up his first letter with a second.

"Mahabuleshwur, 8th April 1851.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,—I am much obliged to you for sending my proposal regarding the Cape to the Governor-General.

"I am, perhaps, too sanguine in such matters, but as you have been kind enough to forward my letter, I think it probable the Governor-General will not make any objection, particularly if he should have received by last mail a requisition from England to send troops from this country; and I think we may without vanity say that it would puzzle his Lordship to find anywhere such Cavalry as you could give him from the Nizam's Contingent.

"I showed the Naib Duffadar and four Sowars, now with me, to Sir John Grey* the other day, and told him I was in hopes that two of the Regiments might be sent to the Cape. He was delighted with the appearance of our men, and seemed to think they would do much better than English Dragoons for the Kaffirs. He even talked of writing to his relative, Lord Grey, on the subject.

"I will, of course, now wait for the answer of the Governor-General, in hopes that it may be favourable.

"This is a beautiful place and a fine climate, and being so near the Nizam's territories, if Mrs. Fraser or any of your family require a change they would find this a delightful residence in the hot weather.

"Believe me, very sincerely yours,

"W. F. BEATSON."

Lord Dalhousie was not more favourably impressed by the second letter than by the first.

"Camp, April 29th, 1851.

"DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—I return to you Brigadier Beatson's letter. It is so silly that it does not deserve an answer either from you or from me.

"If Sir John Grey ever made such a speech as is related, he is even further gone in his dotage than his critics assert. I have received no orders for troops from England. I have sent instructions to the Presidencies to hold European Infantry in readiness, but I do not think they will be required by the last intelligence.

"Believe me, yours very truly,

"DALHOUSIE."

In his letter of the 16th of April, Lord Dalhousie expressed his disapproval of a certain degree of "tartness" in the tone of General Fraser's official correspondence. That the General was utterly disheartened about this time by the apparent determination of our Government to do nothing in the way of either leading or driving the Hyderabad State into the road of safety, will be shown

¹ Then Commander-in-Chief at Bombay.

as clearly, perhaps, as can be done by the following letter to his old friend Major Moore, then in the Court of Directors.

“Hyderabad, 4th May 1851.

“MY DEAR MOORE,—You stated in one of your notes some time ago that mine was not a very enviable situation at Hyderabad. I fully assent to this; not only with reference, however, to the Nizam and his people, but more especially so to the weakness and want of energy of my own Government, which throw more difficulties in my way and are more injurious to his country than all the bad qualities of the Nizam’s advisers. But I do not propose now to enter deeply into this subject. I have written dozens and dozens of despatches most fully and explicitly, and the Court of Directors ought to know by this time what my sentiments are, not only with regard to minor transactions and departments here, but what is of greater importance with regard to the only means that seem to present themselves by which the final ruin of the country can be averted. You once said in a note to me that you were desirous of upholding the tottering fabric of the Nizam’s power. So am I, and so I have ever been, and to this end have all my suggestions and recommendations tended. The British Government profess the same desire, but their acts belie their professions. Look at the general and undeviating tenor of my reports and despatches since the resignation of Chundoo Lall, and look at the undeviating tenor of the conduct of the British Government. Is there any analogy or consistency between these two things? None! I had in view the object I have stated, that of saving the Nizam from perdition; but the virtual result of the measures of the British Government, whatever its professions may have been, is the approaching subversion of the Nizam’s power, and the almost inevitable absorption of his country into our Empire. Where is the investigation of accounts I recommended; the reduction of unnecessary expenditure to an enormous amount; the disbandment of useless troops; the re-establishment of the ancient system of police; and fifty other things that I recommended to Sooraj-ool-Moolk, that we worked out together, and to which he would have given effect, if he had been in the first instance supported, instead of being discouraged and slighted by Lord Hardinge? He was removed from office, not, it is true, as a positive act of the Government of India, but certainly in consequence of reasonable support being withheld. The result was the removal of the only man who had professed a desire to co-operate with me in the reform of the country—Sooraj-ool-Moolk. From that hour to this there has been the positive negation of all Government deserving the name.

“I am ashamed of the weakness and irresolution of my own Government, and I would add a still meaner quality, but that it is just possible

they did not speak with deliberate hypocrisy—although it has that effect—in professing a wish to maintain the Nizam's independence, while obstinately refusing to adopt or encourage the measures which alone could have promoted that object.

"The Nizam declares that he will not appoint a Dewan with full administrative powers, and thus we have got into a dilemma from which it will not be easy for us to extricate ourselves.

"I have lately suggested reasons for placing it in the Nizam's power to give up to our management the administration of his country for about five years,—reasons which, if properly and fairly urged, would, I am confident, render it the Nizam's wish, as well as his interest, to assent to our proposition. At the expiration of that period we might make such arrangements as would preclude the possibility of the country ever reverting to its present degraded and backward condition. I am not at all contemplating the part we have played in Mysore, but look to the temporary ruler going back in due time to the humbler position of Resident.

"Do not imagine that I am now speaking for myself. I am very tired of Hyderabad and all its concerns. My patience is quite exhausted, and I am desirous of nothing so much as that my present amanuensis should exercise for a short time just that small portion of economy which will enable me to bid a final adieu to public life, or at all events to that harassing and unprofitable scene in which I am now engaged, and to those duties which any fool could discharge as well as I, since no other quality is required for them than dull subserviency. I feel as if the last ten years of my life had been thrown away, and that I have been labouring with unremitting assiduity at a fruitless and ungrateful task.

"Now, my dear Moore, I have given you the result of about twenty paces up and down the old library at the Residency, with which it is more probable you would not have been troubled if I had had to write it myself in my own crabbed and illegible hand, or had a less faithful amanuensis than my wife to write for me. Give my kindest regards to Mrs. Moore and Willy.

"Believe me, always very sincerely yours,

"J. S. FRASER."

The General had good cause, from his point of view, to be perplexed and puzzled as to the policy and probable proceedings of the Government of India. But he was very soon to find out that under the rule of Lord Dalhousie, whose powerful personality then embodied the Government of India, there was not so much weakness or irresolution as he supposed, but that the indifference or

absolute unwillingness as to any measures that would really be beneficial to the Hyderabad State, were even greater than he had imagined. The Governor-General was not in the least disposed to adopt either of General Fraser's plans. Lord Dalhousie would not use that influence, which the Resident assured him would be irresistible, to induce His Highness to name a Dewan with whom the British representative could co-operate; nor would he entertain the scheme of temporary management of the Nizam's dominions. Lord Dalhousie did not recognise the Imperial duty of instructing and reforming the allied States. He expressly repudiated our having any such mission. He made the repudiation of any such duty a principle for his own guidance. Commenting in Council on what he called the "mixed government proposed" for Hyderabad, of Minister and Resident,—“If”, he said, “provision be made for carrying it actively and practically into operation, all the toil of a laborious task, and all its real responsibility, must ever fall on the British Agent, by whom the Native Ministry is controlled. The Agent, on his part, while he reaps no advantage from his labours for his own State, must feel himself to be without undivided authority.”¹

And just in the same way, when the temporary management of the small Rajpoot State of Kerowlee was proposed, he objected that we should “for many years to come have to bear the labour of governing this State, employing, always at inconvenience, a British officer for the purpose,” and at the end of the young Prince's minority have to “hand over the country with its revenue of four lakhs of rupees”.² When the question of the annexation or of the reform—for which General Sir William Sleeman answered—of the friendly and faithful State of Oude was under consideration, Lord Dalhousie, pronounced in one of his consultative Minutes, that if the British Government undertook “the responsibility, the labour, and the risk,” of reconstructing and reforming a Native State, it ought, “after providing for the pensioned dynasty, for the administration of the Province, and for its progressive improvement,” to be allowed to appropriate the surplus revenue to Imperial purposes.³

And here it seems necessary to call to mind that this point of

¹ *Papers, Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), p. 38.

² *Papers, Kerowlee*, 1855, p. 9.

³ *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 190.

our being entitled, in case of our undertaking the reform of a Native State, to appropriate its surplus revenue, is the very point for which the Government of Lord Ellenborough stipulated, with reference to Hyderabad, in 1843, and which the Court of Directors expressly negatived as unfair and unjust.¹

It is worthy of remark in this connection, that in the first draft of the Treaty of 1853, Lord Dalhousie endeavoured to obtain the surplus revenue of the Assigned Districts by means of an absolute cession;² that in the revised Treaty of 1860 the surplus revenue was once more claimed, but again successfully reserved by the Nizam's Government; our negotiators, however, obtaining a release from the obligation of furnishing accounts to the Nizam, on condition of handing over any surplus that might remain, after paying, entirely at our own discretion, all expenses of local administration.³

On the 16th of April 1851, in a letter to Sir Henry Pottinger, the Governor of Madras, General Fraser says:—

“I regret to say that I have received no definite instructions as yet regarding the Nizam's affairs, or the payment of the large debt due to us, now nearly 75 lakhs of rupees. I have said everything I can on this subject, but they seem to dread all approach to it, and to have a peculiar aversion to any effectual interference here. I have never wished for any infringement or violation of Treaties, but I cannot

¹ *Ante*, pp. 188, 189.

² When the negotiations were beginning in 1853, under Colonel Low, the Nizam, “pointing to the draft Treaty, which was lying on the floor, and on which he seemed to look with a sort of horror, said, ‘There never, in the time of General Fraser, was such a thing as that brought to me’.”—*Nizam's Debts* (418 of 1854), p. 120.

³ That condition, to say the least,—I feel bound, with some reluctance to add,—has been stretched to the uttermost, and the surplus payable to the Hyderabad State reduced beyond all fair expectation, by the ever-growing charges, both of civil administration in the Berar Provinces and of the Contingent. I have always officially offered all the opposition in my power to these progressive exactions, and I am encouraged in what seems to me to be the duty of protesting against them here by the fact that my representations in 1866, regarding the surplus revenue and accounts of the Assigned Districts being withheld from the Nizam's Government, had their due weight, led to a settlement and payment of surplus revenue being made, and met with the approval of Sir Stafford Northcote, then Secretary of State for India.

help thinking that much more could have been done than has been done."

In one of those despatches which had called forth from Lord Dalhousie the warning as to their "tartness" of style, the General had commented on the unconcern with which the Nizam and his private advisers received "the gentle suggestions and mild expostulations, such as it has been the habit of the British Government to address to His Highness."

A few weeks were to prove that the Government of India had not been staying its hand from any "weakness" or "irresolution", and that it was quite capable of "expostulation" in terms that could hardly be characterised as "gentle" or "mild". On the 27th of May 1851, Lord Dalhousie recorded a Minute, accompanied by the draft of a Khureeta, or letter to the Nizam, which contained, between them, a most extraordinary mixture of protestations in favour of the Nizam's independence, and of measures and menaces involving the destruction of his independence.

The Governor-General declared his "entire dissent from, and disapproval of the policy which the Resident has suggested for the adoption of the Government of India". In other paragraphs of the Minute—not included in the despatch founded on it, and only made known to General Fraser when the Blue Book of 1854 was published,—the Governor-General denounced the Resident's policy as "a system of unwarranted and officious meddling", proceeding, he feared, "not from sentiments of enlarged benevolence, but from the promptings of ambitious greed." This policy, he said, was that of "disregarding international contracts, in order to obtrude on Native Princes and their people a system of subversive interference, which is unwelcome alike to Prince and people."¹

And yet in this very Minute, and in the orders based upon it, Lord Dalhousie was directing and instituting "a system of subversive interference" over one-third of the Nizam's country, its richest provinces, for the purpose of extorting the payment of a very doubtful debt, and which he eventually enforced by threats of military coercion. General Fraser's policy, in its most extreme form, was that of temporary management for a fixed period, with

¹ *Papers, Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), p. 38.

the consent of the Sovereign, and with the willing aid of the great dignitaries of the State. The alternative and more moderate plan, which the Resident had been urging ineffectually, from first to last, and which he declared to be still practicable, was that of the installation of an efficient Minister, with full powers, and with an understanding that for a certain term he should act in consultation with the British Resident, and under the control of instructions approved by the British Government. To either of these plans General Fraser was convinced, with good reason, that he could obtain the support of the most influential nobles, and the consent of the Nizam. All that the General required to strengthen his hands and those of the Minister in whom he had confidence, and with whom he felt he could co-operate, was that their plan should be commended to the Nizam in a direct and distinct communication from the Governor-General. This Lord Dalhousie declined to do because, according to him, it would be "unwarranted and officious meddling". Yet in that very same Minute, with incredible inconsistency, he claimed the right of addressing the Nizam "in terms of earnest remonstrance and authoritative counsel".¹ "Authoritative counsel" was all that General Fraser had asked for, but he could never get it. He now got much more than he wanted.

General Fraser, it may be remembered, had, on the 12th of March, submitted, in a direct letter to the Governor-General, the draft of a Khureeta to the Nizam, written in what might well be called "terms of earnest remonstrance and authoritative counsel", in a style at once dignified and decided, convincing and conciliatory.² If this draft had been adopted at the time, and the course pursued which was then recommended, the Resident was well assured that he could gain the requisite ascendancy over the counsels of the Nizam. But no notice was taken of it. Three months more were allowed to elapse, and then a Khureeta was addressed to the Nizam of a very different character from that which the General had suggested.

The notions of "earnest remonstrance and authoritative counsel" prevailing at Calcutta, more especially in the Persian translation office, must have been very different from those which General

¹ *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), p. 34.

² *Ante*, p. 327.

Fraser entertained. Even in its English version, for which alone, it may be said, the Governor-General could be held responsible, the language of the Khureeta to the Nizam, dated the 6th of June 1851, cannot but appear extremely offensive, when it is considered that the matter in question was really one of money and accounts, and that it was addressed, in Lord Dalhousie's own words, to "an old and staunch Ally", with whom "for more than half a century relations of amity" had subsisted.¹ The Nizam had never been suspected of any ambitious designs, or even of any delusions as to his comparative strength by the side of the British Government. Yet he was threatened with "the indignation of the Government of India", "whose power", he was reminded, "can crush you at its will".²

These are hard words, even in the English edition, as presented to Parliament, but in the Persian original, as presented to the Nizam, the terms, instead of being anything like "earnest remonstrance and authoritative counsel", would be more fairly described as terms of gross insult and menace. The phrase which in English appears as "whose power can crush you at its will", means, when properly translated, "*whose power can make you as the dust under foot, and leave you neither a name nor a trace*".³

It may be argued that this violent language has no reference to money matters, but to "open insults" alleged to have been offered "to British troops" within His Highness's territories. In the first place, it was going very far to characterise as an "outrage on the dignity" of the British Government that on two occasions there should have been petty disputes between small detachments of our Sepoys on the march, and the Arab soldiery stationed in villages in the vicinity of which our troops halted. In each case, anyone who should now peruse the reports might well have some doubt whether the Arab commandant or the young English officer in charge of the detachment was in fault; in each case apology and reparation were offered; and on the last occasion, which

¹ Paras. 45 and 27 of the Minute, *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), pp. 45 and 86.

² *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), p. 42.

³ In order that there may be no mistake as to the exact meaning, I give the Persian words, transliterated as follows:—"Har gāh kwhāhad ān 'ālīshān rā pāmāl sākhta be nām nishān sāzand."

happened at a village called Becchkonda, in December 1850, when a guard of the 17th Madras Native Infantry was prevented from entering certain precincts, said to be occupied by the wives and children of the Nizam's Irregular troops, the unfortunate Arabs were severely punished by various terms of imprisonment. But in the second place, the object of the Khureeta was twofold,—first to insist on the payment of an alleged debt arising from advances made for the Contingent; and, second, to insist on the permanent maintenance and regular pay of the Contingent as a Force existing under “the obligations of a Treaty”. With these objects in view the Nizam was exhorted to disband his Arabs and other Irregular troops, in order that funds might be available for the expenses of the Contingent; and the chief argument against the retention in service of the Arabs and other mercenaries was founded on these trivial collisions with our marching detachments, magnified into “outrages” against the “dignity” of the British Government. Thus it was merely in furtherance of the demands in favour of the Contingent that this unprovoked insult was offered to our “old and staunch Ally”.

The Governor-General's orders were that the Nizam, having failed to pay the debt accumulated, with interest, for advances made for the pay of the Contingent, was to be “called upon to make over to the British Government” certain “portions of his territory”, viz., the provinces of Berar, and the border districts down to Shorapore and the Raichore Doab, between the Kistna and the Toombuddra. The Resident was to use his “discretion in not urging His Highness to compliance with undue haste.” But no “remonstrances or solicitations” were to be admitted, and the Nizam was to be told that “the Governor-General's determination was fixed irrevocably”.¹

Although the Governor-General had, in General Fraser's opinion, rushed into the opposite extreme from inaction and indefinite expostulation, and had very much overdone the demand for explicit and authoritative counsel,—for even the Nizam himself could not have been more shocked than the Resident was at the harsh and hectoring language of the Khureeta,—still the immediate results of the evident determination of the Supreme Government to have either cash or security completely confirmed and proved

¹ *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), p. 43.

the accuracy of the General's forecast, and the soundness of the policy he had always recommended. When Lord Ellenborough, Lord Hardinge, and Lord Dalhousie in succession, had insisted on the necessity of having a great military force within hail, and alleged the occupation of our forces elsewhere as a reason for leaving Hyderabad alone, General Fraser had always written to the same effect,—for example :—

“ This is a weak and subdued Government. Hesitation on our part might inspire the Circar for a moment with the semblance of boldness, and with a desire to escape control; but I have not the slightest apprehension that any protracted resistance would ever be offered to the expressed will and resolution of the Government of India.”¹

In the Khureeta of June 1851, the Governor-General had insisted on “the agency of a Minister” as “indispensable”; and “intimated” an “expectation” that a Minister should “forthwith” be appointed, “whose position in society, whose personal character, and whose acquaintance with public business” should “constitute him a fit agent for transacting the important affairs now depending between the Government of India and the Court of Hyderabad.”² A copy of the Khureeta was, as usual in such cases, privately communicated to His Highness on the 20th of June. On the 23rd the Nizam signified to Sooraj-ool-Moolk his intention of appointing him Dewan with full powers, and desired him to write privately to the Resident, informing him of that point being settled. On the 29th Sooraj-ool-Moolk was invested with the customary patent and dress of honour, and on the next day paid a visit of ceremony to the Resident as the Nizam's Minister.

On the 1st of July 1851, General Fraser waited on the Nizam for the purpose of formally delivering the Governor-General's Khureeta, “accompanied by schedules of the districts to be transferred to our temporary authority”. His Highness then said that Sooraj-ool-Moolk would discharge the debt and also pay the Contingent. On the 16th of July the Resident was able to report to the Government of India that “His Highness had found means to take upon himself both these objects, namely, the entire and immediate payment of his debt to us, and giving the best security that could be offered for the future regular payment of the Con-

¹ *Ante*, p. 201.

² *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), p. 42.

tingent, short of the actual transfer to us of part of his country for this purpose." Under these circumstances the Resident did not consider he should be "justified in at present urging the demand for the transfer of districts, and consented to postpone it until the pleasure of the Government of India should be known."

The Governor-General approved of General Fraser's proceedings. "The Government of India", it was said in a despatch dated 31st July 1851, "had no desire to take possession of territory, except as a security for the gradual liquidation of His Highness's debt; when liquidation of that debt, not gradually but at once, was provided for by His Highness, a cession of territory could no longer be desired by the Government."¹

On the 15th of August the Nizam's Government had, in conformity with its promise, completed the payment of the first instalment—more than half—of its debt to the British Government, "Company's Rupees 34,08,485 : 11 : 4, leaving the balance of Co. Rs. 32,97,702 : 9 : 2, to be paid on or before the 31st of October 1851."²

The following letter from General Fraser to the Governor-General will show that there were no misgivings up to its date as to the punctual and full payment of the second half of the debt on account of the Contingent.

"Hyderabad, 2nd September 1851.

"MY LORD,—I this morning received your letter of the 19th ultimo, and shall be guided by the information you have given me regarding the places on which it will be most convenient, in the order stated by the Secretary, that hoondees in payment of the Nizam's second instalment be drawn. I have not yet received any instructions from Calcutta on this subject.

"I shall endeavour to ensure that the bills are good. Those drawn in payment of the first instalment were all furnished by the wealthiest and most trustworthy Soucars here, and I have no reason to suppose that any failure will take place in the payments. I have come out to pass some time at Bolarum, the Nizam's cantonment, ten miles from Hyderabad, and expect to receive a visit from the Minister on Friday next, when he will, no doubt, let me know what the Nizam is doing. I hear from my Assistant, Captain Davidson, whom I have left behind at Chudderghaut, that they are thinking of nothing but the reply to

¹ *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), pp. 52, 63.

² *Ibid.*, p. 67.

your Lordship's khureeta, and that His Highness is objecting to any positive promise of reductions in the number of his Arabs or other Irregular troops.

"Mr. ——— is exhibiting 'the ruling passion strong in death' (for his age and infirmities seem to be hastening him to the grave), and is said to be deeply engaged, as usual, in the political intrigues of the City. I am sorry to say it is reported that even Sooraj-ool-Moolk has succumbed to the terror of being held up, as heretofore, to public scorn in the newspapers, and that he has not only granted a handsome monthly allowance to ——— and the other members of his family, but that he is also in frequent secret communication with him. It would of course be difficult, if not impossible, to prove this.

"I have been sending up an official despatch to-day about a question that Sooraj-ool-Moolk has thought proper to agitate regarding the Secunderabad Abkaree, or contract for the sale of spirituous liquors, and I cannot help thinking that his note on this subject bears every mark of having been dictated by a European, or at least a man of European education and habits of thinking, both as regards its matter and its style. The tone of expression in which it is couched but just stops short, and hardly that, of being disrespectful to the British Government. I cannot bring myself to imagine that it has emanated altogether or exclusively from Sooraj-ool-Moolk."

This is Lord Dalhousie's answer:—

"Simla, September 28th, 1851.

"DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—I have received to-day your letter of the 2nd instant. Before this time you will have heard from Calcutta regarding the hoondees. If their wishes can be complied with so much the better, but our great object is to get the bills, and good ones. The mere convenience of place must give way to the main object of getting the money safe *somewhere*.

"The proceedings you mention are very disgraceful. If you can bring it home by any reasonable evidence, though it were short of judicial proof, I should, without hesitation, address the Court of Directors, and intimate my intention of removing the whole family from the territories of this Native Prince, under the powers given by the Act.

"Believe me, yours sincerely,

"DALHOUSIE.

"P.S.—I presume I shall hear from you regarding the conduct of one of the Cavalry Regiments, to which I see allusions."

The Nizam's answer to Lord Dalhousie's Khureeta was not

despatched until the 23rd of September 1851.¹ The Dewan Sooraj-ool-Moolk, in a private note to the Resident, explained this delay by saying that His Highness wished to wait until the payment of the first moiety of the debt, thirty-four lakhs of rupees, had been paid. "His Highness", he added, "seemed to be concerned at the severity of the tone of the Governor-General's letter, and always had some excuse for delaying a reply to it."

With reference to the second instalment, General Fraser addressed the following letter to the Governor-General.

"Hyderabad, 30th September 1851.

"MY LORD,—I have received your Lordship's letter of the 1st instant, and shall not fail to bear in mind that it is your fixed intention to act rigidly up to the declaration of the public despatches, and to exact full payment of the remaining instalment of the Nizam's debt at or within the date named. This appears to me to be somewhat more rigid than the instruction conveyed in the Secretary's letter of the 31st of July last, which contains these words:—'If, however, from whatever cause the arrangement to which his Lordship now assents shall materially fail, you will fall back on the instructions conveyed in my letter of the 6th June last, No. 1783, and will require and enforce the cession of territory therein enjoined.' Here some allowance appears to be made in the event of an immaterial or partial failure, by which I conclude was meant that the extreme measure of taking territory was not to be had recourse to if the greater part of the second instalment were paid by the 31st of October. I have never hinted to the Nizam's Government that any failure whatever would be allowed, but on the contrary have given Sooraj-ool-Moolk to understand that I expected the whole balance to be paid by the 31st of October, or that the Circar must expect an immediate demand for territory. It was as well I did so, as this is in accordance with the terms of your private letter now under acknowledgment, that full payment is to be exacted by the 31st of October.

"As far as I can learn from Sooraj-ool-Moolk himself, there is not likely to be any failure, as he informs me that he has no doubt the whole amount will be paid punctually.

"I was making up my despatch to Government, with the Nizam's reply to your Lordship's Khureeta, at the moment when I received your letter to which I now reply. His answer was too long delayed, and I had several times remonstrated with the Minister on this subject. But

¹ It will be found in the Blue Book, *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), pp. 46 to 48.

I am quite sure that no discourtesy or disrespect was intended, or I should have adopted a very different style of remonstrance. On this subject a private and confidential note from Sooraj-ool-Moolk reached me last night, which I transmit to your Lordship just as I received it.

"A disagreeable state of things has occurred in the 5th Nizam's Cavalry at Aurungabad. It seems to have arisen from a strong party feeling in the Regiment, originally occasioned, as far as I can perceive, by an injudicious measure of the Commanding officer in calling for a list of the inferior class of Mohammedans in his Regiment, which naturally excited much distrust and dissatisfaction, and has finally resulted in the Rissaldar, and several other Native officers and men, being placed under arrest or confinement. I have ordered the requisite steps to be taken, but have not addressed Government officially on the subject, as the case is rather a complicated one, and I cannot yet form a definite judgment regarding it.

"I remain, my Lord,

"Your very faithful and obedient servant,

"J. S. FRASER."

This "disagreeable" affair in the Nizam's Cavalry Regiment at Aurungabad, now first mentioned, was destined to occupy a disproportionate share of the General's attention for many months, and to exercise an unpleasant influence over the last days of his long tenure of the Hyderabad Residency. Lord Dalhousie's next letter explains his views with regard to the second payment of debt expected from the Nizam.

"Simla, October 14th, 1851.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,—I have just received your letter of the 30th ultimo, and reply at once, to relieve you of any doubts regarding what you view as a discrepancy between my private letter of 1st instant, and official letter of 31st July. None was intended. In both I contemplated insisting on *substantially* full payment; but I did not in either mean to preclude you from holding the payment sufficient for the time, even though it should fall *something* short of the actual total. I don't wish to go on my 'pound of flesh'.

"Perhaps the best plan will be to report what has been paid on 1st November.

"Yours sincerely,

"DALHOUSIE.

"P.S.—The Khureeta is trash. I had, perhaps, better not send back the accompanying confidential letter, lest it should go astray in the Post Office.—D."

CHAPTER IX.

Apology for the Contingent—Lord Dalhousie denies extortion—The Subsidiary duties done by the Contingent—Lord Dalhousie will not reduce a man—He admits the excessive costliness of the Force, but will not set a good example to the Nizam—Debt of 1853 created by Lord Dalhousie's neglect—Savings by unlawful reduction of Subsidiary Force rightly belong to the Nizam—Excise revenues of Secunderabad and Jaulnah unjustly appropriated—No debt really due by the Nizam in 1851 or 1853.

WE have now arrived at that stage in our narrative when, under heavy and decisive pressure, a large sum of money had been paid by the Hyderabad State to the British Government, and a second instalment at a short date promised, on account of the Force called sometimes "the Nizam's Army", and sometimes "the Contingent". We are coming, also, very close to the period when territorial security was exacted from the Hyderabad State, under the forms of a Treaty, for the payment of another large sum of accumulated arrears with interest on the same account, and in order to provide for the regular monthly pay of that Force. This appears, therefore, to be a suitable place to examine the arguments on both sides as to the legitimate origin and maintenance of the Contingent; as to the growth of the heavy liabilities on its account entailed upon the Nizam; and as to the existence of any counter-claims by the Hyderabad State against Lord Dalhousie's demands. The most frank and open apology for the existence and maintenance of the Contingent is to be found in a despatch from the Government of India, dated the 7th of October 1848. Here are its most important passages :—

"Colonel Low, in para. 14 of his despatch of 20th July last, when remarking on the state of the finances of Hyderabad, observes that he feels it to be a painful consideration that the debt under which that State is labouring, is in a great degree to be attributed to the vast sum

which the Nizam is annually required to pay for the support of the Contingent. He counsels a gradual reduction of the expense, which should be commenced, however, he thinks, without delay.¹ The Governor-General in Council concurs to a considerable extent with Colonel Low, but not to the full extent to which he goes.

“His Lordship in Council cannot acknowledge that the British Government commits any injustice, or practises any extortion whatever on the Nizam’s Government, in requiring that this Force, fully manned, equipped, and disciplined, shall be maintained in His Highness’s territories and at his expense.

“The Treaty of 1800 gave us a right to demand at any moment 15,000 troops from the Nizam. Experience soon proved to us that whenever the demand was made, we should receive, not 15,000 troops, but as many worthless and undisciplined rabble.² We rightly and justly construed the Treaty to mean that we were to be supplied with the specified number of *effective soldiers*; and we, therefore, with unquestionable equity, may and do demand of His Highness, that certain precautions should be taken to keep on foot a regular Force, paid by him and officered by us, which shall be available for the maintenance of peace in those central districts of the Deccan, and we demand only 8,000 instead of 15,000 men.”

Here I must interrupt the official argument of 1848 for a moment, to observe that by the Treaties of 1798 and 1800,—Article XII of the latter providing for every imaginable exigency,—“the maintenance of peace in the Deccan”, and the subordination of all the Nizam’s feudatories, was to be ensured by the Subsidiary Force, for which the Hyderabad State paid by a large territorial cession. The Contingent, therefore, only did our prepaid work at the Nizam’s expense. The Subsidiary Force, in disregard of these Treaties, was relieved from its contracted work, and, in defiance of those Treaties, was reduced from its contracted strength, to the advantage of the Honourable Company’s finances.³

The Governor-General pursues his apology:—

“His Lordship in Council does not think that we are called upon in justice to reduce a man of that Force, reserved as they are for the service of His Highness, and for upholding his authority and interests;

¹ *Ante*, pp. 248 to 254.

² On this point see Appendix B, The Nizam’s Military Co-operation.

³ See the statement by Colonel Sykes and other Directors, *ante*, p. 260.

and his Lordship in Council is very certain that in policy we ought not to adopt any such measure."

And here again I must interpolate a remark. If this Force was "*reserved for the service of His Highness*", it was, confessedly, doing the sole duty prescribed by Treaty for the Subsidiary Force, and could not, therefore, be the Force which Lord Dalhousie had previously in this same despatch declared we had, by Treaty, "a right to demand at any moment". I shall show presently that we had no such absolute and unlimited right, but if we had, a Force "*reserved for the service of His Highness*" could not be available for our wars "at any moment".

"At the same time", the despatch continues—

"His Lordship in Council agrees with Colonel Low in thinking that we cause the Contingent to become a much heavier burden on the Nizam's finances than it ought to be. The Staff, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, is preposterously large; the pay and allowances, and charges of various kinds, are far higher than they ought to be."

"The Contingent is a much heavier burden on the Nizam's finances than it ought to be",—"the pay and allowances, and other charges, are far higher than they ought to be",—"the Staff is preposterously large". Lord Dalhousie had, also, said on other occasions that the Contingent was "unfairly large and too expensive",¹ and had admitted its "extravagant costliness".²

And yet "we are not called upon in justice to reduce a man"; and the Governor-General goes on to say that he will not even set the Nizam a good example by reducing this too heavy, "preposterously large", "unfairly large" burden. The good example must come from His Highness.

"Whenever His Highness shall evince a desire to enter honestly and sincerely into an examination of the state of his Kingdom, and give evidence of his willingness to endeavour to find a remedy for its evils, the Governor-General of India will be prepared to make every exertion to introduce such changes into the Contingent Force as may safely diminish the great cost which it imposes on the State, while it leaves the Force in a state of thorough efficiency to meet the purposes contemplated in the Treaty.

"More than this, the Governor-General in Council is very willing to

¹ *Ante*, p. 258.

² *Ante*, p. 269.

commence on the reduction of the numerous and expensive Staff appointments in the Force, by getting rid of them as vacancies occur, and opportunities arise. Beyond this the Governor-General in Council does not consider that it would be wise to go at present."

Before leaving this despatch it must be observed that although the Governor-General was "very willing to commence on the reduction of the numerous and expensive Staff", he did not do so. "Vacancies" did "occur", and "opportunities" did "arise". But the vacancies were filled up as usual, and the opportunities, somehow or other, escaped notice. At no opportunity between October 1848 and May 1853, when the Treaty assigning territorial security for our demands was concluded,—not even after August 1851, when, by the appointment of a Minister and the payment of thirty-four lakhs of rupees, His Highness had surely "given evidence of his willingness", and "evinced a desire to enter" on a better course,—were any reductions made in the "preposterously large Staff", or in any of the other "expensive charges" which, as Lord Dalhousie admitted, made the Contingent "a heavier burden on the Nizam's finances than it ought to be".

The cost of the Contingent in 1849 was thirty-eight lakhs and a half. Its numerical strength and cost were almost exactly the same in the last year of its existence as "the Nizam's Army".¹

In 1848 the Governor-General admitted the "preposterous" charges of the Contingent. He professed to be "prepared", and "very willing", "to make every exertion" that "might safely diminish" those charges "as vacancies occurred, and as opportunities offered". In five years he did nothing.

That he could have "safely diminished" the charges within that period, and without any wonderful "exertion", is proved by the fact that, when there was a possibility of loss or inconvenience to our Government, Lord Dalhousie, in the first clear year after the

¹ The exact figures, as officially given, are—

	European Officers.	Warrant and Non-Commissioned Officers.	Natives of all Ranks.		Guns.	Camp Followers.	Annual Cost
			Cavalry.	Infantry and Artillery.			
1849	79	90	2910	6731	37	881	Rs. 38,45076
1852	79	82	2910	6731	37	881	38,30000

Assigned Districts were taken, reduced the cost of the Contingent to twenty-four lakhs and a half, and after three years to twenty-three lakhs.¹ The Nizam's Army was, according to the official statement, "reorganised on the 1st of January 1854, and its designation changed to that of the Hyderabad Contingent". For the first year of reorganisation its cost is officially declared to have been only seventeen lakhs and a half of rupees.

If, therefore, in the four years—1849 to 1852 inclusive—before the stringent and peremptory demands of 1853, the Governor-General had made the same "exertion to diminish" those charges confessed by himself to be "preposterous and extravagant", that he made as soon as those demands were satisfied, there would have been no pretext for making those demands at all. There would have been no debt in 1853. There would have been a clear saving to the Nizam's Government in those four years of at least sixty lakhs of rupees. Let it be understood that the Nizam was perfectly passive; he was allowed no choice or voice in the organisation or expenditure of the Contingent. All he had to do was to meet the charges, either in cash or in account. The alleged debt of 1853, amounting to fifty lakhs of Hyderabad rupees (or forty-three lakhs of Company's rupees), arose entirely from the advances, with interest upon them, made by the Resident out of his own treasury to supplement all the sums that could be extracted from the Nizam's Government for the charges of the Contingent. But if those charges had been reduced in time,—when Lord Dalhousie's eyes were open to their "preposterous" character,—the sums extracted from the Nizam's Government would have been more than sufficient. Taking, as we surely may, the savings that *ought* to have been made in the four years before 1853, as identical with the savings that actually *were* made in the four years after 1853, viz., sixty lakhs, we find that in May 1853,

¹ Here are the official figures :—

	European Officers.	Warrant and Non-Commissioned Officers.	Natives of all Ranks.		Guns.	Camp Followers.	Annual Cost.
			Cavalry.	Infantry and Artillery.			
1855	50	56	2300	6282	24	644	Rs. 24,65,418
1856	49	56	2300	6282	24	644	22,72,032
1857	50	56	2300	6282	24	644	23,02,273

instead of owing fifty lakhs for the Resident's advances, the Nizam would have had ten lakhs to the good in his own treasury. He would not have paid more, because he would not have been called upon to pay more.

We learn, furthermore, from the dissent by Sir Henry Willock in the Blue Book of 1859, that "the despatch of the Court of Directors of the 18th December 1849 sanctioned a more extensive relief to the Nizam than that contemplated by the Governor-General"—and, it must be added, "*contemplated*" only. "We are of opinion", the Directors had said, "that these measures ought not to be made dependent on the conduct of the Nizam. If the Contingent imposes upon the finances of the Nizam a greater burden than is required by the maintenance of efficiency, the Nizam ought at once to be released from such unnecessary pressure." "Since the issue of the above instructions", continues Sir Henry Willock, "the embarrassments of the Nizam have increased; his country has been disturbed by internal commotion; the services of the Contingent have been refused him, when they might legitimately have been afforded; the revenue has been further on decline; the pressure of the Contingent has been more sensibly felt, and no step has been taken to carry out the instructions of the Court. Vacancies have occurred in the Staff of the Contingent, and they have been filled up by the Governor-General."¹

"Successive Residents at Hyderabad", said Sir Henry Willock, "officers of high character and standing, Sir Charles Metcalfe, Colonel Stewart, General Fraser, and Colonel Low, have severally declared that we are not justified by Treaty in making such large calls on the Nizam's treasury, and that the burden of the Contingent has materially operated in producing the financial embarrassments which now paralyse the power of the State."²

The Honourable Court again addressed the Government of India on the 3rd December 1851, expressing their desire that "by a general revision of the constitution and expenses of the Contingent, the Government of India should set an example to the Nizam of the retrenchments which the condition of his finances so urgently requires." Nothing was done.

But although nothing was done, there was, we perceive, a practical unanimity of opinion at the Hyderabad Residency, in the

¹ *Papers Relating to the Nizam* (234 of 1859), p. 9.

² *Ibid.*

Council-chamber at Calcutta, and in Leadenhall Street, that the cost of the Contingent was excessive, and ought to be diminished. And this opinion had prevailed for many years.

Thus it may fairly be said that the alleged debt of fifty lakhs of rupees, accumulated between 1849 and 1853, was debt directly, if not deliberately, created by Lord Dalhousie's refusal, with his eyes open and his conscience awakened, to cut down those "excessive" and "preposterous" charges, which he cut down very promptly when, by using the debt of his own creation as a pretext, he had got securely in pawn the Nizam's Berar provinces.

But was the so-called Contingent a Force of legitimate origin, and lawfully maintained at the Nizam's expense? That seems to be extremely doubtful. Colonel Low, when acting as Resident in 1848, said that the Contingent was kept up "for purposes of our own, not of the Nizam's."¹ There is a perfect chain of official admissions to the same effect from 1819 down to 1853. In a Minute of 10th November 1819 the Marquis of Hastings thus expresses his determination as to the maintenance of the Contingent:—"It is perfectly true that those troops are, in fact, more ours than those of the Sovereign by whom they are maintained. Although paid by the Nizam, and nominally appertaining to His Highness, their habit of receiving their stipend through us, and of being commanded by British Officers, leave room for the expectation that in any rupture between the States they would side with us against their ostensible master. Now, would it be consonant to wisdom, or to the trust reposed in us by the Honourable Company, that we should sacrifice such a security to a casuistical point of equity?" And further on in the same Minute he says that it would be "impolitic to let an over-refinement cause our open abrogation of such an inexpensive addition to our strength".

The "casuistical point of equity" and "over-refinement", to which Lord Hastings refused to sacrifice our "inexpensive" gains, are expressions which tell their own tale with cynical straightforwardness.

Here is an extract from the instructions issued by Lord Hastings to the Resident on the 26th October 1819.

"This invariable attention to the interests of Chundoo Lall (to which we are in honour bound), and the maintenance of the Reformed Troops" (the Contingent Force), "are the essentials for us.

¹ *Ante*, p. 248.

"The Reformed Troops, which we owe to Chundoo Lall, will have taken such root in the establishment of the country, that there can be little hazard, and shortly there will be none, of any endeavours to reduce them."

If the Nizam were to indicate any wish to remove the Minister, the following course was prescribed by Lord Hastings to the Resident, in a letter dated 25th October 1822.

"The proposition would have to be met with such a countenance as should imply serious consequences. You would give it to be understood, by intelligible hints, that the removal of Chundoo Lall would cause a material change in the connection between the two Governments. It would be fitting to throw out, as if loosely, that, should a Minister in whom the British Government could have no confidence be entrusted with His Highness's concerns, it might be incumbent on the British Government to look to its interests in another mode than what had hitherto sufficed, and to claim for itself, as standing in the Peishwa's position, all those rights over the Hyderabad dominions which that Prince had possessed. This glimpse of eventual procedures would assuredly be decisive. The Governor-General in Council holds the good faith of this Government to be staked for the maintenance of Rajah Chundoo Lall in his office, unless he shall be guilty of some distinct delinquency: and you will please to regard it as a special obligation upon you to support that Minister."¹

Rajah Chundoo Lall was, in fact, upheld at the head of the Hyderabad administration by irresistible British power for more than thirty years, and then reluctantly given up,² not in accordance with the judgment or wishes of the Sovereign, not for the advantage of the people, but for the promotion of what were officially asserted to be British interests, and which certainly were the interests of a great many English officers, for the purpose of compelling the Hyderabad State to sustain from its revenues this Force, which no Treaty recognised or justified, and which was employed in doing the duties which properly devolved, under Treaty and in return for a subsidy territorially secured, on the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force.

No operation, no march, no movement, was ever made by the Hyderabad Contingent, that we were not bound, by the terms of the Treaty of 1800, to make for the service of the Nizam, by means of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force.

¹*Hyderabad Papers*, 1824, pp. 31, 32.

² *Ante*, pp. 193, 194.

Even Lord Dalhousie himself admitted this, in substance and in terms, in the 45th paragraph of his Minute of 30th March 1853, when he said :—

“I am well aware that indirectly we derive benefit from it. It preserves order within the dominions of the Nizam, and so performs duties which in some degree would otherwise fall on the Subsidiary Force. Neither do I overlook the fact that, if the Contingent should be abolished, our obligation to protect His Highness’s person, and to repress important resistance to his authority, would remain in force, while our means of fulfilling the obligation would be diminished.”¹

Lord Dalhousie appears, it is true, to qualify this admission by saying “*in some degree*”, and by adding an assertion that “the Subsidiary Force is not required by Treaty to perform all the petty services that now fall upon the Contingent”. But without admitting that any degree or distinction of services can be founded on the comprehensive engagements of the Treaty of 1800, it is quite enough to remark that “petty services” could have been performed by a petty Force.

Colonel Sykes pointed out in the Court of Directors that a most unwarrantable and insidious assumption was made by calling this Force “the Hyderabad Contingent”.

“Although Captain Sydenham, the Resident, for the first time designates the Nizam’s Infantry as the Nizam’s Contingent, he does not claim the shadow of authority for the designation. The Resident neither adverted to the authority of the Nizam for it, nor does it appear that the Nizam directly or indirectly sanctioned it, or even knew of it. In short, it was a term gratuitously assumed by the Resident, and could not honestly be identified with a Contingent which the Nizam was only bound to supply in the time of actual war ; but the term has, unhappily for the Nizam, adhered to that body of troops ever since, and has occasioned mistaken associations in the minds of successive authorities in India, that it was a commutation of the Contingent stipulated for in the Treaty of 1800, and that we were therefore justified in exacting its maintenance.”²

It is needless to argue here the question whether any tenable or plausible case can be presented for the assertion, occasionally made, that the Contingent was maintained under Treaty obligations, for this simple reason, that Lord Dalhousie, having originally

¹ *Nizam’s Debt* (418 of 1854), p. 112.

² *Papers Relating to the Nizam* (234 of 1859), p. 13.

made use of that plea, and emphasised it with the most imperious and intimidating language in his direct address to the Nizam,¹ afterwards, on more careful examination of the facts, withdrew that plea, and put on record, in the clearest possible terms, that the Nizam stood bound by no such Treaty obligations. In the 16th paragraph of his Minute of 30th March 1853, after explaining at some length how he had arrived at the conclusion, he says :—" These are the reasons by which I have found myself forced to the conclusion that the Government of India has no right whatever, either by the spirit or by the letter of the Treaty of 1800, to require the Nizam to maintain the Contingent in its present form." Again, in its 44th paragraph he says :—" I, for my part, can never consent, as an honest man, to instruct the Resident to reply, that the Contingent has been maintained by the Nizam, from the end of the war in 1817 until now, because the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800 obliges His Highness so to maintain it."²

Granting, however, for the sake of argument, that the Force in question was rightly called the Contingent, that it was of legitimate origin, and even that it was kept up in obedience to the terms of a Treaty, so that the advances made by the British Government for its pay constituted a debt properly charged against the Hyderabad State, it remains to be inquired whether the Nizam's Government had not some counterclaims, or charges which ought to have been taken as a set-off against the debt on account of the Contingent, and would have equalled or surpassed it in amount.

The Nizam ceded territory under the Treaty of 1800, in commutation of a subsidy in cash, on the express stipulation that in return for it the British Government was to maintain the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force at a certain specified strength. But that Force was reduced, without the Nizam's consent, and in disregard of Treaty obligations, for a lengthened period, to a lower strength than that specified, at a great pecuniary saving to the British Government. The British Government was able to reduce the numbers of the Subsidiary Force, and its own expenditure, mainly in consequence of the services rendered by the Contingent, and

¹ See paragraphs 8 and 34 of his Minute of the 27th of May 1851, and his Khureeta to the Nizam.—*Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), pp. 32, 34, 41, ante, p. 344.

² *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), pp. 100, 111.

the expenditure thereby imposed on the Hyderabad State. The savings arising from the unauthorised reduction of the Subsidiary Force ought clearly, therefore, to have been credited to the Nizam's Government.

This fact was perfectly well understood by our authorities.¹ Major Moore, in the Court of Directors, thus explained the position in his Dissent, dated the 7th November 1853 :—

“ We have reduced the numerical strength of our Regiments in the Subsidiary Force from 1,000 firelocks to 750 of Infantry, and from 500 sabres to 420 in each Regiment of Cavalry, and the number of troops kept up by us in the Hyderabad territory for the last thirty years has been more than one-fourth less than the number for which we had contracted, and received payment in advance.

“ Upon what plea did we fall short in the due performance of our contract? By what right have we received payment for troops we did not furnish? If these facts are true, are we, or are we not, bound to account to the Nizam for what we have received from him for an equivalent we have not fulfilled?”²

If the saving of at least one-fifth of the cost of the Subsidiary Force for thirty years, in contravention of the Treaty of 1800, and by the substitution of the so-called Contingent kept up at the Nizam's cost, were fairly calculated, without any interest, it would place a sum of more than two crores of rupees—two millions sterling—to the credit of the Hyderabad State.

The Nizam's Government in 1851 had a still more tangible and categorical claim for very large sums of money annually appropriated by our authorities for a series of years, but really due, and eventually acknowledged to have been due, to the Hyderabad State.

In a letter dated the 6th of February 1850, General Fraser submits a request for a suitable remuneration being granted to an officer performing the duties of Superintendent of Police at Secunderabad, the cantonment of the Subsidiary Force, where “ it is reckoned that about 54,000 of the Nizam's subjects reside”. The Resident had no doubt that this officer ought to be paid for these additional duties, but raises the question “ whether he should be paid by his own Government or by that of His Highness the Nizam”. Here is his own opinion :—

¹ See letter from Lord Auckland's Private Secretary, Mr. J. R. Colvin *ante*, p. 91.

² *Papers Relating to the Nizam* (234 of 1859), p. 4.

"It appears to me that it should be by the former, because our Government receives the profits of the Secunderabad Abkarree, or excise duties arising from the sale of spirituous liquors and intoxicating drugs, and appropriates them to its own use, amounting on an average of the last ten years to 84,124 : 13 : 10 Company's rupees¹ per annum; and I cannot find on the records of my office any sufficient reason to justify our thus having appropriated the whole of these profits to ourselves, without the assent of the Nizam's Government, or even, so far as I can learn, any communication with it on the subject.

"On the contrary, the very question now referred to was recently brought forward by Shums-ool-Oomra Bahadur, during his administration, and was not decided only because he was removed from office, and that the discussion of the matter has not since been renewed by the Nizam's Government.

"I may add that the profits of the Kurroorgeeree, or duty on grain and other articles of consumption imported into the cantonment, are appropriated exclusively by the Nizam's Government; although I perceive no sufficient reason why any distinction should be made between these two sources of revenue, in as far as regards the right of appropriating them.

"Our own Regulations, no doubt, provide for the levy of Excise duties in Military cantonments in the Company's territory, and the proceeds are received and carried to account by the Civil Collector; but I apprehend we should be somewhat embarrassed to show our right to make these Regulations applicable to the cantonment of Secunderabad, under the peculiar circumstances above explained."

And in a postscript to this letter the Resident adds :—

"It may be proper for me to observe that with regard to the appropriation of the average amount of Abkarree duty received at Secunderabad, viz., Company's rupees 84,124 : 13 : 10 per annum, I have reason to believe that but a small proportion, perhaps not more than a fourth part, is disbursed on account of the expenses of the police establishment, etc., at Secunderabad, and that the balance of above 60,000 rupees per annum is remitted to Madras, and carried to the credit of the Honourable Company."²

The Nizam's Minister, in a note to the Resident, dated the 19th of August 1851, renewed his claim on the part of the Hyderabad Government to the profits arising from the Abkarree, or Excise

¹ About a lakh (100,000) of Hyderabad rupees.

² The Abkarree collections at Jaulna, the other cantonment of the Subsidiary Force, raised the amount to more than Rs. 100,000 per annum.

and liquor licences, in the cantonment of Secunderabad, "in terms", as General Fraser said, "showing an intention to claim the arrears of revenue for past years, which has hitherto been appropriated by the British Government."

"It appears to me", continued the Resident in his remarks on the Minister's demand, "that some difficulty may be found in solving this question in such a manner as will prove satisfactory to the Nizam's Government; and I beg to refer to my letter under date 6th of February 1850, giving cover to a correspondence between the Minister and myself, in which the same subject is brought forward that is now renewed by Sooraj-ool-Moolk, when I took occasion to express some doubt of the justice of our appropriating to ourselves the entire and exclusive profits of the Abkarree contract in question."

"Viewing the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force as a mere Lushkur or Camp, as it was originally called, accompanied by its own usual number of camp-followers, it might seem fair enough that the proceeds of the Abkarree contract should have been appropriated for the payment of police and other charges. But the matter assumes a different aspect, when, in process of time, the Camp became a permanent cantonment, and gradually drew within it, or around it (for the precise limits of the cantonment have never yet been determined), a large number of His Highness's subjects, estimated by Brigadier James at between 50,000 and 60,000, resorting thither for the purposes of trade, or the advantage of our military protection."

The General considered, however, that the question of the arrears of this Excise revenue was open to argument "on plain and reasonable grounds", and was clearly "inadmissible" under the actual circumstances.

"If, before the receipt from Government of the final orders on this subject, any intimation reaches me from the Nizam's Government of its expectation that the arrears of Abkarree revenue shall be taken as payment, or part payment, of the second instalment of the debt still due to us by the Nizam, and to be paid before the 31st proximo, I shall at once declare it to be out of the question that I should allow what is at best a problematical claim to be regarded as a set-off against the fulfilment of a positive and unconditional engagement to pay within an early fixed period the amount of a *bond fide* and acknowledged debt."

In a despatch dated the 12th of November 1851, Lord Dalhousie

entirely rejected this claim on the part of the Nizam's Government in the following terms :—

“ His Lordship thinks there is no ground for the claim to the tax on the part of the Nizam. It is a check established for the maintenance of order, sobriety and discipline among the troops in cantonment; and as such is not claimable by His Highness, but belongs to the Power whose troops they are, and who are placed in such cantonment by virtue of Treaty.”

The reasoning in this paragraph could hardly be more feeble or more perverse. “ By virtue of Treaty,” the Treaty of 1800, whereby the Nizam paid fully for the service, the Honourable Company agreed to maintain the Subsidiary Force. By Article v of the Treaty of 1800, the Nizam ceded “ to the Honourable East India Company, in perpetuity, all the territories acquired by His Highness under the Treaty of Seringapatam of 1792, and under the Treaty of Mysore of 1799”, “ for the regular payment of *the whole expense* of the said augmented Subsidiary Force.”

As if this proviso were not enough, under Article VIII of the same Treaty, “ the said East India Company agrees to accept the said districts as a full and complete satisfaction for all demands on account of the pay and charges of the said Subsidiary Force.”¹

One part of “ *the whole expense*” or “ *charges*” of keeping up such a Force, was necessarily that of “ maintaining order, sobriety and discipline among the troops in cantonment”. How could that expense be chargeable to the Nizam's Excise revenue? But even if that expense could, under any pretext, have been so charged, General Fraser tells us, in the postscript to his letter of the 5th of February 1850,² that only a small part of the Abkarree collections was required for the police and sanitary arrangements of the cantonments, and that three-quarters of these collections were annually remitted to the Madras Government, that is to say, were appropriated for Imperial purposes.

But it is really no longer possible for anyone to raise an argument in favour of the arbitrary refusal of Lord Dalhousie in 1851, or to revive the discussion on the lines adopted by that Governor-General, since the principle was, after full consideration, conceded in favour of the Hyderabad State by the Government of Lord Canning, as mentioned in the following extract of a despatch

¹ *Atchison's Treaties*, vol. v, pp. 71, 72.

² *Ante*, p. 362.

dated the 12th of October 1860, from the Resident, Colonel Davidson, to the Government of India, which contains as ample an acknowledgment as could well be made.

"I have always been of opinion that, had the pecuniary demands of the two Governments been impartially dealt with, we had no just claim against the Nizam for the present debt of forty-three lakhs of Company's rupees. His Highness's Minister, in a note dated 19th August 1851, when pressed on account of the arrears of the pay of the Contingent, asked for the surplus of the Abkarree revenue of Secunderabad and Jaulna, which was afterwards prospectively allowed to be a portion of the legitimate revenue of the Hyderabad State. We carried these revenues, which at present amount to one lakh annually, to our own credit from 1812 to 1853; say for forty-one years. The above would have given the Nizam a credit of forty-one lakhs (£410,000), without interest, against the debt we claimed. Further, we charged His Highness, from January 1849 to May 1853, with interest at six per cent. on advances for the pay of the Contingent, which charge for interest amounted to ten and a half lakhs of rupees, although the Nizam earnestly protested against being made to pay interest at all, but nevertheless it was debited against him in account.

"I believe it must be apparent, from what I have stated above, that in 1853 we had little or no real pecuniary claim against the Nizam."¹

Again, in his Administration Report for the official year 1861-62, paragraph 150, the same Resident, Colonel Davidson, says:—"This debt the present Nizam and his father equally refused to acknowledge. They brought counter-claims against the British Government, which they complained had neither been recognised nor refuted."

It appears to me, therefore, impossible to avoid the conclusion that in 1851, when the Nizam was compelled to pay upwards of forty-two lakhs of rupees, by Lord Dalhousie's peremptory demand for territorial security, and in 1853, when, under threats of military coercion, he was made to give territorial security for an alleged debt of about forty-three lakhs more, His Highness did not really owe one single rupee to the Honourable Company, but that, on the contrary, the pecuniary balance, if rightly calculated, would have been immensely in favour of the Hyderabad State.

¹ *Papers, Deccan, Hyderabad Assigned Districts* (338 of 1867), p. 27.

CHAPTER X.

Small Payment on account of Debt—Nizam's jewels pawned—Letters to and from Lord Dalhousie—The Nizam says the Contingent is not to be reduced—Lord Dalhousie declares he has given no hint on that subject—A Respite Granted—General Fraser's Instructions for managing Assigned Districts—No Treaty wanted—Interviews with the Nizam—His Highness doubts whether he should please us if he improved his own troops—The Resident instructed not to press for payment of Debt—Lord Dalhousie determined on territorial assignment, with a Treaty—His important Letter on this subject and General Fraser's answer—Project of the Hyderabad Bank—Lord Dalhousie's veto—Honest abstraction of State Jewels and their redemption—Trial of Zoolficar Ali Beg—Censure of Government—General Fraser's indignant rejoinder and resignation—Departure from Hyderabad.

ALTHOUGH the second instalment of the Nizam's debt, amounting to about thirty-two lakhs of Company's rupees, was to have been paid up by the 31st of October 1851, General Fraser, after a wearisome series of written communications, and private interviews with the Nizam and his Minister, had only received by the 5th of December, the sum of Co. Rs. 873,547. On that day the Resident wrote to Lord Dalhousie that he could not yet say that "the desired effect had been produced, but perhaps enough to induce the Government of India to wait a little longer." On the 11th of December the General wrote again, as follows:—

"MY LORD,—You will probably desire to know what chance there is of the remainder of the Nizam's debt being paid by the 4th proximo. I did not advert to this point in my public letter of the 5th instant, because I did not possess information on the subject which would give any value to my opinion regarding it. Having written, however, the day before yesterday a private note to Sooraj-ool-Moolk, for the purpose of exciting him to activity in the provision of means for the final liquidation of the Nizam's debt, I took occasion to ask him how it happened that he was only enabled to send me Co. Rs. 873,547, when in his note to me of 28th October last, he told me that he had twenty

lakhs of Hyderabad rupees ready; and in his note of the 1st November, that the Nizam had made over jewels, etc., to him to the amount of thirty lakhs of rupees. I received his reply last night, and transmit it for your Lordship's information.

"I remain, My Lord,
"Your very faithful and obedient servant,
"J. S. FRASER."

The hopes held out in Sooraj-ool-Moolk's private note, though expressed with some confidence, were not calculated to convey anything like certainty to the experienced mind of the Resident, or to the Governor-General, for the Minister said that more than half of the eight lakhs of rupees just sent had been raised by pawning some of the Nizam's jewels, and that he relied chiefly on a similar transaction on a larger scale—for which, he assured General Fraser, His Highness had issued orders—for completing the second instalment.

Sooraj-ool-Moolk had written to the Resident on the 19th of November a note, which was at once forwarded for the Governor-General's information, in which the Minister stated that at a conference with the Nizam on the subject of reducing the number of troops, His Highness "commanded" him "to except the troops of the Sarf-i-Khass, for his Highness's own protection and personal attendance, and also the Contingent".¹

It is to this "official announcement of the King's wishes," eagerly welcomed and made the most of at Calcutta, that Lord Dalhousie alludes in his next letter.

"Camp Futtehghur, December 26th, 1851.

"MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—A great accumulation of business at this moment must prevent me for a short time from entering officially on the subject of your last despatch, but I lose no time in saying to you privately that I quite coincide with you in all you have done regarding the payment of the second instalment of the Nizam's debt. The real and the only object of this Government has been to obtain that payment, and the fixing peremptorily of a final day for its payment was resorted to as the sole effectual means of convincing the Nizam that we were in earnest. I have no desire to press him to a day, and am very willing to make all reasonable allowances for the undoubted difficulties with which he has to contend, and which his

¹ *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), p. 86.

Minister is apparently struggling manfully, and in good faith, to overcome.

"I, therefore, without allowing him to suppose that there is any relaxation on our part,—a belief which you have wisely discouraged,—am willing to give him reasonable time to complete his payments as he can, assuring you at the same time that if you see any reason to doubt the sincerity of his exertions for that purpose, or the reality of his now declared intentions to reduce, I shall still have recourse to the occupation of such territory as shall suffice to pay the remaining portion of the debt on the same terms as were contained in my original declaration.

"The official announcement of the King's wishes regarding the Contingent, proceeding as it has done from himself, without any hint or prompting from any of us, is a matter of great importance, especially as it was on record before the question which I addressed to you on that point had reached Hyderabad. The negative assent (if I may so say), which consisted in the absence of any remonstrance, and even the expressions used in conversation with the King, were hardly sufficient, and, at all events, fell far short of what he has now formally pronounced.

"If Sooraj-ool-Moolk successfully conducts to a conclusion the several measures to which I have referred, he will deserve well of his Master, and will richly deserve any compliments which you may suggest for his gratification and encouragement.

"I will write officially very soon.

"Yours sincerely,

"DALHOUSIE.

"P.S.—I am sorry Capt. Griffin memorialised, especially as he did so without personally memorialising me. I quite recognised the peculiarity of his case, and was prepared on the first opportunity to remedy it. But as he has handed me up, of course I must hold my hand. He can't expect me to be coerced into serving him.

"D."

Lord Dalhousie says that "the official announcement" of the Nizam's "wishes regarding the Contingent"—that it was not to be included among the troops to be disbanded or reduced,—was "a matter of great importance", "proceeding, as it has done, from himself, without any hint or prompting from any of us." He must quite have overlooked the fact, though the date was not very far distant, that in June he had personally addressed the Nizam, telling him that "the maintenance of the Contingent" was

"a duty imposed on the Government of Hyderabad by the stipulations of existing treaties"; and that "the efficient maintenance of this Force" was "not only necessary to fulfil the obligations of Treaty, but essential as the main support of the stability" of His Highness's "throne". The injunctions,—for they are, indeed, rather too strong to be described as "hints",—occurred in a document calling upon the Nizam to give territorial security for the accumulated arrears of that Contingent, telling him that the "independence of his sovereignty" was in "imminent danger", and incidentally reminding him that he had to deal with a "great Government, whose resentment it was dangerous to provoke", and which could, "whenever it pleased, crush him under foot, and leave him without a name or a trace".¹

Whatever may have been Lord Dalhousie's intention in asserting a treaty obligation for the Contingent, there can be no doubt that the Nizam, in his simplicity, took it as a very strong hint—not the first he had received by any means,² though, perhaps, the strongest—that the Contingent was a sacred institution. The Nizam Nasir-ood-Dowla had been nurtured in that faith by its high priest Rajah Chundoo Lall, ordained and sustained in office by a succession of British authorities merely for its preservation. It may be worth while recalling the observation made by His Highness at an interview with General Fraser on the 7th of October 1850. "He observed that Maharajah Chundoo Lall had repeatedly impressed upon his mind the importance of maintaining the Contingent and regularly paying it."³ Lord Dalhousie now renewed the testimony and the covenant, assuring the Nizam that on the maintenance of this Force depended "the stability of his throne", since its disbandment would involve the violation of a Treaty. Lord Dalhousie very soon, as we shall see, ascertained and acknowledged that there was no such Treaty obligation, but the Governor-General's corrected views were never communicated to the Nizam.

At the end of the year 1851, satisfied for the time with the payment of forty-two lakhs of rupees on account, and still more with what he called the "official announcement" that the Nizam would

¹ *Ante*, p. 344. *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), pp. 41, 42, 43.

² See, for example, the hint given by Lord Ellenborough's Government.
--*Ante*, p. 165.

³ *Ante*, p. 315.

not ask to be relieved from the Contingent, Lord Dalhousie recorded a Minute on the 3rd of January 1852, declaring his intention of "not proceeding to extreme measures", as he "saw cause to believe that His Highness was, in sincerity, labouring to meet the requirements which such measures were intended to enforce". He quoted with peculiar satisfaction the report of the Dewan, Sooraj-ool-Moolk, that the Nizam had expressly made his plan of reducing troops "exclusive of the Sarf-i-Khass and the Contingent, which, *in conformity with orders*, are to remain fixed and determined as at present." There is much reason to believe, if only from these words, that what Lord Dalhousie would not recognise even as "hints" the Nizam considered as "orders". His Highness understood most certainly that he had no choice or voice as to the essential point, the *expense* of this Force, a truth plainly acknowledged by Lord Dalhousie when he states in this Minute that it is "imposed" on the Nizam. He reiterates his "opinion that the Contingent is unnecessarily costly, and that the same or a sufficient Force could be maintained at a less expense than is now imposed on His Highness's treasury." He says that "some time ago" he "took measures with a view to reducing the charges of the Contingent", and he "trusts" that "means may be found of lightening the burden without impairing its real efficiency".¹ Excellent and equitable as may have been Lord Dalhousie's intentions for the moment, "means" were *not* "found", and the "burden" was *not* "lightened", as has already been shown by authentic figures.²

The "extreme measure", now suspended for a term, was, as we know, the demand for districts in "mortgage", as a security for the alleged debt, and with a view to its gradual liquidation in three years. The officers selected to take charge of the three districts, with the sanction of the Governor-General, were Captains Meadows Taylor and Bullock and Mr. Henry Dighton.³ While it yet appeared likely that this "extreme measure" would have to be put in force about June 1851, General Fraser issued identical instructions to these three gentlemen, "appointed to the administration of certain provinces of His Highness the Nizam, transferred to our temporary management." These instructions received

¹ *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), pp. 91, 92.

² *Ante*, pp. 354, 355.

³ *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), p. 35; *ante*, p. 272.

the approval of the Government of India, and a few extracts will explain their general tendency and spirit.

“ You have not now been appointed to the administration of a district in British territory to which a system of known and established rules is already applicable, and where arrangements once made are likely to be of permanent duration ; but on the contrary you are placed in charge of a portion of territory belonging to an independent foreign Prince, to be administered by us merely in temporary trust. Were the districts in question ceded to us in perpetuity, there can be no doubt that the whole present system of management would require great and radical change. But you must bear in mind that this is forbidden, equally by the circumstances of the case and the instructions of the Government of India.”

The Resident forwarded for their information the letter from the Government of India (published in the Blue Book), No. 1783, dated the 6th June 1851, and called their particular attention to its paragraph 9, where it was enjoined, “ that as little change as possible is to be introduced when transferring the Nizam’s districts to the authority of the British Government, and that for the present our superintendence over the transferred districts is to be general, and should not extend to any close interference with the details of administration”.¹

“ Under the orders of the Government of India you will adhere, as nearly as circumstances will conveniently permit, to the system which you may find already established in the districts placed under your charge with respect to the assessment and collection of revenue ; and you will of course perceive it to be desirable to abstain from making any revenue agreements, or contracts of any description, for periods beyond three years at most from the beginning of 1261 Fuslee ; at the expiration of which time, as the districts in question may be restored to His Highness the Nizam’s authority, we should in all likelihood find ourselves much inconvenienced and embarrassed by having deviated from this rule.”

In all their plans and suggestions for changes, by appointment, promotion, or dismissal among the official classes of the districts, as in the measures prescribed or suggested by General Fraser himself in these instructions, for the improvement of the local institutions of police and the administration of justice, and for the execution of public works, he warned these officers that they

¹ *Nizam’s Debt* (418 of 1854), p. 44.

"must never cease to bear in mind the express and special object for which the transferred districts have now been made over to our temporary management".

"I enclose a copy of the authority with which His Highness the Nizam has furnished me, to take charge of the transferred districts; and I add to it the requisite authorisation from myself, empowering you to enter upon your duties as Superintendent."

These instructions were issued; but owing to the Nizam having paid up the first instalment of thirty-four lakhs of rupees, as described in our last chapter, the three officers were stopped just as they were proceeding to their respective districts. But it will be seen from these instructions, that if the arrangement had been carried out, as originally designed and worked out in all its details by General Fraser, in communication with the Government, and in direct correspondence with Lord Dalhousie, there would have been no doubt, question, or possibility of debate as to the assignment being temporary; while the actual charge would have been committed to three local officers, holding no British commission or warrant, but acting under a double authorisation from the Nizam and from the Resident, who, in this formality and in his control over the management, would have represented both our Government and that of His Highness. The districts were to be managed very much as Captain Meadows Taylor was then managing Shorapore, with the Nizam's consent, under the control of the British Resident. There was to be no Treaty, convention, or instrument impeding total or partial restitution, or in any way impairing the sovereign rights of the Nizam. It was to be little more than a revival of the agency of English Superintendents introduced by Sir Charles Metcalfe, and hastily relinquished in 1829 to please Rajah Chundoo Lall.¹ General Fraser's aim, as in his previously defeated project for a model district under Mr. Dighton,² was that of establishing under his own guidance a school of administration, which might gradually spread its influence over the whole country, and into the counsels of the State. And these results he thought would be more easily, more effectually, and more permanently reached and retained under the elastic and considerate arrangements he suggested, than under compulsion disguised as a Treaty.

¹ *Ante*, p. 36.

² *Ante*, p. 219, 220.

It was towards a very large and, if possible, a complete extension of this plan of temporary tutelage and administrative education, that General Fraser endeavoured at every fitting occasion during his long tenure of the Residency, from the time of Lord Auckland¹ down to that of Lord Dalhousie, to lead our Government, but always without effect. His influence over both the Nizam and the most powerful and capable nobles of his Court, Sooraj-ool-Moolk and Shums-ool-Oomra, and their confidence in his fair and beneficent intentions towards the Hyderabad State, augmented in so manifest a manner after the lapse of the first few years, that having entertained considerable doubts originally as to the Nizam's free consent being ever given to a scheme of reforming management, he became perfectly certain at last that he could secure the consent of His Highness and the zealous co-operation of his Minister. But that plan did not suit Lord Dalhousie.

The temporary assumption of districts having been dropped for the time, the early months of 1852 were chiefly passed in an unsatisfactory series of remonstrances and explanations between the Resident and the Minister, with occasional references to the Nizam himself, on the subject of "the very partial and imperfect manner in which they were paying the arrears of the Contingent". In a letter dated the 14th of May 1852, General Fraser once more—though several times almost forbidden to renew the proposal—wrote to the Government of India :—" I cannot hesitate to repeat the opinion already offered on former occasions, that the Nizam's Government possesses but little capacity or vigour, and that if the Nizam is to be replaced in a position of honourable independence among the Native Princes of India, this will never be done otherwise than under temporary European management."

Some observations made by the Nizam on one or two occasions about this period are somewhat interesting and significant, when considered from the standpoint of the head of a State the relations of which with our Government, and its comparative importance, had been so remarkably modified by circumstances almost within his own recollection. At a private interview with His Highness on the 26th June 1852, the Resident complained that engagements to pay the Contingent regularly, by the allotment of the revenues of certain districts, had not been kept.

¹ See p. 45.

"Instead of seeming to consider any apology necessary, the Nizam entered upon, as he generally does at every interview I have with him, a long explanation of the difficulties and disordered condition of the State, which he dated from the time of Maharajah Chundoo Lall. He spoke of these difficulties as being the cause of the deepest distress to him, and observed that the condition of his country filled him with grief.

"'Why, then,' I replied, 'does not your Highness immediately remove the source of this grief by applying yourself with energy and vigour to the relief of your financial embarrassments by the reduction of all unnecessary expenditure, more particularly of the Irregular troops, or Tynatee Jamayut Force, costing, as it does, nearly twice as much as the Contingent, and being absolutely worthless?'

"'If your Highness,' I continued, 'is resolved to maintain a body of Irregular troops, disband at least a considerable portion of the present nominal force; take means for assuring yourself that the remainder are actually and in good faith kept up for the service of the State, and let them be better clothed and disciplined than the wretched beings who now pass under the name of soldiers.'

"The Minister here remarked to His Highness that, on entering the precincts of the Palace, I had stopped in front of the Battalion that was drawn up there to salute me, and had expressed my astonishment that the Nizam could permit such a miserable, ill-clad, and undisciplined rabble to mount guard near his Pala.

"Upon this, the Nizam, turning to me again, replied, 'These troops are, as you say, worthless, and have not the clothing and discipline of yours. But what can I do? If I were to proceed to clothe, and discipline, and organise them more regularly, what would your Government say, and what ideas would it entertain?'

"I did not consider it necessary to press His Highness for the meaning of this last remark."

On the 23rd of July, Captain Davidson, the Assistant Resident (afterwards Colonel and Resident), was informed by the Dewan Sooraj-ool-Moolk of some remarkable observations lately made by the Nizam.

"His Highness on several occasions lately had remarked to him, when he pressed for money from His Highness's private treasury to pay the Contingent, 'Don't be afraid—the British Government never can take from me districts to pay troops I am not bound to support by the Treaty.' The Nizam also told the Minister that it was his duty to have the pension-list of the Contingent, amounting to nearly two lakhs of rupees per annum, regulated, as it was not the custom of his Govern-

ment to pension men belonging to foreign parts (Hindustan, as distinguished from the Deccan), not his own subjects, and who could gain their own livelihood by agriculture and other pursuits, but to pension women and old people who had no other means of gaining their subsistence.

"The Nizam also remarked, 'I am aware that the days when my alliance was useful or desirable to the British Government are well-nigh at an end; but I fully rely upon its honour and good faith for the performance of the different articles of the Treaties existing between the two Governments'."

By this time there can be little doubt that Lord Dalhousie's mind was made up to have the Berar Provinces by means of a Treaty, for General Fraser had received a letter from the Government of India, dated the 10th of April 1852, easily interpreted now, under the light of subsequent events, but which was puzzling at the time, in which the Resident was desired to make every arrangement possible "for the regular pay of the Contingent, *abstaining at this moment from pressing for payment of the principal of the Company's debt.*"

The important letter from Lord Dalhousie, to which our attention must now be turned, opens for the first time the question of a Treaty, whereby the territorial assignment of the Nizam's best provinces was to be obtained, and the Hyderabad Contingent converted from its peculiar status, at once arbitrary and precarious, into a permanent and recognised Force, available for our purposes but paid by the Nizam.

"Government House, Calcutta, September 16th, 1852.

"DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—The unfortunate interruption of many important matters caused by the war in Burmah has prevented the Government from dealing with the affairs of the Nizam, as, under more favourable circumstances, it would have attempted to do. The state of the Contingent, however, as represented in your despatches for months past, is so unbecoming to the Government, and so unjust to the Force, and the application of any remedy by the Nizam or his Minister appears by your last despatch to be so hopeless, that however inconvenient the measure may be, and however unpropitious the time, a new effort must be made by the Government of India for an adjustment of this long vexed question.

"The two leading demands of the British Government in 1850 were, payment of the debt due by the Nizam to the Government of India, and security for the regular payment of the Contingent. These points,

especially the first, were urged with more severity than usual, on the ground, justly taken, of the total indifference of the Nizam to his obligations both towards this Government and the Contingent, and his neglect of every duty necessary for the maintenance of his relations with us.

"Under the pressure of these representations and demands, the Nizam has undoubtedly done much, though by no means all that he professed and promised, towards redeeming his obligations and resuming the observance of his duties. He has paid up somewhere about two-thirds of his debt, he has appointed a Minister, and he has made plausible, though probably insincere, and certainly unperformed, promises for the reduction of his expenses, and for examination of the real condition of his finances.

"On the other hand, he has not only palpably failed to meet our second demand for the regular payment of the Contingent, but he has endeavoured to repudiate his promise of setting apart certain specified revenues for this purpose, and even to deny having made it.

"The consequence has been that the Contingent, even after your recent payments from the British treasury, is no less than five months in arrears; and the officers and men of the Force are shown, not by your despatches only, but by private intelligence received here also, to be in great straits and to be exposed to severe losses. The compliance of the Nizam with the requirements of this Government, and his appointment of a Minister, tardy though it was; and the exertions he has made, unquestionably at great pecuniary disadvantage, to pay our debt, would dispose me to relax the peremptory strictness of our demand for entire repayment. But, on the other hand, the total neglect of what is a still more direct duty on his part, namely, the payment to his Contingent, and the fresh violation of his promise to make permanent assignment of revenues exclusively for that purpose, induce me to resolve on pressing that point, and insisting upon a *bond fide* settlement, one way or the other.

"I say 'one way or the other', because I am unable to concur with you in the views you take, and which you have urged in a recent despatch, of the Treaty obligation of the Nizam to maintain the Contingent in its present form.

"The Government of India frequently speaks of the obligation to maintain the Contingent imposed by Treaty, because for forty years the Nizam has admitted practically the application of such an interpretation to the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800. If, however, the Nizam should turn round upon us, and deny the obligation existing by Treaty, I am bound as a public man to say that I could not honestly argue that there was any other warrant than that of practice for upholding the Contingent. I could argue, and have argued, that His Highness's

conduct has hitherto given that construction to the Treaty, and that till it is rejected and resisted, there is an obligation upon him to support properly the Force which, under that construction, he has allowed us to organise: but if he were to take his stand upon the Treaty, I could not argue that either the letter, or the spirit of it, bound the Nizam to maintain 9,000 troops, of a peculiar and costly nature, in peace, because it bound him to give 15,000 of his troops on the occurrence of war.

“The question cannot be allowed to remain any longer in a state of uncertainty. The positive demand which must now be made upon him to make satisfactory provision in our hands for the payment of the Contingent, which he has heretofore consented to maintain, must bring the question to a point. And whatever be the decision, effect must be given to it by a formal instrument; because we have seen that neither the official assurances of the Minister, authorised to give assurance, nor the personal word of the Sovereign, solemn and pledged, will afford us any security for the performance of the promise which they may ratify.

“The specific demand which we must make, supported by the reasons to which I have adverted, is that the Contingent shall be put upon a clear and secure footing by means of a Treaty, supplementary to that of 1800, which must be concluded for the purpose. The amount of the Contingent, its duties, etc., must be distinctly specified; and for its payment territory must be made over to the British Government. This territory shall be assigned only, not made over in sovereignty; and it shall be on the same footing as the territories assigned by Scindia in Gwalior in 1843, for the like purpose of maintaining a Contingent. The actual territory to be assigned will probably be those which the Government of India intimated its intention of occupying unless the debt due to it should be liquidated. Power to exercise the rights of government must, of course, be conveyed to us within the ceded districts of the Nizam.

“On concluding this arrangement, the Government of India will relinquish any further demands for the immediate payment of the rest of the debt due to it. The Contingent shall be fully paid-up by the British Government, on the part of the Nizam; and the aggregate sum, composed of this payment of arrears, together with the unliquidated residue of debt, shall constitute a loan to the Nizam (either for a long period or indefinitely), on which interest shall be paid as before, at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum.

“The revenues of the ceded districts, after defraying expenses of management, shall be applied (1st) to the payment of the Contingent (2nd) to the payment of interest on the loan above-mentioned; (3rd) to the smaller payments annually due; (4th) the surplus, if any, to be

paid over to the Nizam, for whose information and satisfaction the accounts of the ceded districts shall annually be submitted by the Government of India.

"An assurance shall further be given to His Highness that the expenses of the Contingent shall, as opportunity offers, be reduced to the lowest sum consistent with the maintenance in full efficiency of the Force he may name.

"The Nizam, in his official communications with you, as the representative of the British Government, during last year, formally stated that he wished the Contingent to be maintained. He even stipulated for its maintenance at its full present force, as the only condition on which he would consent to effect those reductions in the other troops of his State, which, for his own sake, we have urged him to make.

"His interest must strongly urge him to uphold the only Force in any degree at his disposal in whose discipline and fidelity he can place the smallest reliance. The terms we propose for his adoption are perfectly just, moderate, and usual. They provide for no more than the maintenance of the number of troops for which he stipulates, on the most economical footing which may be compatible with their efficiency; and the assignment of lands for the payment of the force is not an alienation of sovereignty, but a cession of management made for his own behoof, just as it was lately made for the neighbouring State of Gwalior.

"In short, if the Nizam be sincere in the expression of his wishes, and at all reasonable as to the mode of executing them, he can make no objections to a proposal which is so obviously favourable to his interests.

"But unfortunately we have had many proofs that the Nizam cannot be depended upon as either reasonable or sincere.

"Notwithstanding, therefore, the formal declaration in 1851 of his wishes for the maintenance of the Contingent, he may be so insincere as to repudiate that wish now, as he has lately attempted to repudiate his promise made at the same time for the assignment of specific revenues for its payment. He may take his stand on the actual Treaty, and deny his obligation to uphold the Contingent in its present form, when he sees it about to be permanently established in that form. He may be so unreasonable as (while willing to render the Contingent permanent) to object to the assignment of territory for its payment, though this is essential to its permanency.

"If he shall do so, the question will become more grave than it has ever yet been. At this moment I do not wish to commit myself to any declaration as to the course the Government of India would, under such circumstances, feel itself called upon to take. But, assuming that the Government should resolve to admit his re-

puddation of the Contingent (whatever it may think of the conduct of a Prince who could act so dishonestly), still the Contingent must be provided for at the present moment, and for some time to come. For, assuming that the Treaty does not impose upon the Nizam the obligation to keep up the Contingent, he and his predecessors have for forty years continued to do so. They have raised a numerous army, to whom, in a certain degree, the right of pension has been granted, and for whose proper treatment the faith of the British Government, by whose officers the Contingent is commanded, has been pledged. The Nizam cannot be permitted to disband this army at once, and to turn its soldiers loose upon the country. Such an act would be inconsistent either with justice to the troops, or with the tranquillity of the country.

"If, then, the Nizam should refuse to give his consent to the continuance of the Contingent, provision must still be made for its maintenance, while it is in the course of being gradually absorbed with a view to its ultimate extinction. For that purpose an assignment of territory will be as indispensable as in the other case. The Nizam must be prepared to give it: if he refuses, the British Government will not submit to such an outrage upon all justice, and will take temporary possession of the territories by force, for the purposes already indicated.

"In case of a refusal by the Nizam of the proposals regarding the Contingent, the Government of India cannot be expected to treat H.H. with any indulgence, and the demand for the liquidation of the residue of the debt will not be relaxed.

"Having thus sketched to you the outline of those measures which the Government of India feels itself obliged to adopt towards the Nizam, I wish to be favoured with your opinion as to the probability or otherwise of our obtaining His Highness's consent to them; and to invite any suggestions which you might wish to offer as to the most eligible mode of proceeding with a view to ensure success.

"Being aware of your views regarding the hopelessness of any measure for bettering the condition of the Nizam's dominions, which does not include the assumption of their management by the British Government, and thinking it likely that you may be disposed to urge some attempt being made to accomplish that end now, in connection with the adjustment of the Contingent, I think it right to add that my own opinion, as well as that of the Council, is wholly opposed to such a policy, and that, therefore, it need not be mooted on this occasion.

"The arrears of the Contingent should not be allowed again to increase beyond the point to which you reduced it by the last payment.

Your instructions authorise you to take steps for preventing their doing so.

"Requesting a reply as early as you may be able to give it,

"I beg to remain, yours very truly,

"DALHOUSIE."

To this important letter General Fraser returned without delay a reply, which appears to me to be equally important for the historical and for the personal purposes of this Memoir.

"Hyderabad, 29th September 1852.

"MY LORD,—I have had the honour to receive your Lordship's confidential letter of the 16th instant, to which I hasten to reply. This letter refers almost exclusively to certain measures which, in your Lordship's opinion, it has become necessary to adopt for the purpose of ensuring the future regular payment of the Contingent, consequent on the failure, and even disavowal, of the Nizam's promise to set apart certain districts of which the revenues were to be appropriated to this specific object.

"Adverting to the Nizam's debt to the British Government on account of the sums already advanced by us for the pay of the Contingent, your Lordship observes that the violation of his promise with regard to the permanent assignment of revenue for the discharge of the monthly demands of the Contingent, has induced you to resolve on pressing this point, and insisting upon a *bond fide* settlement.

"I have never, to the best of my recollection, urged in any of my despatches that the Nizam was bound by treaty to maintain the Contingent in its present form, though I have observed that he was bound by treaty to maintain an available Force of much greater magnitude, and involving a much more onerous burden upon his State than the maintenance of the Contingent, yet with few or none of its advantages. I have spoken of the Nizam's voluntary maintenance of the Contingent as the alternative to an obligatory and absolute stipulation by which we might insist upon his abiding, if he preferred doing so rather than maintain the Contingent. I have never offered my opinion as to any obligation to maintain the Contingent being imposed by Treaty, because I am well aware that the Treaty expresses no such stipulation; but it has appeared to me that if the Nizam chose to reject the option of maintaining the Contingent, we had then every right to insist on a Force of 9,000 Cavalry and 6,000 Infantry being maintained for the purposes of eventual war. I know well that this last mentioned Force, undisciplined and irregularly organised, would never in any case prove of much service; but I keep in view this stipulated obligation of the Nizam as a fair and legitimate set-off and counteraction to any attempt

he might meditate to rid himself of the expense of the Contingent. Your Lordship's argument in support of the Nizam's obligation to maintain the Contingent is founded upon the fact that for forty years he has practically admitted the application of such an interpretation of the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800. To this reasoning I express no dissent, because the general tenor of your letter does not appear to sanction, and still less to encourage, the tender of my own personal opinions when they chance to be opposed to those of the Government of India. But when your Lordship proceeds to observe that the Nizam's consent has hitherto been given to this construction of the Treaty, I may be permitted to remark that the consent, if given at all, has been but a tacit one; for, as far as I am aware or can recollect, His Highness never expressed any direct judgment in favour of the maintenance of the Contingent until he did so in my interview with him in October 1850, which was immediately afterwards reported to Government.

"The ultimate consequence or result of the two several points of view in which your Lordship and myself regard this question is this: that by the former the Nizam is virtually relieved from the obligations of the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800, without any corresponding or equivalent compensation to us in lieu of it, for your Lordship admits that he might insist on the gradual absorption and final extinction of the Contingent; whereas by the latter, in which I consider him under an obligation to maintain the Force referred to in the 12th Article of the Treaty, he is bound in justice, if it does not suit his purpose and the state of his finances to maintain that large Force, to accede at least to the equivalent we propose in the existence of the Contingent as at present organised.

"I consider this so clear, that in the agreement now about to be framed, I would expressly relieve him from the stipulation of the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800, substituting the Contingent in lieu of it, to remain as a permanent Force for the ordinary duties of the Nizam's country, and applicable to our own purposes in the event of our requiring it elsewhere.

"I concur in the justice of your Lordship's remark, that until His Highness's assent to the existence of the Contingent is denied, and its further maintenance resisted by him, he is under an obligation to support the Force which he has thus allowed us to organise. Your Lordship's opinion, then, with regard to the Nizam's obligation to maintain the Contingent, at least for the present, upon whatever train of reasoning that opinion may be formed, being clear and decided, you have resolved to leave this question no longer in doubt, but to proceed immediately to determine those measures which are considered neces-

sary to ensure the regular pay of the Contingent in future, and to define at the same time its number, amount of pay, duties, etc., etc.

"The measure which your Lordship proposes to take with this view is that a portion of territory shall be assigned on the same footing as territories were assigned by Scindia in 1843, for the like purpose of maintaining a Contingent; and your Lordship adds that the actual territories to be so assigned will probably be those which the Government of India formerly intimated its intention of occupying until the debt then due by the Nizam to the Company should be liquidated. It is also understood that power to exercise the rights of government within the ceded territories must be conveyed to us by His Highness the Nizam.

"Your Lordship states that on concluding this arrangement the Government of India will relinquish any further demand for the immediate payment of the remainder of the debt due. The Contingent will be fully paid up by the British Government on the part of the Nizam; and the aggregate sum composed of this payment of the arrears of the Contingent, together with the unliquidated residuc of debt, shall constitute a loan (either for a long period or indefinitely), on which interest shall be paid as before at the rate of six per cent. per annum. The revenues of the ceded districts, after defraying expenses of management, are to be applied, first, to the payment of the Contingent; secondly, to the payment of interest on the debt and further loan above mentioned; thirdly, to the smaller payments annually due; and fourthly, the surplus, if any, will be paid over to the Nizam, for whose information and satisfaction the accounts of the ceded districts will annually be submitted by the Government of India.

"An assurance is further to be given to His Highness that the expenses of the Contingent shall, as opportunity offers, be reduced to the lowest sum consistent with the maintenance in full efficiency of the Force he may name.

"Your Lordship proceeds to observe that the terms thus proposed for the Nizam's adoption are perfectly just, moderate, and usual; and you express an opinion that if the Nizam is sincere in the expression of his wishes, and at all reasonable as to the mode of executing them, he can make no objections to a proposal which is so obviously favourable to his interests.

"If, however, the Nizam should refuse to give his consent to this arrangement, and to the continuance of the Contingent, your Lordship observes that provision must still be made for its maintenance, while it is in the course of being gradually absorbed with a view to its ultimate extinction, for which purpose an assignment of territory will be as indispensable as in the other case, and that this arrangement will be enforced upon the Nizam if he does not voluntarily accede to it.

"Your Lordship concludes by desiring my opinion as to the probability or otherwise of our obtaining the Nizam's consent to these measures, and any suggestions are invited, which I may wish to offer, as to the most eligible mode of proceeding with a view to ensure success.

"To the fact of the arrangements above proposed being just and moderate, as far as regards merely our own interests, and the obligations under which I have acknowledged that I consider the Nizam to be placed, I fully assent; but if it be desired that I express an explicit and straightforward opinion upon the subject, I cannot allow it to be limited and circumscribed by this simple and exclusive view of the case. As regards ourselves, the justice of this proposed arrangement cannot be impugned; but as regards the Nizam, I consider it to involve his certain ruin, and the utter extinction of his power as an independent Sovereign. I am not now going to renew any suggestion for our proposing to the Nizam to cede to us the temporary management of the whole of his country, since your Lordship acquaints me that this is so entirely opposed to the views and policy of the Government of India; and therefore, without proceeding so far as to suggest any other course of procedure in substitution of, or in addition to, that which your Lordship has decided, I will confine myself on the present occasion to a slight sketch of the consequences to the Nizam which this arrangement must involve, and of the opposition therefore which I think His Highness will be likely to offer to it.

"A very large, and probably the greatest part of that territory which we are now proposing to bring under our management, belongs to Arab Chiefs, and other powerful Talookdars, most of whom have such large outstanding demands upon the Nizam's Government,—on account either of muzzeranas exacted from them for their investiture, which they will allege has not yet been reimbursed to them from the profit of their districts; or of territorial revenue forestalled and actually paid by them to the Government,—that although I do not contemplate the probability of their offering any armed opposition to the British Government in regard to the surrender of their Talooks, yet I cannot but anticipate that, their resources and means of repaying themselves being thus at once cut off, their pressure upon the Nizam's Government will be such as rapidly to accelerate that bankruptcy which, if it has not yet been actually declared, is certainly impending.

"It is not my opinion that any circumstances whatever in which the Nizam could be placed would induce him to offer any actual resistance to the absolute demands or injunctions of the British Government. But I think we might expect from him that passive resistance which would consist in his refusing any formal cession to us of the required

districts, while at the same time he would allow us to adopt our own means for taking possession of them if we chose to do so.

“The character of the Nizam is such that it is impossible to foresee with any certainty to what line of conduct it would prompt him in any given case, but I have stated what I think it would probably be in the matter now in question. He has a great deal of ancestral and dynastic pride; and this, with the self-complacent retrospect in which he frequently indulges, as to the advantage which his alliance has proved to the British Government in past years, and an anticipation of the increased difficulties in which he will be involved by the claims of those who, under our management of his territory, must necessarily be removed from their lucrative offices and situations, will, I think, constitute altogether a powerful motive for his resisting our proposal as far as he can do so, and endeavouring to stave off what he will regard as a great calamity and degradation, by promises and protracted negotiations and the temporary expedients he may have recourse to, either by making, at the last moment, a payment in liquidation of our demands from his own private treasures, if he possesses them (upon which latter point no one here pretends to possess any certain information), or by exacting a loan from the Nobles and other Chiefs of the State by impressing upon their minds that his ultimate downfall must be accompanied by their ruin also.

“I have spoken above of the *necessary* removal of Talookdars and others when their districts are brought under our management; and the Government will judge of the extent of that necessity, when it adverts to the description I have frequently had occasion to give of the mode in which these Talookdars administer the affairs of their districts; residing for the most part in the city of Hyderabad, deeply engaged in pecuniary transactions with the Nizam’s Minister and others, maintaining their personal interests by extensive bribery, and ruling their distant Talooks by an inferior class of Naibs, whose misconduct and oppression form a frequent source of complaint on the part of the Ryots and other inhabitants of the country.

“The general purport of what I would say is this, that although I think we have an abstract right, as far as we are ourselves exclusively concerned, to propose to the Nizam the arrangements which your Lordship is now contemplating, we ought not to shut our eyes to what appears likely to be the certain consequence of those arrangements to the Nizam, if they are proposed to him in their present bare and isolated form, without our recommending to him at the same time other coincident measures, and aiding to give them effect, which would counteract and avert the evils to which I have referred as the probable and almost certain result that will otherwise ensue.

“With respect to the most eligible mode of proceeding with a view

to ensure success, in the event of your Lordship determining on those measures which form the subject of your letter, it appears to me that the means most likely to influence the Nizam, and to render his acquiescence probable, is that your Lordship should personally address him a letter, stating plainly and explicitly the grounds of your present procedure, and furnish me at the same time, for presentation to His Highness, or previous discussion with the Minister, a draft of the instrument which you would propose to be mutually concluded between the British Government and His Highness. Your Lordship's letter to the Nizam, I think, should be expressed in the most distinct and determined but, of course, courteous language. The more decided and resolute its tone, consistently with that friendly feeling which subsists, and should be understood to continue to subsist, between the two Governments, the more likely it will be to ensure the Nizam's assent, and to prevent those attempts which he will otherwise be sure to put in practice, to evade your demands, or at least to render them the subject of a protracted negotiation. The language of the letter cannot be too decided and definitive, provided it affords the Nizam no room to complain of unnecessary severity and harshness, or exhibits an apparent intention of coercing him merely because we possess the power of doing so.

"The agreement, or other formal instrument, by whatever name it may be designated, cannot, I think, be better or more judiciously worded than in the manner which your Lordship appears to have in view. After an explanatory preamble, which the circumstances of the case naturally require, the provisions of the instrument should be plain, distinct, and specific, leaving no room for subsequent doubt or uncertainty, and precluding, as far as possible, every chance of future misunderstanding, or any necessity for reagitating the same questions which ought at once and at first to have been definitely settled.

"I refrain from touching on the future organisation of the Contingent, and those modifications of its present system which may seem desirable, until I receive the instructions of your Lordship to this effect.

"I remain, my Lord, with great respect,

"Your very faithful and obedient servant,

"J. S. FRASER.

"To the Most Noble the Marquis of Dalhousie, K.T., etc., etc."

From the first of these two long letters, that of Lord Dalhousie, we find that the Governor-General, about a year after having impressed upon the Nizam, in June 1851, in vehement and menacing language, that the Contingent existed, and must be

maintained, by virtue of the obligations of a Treaty, had already learned that this assertion was untenable. "I am bound as a public man to say", he acknowledges in September 1852, "that I could not honestly argue that there was any other warrant than that of practice for upholding the Contingent."

He makes the most of the "practice", and of the long-continued acquiescence of the Nizam's Government; and he dwells again on the Nizam's alleged "*wish* that the Contingent should be maintained"—that "*official consent*" which had been so eagerly welcomed at Calcutta.

"He even stipulated", the Governor-General writes, "for its maintenance at its full present force, as the only condition on which he would consent to effect reductions in the other troops of his State."¹ This version of the contents of Sooraj-ool-Moolk's note is by no means borne out by the mere words; while, as already remarked, the true significance of the incident was that the domineering decree of June 1851 had forced the Nizam to subscribe to the false creed that the Contingent was the offspring of a Treaty, a sacred institution on which depended "the stability of his throne", and which must be kept up "in conformity with orders".² In his own council chamber, as we know, the Nizam declared he was "*not* bound by Treaty to support these troops", but after the Khureeta of June 1851, he felt himself effectually silenced on that subject in his intercourse with the Governor-General.

Lord Dalhousie's great and well-founded anxiety was, as he lets us know at every turn, lest the Nizam should "take his stand on the actual Treaty and deny his obligation to uphold the Contingent in its present form, when he sees it about to be permanently established in that form".³

So long as he really believed in the Treaty obligation, he was content with a friendly co-partnership in the mortgaged districts, as designed by General Fraser. But when he lost that moral claim he grasped at more material security. Having convinced himself that he had unwarrantably threatened the Nizam under the untenable pretext of a Treaty, Lord Dalhousie left that untenable pretext and those unwarrantable threats to operate unchanged, until he could efface the flaw, and bind the Nizam

¹ *Ante*, p. 378.

² *Ante*, p. 370.

³ *Ante*, p. 378.

with that Treaty obligation which had hitherto been confessedly a mere pretence. Recognising at last the defective and precarious title of the Contingent, he determined to make it valid by a Treaty, and thus to have that “inexpensive addition to our strength”, as Lord Hastings called it, “put upon a clear and secure footing”, and “permanently established”. And as Lord Dalhousie had the giant’s strength, and was prepared to use it, the Nizam had to submit. That is the whole story of the Treaty of 1853.

With what reluctance, under what a painful sense of official subordination, General Fraser once more approached this problem under its new aspect of a Treaty to be imposed on the Nizam, is quite evident even in the guarded and measured language of his answer to Lord Dalhousie. He refers throughout to “your Lordship’s opinion”, and “your Lordship’s resolve”.

“I have never”, he says, “to the best of my recollection, urged in any of my despatches that the Nizam was bound by Treaty to maintain the Contingent in its present form.”

“Your Lordship’s argument in support of the Nizam’s obligation to maintain the Contingent is founded upon the fact that for forty years he has practically admitted such an interpretation of the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800. To this reasoning I express no dissent, because the general tenor of your letter does not appear to sanction, and still less to encourage, the tender of my own personal opinions, when they chance to be opposed to those of the Government of India. But when your Lordship proceeds to observe that the Nizam’s consent has hitherto been given to this construction of the Treaty, I may be permitted to remark that the consent, if given at all, has been but a tacit one; for, as far as I am aware, or can recollect, His Highness never expressed any direct judgment in favour of the maintenance of the Contingent until he did so in October 1850, which was immediately afterwards reported to Government.”

This refers to the private interview, described in its proper place, when the Nizam spoke of the repeated injunctions on this point of Rajah Chundoo Lall.¹

When Colonel Low, during the negotiations for the Treaty of 1853, pressed upon the Nizam Lord Dalhousie’s argument of his having “practically acquiesced” for so many years in the maintenance of this Force, he added: “Moreover, your father thought it

¹ *Ante*, p. 315.

a good arrangement, and therefore he consented to it." "I was here interrupted", says Colonel Low, "by the following exclamation, 'Don't say my father, say the Maharajah.' I asked if he meant Rajah Chundoo Lall, and he replied in the affirmative."¹ Whenever the Nizam spoke of Chundoo Lall in this connection, he obviously meant that the Maharajah was considered by him in these matters as the mouthpiece of the Honourable Company, and that, therefore, the Contingent was, in his eyes, inviolable. He had been brought up in that belief, and Lord Dalhousie had sternly checked the slightest deviation from it.

General Fraser had, at several previous periods, had occasion to report officially that the Nizam viewed the Contingent "with dislike", that he paid it "reluctantly", that he "would most willingly get rid of the heavy expense it involved", and that he was "averse" to it. The General had, also, officially given his opinion that "neither the continued maintenance nor the original organisation of the Contingent is "provided for by any existing Treaty".²

In reply to the Governor-General's inquiry as to "the probability or otherwise of our obtaining His Highness's consent" to the assignment of districts under Treaty, General Fraser gave his opinion that the Nizam would "not offer any actual resistance to the absolute demands or injunctions of the British Government", but that we might expect "that passive resistance which would consist in his refusing any formal cession of the districts, while he would allow us to adopt our own measures for taking possession of them, if we chose to do so."

It is worthy, also, of notice that in the last paragraph but one of his letter, while suggesting that Lord Dalhousie should address another letter to the Nizam, the Resident advises that it "should be expressed in the most distinct and determined, *but, of course, courteous language*", and again, that "the language of the letter cannot be too decided, *provided it affords the Nizam no room to complain of unnecessary severity and harshness, or exhibits an apparent intention of coercing him merely because we possess the power of doing so.*"

This was a pretty clear hint that General Fraser did not admire such diplomatic amenities as telling the Nizam that he was as "the dust under foot", and could easily be crushed into nothing-

¹ *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), p. 95.

² *Ante*, pp. 90, 94, 165.

ness, and that he did not recommend their repetition. Such presumption on his part, joined with his forecast as to passive resistance, which subsequent events proved to be very accurate, and with his evident distaste for "negotiations" that might be "protracted", unquestionably placed General Fraser before the eyes of Lord Dalhousie as not the most flexible instrument or the best possible agent for the stern and prompt execution of the process on which the Governor-General was now quite determined. It is understood that very soon after the General's last letter was received at Government House, it was arranged that Colonel Low was to succeed to the Hyderabad Residency as soon as it could be vacated.

An opportunity can always be found, or fabricated, in the course of official business, for giving a hint, even to an officer so highly placed and so distinguished as General Fraser, that he is no longer looked upon with favour, and that his resignation would be acceptable.

Great efforts were made in the year 1852 by a syndicate of the leading Soucars of Hyderabad, under the chairmanship of Mr. Dighton, and with the Minister Sooraj-ool-Moolk heartily co-operating with them, to establish a Government Bank in the City, which was to become a public treasury for the receipt and disbursement of revenue, and to supersede entirely the antiquated financial system. So many of the intended shareholders and directors of this Bank were interested in maintaining the territorial and political integrity of the Hyderabad State, and in the establishment of an effectual check on provincial expenditure and remittances, that it was worth their while to arrange for lending money to the Nizam at a much lower rate than the usurious interest that had hitherto prevailed. The capital was fully subscribed, and a loan of forty lakhs of rupees, at six per cent., on the security of a large portion of His Highness's jewels, was speedily arranged, and was to have been devoted to the liquidation of the debt claimed by the Honourable Company on account of the Contingent. The jewels were actually received in pledge, and placed in Mr. Dighton's charge.

General Fraser, whose intimacy with Mr. Dighton has been mentioned, was generally informed of the endeavours that were being made to start the Bank, and was even consulted as to some

points in its proposed organisation. But he took no part whatever in its formation, and the experiment seemed to him, up to the very day of its local success, very unlikely to succeed. Any premature interference on the part of the Resident, or of the Government, would, in the event of failure, have strengthened the opposition against the Minister, and would have wrecked this last scheme for rescuing the Nizam's Government from its difficulties without a territorial cession. When, however, the local success of the undertaking was assured, the Resident was informed officially by the Minister of what had been done, and, as a proof of the Bank being a reality, he declared that he should be prepared on a certain day to pay forty lakhs of rupees as an instalment of the debt. But Sooraj-ool-Moolk and the Hyderabad Syndicate had reckoned without their host. Lord Dalhousie had made up his mind to have the Berars. He had already told the Resident to "abstain from pressing for payment of the debt."¹ General Fraser's report of the proposed Bank was received by the Governor-General with unqualified disapproval and displeasure. He would have none of it. Such a financial combination, involving, if the Governor-General understood rightly the information given him, "the lending of money by a British subject to a Native Prince", "without the consent and approbation of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, or of the Governor in Council of one of the Governments in India", would be contrary to the spirit and the letter of an Act of Parliament, viz., 37 George III, chapter 142, section 28. The consent assumed to be necessary Lord Dalhousie would not give.² On the contrary, the Resident was desired to send immediate and full information as to the persons under whose direction the Bank was being organised, and was instructed that in the event of any one of them being a European, the Hyderabad Government would be forbidden, under Article VI of the Treaty of 1798, to give him any employment, or "to permit him to remain within its territories". And so Mr. Dighton was for the second time proscribed,³ and even threatened with deportation. This was a death-blow for the Bank, and threw alarm and confusion into

¹ *Ante*, p. 375.

² It was very doubtful whether this consent was really required, but there was no contending against the Governor-General's political and executive power.

³ *Ante*, pp. 220, 221.

every corner of the Palace and the City. Everything had been founded, and everything depended, on the confidence placed in Mr. Dighton's financial capacity and integrity at the head of the new undertaking, and also to some extent on the credit of his good relations with the Residency and the Government. All the scaffolding of the frail structure fell down at once. On every side there was doubt, distrust, and panic. Some of the cash was intercepted and impounded. The Nizam, very naturally indignant at his disappointment, and filled with doubts as to the destiny of his jewels, retained a great part of the money intended for the payment of debt. All who were concerned or interested in the abortive Bank saw nothing before them more hopeful than complicated litigation in a locality where the judicial institutions were far from satisfactory. There were even wild and inconsistent rumours abroad, now that the Nizam would repudiate the pledge and seize his jewels, now that, as they were beyond the precincts of the Palace, the Governor-General would claim to have a lien on them.

Although all has now been told relating to the proposed Bank of Hyderabad that occurred up to the time of General Fraser's resignation, a few words must be added to complete this episode. General Fraser had gone, and there was an interregnum for a few weeks under his Assistant, Major Davidson, until the arrival of his successor, Colonel Low. Consternation spread among those who had contributed to the capital of the Bank in reliance on the influence and management of Mr. Dighton. They could not believe that the Government of India had really forbidden a voluntary association for so beneficial a purpose. They suspected that there was a fraudulent design somewhere to deprive them of their money. And even those who were the best informed knew that their funds and their security were in great jeopardy. The Minister could do nothing more. Mr. Dighton, whose conduct and reputation had sustained the whole concern, was beset and literally besieged for some days. In order that the large sum of money already advanced should not be lost to its proprietors, or to say the least, the payment of principal and interest deferred to an indefinite date—it was requisite to act promptly. The jewels were deposited at the house of Mr. Dighton's right-hand man, Mohammed Azim Ali Khan, in the Chudderghaut Bazar, on the

road to the Residency, outside the City walls. They were under the charge of a double guard of Arabs and Rohillas, and there were three locks to the coffer, of which three different interested parties kept the keys. Mr. Dighton declared himself to be under the necessity of going to Madras, partly on business, partly for change of air, as he was out of health, and suggested that before his departure the jewels had better be examined and compared with the catalogue attached to the mortgage-deed. A committee of the shareholders was appointed for this purpose, and so elaborate were the checks and counterchecks under which the scrutiny was performed, that each tray of the jewel-chest in succession was carefully restored to its place *perfectly empty* in the inner chamber, after the Committee had verified and passed its contents as correct in the outer apartment. A pair of jack-boots and a pith helmet formed the simple apparatus employed in a conveyancing process worthy of Robert Houdin. The strong-box with its three locks remained under the double guard of Arabs and Rohillas; while Mr. Dighton proceeded to Madras, without an escort, carrying half of the jewels in his own palanquin; the apothecary in attendance on him having unconscious charge of the other half—worth about a quarter of a million sterling—in a box labelled “medical comforts”.

No news of the flitting was given to the Minister until the precious deposit was well across the Kistna River, within British territory, when a letter was despatched to Hyderabad. Every one concerned, the Nizam included, had still perfect confidence in the probity of Mr. Dighton. The jewels were shipped to England, where Mr. Dighton, also, very soon proceeded. In the meantime the Berar Provinces were assigned under the Treaty of 1853, and the Minister, Sooraj-ool-Moolk died. One of the first objects of his nephew and successor in office, the Nawab Salar Jung, was to redeem the State jewels, and he opened a correspondence with Mr. Dighton. The jewels were then in Holland, and a contract for their sale, under the powers conferred by the Nizam's bond, was very nearly completed. Salar Jung immediately found the means to pay the large sum due for interest, and by the end of 1854 the principal sum was discharged, and the jewels restored to the strong-room in the Nizam's Palace. This transaction, whereby the young Minister kept faith with those who had come forward

at a great crisis to help the Nizam—without avail, from no fault of theirs—was the first of a series of measures which speedily gained him the confidence of his Sovereign, of the financial community, and of the British Government.

The utter failure of the Bank project, through Lord Dalhousie's arbitrary prohibition, the consequent panic and confusion in the local money market, and the temporary abstraction—justifiable though it was—of such a large quantity of the Palace jewels, left the Nizam quite helpless, without cash, credit, or security, to meet the peremptory pressure of Colonel Low—enforced as his Assistant and successor, Colonel Davidson, said, by “objurgations and threats”¹—for a territorial assignment under treaty.

The Governor-General's veto on the Bank, and his evident displeasure at the Resident's toleration of that enterprise, was one more sign, which General Fraser could not misunderstand, that his relations with Lord Dalhousie were becoming strained. But another source of disagreement had, also, been opened for some time, and came to a climax in September 1852.

It may be remembered that in a letter that has already been given, dated 30th September 1851, General Fraser had briefly informed Lord Dalhousie of “a disagreeable state of things in the 5th Nizam's Cavalry at Aurungabad”, arising out of “a strong party feeling in the Regiment”, and that he had, even in that early stage of the affair, attributed its origin to the “injudicious” conduct of the Commandant.² Captain Yates, the Commandant in question, was one of the old local officers in the service of the Nizam; and that General Fraser was not very wrong, either in his original impression or in his final judgment, may be gathered from the following paragraph of a letter of the Government of India, dated 17th September 1852, in which the whole of the proceedings are reviewed:—

5. “His Lordship in Council approves of your having suspended Captain Commandant Yates from the functions of his commission, and he concurs with you in your opinion of the conduct of that officer. You are requested to submit for consideration such measures as you may deem expedient for the future disposal of that officer.”³

¹ *Hyderabad Assigned Districts* (338 of 1867), p. 26.

² *Ante*, p. 350.

³ As there was nothing beyond serious errors of judgment, nothing

The only other officer whose conduct General Fraser seriously censured was Brigadier William Mayne; and it is impossible for me to ignore the fact, though I lay no great stress on it, that the Brigadier had been a popular and favoured member of Lord Dalhousie's family, as Commandant of the Body Guard, and that throughout this long and complicated business he had been—for he made little secret of it—in constant correspondence with more than one of the Governor-General's personal Staff. And yet, in spite of the bias in his direction evident in the following paragraph of the same letter, it will, I think, be almost equally evident that the strictures of the Resident on the Brigadier's conduct must have been well founded:—

4. "The Governor-General in Council considers the conduct of Brigadier Mayne to have been arbitrary in regard to the trials held at Aurungabad; and the orders he issued as affecting the officers and men then under accusation and awaiting trial, were, in the opinion of his Lordship in Council, much to be regretted.¹ In some instances there are indications of a want of due subordination on the part of the Brigadier to the authority of the Resident, which his Lordship in Council cannot view without dissatisfaction; but in no way does it appear to the Governor-General in Council to be shown that partiality can be attributed to Brigadier Mayne, while his Lordship in Council would wish that Brigadier Mayne had been treated with more consideration, and had been allowed, by the Court Martial at Bolarum, to explain his proceedings at Aurungabad, on which proceedings the Court thought fit to make severe comments. The total denial, also, to Brigadier Mayne of all inquiry into the authorship of the letter of 'Nizamito', is a further instance in which the Governor-General in Council considers Brigadier Mayne to have been treated without consideration."

The Governor-General admitted the justice of General Fraser's condemnation of Brigadier Mayne for having been "arbitrary" in his treatment of the officers and men under his command, and "insubordinate" in his behaviour towards his superior officer. Nevertheless, he was acquitted of "partiality", and more "consideration" was claimed for him. As to the neglected inquiry into

affecting his honour or character, imputed to this gentleman, he was placed in another appointment, without command of troops, until provided with a pension.

¹ A very mild term!

the authorship of the "Nizamite" letter, General Fraser shall speak for himself.

The paragraphs we have quoted from the letter of Government will give some slight notion of the way in which personal quarrels, official recriminations, and newspaper scandals were mixed up with more important questions of military discipline and the organisation of Indian Cavalry. Assuredly, I am not going to enter on a wearisome history and analysis of the long series of charges and counter-charges affecting persons of every rank in the Nizam's Cavalry, from a private trooper up to a Brigadier, arising out of what General Fraser called "an injudicious measure of the Commanding Officer", Captain Yates, "in calling for a list of the inferior class of Mohammedans in his Regiment."¹ Suffice it to say, that in the Hyderabad Contingent, as in all the Indian Irregular Cavalry to this day, the monthly pay issued for each trooper is pay for man and horse,—the horses belonging not to the Government but to the officers and men of the corps. The right of owning horses in the Regiment—the right of each horse being termed an *Assamee*—was heritable and saleable, and greatly esteemed as property conferring more or less of social position and influence. The owner of one or more horses is called a *Silladar*,—if riding and owning one horse only, a *Khudaspa Silladar*,—and the man riding a horse not his own property is called a *Bargheer*. The men of all ranks in the Hyderabad Cavalry were supposed to be "*ashwāf*", or men of birth; and by various rules of etiquette and slight privileges, much valued by the troopers and observed by the English officers, were addressed and treated as gentlemen. Even the *Bargheers* were not *always* or *necessarily* lower in station than the *Silladars* who owned horses, whose horses they rode and from whose hands they received their share of the pay issued for each *Assamee*; for in many instances the *Bargheer* was the *Silladar's* son, kinsman, or clansman, and might have before him the prospect of inheriting or of buying an *Assamee*. But in many, perhaps most, cases the *Bargheer* was the retainer or dependent of his *Silladar*, and of lower social standing. These, however, were delicate points, not publicly or officially recognised, and with which it was obviously most unadvisable for any English officer to interfere. Unfortunately, Captain

¹ *Ante*, p. 350.

Commandant Yates, of the 5th Nizam's Cavalry, without consulting his Rissaldar, Zoolficar Ali Beg, the senior Native officer, who would have cautioned him against such a step, persuaded himself, or was persuaded by some designing person, that some Bargheers had found their way into the ranks who could not be considered as *ashrāf*, or men of birth; and either with a view to getting rid of them, or of keeping out recruits of this class in the future, the Commandant ordered lists to be prepared which would have openly displayed and officially confirmed invidious and offensive distinctions between different classes of soldiers, who were quite accustomed and content to meet on parade or in the orderly room on a footing of soldierly comradeship, while off duty, and in private life there might be every comparative degree of intimacy, of reserve, or of deference between them. It may be easily understood how the apple of discord was thus thrown into the ranks of the Regiment. A few intriguers, probably with an eye to something that might be picked up in the way of promotion or the purchase of Assamees, if a general row took place, would see no objection to the classification for which Captain Yates called, but the great majority were against it, and so far as it was possible, opposed it. The Rissaldar, Mirza Zoolficar Ali Beg, himself a man of rank, with a somewhat large "Pagah",¹ or body of Assamees, numbering in all thirty-seven horses, remonstrated against the measure, so far as was consistent with the respect and subordination due to the Commandant of the corps. But the mischief was done; discontent and mutual distrust were introduced into the Regiment; anonymous letters and petitions began to fly about; and at last Zoolficar Ali Beg was accused of having encouraged underhand opposition and secret denunciations, and taken part in what was called "a conspiracy" against the Commandant, was placed in arrest, and ordered for trial by Captain Yates. Unquestionably and inevitably, under the circumstances, a strong "party feeling" was excited. Even the English officers of the Contingent took sides—very few, however, supporting Captain Yates—and when Rissaldar Zoolficar Ali Beg was sent before a European Court-Martial at Bolarum, the head-quarters of the Contingent, one of the senior officers of the Force, Brigadier Johnston, offered to appear as *amicus curiæ* for the Rissaldar and to conduct his defence.

¹ For further explanation, see Additional Appendix, pp. i to xxvi.

General Fraser allowed this offer to be accepted, having previously acceded to the prisoner's application to be tried at Bolarum by European officers, on the plea that he could not be sure of a fair trial at Aurungabad, where the Regiment was stationed. The Rissaldar did not, of course, make such a statement, but it was well understood that he was afraid of the local influence over Native officers and witnesses of Captain Yates and Brigadier Mayne.

Throughout these vexatious and perplexing proceedings the Resident availed himself at every step of the advice of a very acute and able officer, Captain McGoun, Deputy Judge Advocate-General to the Subsidiary Force and the Nizam's Army,—afterwards General and Military Auditor-General at Madras,—and in the following extract from one of his earliest private letters to General Fraser on this subject, he will be seen to have detected the inquisitive, inquisitorial, and unjudicial temper in which the whole affair commenced and was conducted, and to have expressed that same aversion to it which General Fraser avowed, and which was most injuriously imputed to him by Lord Dalhousie as “party feeling”. Captain McGoun's letter is dated the 7th of October 1851, and was accompanied by his written opinion as Judge Advocate on the proceedings of a Panchayat, or Native Court-Martial, at Aurungabad—which proved to be first of a long list—on Karamut Ali, a non-commissioned officer of the 5th Nizam's Cavalry, charged with having sent an anonymous “urzee”, or petition, to the Resident complaining of the offensive distinctions made by the Commandant, Captain Yates, between different classes of men in the Regiment. The Panchayat had found the man guilty. Captain McGoun, believing in his innocence, and being quite certain that there was no evidence of his guilt, advised the General not to confirm the verdict and sentence. In the Memorandum on this case Captain McGoun analysed the evidence at great length, sifting the grain from the chaff, and in the letter he added a less formal explanation of his views.

“You will observe that I sometimes make use of the word *legal*, but I am well aware that these Panchayats are supposed to be beyond the pale of the law, and I have not been testing this one even by the standard of a court-martial. I have endeavoured to view it through the medium of those great principles of reason and equity on which our jurisprudence, with all its faults, is founded, and in particular by those

rules of evidence which are applicable to every inquiry. You will perceive that much of the evidence here produced is what the lawyers call "*res inter alios acta*", and in no way rightly affected the prisoner. What A says or does, or what is said or done in his presence, with his assent, may be adduced against him in evidence; but what B says to C, or C to D, cannot effect A, unless A has been a party to their sayings or doings, or assented thereto. The admission of this description of evidence has, I can have no doubt, heavily weighed against the prisoner.

"I may be biassed, as many may be in this matter, for I confess all my feelings as a man and a soldier are with the men, not with the officer who is at the head of them; but making every allowance, as I have tried to do, for this feeling, I cannot bring my mind to believe that the prisoner is guilty of the charge, *i.e.*, that he forwarded the anonymous urzee, and abused Yates."

In April 1852, the series of trials terminated in the full and honourable acquittal of Rissaldar Zolficar Ali Beg, and the Government, as we have seen, agreed with General Fraser on the two main points of the original and persistent errors of Captain Yates, and of blame being due to Brigadier Mayne for his conduct and demeanour both towards his superiors and his inferiors. Yet the confirmation of all the Resident's acts and orders was accompanied by what, when General Fraser's high position and distinguished services are considered, cannot but appear a most gratuitous and unjustified censure on his personal conduct in the supervision of these intricate proceedings. If it had been intended to provoke the Resident into tendering his resignation, or to give him a broad hint that he no longer possessed the confidence of the Governor-General, the language and the style of these passages could not have been better chosen. The letter from the Secretary to the Government of India was dated 17th September 1852, and it was mainly an answer to a despatch dated 17th of November in the previous year, before the trial of Zolficar Ali Beg had commenced, in which the Resident had thus explained his reasons for having removed the trials from Aurungabad to the head-quarters of the Contingent at Bolarum.

"Since these trials commenced, and during their progress, so violent a party spirit has exhibited itself among many officers at Aurungabad, that had I allowed my attention to be withdrawn from the primary and essential business in hand, by the mutual attacks and recriminations of

these gentlemen, the investigation and settlement of the original charges preferred against the prisoners would have been rendered a matter of secondary consideration; and the whole case would have become involved in most embarrassing confusion. It is to put a stop as far as possible to any further manifestation of this objectionable spirit, and to bring back the European officers to a calmer and more rational conduct than that by which their proceedings have hitherto been marked, that I have removed the trials from Aurungabad to Bolarum, within the sphere of my own more immediate and direct authority."

Referring point blank to General Fraser's original and continued animadversions on the party spirit that rendered the settlement of these cases so painfully difficult, the Secretary to the Government of India wrote as follows:—

"3. His Lordship in Council desires to record the regret with which he observes the party feeling so evidently evinced in the cases at Aurungabad and at Bolarum, during the investigation of the accusations preferred against the Rissaldar Zoolficar Ali Beg and other persons. From this party feeling, in the opinion of his Lordship in Council, the Resident himself has not been exempt. It appears to his Lordship in Council that sufficient means for insuring to the parties accused a fair trial might have been found without adopting the unusual measures deemed expedient by you."

The letter then goes on to specify a number of matters entirely within the competence of General Fraser as Resident and Commander of the Contingent, such as the permission given to Brigadier Johnston to undertake the prisoner's defence; the publication by the Resident of a General Order dated the 8th of April 1852, notifying the acquittal of the Rissaldar, "while the subject of the charges was yet under the consideration of the Government of India"; and "the entire suppression of all inquiry into the alleged connection of Captain Orr with the authorship and publication of the offensive and unbecoming letter signed 'Nizamite' in the *Bombay Times* newspaper of the 18th of October 1851," as "indicating the same bias of feeling on your part of which you so justly complain as shown by others."

The General's reply, dated 6th October 1852, to this despatch very plainly reveals the sentiments of indignation and resentment which it had excited, and was perhaps, intended to excite. He said:—

"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 3,268, under date the 17th ultimo, and learn with equal pain and surprise that the Government of India attributes to me a party feeling in the case of the recent trial of Zoolficar Ali Beg, of the 5th Cavalry, and other persons. A party feeling, entertained by an officer in my situation, upon whom the final issue of the trial depended, implies so serious a fault, and such an utter disqualification for the duties of the office with which I am vested, that I feel compelled, in justice to myself, to repudiate this imputation in the most direct and emphatic terms consistent with the respect I owe to the Government; and to affirm that in so far as any human being can judge of the motives of his own conduct, there is not the slightest real foundation for so dishonouring a charge. To have acted under a party feeling, or any other influence whatever but a simple desire to do my duty, would have been an abuse of the authority I derive from my office, and a perversion of the ends of justice, which I must be permitted to disclaim in the most distinct and unqualified terms. The whole of my conduct in this case, from first to last, was founded on the anxious desire to remedy the evil consequences of that party feeling which was evinced by others, but in which I did not in the remotest degree participate. Personally, I could have had no motive for such feeling, or for partiality to any one of the parties concerned more than to another. Brigadier Mayne and Captain-Commandant Yates, and Captain Orr, and the accused person, Zoolficar Ali Beg, and every other individual concerned in the whole transaction, were all precisely alike to me. I had no conceivable motive for leaning or bias to the cause or interests of one rather than of another. I was not on terms of such close and familiar intimacy with any one of these parties as to lead to any wishes and ulterior views on my part regarding the final issue of the trial, except such as were prompted by a simple desire to insure that the strictest and most impartial justice should be administered. But besides the absence of any assignable motive for such conduct, I affirm that it was my constant endeavour, and scrupulously sustained resolution, during the whole progress of this investigation from first to last, to keep my mind divested of every extraneous influence, and of that bias which might naturally have been induced by the expressions of sympathy which were loudly and generally uttered for what was deemed a cruel and unjust persecution of an innocent man."

The General went on to show, in a manner perfectly convincing, that what the Government called his "unusual measures" were intended and well calculated to make sure that the prisoner had an impartial trial, and that they were neither unprecedented nor

unusual. With regard to the fault attributed to him in what is called "the premature publication of a General Order" while the charges against the Rissaldar were yet under the consideration of the Government of India, the General said :—

"It is not in my recollection that I ever submitted those charges for the consideration or orders of the Government of India.

"The confirmation or otherwise of the sentence passed by a General Court Martial, is vested in the Resident by His Highness the Nizam, under the sanction of the Government of India; and with respect to the Resident's confirmation or otherwise of the sentences of General Punchayuts in the Cavalry Division, he acts in this respect in conformity with the practice that has obtained in the Contingent, without a single exception, from its first formation to the present day. In finally disposing, therefore, of the verdict and sentence of the Court which sat at Bolarum, without further reference to the Government of India, I am not aware that I assumed an authority which I did not rightfully possess."

This was conclusive and unanswerable. The Government of India had apparently quite forgotten that, notwithstanding all its encroachments and assumptions of authority, the Contingent was the Nizam's Army, serving in a foreign State, and that under no power but that of the Nizam could the proceedings of a court-martial in that Force be legalised. It was forgotten, also, that the verdict of such a court, the sentence, and its confirmation, were all judicial acts over which the Executive Government of India had no legitimate power of control or interference, any more than it had over the proceedings of the Supreme Court of Bengal.

Immediately after the conclusion of the Treaty of 1853, when the Contingent had ceased to be the Nizam's Army, it was found that there was no legal authority under which a General Court Martial could be held in that Force, and that the defect could not be supplied without either a change in its constitution, or an extension of the powers conferred on the Commander-in-Chief at Madras. In 1853, when Colonel Low, after completing the Treaty of 1853, was called up to the Supreme Council, his successor Mr. Bushby was a Civilian. Major McGoun, who had left Hyderabad, had been promoted, and was acting as Judge-Advocate-General of the Madras Army, thus explains what then occurred, in a letter dated from Bangalore, 3rd September 1853, to General Fraser, who was then in England.

“The Contingent being now a British one, no one can assemble courts-martial in it without a Warrant from our Commander-in Chief, Sir Richard Armstrong. My Lord Dalhousie applied for one in his usual offhand way, but his Excellency refused, as his Warrant from the Queen did not authorise his granting a Warrant to any one but *an officer ‘not under the rank of Field Officer.’* This will, I imagine, lead to a field officer being appointed to command the Contingent in the room of the Resident.”

This proves the complete accuracy of General Fraser’s contention, that his power of assembling courts-martial and confirming their sentences was derived from the Nizam, and was beyond the legal authority of the Government of India, and that such assembly or confirmation, therefore, did not require the sanction of our Government.

As to the alleged “suppression of all inquiry into the authorship and publication of a letter signed ‘Nizamite’ in the *Bombay Times* newspaper”, General Fraser wrote, in his reply of September 17th, as follows :—

“It is true I did suppress that inquiry, because I considered it objectionable in two points of view,—first, that if the inquiry was expedient at all, the time and occasion were not suitable for it, in the very midst of the military trials at Aurungabad. Those proceedings would have been embarrassed and obstructed by the intervention of fresh matter having no immediate or direct relation to those trials ; and with this additional anomaly, that both the prosecution in the one, and the proceedings in the other, were to be superintended and conducted by the same officer, Captain Strange.

“But secondly, and what I consider of more importance than the first objection, I do not regard, and never have regarded, articles in newspapers to be a fit subject for military inquiry. If there is a reasonable expectation that positive proof can be obtained against an officer in the army as the author of a false and infamous statement in a newspaper, he is, of course, subject to have charges preferred against him, and to be brought to a court-martial. But with regard to a mere preliminary inquiry, for the purpose of eliciting from a suspected officer an acknowledgment of his offence, and consequent crimination of himself, I consider this as being no more warranted by Military than by Civil Law ; and the legality of such an assumption of power by superior authority seems to me to be so uncertain and problematical, that I know not in what manner an officer could be proceeded against, who, under these circumstances, should deny the lawfulness of such inquiry, and repudiate any obligation to make an admission which

would involve an acknowledgment of guilt. What an officer might choose to do voluntarily is another question. I am now speaking the matter as a duty of obligation.

"It seems to me that the course of procedure to which an officer should have recourse, who finds himself the subject of a defamatory attack in a newspaper, is plain and obvious. He has either to prefer charges against the suspected writer, if an officer of the Army, with a view to his being brought to a court-martial, provided the accused possesses sufficient proof to establish the charges, or, failing this, prosecute the publisher of the paper in a Civil Court for libel.

"But since the Government of India is of opinion that inquiry into Captain Orr's supposed offence should not have been suppressed at the time when I did so, I have only to observe that it is now open to Brigadier Mayne or Captain Yates to prefer a regular charge against this officer; when, if I find that there appears to be sufficient evidence to substantiate it, I shall order him to be brought to a court-martial and the case regularly and legally disposed of."

There was no evidence at all, and no charge was ever preferred against this officer. Here, also, the strictures of the Government of India were conclusively and unanswerably rebutted.

Before despatching his reply of the 6th of October 1852, the General communicated it to the Deputy Judge-Advocate General whose regular duty had made him the adviser of the Resident on all points of military law. This is Captain McGoun's opinion on the whole matter in dispute:—

"MY DEAR GENERAL,—I have read over your proposed reply two or three times. My feeling on the subject is one of intense regret that you should have been placed in a position to render such a reply necessary. But the groundlessness of the accusation leaves you, as you conceive, no alternative. Nothing could be more clear, or more convincing than your answer: it is far too much so to be palatable to Calcutta. However, this is not to be helped, and there can be no crime in a man defending himself against an unjust accusation. Every word you have said is the truth. It is respectfully said; and whether it is agreeable, or not, to the Government of India, must be a matter of perfect indifference to you. You have repudiated the motive imputed to you, and there the matter rests as far as you are concerned.

"I do not see that you can amend what you have written. In one or two paragraphs you might soften down what you have said,—for instance, in paragraphs 2 and 3 the words circumscribed by my pencil might, I think, be omitted; and the concluding part of paragraph 5 might be modified, made more general. The words in paragraph

graph 13, "did not come within the legal competence of the Government", might also be omitted, for although true they are *strong*.

"These are mere verbal alterations: no others appear to me necessary, but I shall do myself the pleasure of breakfasting with you to-morrow, and having a talk about the matter generally. Meanwhile, believe me,

"Very faithfully yours,

THOS. MCGOUN.

"P.S.—I fear the English of it all is that Mayne has been let off at your expense. We have an old saying in Scotland that 'Every herring ought to hang by its own head.'"

After the General had left Hyderabad, but before he had sailed from Madras, the Government of India sent a rejoinder, dated 26th January 1853, to his indignant letter of the 6th October, maintaining that the strictures and censure he complained of were "fully justified". There is really nothing in it worthy of reproduction here. It sustains none of the positions taken up in the first letter and subverted by General Fraser; and even with regard to the alleged authorship of a letter in the *Bombay Times* by Captain Sutherland Orr, the Government adopts General Fraser's view that any inquiry into that matter would be inexpedient. Where argument is attempted in the letter it fails, because the facts are misunderstood or misstated, which is clearly shown in the following letter from the Deputy Judge-Advocate-General, Major McGoun.

"Mulkapore, 9th February 1853.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,—The day before I left Secunderabad Davidson was good enough to show me the Governor-General's reply to your remonstrance, if I may so call it. I shall not attempt to describe my feelings of disgust and vexation at its perusal. If it were a mere matter of dispute between you and the Government, it would be best treated with silence and—something else; but as doubtless the whole matter will be considered by the Home Government, I think it desirable that you should put them right as to facts, and leave the argument where it is. Before going further, I must ask you to excuse my offering this unsolicited advice. No one but yourself knows all the circumstances so well as I do; and I truly wish I could be put into the witness-box to testify to the care and attention you bestowed on the case from first to last, and how anxious you were to give it an unprejudiced and unbiassed consideration. Knowing all this, the letters from the Government have given me more pain than I ever felt about any public matter.

"I did not get a copy of the letter, but I read it attentively, and recollect well the misstated facts.

"*First*: it is assumed that the European Court at Bolarum was a General Court Martial. It was never so intended nor so designated. The Nizam's Cavalry Regulations provide Punchayuts for officers and men of that branch, but it is not laid down whether these Punchayuts shall consist of European or Native officers. You felt—and the matter was fully discussed—that you had the option of appointing the one or the other, and the occasion fully justified the selection of a European Court. It is also to be borne in mind, although a secondary consideration, that it was the express wish of the Prisoner that the Court should be so constituted. To say, therefore, that it was in any way an exceptional or unusual Court, or that it was a General Court Martial at all, is *not fact*, and any argument founded thereon is as worthless as the assertion itself.

"*Second*: it is asserted that you allowed, and implied that you encouraged, Brigadier Johnston to defend the Prisoner. I recollect perfectly well your telling Major Johnston that you would allow the Brigadier to come down to the Court at Bolarum, but you did not interfere with the Court's action by authoritatively sanctioning his undertaking the Prisoner's defence. I was surprised, therefore, at finding in the Governor-General's letter an evident impression that something more than this had been conveyed to the Brigadier. It shows profound ignorance of military usage to say that prisoners are not allowed the aid of a friend. It is a thing of every-day occurrence; and where, as in this case, there was a strong bond of friendship between the Brigadier and the Rissaldar, it would have been a gross abuse of power to have denied the latter the aid and assistance of his friend. I entertain strong opinions on this point, and consider it would be intolerable tyranny if a man in the position of a prisoner defending himself against utter ruin and against the loss of what is dearer to him than life itself, should be denied the aid of his friend's counsel. We soldiers are in a measure slaves, but not to that extent. As to the charge or insinuation of your pitting one Brigadier against the other, it is childish,—as is also the accusation that the Rissaldar ought not to have been allowed to choose a European Court, and to say he had no confidence in a Native Punchayut. It makes me feel sick to consider such arguments.

"*Third*: In another paragraph you are said to have visited, or allowed your Staff to visit, the Rissaldar while under trial. This is not fact. It is not true. None of your Staff visited him. I can only say for myself that I did not even go to Bolarum the whole time the trial was going on; and so anxious was I to stand clear of becoming

or seeming biassed, that when some of the proceedings were sent to me to Jaulnah *privately*, I returned them unread, with a *strong* letter, to the person who had acted so indiscreetly. Had you visited the Prisoner, or allowed your Staff to do so, there might have been some ground for the view the Government has taken; but as it is pure invention—and of a most malicious nature—it should not go uncontradicted, and that in the plainest terms.

"*Fourth*: It is argued that although competent to appoint and confirm the proceedings, you should not have passed any remarks on the Rissaldar and his case, as it fettered the Government. If the Government had predetermined to victimise the Rissaldar, without reference to his guilt or innocence of the charges against him, the argument would hold good; but who ever heard of the supreme military authority having power to dispose of a trial only in part—to confirm, but not to express approval or blame? It would be well, at any rate, if Government read the proceedings—for which they have not yet called—and thus became acquainted with all the circumstances, before venturing on an adverse opinion on so large a range of subjects.

"*Fifth*: You are said to have concurred in the Court's opinion of Mayne's conduct. Suppose you did,—was his conduct beyond your authority and control? I have again perused the remarks of the Court, and I do not find in them anything reflecting seriously on Mayne. He is hardly alluded to throughout.

"*Sixth*: In the concluding paragraph there is an unmeaning remark about 'courtesy' to Mayne, as if you should have set justice, discipline, and every other consideration aside, and consulted only his feelings and wishes! However, this would not be worth noticing, but in this paragraph there is a misstatement, viz., that you directed the restoration of the men in General Orders. You did no such thing. But if you had—you had the power to do as you did; and if you did right—and that is not disputed—why cavil at the *modus*? But it would appear, as I said before, as if nothing was taken into account but Mayne's feelings.

"These are the principal points which occurred to me in reading over this most extraordinary letter. I know it will be your inclination to treat it with silence and—something else; but still, as I have already said, it is worthy of consideration whether you ought not to put them right as to facts, making them, if you like, a present of their arguments.

"Now, my dear General, you must excuse my thus offering my unasked-for opinion. You will comprehend the feelings that prompt me to do so. D.V. I shall be at Madras on the 23rd or 24th, some days before you sail, and I need not say how delighted we shall be to see you again before your departure from India.

"Mrs. McGoun joins me in kindest regards to you and Mrs. Fraser, while

"I remain always, yours very sincerely,

"THOS. MCGOUN."

It is not too much to say that the judgment of the large military circle at Secunderabad and in the Hyderabad territories, and of the Madras Army, was practically unanimous as to the rectitude and the satisfactory character of the settlement that General Fraser had made of the differences and the heart-burnings with which the Contingent had so long been distracted. But he knew, much better than his friend, Captain McGoun, how "unpalatable," how intolerable indeed, his reply would be found at Calcutta. Lord Dalhousie, who had already objected to the "tartness" of some of the General's replies, had disowned "meekness" as entering into his own disposition, and had said that "sharp words might meet with sharp answers",¹ was not very likely to take in good part a letter which was not only "sharp" and "tart," but which put the Governor-General so thoroughly in the wrong. The Resident felt that the further progress of the discussion, which the Governor-General would hardly leave as it was, could not but be tempestuous, and its final issue would probably depend on an appeal to the Home Government. He had no more wish to enter on a protracted controversy of this description, than he had on a protracted negotiation for the Treaty to obtain the Berars, to which he had a profound aversion, but on which Lord Dalhousie had decided. Everything added to his desire to have done with Hyderabad affairs. On the 20th of July 1852, he had written to his old friend, Major Moore, the Director :

"Everything at Hyderabad proceeds in the old unsatisfactory way, but I think I may say with truth that this is not my fault. I am heartily tired of it, and ask your friend Mrs. Fraser every day to make up her mind to return to England. But she always tells me that there is not money enough to pay our passage."

In the very midst of the General's growing desire to retire from the Residency, the money problem received a natural though sorrowful solution by the death of his elder brother, General Hastings Fraser, to whose private fortune, as well as to the landed property of Ardachie, my father succeeded. The General almost

¹ *Ante*, p. 336.

immediately addressed the following brief letter to the Secretary to the Government of India.

“Hyderabad, 12th November 1852.

“SIR,—Private affairs requiring my presence in England, I request that the Government of India will be pleased to permit me to deliver over charge of the Hyderabad Residency to my Assistant, Major Davidson, and grant me leave of absence, preparatory to applying for furlough to the Government of Fort St. George, from the date of my so delivering over charge, and my resignation of this office and embarkation at Madras, which will be either in the middle of February next, or at the end of that month.

“I have the honour to be, etc.,

“J. S. FRASER.”

One of the General's last acts as the head of the Hyderabad Contingent was to ask for a better place in it for a very deserving officer, and a special friend of his own, Captain Doria. The letter was addressed to the Governor-General's Private Secretary, Mr. Courtenay.

“Hyderabad, 12th November 1852.

“MY DEAR SIR,—I wrote a public letter to Government yesterday regarding Captain Commandant Roebuck's return to England on sick certificate, and I have now to request that you will submit to the Governor-General the accompanying copy of an application from Major Briggs, Brigade Major Hyderabad Division, to be appointed to the temporary command of the 8th Nizam's Infantry, vacated by Captain Roebuck's departure. Major Briggs is an able and highly deserving officer, and merits the Governor-General's favourable consideration.

“If his request is complied with, the office of Brigade Major of the Hyderabad Division will become temporarily vacant. The title to a staff appointment of this description should be found, I think, rather in the requisite qualifications than in mere seniority. If I were permitted to recommend an officer upon the acknowledged ground of superior ability, combined with great activity and zeal, I should mention Captain Doria, at present employed as Superintendent of Roads. He has never asked me for anything more than he has got, which is not, perhaps, the least recommendation in his favour, nor does he know that I have any intention of bringing his name to the notice of the Governor-General on the present occasion. If near relationship to one of the most eminent men we have ever had in India could in any way add to the personal claims of the officer I have now mentioned, he possesses this advantage. He is the nephew of Sir Thomas

Munro, his mother, the Marchesa de Spineto, being the sister of Lady Munro.

"I have this morning sent up a letter to Government, requesting that my resignation of the Hyderabad Residency may be accepted; and I beg you will be so good as to acquaint the Governor-General that the private affairs in England, given as a reason for this application, refer to the death of my elder and only surviving brother, General Hastings Fraser.

"I remain, my dear Sir,

"Yours very sincerely,

"F. F. Courtenay, Esq.,

"J. S. FRASER.

"Private Secretary to the Governor-General, Calcutta."

The vacant Brigade Majorship was not filled up by the appointment of Captain Doria, as recommended by General Fraser in this last of his private communications, as Resident at Hyderabad, with the Governor-General of India.

Just a fortnight before General Fraser sent in his resignation to Government, the old officer, then on the Residency Staff, one of whose recent letters to myself I have already quoted,¹ wrote the following letter to his old colleague, Major Moore, the Director, which fairly represents the general feeling entertained by all the English officers then serving in the Hyderabad territories, who were acquainted with the circumstances that had led to the unfounded imputations from head-quarters against the General's impartiality.

"Bolarum, 25th October 1852.

"MY DEAR MOORE,—The Governor-General's *fiat* has at length been received on the proceedings of the 5th Cavalry. It has taken us all by surprise; and so much does General Fraser feel the injustice of the judgment, that I shall not be astonished—unless something be said or done to pacify him—if it should lead to his resignation. The Resident is accused of showing the same 'party feeling' which he has condemned in others, which in his official reply he designates, as it really is, 'a dishonouring charge'. He has repudiated the imputation in the most emphatic terms consistent with the respect due to the Government. You will, of course, see the whole of the correspondence and judge for yourself. Never was there so groundless a charge against a high functionary. Neither the sympathies nor the antipathies of the Resident were with either of the parties concerned. I know it to have been his constant endeavour to keep his mind free from everything like

¹ *Ante*, p. 199.

bias. I dare say you have discovered that I do not blindly concur in every public act of our friend, but as a quiet observer of all that has been going on, I must say that I think it would be impossible to overestimate the rectitude of his official conduct throughout these unhappy proceedings. I should like to see your Court do what the Governor-General has not done, call for the proceedings of the Bolarum trials. Our labours will then be appreciated and better understood."

I have just received, also, another letter from the same old friend, an extract from which may throw a little light on the latest relations between Lord Dalhousie and my father. It is dated "21st September 1884".

"I know there were differences between them with regard to their policy, and I recollect the Governor-General once writing to the General that if he persisted in his tone of correspondence, he should be obliged to write to him in a way he would not like,—it looked very much like a threat.¹ When General Fraser was at Calcutta, staying at Government House, in 1848, Lord Dalhousie remarked to some one, 'in conversation he makes me feel as if I were the Resident and he was the Governor-General'. I know that to be the fact. So you see a sort of antagonism sprang up early. The immediate cause of the Resident's resignation was a dishonouring expression in an official military letter at the close of the Cavalry Panchayuts connected with the trial of Zoolficar Ali Beg and others. So much was the General hurt that he said to your mother, 'Be prepared to leave in a month.'"

"I recollect when the Berar affair was finally settled how the Governor-General promised his friendship and patronage to those concerned. If then he was so pleased at winning the game he had so long been engaged in, how great must have been his feelings of animosity against those who had previously thwarted him. He gave the General a cold shoulder because he would not lend himself to such an atrocious measure,—a practical illustration of Indian political life, where the officials who lend themselves as willing instruments to acts of spoliation and such-like sharp practice, are promoted and rewarded, while the high-minded and honest official, who will not lend himself to such atrocities, is neglected and too often visited with censure.

"On returning to India in '54, your father, after passing Aden, where he had seen Outram, wrote to Lord Dalhousie regarding Outram's affairs, to which Lord Dalhousie replied in a friendly spirit, indicating harmony between them in their private relations. This, I think, was the last letter that passed between them."

¹ *Ante*, p. 336.

A few days before his departure from Hyderabad, the General wrote as follows, in reply to a very friendly letter from Sir Henry Pottinger, the Governor of Madras.

“Hyderabad, 20th December 1852.

“MY DEAR SIR HENRY,—I am greatly obliged by your letter of the 10th instant, and should with pleasure accept your kind invitation to Government House with Mrs. Fraser and my family, had we not promised to take up our abode with my daughter, Mrs. Sim, who will be much disappointed if we fail in our word. We are in deep mourning, which would, of course, prevent our participating in any large parties; and this renders our daughter's house our most suitable place of residence. I propose leaving this on some day between the 1st and 10th proximo, and as we are going down by slow marches, we shall probably be at Madras at the end of that month, embarking on the screw-steamer *Mauritius* about the 20th or 21st of February.

“I am glad to leave Hyderabad, for I have long been tired of the part I have had to perform here. Our conduct towards the Nizam, whose independence we profess it to be our intention of maintaining, has been but little adapted to that end; and the course now about to be pursued will, I fear, be but little creditable to the British Government.

“I quite coincide in your opinion regarding the Burmese war, and though I never liked the commencement of it, for I seldom place implicit confidence in the grievances of merchants, who are generally quite as much to blame as those against whom they complain, yet once commenced, it should have been conducted with vigour. It has drawled along in a most incomprehensible manner, and contributes in no degree to our reputation, either in a political or military point of view. I am somewhat surprised to hear you express your distaste for Indian politics in general, considering how much you have distinguished yourself in this department during the whole of your career. I should be sorry to learn that you were about to leave Madras, if that Government were less subordinate in matters of detail to the Government of India. As to parties at home, I know not which appears most bent on losing its character for consistency. The Derbyites seem to have a happy ability for evasion; while I cannot help agreeing with Mr. Hume that Lord John Russell's address to the people at Perth savours a good deal of the *ad captandum* style. I think it will afford me some amusement at home to attend sometimes, if I find opportunities of doing so, the debates in the two Houses of Parliament.

“Believe me, my dear Sir Henry, with the highest esteem and kindest regards, in which Mrs. Fraser and the Bells cordially join,

“Very sincerely yours,

“J. S. FRASER.”

CHAPTER XI.

The Treaties of 1853 and 1860—Their History, Nature, and Results—Both of them Compulsory and One-sided—The Burdens on the Nizam admitted to be unfair, but fastened more firmly by Treaty—Illicit Advantages gained for the Honourable Company—Progressive Reforms effected in the Hyderabad State.

AT the end of Chapter IX of this book the conclusion was reached, after a careful inquiry, that in 1853 His Highness the Nizam did not really owe one single rupee to the Honourable Company; but that, on the contrary, the pecuniary balance, if rightly calculated, would have been immensely in favour of the Hyderabad State.¹ The argument carried on so far grew naturally out of the incidents of General Fraser's long tenure of the Residency, and as he continued after his retirement from public life to take the deepest interest in Indian affairs, the story would really be left half told, if I omitted to describe in terms that will fairly represent his views, the transactions that immediately followed his retirement, and to explain in some degree their character and results.

Colonel John Low arrived at the Hyderabad Residency, and took over charge from Major Davidson, who remained as his First Assistant, on the 7th of March 1853.

On the 20th of April the new Resident received his "full instructions" from the Government of India for his "guidance in the projected negotiation" for a Treaty with the Nizam. On the 20th of May a Treaty was signed and sealed by His Highness,² by Article VI of which the Berar provinces and other districts were assigned "to the exclusive management of the British Resident for the time being at Hyderabad, and to such other officers acting under his orders as may from time to time be appointed by the

¹ *Ante*, p. 365.

² *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), pp. 93, 116, 137.

Government of India to the charge of those districts",—"for the purpose of the regular monthly payment of the Contingent troops", and "also for the payment of the interest" on the alleged debt of about 50 lakhs of Hyderabad rupees, "so long as the principal of that debt shall remain unpaid."¹

General Fraser's anticipations as to the Nizam "endeavouring to stave off what he would regard as a great calamity and degradation", by "passive resistance" and "protracted negotiations",² were completely verified. From the first introduction of the subject by Colonel Low, "the Nizam expressed a very decided repugnance to making any such Treaty", and said, "God forbid that I should suffer such disgrace".³

But Lord Dalhousie had the giant's strength, and used it. He was determined not to have any "protracted negotiations", but to have a territorial assignment under Treaty forthwith. As already hinted, in his letter to General Fraser of September 16th, 1852, military coercion was contemplated if the Nizam did not submit at once.⁴ And "if His Highness the Nizam", said Lord Dalhousie, "should reject the settlement that has been proposed for his benefit, and if evil should consequently befall his State, the Government of India must stand acquitted of all blame towards him"⁵.

With instructions conceived in this spirit, Colonel Low brought the negotiations, if they can so be called, to a speedy conclusion, the moment he perceived a possibility of their being "protracted". The Nizam's vain endeavours to gain time, and his counter proposals, were cut short by an intimation that unless he at once consented to sign the new Treaty, orders would be given for the advance of British troops, not merely into the districts that were wanted, but also into the capital. This was not done officially, or openly, but in a private and familiar note addressed by the Assistant-Resident, Major Davidson, to the Minister, Sooraj-ool-Moolk. Colonel Low, in his despatch of the 19th of May 1853, announcing that the Nizam had at last consented to sign the Treaty, mentions "a note" dated the 14th of that month, which was "sent in original to the Nizam by the Minister, to impress

¹ *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), p. 144.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 383, 384.

³ *Nizam's Debt*, p. 117.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 378, 379.

⁵ *Nizam's Debt*, p. 115.

the mind of His Highness with the belief that further unnecessary delays in settling the matter would not be permitted".¹ A careful perusal of the private note to which the Resident thus briefly alludes, is necessary to make its coercive efficacy fully intelligible. It runs thus :—

“ Hyderabad, May 14th, 1853.

“ MY DEAR NAWAB,—I believe the Resident requires your attendance this evening, to inform you that his negotiations with the Nizam are at an end, and he applies to the Governor-General to move troops by to-day’s post.

“His Highness asked for four months’ delay, which was refused, not even in that time positively stipulating to pay the troops. Had he, however, done so, this would have been refused, as contrary to the instructions of the Governor-General.

“His Highness next offered to place forty lakhs of talooks² in the hands of Shums-ool-Oomra for the pay of the Contingent. The Resident said, ‘No,’ as he could not be assured that there would be no interference on the part of his Highness’s Government, or his other officers; but if the talooks were made over to the Resident and Shums-ool-Oomra, or any other officer of the Hyderabad Government as Commissioners—they to have the entire management and control of these districts, only furnishing accounts yearly to his Highness—he would refer the propositions to Calcutta, but without the slightest expectation that the Governor-General would agree to it.

“His Highness has refused to agree to the above, and therefore he has lost a chance of obtaining a remission of what was disagreeable to his ideas of dignity. The terms first proposed are now renewed, and with an unfriendly feeling that would, in my opinion, drive matters to extremities. Indeed, I have a letter from my nephew at Poona, mentioning that the 78th Highlanders and H.M.’s 86th Regiment have received orders to be in readiness to march on Hyderabad. Don’t suppose military operations will be confined to the Districts; and if you are a friend of his Highness, beg of him to save himself and his dignity by complying at once with what the Governor-General will most assuredly compel him to accede to.

“ CUTH. DAVIDSON.”

The meaning of “military occupation” not being “confined to the Districts”, was that the city of Hyderabad would be occupied by British troops. Then the Nizam and his advisers saw that he had before him the choice of signing the Treaty or being dethroned.

¹ *Nizam’s Debt* (418 of 1854), pp. 132, 133.

² Meaning land producing revenue of about £400,000 per annum.

They understood perfectly, as it was intended they should, that it must come to that. The Nizam's Government was not as strong in 1853, nor was Hyderabad so orderly, as they became during the long administration of the Nawab Sir Salar Jung. Without counting the armed men in a fortified city of 300,000 inhabitants, where almost every man was armed, the City was full of those "turbulent mercenaries", whom, as they, of course, were well aware, our Government was constantly urging the Nizam to disband. Their leaders would certainly have taken every advantage of Mussulman fanaticism and general excitement to have one last despairing struggle before they submitted to the loss of their homes and of all that they possessed. Although the City could not have resisted a British force for twenty-four hours, it would not have been occupied without a contest. The first shot fired from the walls would, so far as we can argue from the general tone and temper of Lord Dalhousie's policy, have cost the Nizam his throne. It would have been worse than useless for him to plead that he could not control the unruly rabble of his capital. As a great number of them could easily have been proved to be in His Highness's pay, his conduct would probably have been stigmatised as gross treachery. The "evil" foreshadowed by Lord Dalhousie would then "befall his State", and "the Government of India would stand acquitted of all blame". Under the influence of this intimidation, of these "objurgations and threats", as Colonel Davidson called them,¹ the Nizam submitted, and signed the Treaty. He submitted to the threat of military coercion, with its manifest consequences.

The compulsion thus used on the weaker party vitiates the Treaty of 1853, not only on moral grounds, but also on well recognised grounds of international law, and unfavourably distinguishes it from almost every other Treaty concluded with the States of the Indian Empire. It is quite true that in very many instances recorded in history, and in most of our Indian cases, treaties of peace between belligerents have been concluded under compulsion.

But the Treaty of 1853 was a Treaty between friends and allies in a time of profound peace, under circumstances which rendered threats and military coercion oppressive and iniquitous. It was a

¹ *The Deccan* (388 of 1867), p. 26.

mere question of money—the exaction of a balance of account that was, to say the least, questionable. To obtain this payment, and the means of making certain future payments to a Force raised by our own contrivance and kept up solely for our own benefit, an assignment of territory was extorted from an Ally, the integrity of whose dominions, and whose internal and external security, had been guaranteed by the Treaty of 1800 for a valuable consideration which we still held. Although that assignment was professedly declared, throughout the negotiation, to be temporary and by way of a redeemable mortgage, it was, no doubt, intended by Lord Dalhousie, in accordance with the rapacious policy of that period, to be permanent, and the letter of the Treaty was drafted with that object in view.

With regard to the temporary nature of the assignment having been declared in the negotiation of the Treaty, Colonel Low, the Resident, has left no doubt upon this point in his despatch dated 4th May 1853, describing the most critical moment in the transaction. “Finding”, he writes, “that the Nizam’s dislike to the words ‘*in perpetuity*’ was extreme, and fearing that the whole negotiation might fail if I insisted on that word, I announced that that was a part of the scheme which my Government had allowed me the liberty to alter if necessary; and I announced formally that if His Highness wished it, the districts might be made over merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent as long as he might require it.”¹ In short, from what Colonel Low said to him, the Nizam was led to suppose that we fully admitted his right to call upon us to abolish the Contingent at any time, if he should cease to “require it”.

And yet, under some strange hallucination, let us charitably hope, as to the omnipotence of the written letter, apart from the spoken word—while the words “in perpetuity” were excluded, both the Resident and the Governor soon took upon themselves to assume that the substance of perpetuity was included in the Treaty of 1853. Within a very few days after the ratification of the Treaty, Colonel Low, in a letter to the Government of India, dated 19th June 1853, referring to some jaghire estates in the assigned province of Berar, says:—

¹ *Nizam’s Debt* (418 of 1854), p. 122.

"I suppose that General Fraser excluded these jaghires partly to please the Minister, and partly because the General then expected that the whole of the districts would then remain only a short time in our hands; but, as *I knew that those districts are to be permanently in our hands*, I thought that those jaghires should at once come under our own exclusive management."¹

General Fraser "expected that the districts would remain only a short time in our hands". Colonel Low, recalling and resuming General Fraser's arrangements and assurances, told the Nizam, to save the negotiation from failing, that "the districts might be made over merely for a time", and consequently erased the words "in perpetuity". Yet Colonel Low says he "knew that the districts were to be permanently in our hands". Clearly, the Nizam did not know it, or agree to it.

Lord Dalhousie, in his Minute of 30th May 1853, on the conclusion of the Treaty, recognises that the Nizam "showed himself, from first to last, absolutely and inflexibly resolved to refuse all cession of territory *in perpetuity*; and that he expressed the utmost reluctance even to assign districts to our management, the sovereignty remaining with himself."²

Yet, in paragraph 4 of a despatch dated November 30th, 1853, from the Government of India to the Resident, desiring that all the Nizam's military garrisons may be removed from the Assigned Districts, they are declared to be "assigned *in perpetuity*". This is confirmed in his Farewell Minute reviewing his own administration, dated the 28th February 1856, where Lord Dalhousie says:—"By a Treaty concluded in 1853, His Highness the Nizam has assigned, *in perpetual government*, to the Honourable East India Company, the province of Berar and other districts of his State, for the *permanent* maintenance of the Hyderabad Contingent."³

It is not easy to compare these words with those used by Colonel Low, "to save the negotiation from failing", without a sense of shame. Lord Dalhousie admits the Nizam to have been "inflexibly resolved against cession *in perpetuity*", yet says that the districts are "assigned *in perpetuity*", and that we have obtained "*perpetual government*". Colonel Low, during the negotiation, said the districts were assigned "to maintain the Contingent *as long as*"

¹ *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), pp. 156, 157.

² *Ibid.*, p. 150.

³ *Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie* (245 of 1856), p. 7.

the Nizam "*might require it*". Lord Dalhousie, after the negotiation, said he had obtained "the *permanent maintenance* of the Contingent".

Colonel Low says he "formally announced" that the districts might be "made over merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent as long as" the Nizam "might require it", because he was afraid "the whole negotiation might fail". If the Nizam "inflexibly and absolutely" objected to the *words* "in perpetuity", much more must he have objected to the *fact* of "perpetuity". And after his objection had been admitted before his face,—for fear of complete failure,—to assume and to assert "perpetuity" behind his back, was a deed without a name, legally and politically a nullity, and of no real effect. Founded on intimidation, compulsion, and something worse, the Treaty of 1853 exists only by dint of superior force, and has no lawful or moral validity.

There is, however, a somewhat prevalent impression, founded on official statements, that in 1860 not only were magnificent presents conferred upon the Nizam and his Minister, Sir Salar Jung, as rewards for the invaluable support and assistance given by the Hyderabad State at the height and crisis of the mutinies and rebellion of 1857, but that the demands and deprivations of the Treaty of 1853 were to a great extent relinquished and restored by the Treaty of 1860, intended, according to its preamble, to "mark the esteem in which His Highness the Nizam is held by Her Majesty the Queen". By Article V of this Treaty the British Government restored to the Nizam the Assigned Districts of the Raichore Doab and Nuldroog, retaining only those of Berar; by Article II the territory of Shorapore was "ceded" to His Highness in full sovereignty; and Article III "cancelled the debt of about fifty lakhs of Hyderabad rupees due by the Nizam".¹

Before proceeding to examine the more serious and weighty points regarding the alleged gifts and reparations of 1860, it may be mentioned that, among other rewards for good conduct and gallant service during the mutinies, was a reward conferred by the Viceroy in Council upon the Cavalry of the Hyderabad Contingent, who had taken a brilliant part in the Central Indian Campaign, and were eulogised by Sir Hugh Rose (now Lord Strathnairn) as "the wings of his army". To the men of the Contingent who had been so employed by our Government in its hour of need, an extra

¹ Aitchison's *Treaties*, vol. v, pp. 114, 115.

field allowance, or *batta*, of five rupees a month was granted. But the Nizam had to pay it. It was taken out of the revenues of the Assigned Districts.¹

With regard to the presents, amounting in value to £10,000, conferred upon the Nizam, and to the value of £3,000 given to Salar Jung, in July 1860, it must not be forgotten that in return for them, and in conformity with old usage, presents valued at £15,000 were forwarded by His Highness for the acceptance of the Governor-General, which, according to established rule, were consigned to the Imperial treasury.²

The Nizam's investiture with the collar and star of the Exalted Order of the Star of India, which he ought, of course, according to our Western ideas, to have considered as a very high and utterly unpurchasable honour, was really, owing both to religious and political scruples, which ought to have been foreseen and guarded against, a subject of great embarrassment and anxiety to His Highness. Many seditious and abusive placards were put up in the City on the occasion, denouncing the Nizam for accepting a Christian order of knighthood. The cameo of Her Majesty was in itself an unmentionable difficulty, Mohammedan law strictly forbidding graven images. And then the Governor-General's Persian interpreter, in his translation of the statutes, had, by a most unlucky blunder, designated the collar, which ought to have been rendered by one of several words meaning a necklace or garland, a "towk", signifying a slave's collar, the distinctive badge of servitude. It is a remarkable fact that the Nizam's reluctance, after many painful conferences with the Resident, gave way at last on his learning that the honoured name of the Prince Consort was at the head of the Order.³

Of the alleged debt of "about fifty" lakhs of Hyderabad rupees" enough has been already said.⁴ Its origin and true history being

¹ See Appendix C. The field allowance of five rupees a month was given, on his own responsibility, to the men of the Hyderabad Contingent by that gallant officer Colonel (afterwards General Sir Henry) Durand, then officiating as Governor-General's Agent in Central India, (see *Our Faithful Ally the Nizam*, p. 297). This was, on his part, a most well-judged and timely boon, and it was very properly confirmed; but the very fact of the grant being made by an officer unconnected with Hyderabad, and for services to our Government at such an hour of need, ought to have exempted the Nizam from being made to pay it.

² See Appendix C.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Chapter ix, pp. 351 to 365.

such as they have been shown to be, the account was, in fact, little modified in our favour by the territorial restoration and exchanges, and the relinquishment of the alleged debt under the Treaty of 1860; for these concessions were insufficient to cover the Nizam's legitimate and subsequently acknowledged counter-claims of long standing. I do not mean to say that the Nizam derived no advantage from that Treaty, for he thereby obtained a partial restitution which was very much desired, and which could not have been obtained by other means; but I do mean to say that he did not, as is commonly supposed, receive anything that can be called a reward. What was given up to him was already his own, and its restoration cost the Imperial Government nothing. The Districts were only held in trust, and the surplus revenue was payable to the Hyderabad State. Ample security was retained for the maintenance of the Contingent. The District of Shorapore, which our Government claimed to "cede in full sovereignty", was a recognised fief of Hyderabad.

Assuming, however, that the alleged debt was fairly due in 1853, and that the counter-claims were inadmissible, the Nizam, under Article VIII of the Treaty of 1860, "ceded to the British Government, in full sovereignty, all the possessions of His Highness on the left bank of the Godavery and of the river Wyne Gunga above the confluence"¹—lands, the fee-simple of which, including valuable forests, was worth much more than the fifty lakhs of Hyderabad rupees professedly remitted.

Moreover, there was in 1860 another unsettled balance of account in favour of the Nizam, for which our Government, as Lord Canning and Lord Lawrence successively acknowledged, it was very difficult to frame an apology or an explanation. "The provisions of the Treaty of 1853", says Mr. Aitchison, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, which required the submission of annual accounts of the Assigned Districts to the Nizam, were productive of much inconvenience and embarrassing discussions".² These discussions must have been embarrassing indeed. Under Article VIII of the Treaty of 1853, the British Resident was bound to "render true and faithful accounts to the Nizam every year of the receipts and disbursements, and to make over the surplus

¹ Aitchison's *Treaties*, vol. v, p. 116.

² *Ibid.*, vol. v, p. 10. Sir Charles Aitchison is now Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

revenue to His Highness." No surplus revenue was paid, and no accounts were rendered for seven years—hence the "embarrassing discussions". "By the Treaty", wrote the Viceroy, Lord Canning, in Council, on the 7th of July 1860, "we are bound to render these accounts every year, and it is not creditable that this should not have been done."¹ Under the Government of Lord Lawrence, in a despatch dated 13th of February 1867, "the omission to furnish annual accounts" was "confessed to have been a dereliction from the letter of Article VIII of the Treaty of 1853".²

The cause of no surplus revenue being paid, though veiled by the accounts being withheld, was well known to the Nizam, and fully admitted by the British Resident. It arose, in his words, from extravagance of our management", contrary to verbal assurances during the negotiation of the Treaty, the written provisions of which were actually broken by the accounts being kept back.

"There is no doubt", wrote the Resident, Colonel Davidson, on the 6th of July 1859, "that General Low allowed the former Minister, Sooraj-ool-Moolk, and the present one, Salar Jung, to suppose that our management would cost about two annas in the rupee, or about 12½ per cent. on the revenue",—"and I distinctly remember", he continues, "its being made use of as an argument to induce compliance in signing the Treaty."³ After much "embarrassing discussion" at Hyderabad, the equity of the case advanced by the Nizam's Minister was in substance acknowledged. The Viceroy, Lord Canning, in a despatch dated 7th July 1860, taking into consideration "the expectation of the Nizam, when the Treaty was signed, that the expense of managing the districts would not exceed two annas in the rupee, or 12½ per cent.", and also "the circumstances under which, and the objects for which, the Treaty was made", declared himself "not disposed to charge the Nizam for administering a country which really belongs to him, more than he would himself have incurred, and more proportionately than he incurs in the rest of his dominions." The Government of India, therefore, agreed "to admit the excess civil expenditure of past years as a set-off against the Nizam's debt of fifty lakhs of Hyderabad rupees."⁴

Thus the formal remission of the alleged debt in the Treaty

¹ *Hyderabad Assigned Districts* (338 of 1867), p. 7.

² *Cession of Berar* (29 of 1867), p. 21.

³ *Hyderabad Assigned Districts* (338 of 1867), pp. 4, 5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

of 1860, was nothing more than a form, the documentary record of "a set-off" already officially acknowledged. "It is not to be wondered at", says the Resident, Colonel Davidson, "that His Highness the Nizam fails to regard the remission as a spontaneous and unequivocal gift."¹ It was not in any sense, or with any qualification, a gift at all.

There still remains one apologetic point in favour of the Treaties of 1853 and 1860 that remains to be noticed, in order to complete the argument as to their inequitable and one-sided character.

Article XII of the Treaty of 1800, providing that under certain circumstances the Nizam shall furnish a force of "six thousand Infantry and nine thousand Horse of His Highness's own troops" to co-operate with the Subsidiary Force in time of war, it is urged that by Article VII of the Treaty of 1853, the reduced Contingent is accepted as an equivalent in the future for "the larger body of troops", and that the Nizam is thus relieved from an onerous obligation, and so far derives real advantage from the Treaty.

In the first place, it must strike one that the obligation cannot have been very onerous, and that the alleged relief of 1853 cannot, therefore, have been worth much, since from 1819 to 1853 the Nizam was never once called upon, and could not,—as I shall prove,—according to the terms of Article XII of the Treaty of 1800, have been called upon, to co-operate with our Government against any "power whatever".

The Treaty of 1853 itself pretty distinctly acknowledges that the views of Sir James Law Lushington, Colonel Sykes, and other Directors, of Sir Charles Metcalfe, Colonel Low, Sir Frederick Currie and many others,² as to the Contingent having been an oppressive imposition kept up "for purposes of our own", before 1853, were correct, by stating that the Nizam's quota had previously been available, under the Treaty of 1800, only "*in time of war*", but that "*the present Hyderabad Contingent*" was "*to be maintained at all times, whether in peace or war.*"

The truth is that, as Colonel Sykes and other Directors pointed out, this Force was most unwarrantably and insidiously called "the Nizam's Contingent", while it was really doing the work of the

¹ *Administrative Report of the Hyderabad Assigned Districts for 1861-2* (Despatch No. 26, dated 26th June 1862), published in the *London Examiner*, May 18th, 1867. See Appendix C.

² *Ante*, pp. 74, 76, 77, 247, 248, 260, 359.

Subsidiary Force, for our benefit, at the Nizam's expense. General Fraser substantially pointed out the same thing, when he said that it was "the peculiar and special duty of the Subsidiary Force to overawe and chastise rebels and disturbers of the peace in the dominions of the Nizam"; and that "if the Contingent were viewed as a Force organised in lieu" of the Nizam's quota, "it should be considered as intended to assist the British Government in its external wars", rather than "to maintain the internal peace of his Highness's dominions".¹

Lord Dalhousie explicitly, though doubtless unwittingly, admitted the unwarrantable character of this Force when he said—under the vain idea that he was justifying its maintenance,—that it was "reserved for the service of His Highness, and for upholding his authority and interests".² If so, it was relieving the Subsidiary Force, and was not representing the Nizam's quota for war.

But the case against the Contingent before 1853, and therefore against its compulsory reconstruction in that year under Treaty, is even stronger than has been shown so far. Lord Dalhousie, it may be remembered, originally adopted and acted on the serviceable official assumption that the Contingent existed under Treaty, and was a commutation of the Nizam's quota of 15,000 troops, which we had "a right to demand at any moment", and that "we justly construed the Treaty to mean that we were to be supplied" with a "regular force" of "effective soldiers".³

Lord Dalhousie having officially terrorised the Nizam by insisting on this position, confidentially admitted his mature conviction that it was untenable,⁴ and, after that, it could hardly be assumed again in good faith by anyone. But a few words will show that the position was even more indefensible than he acknowledged or, perhaps, understood.

We had *not* "a right", under the Treaty of 1800, "to demand" fifteen thousand troops from the Nizam "*at any moment*". We had not even the unqualified right to call out the Nizam's quota to our aid "*in time of war*". The Treaty is declared in the preamble, and in Articles III, XVI, and XVII, to be a Treaty of "general defence and protection", of "general defensive alliance"; and "for the more distinct explanation of the true intent and effect of this agreement", Article II declares that the British Government will defend the Nizam's "rights and territories" as its

¹ *Ante*, p. 245.

² *Ante*, p. 352.

³ *Ante*, pp. 345, 352.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 360.

own, against "any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression". Should any such act of "hostility or aggression" be committed "against either of the contracting parties", they will "proceed to concert and prosecute such measures as the case" may "demand".

Then Article XII declares that "*the contracting parties*" will "cultivate general relations of peace and amity with all the powers of India". But, "if a war should break out between *the contracting parties* and any other powers whatever", then the Subsidiary Force "*joined*" by the Nizam's fifteen thousand troops, "shall be immediately put in motion for the purpose of opposing the enemy." The Treaty of 1798, under which the Subsidiary Force was first constituted, provided that this Force should "not be used on trifling occasions, nor, like Sebundy, be stationed in the country, to collect the revenues thereof."¹ These exceptions as to revenue matters and "trifling occasions" were expressly left out in the Treaty of 1800, under Article XVII of which it was agreed that "if in future any subjects or dependents of His Highness's Government, should withhold the payment of the Circar's just claims upon them, the Subsidiary Force, after the reality of the offence shall be duly ascertained, shall reduce all such offenders to obedience."²

The Treaty of 1800, in consideration of ample territorial cessions to the British Government, was intended, in Lord Wellesley's words, to give the Nizam "complete protection and security" on all "occasions", "trifling" or serious, "a general guaranty" against all external aggression, and against "the refractory spirit of his own tributaries and dependents". In the case of war against any Indian power the Nizam was to take his fair share of the burden, and to join the Subsidiary Force with his quota. But there is no provision for the Nizam's quota being ever called out, except in conjunction with the Subsidiary Force.

In short, the Treaty of 1800 is, as appears clearly from its own terms and from Lord Wellesley's comments, a Treaty of defence and protection in favour of the Nizam, the British Government being permanently subsidised for the purpose by a territorial cession. In pursuance of this agreement the Nizam took his full share of the military burden in the Mahratta wars of 1803 and 1818, when the operations were within his own dominions, or in

¹ Aitchison's *Treaties*, vol. v, p. 51.

² *Ibid.*, p. 75.

contiguous territories.¹ But since 1819 there has been no war against any Indian power in which it could have been consistent with the Treaty of 1800, or with military convenience, for the British Government to send the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force against the enemy, and, under such circumstances, to have it "joined" by the Nizam's quota. No one will, I presume, contend that the Nizam could have been called upon to furnish 15,000 of his own troops to take part in either of the Afghan wars, or in the Burmese or Chinese expeditions, or even in the wars of the Punjab. If anyone should attempt such an argument, he must begin by showing, first, that it would have been reasonable on strategic and tactical grounds, to remove the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force to the scene of hostilities; and, secondly, that it would have been justifiable to do so under the terms of the Treaty of 1800.

But it is, in fact, impossible for anyone to take up that argument in good faith, for Lord Dalhousie himself disavowed it. In the second stage of his compulsory sequestration of the Berars, when, having terrorised the Nizam as "the dust under foot" by telling him that the Contingent was kept up to fulfil the obligations of Treaty, that weapon was quietly laid aside, and he confidentially told his Council that there was no obligation of Treaty at all, he added these words:—

"For thirty-five years the Nizam's troops could never have been asked for in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty; for within that period the Nizam and the Government of India have never taken the field together, yet during all that time the Contingent has been maintained at various strengths. According to the present political aspect of India, it is difficult to conceive the possibility of the two Governments ever taking the field together. Yet no diminution of the Contingent has been proposed."²

In the same second stage of his operations, Lord Dalhousie explicitly gave up and refuted his original contention that we might rightly expect and require that the Nizam's quota should consist of "*effective soldiers*", and therefore that we were justified in "*keeping on foot a regular Force, paid by him and officered by us*".³ Here is his own disproof of that pretension:—

¹ See Appendix B.

² *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), p. 100.

³ *Ante*, p. 352.

"The Treaty never contemplated that the Nizam should be made to raise and pay a large body of troops distinct from his own, to be placed at all times, in peace and war alike, under the sole control of the Government of India.

"If it be said, as I have heard it said, that His Highness's own troops were rabble,¹ and that to ensure our being aided by good troops when war came, we had a right to require the maintenance, under our own control and training, of a smaller body during peace, I reply that the Article confers no such constructive right.

"We have no right to set up any arbitrary standard of our own by which the quality of those troops is to be measured, and to demand that a small army should be permanently embodied and made over to us by the Nizam in order that we may ensure its being kept up to our peculiar standard."²

It is wonderful to perceive how well Lord Dalhousie understood, and how thoroughly he exposed, *in secret conclave*, the injustice of the burden fastened on the Nizam, but only with the intention of fastening it on more firmly.

It has thus been made quite clear that the claim of our Government to the Nizam's quota was much less important than has been asserted, and that the advantage to the Nizam in being relieved from this obligation, under Article VII of the Treaty of 1853, was very slight and inconsiderable.

On the other hand, Lord Dalhousie, by means of the compulsory Treaty of 1853, exacted—irrespective entirely of the coveted object of converting the Contingent from an ambiguous body of troops, "existing on sufferance,"³ into a recognised and regularly paid Force, available for our use,—two distinct advantages for our Government at the Nizam's expense, one of them being the illicit release from a service for which the Nizam had paid.

It has already been shown that by reducing, without the Nizam's consent or cognizance, the numerical strength of the Subsidiary Force, in contravention of the Treaty of 1800, the Honourable Company made a saving in expenditure of about two millions

¹ See this very word used by himself, *ante*, p. 352.

² *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), p. 100.

³ *Ante*, p. 90. Lord Dalhousie uses the same words.—*Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), p. 103.

sterling in thirty years.¹ In the Treaty of 1853 this economy at the Nizam's expense was carried further, and regularly recorded. Under Article II of that Treaty the actual Subsidiary Force, to be "stationed within the territories of His Highness", was reduced by three battalions of Infantry and one of Cavalry.² This is the first of the two advantages assumed, without excuse or equivalent, on that occasion.

The second is even less defensible. It has just been pointed out that in the first Subsidiary Treaty of 1798 it was stipulated that the Force was "not to be used on trifling occasions", or for the collection of revenue, and that in the second Subsidiary Treaty of 1800 this restriction was removed, and the Force was to be used if any subjects or dependents of His Highness's Government should withhold the payment of just claims upon them."³

Lord Dalhousie, in his Minute of 30th of March 1853, explaining the proposed new Treaty, says he has "not the least desire to repudiate any of the obligations of the Treaty of 1800, or to resile from the fulfilment of them. I desire to do everything that the Treaty has bound us to do."⁴ And yet in the new Treaty he quietly released the British Government, without any equivalent for the Nizam, or any intimation of what was being done, from the chief obligation of the Treaty of 1800, from the distinctive and special thing that we were "bound to do", and for which the Marquis Wellesley claimed great credit. In order to make a show in the new Treaty of 1853 of some proper and separate functions appertaining to the Contingent,—now for the first time recognised,—the old restriction of 1798 is once more placed on the use of the Subsidiary Force in Article II of the Treaty of 1853; while in Article III the special thing that we were "bound to do" by the Treaty of 1800,—the coercion of offenders by whom "the just claims of His Highness may be resisted",—is made to devolve upon the Contingent. The change thus effected will be readily understood from the simultaneous view subjoined of the passages in question from the three Treaties.

¹ *Ante*, pp. 360, 361.

² Aitchison's *Treaties*, vol. v, p. 103.

³ *Ante*, p. 424; Aitchison's *Treaties*, vol. v, pp. 51 and 75.

⁴ *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), p. 108.

TREATY OF 1798.

Article V of Treaty of 1798, imposing a restriction on the duties of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force.

"The said Subsidiary Force will at all times be ready to execute services of importance, such as the protection of the person of His Highness, his heirs and successors, and overawing and chastising all rebels or excitors of disturbance in the dominions of this State; *but it is not to be employed on trifling occasions, nor, like Sebundy, to be stationed in the country to collect the revenues.*"

TREATY OF 1800.

First part of Article XVII of Treaty of 1800, containing the extended duties of the Subsidiary Force, with the restriction of the Treaty of 1798 removed.

"By the present Treaty of general defensive alliance, the ties of union by the blessing of God are drawn so close that the friends of one party will be henceforward considered as the friends of the other, and the enemies of the one party as the enemies of the other; it is therefore hereby agreed that *if in future the Shorupore or Gudwall Zemindars, or any other subjects or dependents of His Highness's Government should withhold the payment of the Circars's just claims upon them, or excite rebellion or disturbance, the Subsidiary Force, or such proportion thereof as may be requisite, after the reality of the offence shall be duly ascertained, shall be ready, in concert with His Highness's own troops, to reduce all such offenders to obedience.*"

TREATY OF 1853.

Part of Article II of the Treaty of 1853, containing the duties of the Subsidiary Force, with the old restriction from the Treaty of 1798 restored.

"The said Subsidiary Force shall be employed when required to execute services of importance, such as protecting the person of His Highness, his heirs and successors, and reducing to obedience all rebels and excitors of disturbance in His Highness's dominions; *but it is not to be employed on trifling occasions, nor, like Sebundy, to be stationed in the country to collect revenues.*"

TREATY OF 1853.

Article III of the Treaty of 1853, whereby the extended duties of the Subsidiary Force, under Article XVII of the Treaty of 1800, are transferred from that Force to the Contingent.

"Whensoever the services of the said Contingent may be required, they shall be afforded at all times to His Highness the Nizam, fully and promptly throughout his whole dominions; *if rebellion or disturbance shall be excited, or if the just claims and authority of His Highness shall be resisted, the said Contingent, after the reality of the offence shall have been duly ascertained, shall be employed to reduce the offenders to submission.*"

No further explanation or comment is required on this peculiar "fulfilment" in 1853 of the obligations of the Treaty of 1800

The taint of unjustifiable compulsion, whereby the Treaty of 1853 is vitiated, was decidedly not purged by the Treaty of 1860. On the contrary, indications of the same arbitrary and coercive spirit are to be seen in the negotiation of the latter Treaty, and impair the partial reparation which it effected¹ The Nizam having agreed, in anticipation of boons to be conferred, to cede in full sovereignty the lands on the left bank of the Godavery required by the British Government, but objecting to give up his right to have "true and faithful accounts" of the assigned revenues rendered every year, was told that the cession of the lands on the Godavery had been made "unconditionally"; that the Nizam could not "recede from this position"; and that the other proposals were "entirely unconnected with the Godavery cession, to which the Nizam had absolutely agreed".²

As to the other proposals, for restoration to the Nizam of the districts of Raichore and Dharaseo, and for the Nizam's relinquishment of his right to "true and faithful accounts", they were to be "accepted or rejected as a whole". "His Highness", it was said, "can of course reject the proposals", but the Government of India could not "consent to his accepting so much as is perfectly agreeable to him and repudiating the rest".³ Thus, while the cession of territory desired by the British Government was declared to be "unconditional", the partial restoration of territory to the Nizam was made absolutely conditional on his giving up his right to the accounts of his Assigned Districts. And when the negotiation had been pending for about three weeks, in consequence of the Nizam objecting to give up the accounts, the Resident requested the Minister to observe that "the British Government would not allow the Nizam to retract from the cession of the Godavery talooks", and "strongly urged" him "to meet the Governor-General's requisition, as it will otherwise assuredly lead to an unfriendly and angry feeling between the two Governments."⁴ The Nizam

¹ See Appendix C.

² *Hyderabad Assigned Districts* (338 of 1867) pp. 21, 25.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁴ *Hyderabad Assigned Districts* (338 of 1867), p. 30.

and his Minister could not fail to recall the previous use of these identical words of menace,¹ and were, in short, compelled, against their judgment and against their will, to give up the right, under Article VIII of the Treaty of 1853, to have "true and faithful accounts" rendered. Although the Nizam was still to be entitled to the surplus revenues of Berar, the surplus was to be only what we chose to declare.

Though the Nizam could not retain the accounts, he kept an acknowledged right to the surplus, and this was an advantage which nothing but actual coercion would have induced him to resign.

"I was instructed", says the Resident, "to negotiate, so that annual accounts should not be required, and that we should manage the administration without any discussion as to expenditure, taking on ourselves the responsibility for all loss or gain. To this the Minister replied, 'that would be making them over to you, as Bellary, etc.,' meaning the 'Ceded Districts', 'and they would be no longer the Nizam's territory.'"² It is obvious that if the possession of the Berars had been obtained without any responsibility for the surplus, such possession would have been absolutely unconditional, and undistinguishable from annexation. The sovereignty of the Nizam would have been practically destroyed.

The results of the Treaty of 1860 have proved how sound was the judgment on this occasion of the Nizam and his advisers, and how well founded was their unavailing objection to forego the accounts of the assigned revenue.

We have seen how the "excessive" and "preposterous" charges of the Contingent were very promptly cut down by Lord Dalhousie when, by using the debt of his own creation as a pretext, he had got securely in pawn the Nizam's Berar Provinces. In two years he brought down the cost of the Contingent from 38 to 24 lakhs.³ But now, under the Treaty of 1860, our Government having insisted on being released from the obligation of furnishing "true and faithful accounts" of the expenditure of the assigned revenues, the annual cost of the Contingent has been run up to more than thirty-five lakhs, or very near the "preposterous" and "excessive" scale of

¹ *Ante*, p. 414.

² *Ibid.*, p. 14.

³ *Ante*, pp. 354, 355.

1849, which scandalised even Lord Dalhousie.¹ And yet if ever there was a time when the stability of the Nizam's Government and the welfare of his people were mainly secured, as was asserted, by the Hyderabad Contingent, that time has certainly gone by. By the coercive and arbitrary transactions of 1853 and 1860, that Force, which has not fired a shot since the Mutinies, has been converted, without disguise, into what it was, under the deceptive form of "the Nizam's Army", proclaimed to be by the Marquis of Hastings, "an inexpensive addition to our strength", maintained at the Nizam's cost.

Although strongly pressed during the negotiation of the Treaty of 1860, the Nizam was firmly resolved against any change in the peculiar tenure under which the Berar districts, still left under our management, were held and administered. The Government of India was desirous of placing these districts under the Chief Commissioner of Nagpore, but gave way to the Nizam's insurmountable opposition, "on the ground that the true and complete reservation of His Highness's sovereignty over the retained districts might, by his acceptance of that part of the proposal, become questionable."² The districts of Berar, therefore, were left and remain in the Resident's charge.

The desire of the Government of India was, according to very good information, to revert to Sir John Malcolm's old plan of forming a Lieutenant-Governorship of Central India, to include the Berars, Nagpore, the Saugor and Nerbudda territories, and all the Native States now under the Governor-General's Agent at Indore. The Foreign Secretary at Calcutta, Mr. (afterwards Sir Cecil) Beadon, was, it was understood, to have been the first Lieutenant-Governor. Fortunately, in my humble belief and opinion, both for the Hyderabad State, and for the honour and true interests of the Imperial Government, at an early period in the negotiations a rumour became current in the City, "that the Berar districts were to be incorporated with the province of Nagpore"; and the Resident reported that if this point had been "pressed, all that had already been accomplished would have been nullified".³ I may add that I

¹ See *post*, Additional Appendix, p. xxv, in regard to my efforts to prevent this, as recorded by the Resident, Sir Stuart Bayley, K.C.S.I.

² *Hyderabad Assigned Districts* (338 of 1867), p. 35.

³ *Hyderabad Assigned Districts* (338 of 1867), p. 15.

first brought "this mischievous rumour", as Colonel Davidson calls it, to his notice; and the Resident found immediately, on renewing the negotiation, that the instructions of Government in this respect could not be carried out. Both the Nizam's and his Minister's suspicions were roused at the proposal that "the British Government should manage the Berar districts by any agency thought most economical and advantageous". The object was too transparent; and the Resident was assured by the Minister that "it would be of no use to address his Highness" on that point.

There can be no doubt that the insurmountable objection of the Hyderabad Durbar to this change was based on very good reasons. If the districts of Berar had been removed from the Resident's charge, and placed under the Commissioner of Nagpore, and if the Nizam had foregone the accounts without any reservation as to his right to the surplus, it is obvious that the sequestration would have been undistinguishable from annexation,—no link of connection with Hyderabad would have remained—and the sovereignty of the Nizam in that region would have been practically at an end. If such a complex fabric as a new Presidency, with all its vested interests and special departments, had been created, the aversion to break it up, or to curtail its fair proportions, would have constituted a permanent and irremovable obstacle to the restoration of the Berar provinces to their own sovereign.

Let us now make a brief survey and estimate, by recapitulating the conclusions already drawn, of the relative situation, equitably and morally, of our Government and that of the Hyderabad State, with reference to the Berar Provinces, retained in British management under the Treaty of 1860, and originally transferred under the Treaty of 1853. No cause or ground whatever existed for the transfer then made, except the alleged debt of about fifty lakhs claimed for the pay of the Contingent. This pecuniary claim had no solid foundation. In common with several other members of the Court of Directors, Colonel Sykes, M.P., expressed a strong doubt whether "a legal, equitable or moral responsibility could be fixed upon the Nizam for the repayment of the total advances made by the British Government".¹ Sir Charles Metcalfe, as

¹ *The Nizam* (234 of 1859), p. 11.

Resident, and many eminent Indian Councillors and Directors, acknowledged that the Contingent Force, for which the alleged debt was incurred, was imposed on the Nizam through a Minister set up by the British Government, and so sustained entirely for British objects and interests; that the Force also afforded us extensive patronage, and only performed the contract work of the Subsidiary Force—already paid for in advance by the Nizam—at the Nizam's expense. Even on a fair settlement of the accounts of those two Forces, a large balance ought to have been struck in 1853 in favour of the Nizam.¹

Then there was the ample set-off against the alleged debt, arising out of the unanswerable claim of the Hyderabad State, ultimately confessed by Lord Canning, to the Excise revenues of Secunderabad and Jaulnah, wrongfully appropriated for forty years to the general purposes of the Madras Government. This claim was not only pressed on our attention by two of the Nizam's Ministers in succession, in 1850 and 1851,² but also in 1852 by His Highness himself personally, in direct response to a demand for payment of the alleged debt to the Honourable Company. On the 2nd of April 1852, in reply to a note from the Resident of the 18th March, pressing upon His Highness the necessity of finding funds for paying the arrears and current pay of the Contingent, the Nizam wrote in his own name to General Fraser, and made the following observations:—

“I am perfectly certain that your representation to the Government of India regarding the pay of the Contingent will be made in such a manner as not to excite displeasure. Bearing in mind the friendship of both Governments, it is hoped that every assistance will be afforded by the Government of India to this Circar. There is no loss to the Honourable Company in making advances, when urgently required by way of loan, for the Contingent. Regarding the Abkarree revenue of Secunderabad, which is the right of my Government, I beg you will have the amount paid to the Circar in the same manner as the revenue of Customs. The carrying into effect of this affair rests with you.”

It is abundantly clear from the papers that have been published, without going into less accessible evidence, that the Nizam Nasir-ood-Dowla in 1853, and his son the Nizam Afzul-ood-Dowla, signed

¹ *Ante*, p. 361.

² *Ante*, pp. 361-365.

and sealed the two Treaties of those years under the mingled influence of compulsion and of a persuasion that the assignment of their Berar Provinces was temporary and terminable. At both periods compulsion and persuasion were most inconsistently combined.

In his Minute of the 2nd of April 1853, Sir Frederick Currie said we had "no authority under treaty" for having "organised this costly army in the Nizam's name, and imposed this incubus upon the revenues of his State."¹ Lord Dalhousie admitted in his Minutes of 1852 and 1853 that the imposition of this burden on the Nizam was not justified by any Treaty; but, nevertheless, at the severest crisis of the Nizam's financial embarrassment in 1851, caused by this unwarrantable imposition, he had written directly to the Nizam, instructing him in threatening terms that the efficient maintenance of the Contingent was a duty imposed on him by Treaty. It was only in consequence of this inaccurate declaration that the Nizam submitted to the maintenance of the Force, while nothing less than a threat of the immediate military occupation of his capital, implying his dethronement, sufficed to enforce the territorial assignment; and even with all these misrepresentations and menaces, the assignment was eventually extorted from the Nizam—not in the complete form of a cession or permanent assignment, originally projected by Lord Dalhousie, but only by way of temporary security, or, in the words of Colonel Low, our duly accredited representative,—“merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent as long as he” (the Nizam) “might require it.”

In the transactions of 1860, characterised, as has been shown, by a decided spirit of arbitrary compulsion, the same persuasive declarations were made, which, if they covered—as appears but too certain with regard to the words of 1853—a reserved intention of permanent sequestration,² must be classed among those declarations of small ingenuity and questionable validity, which “keep the word of promise to the ear, to break it to the hope”. The Government of India, during the negotiation of the new Treaty, emphatically declared, in a letter dated the 5th of September 1860, that it would “hold this territory, as it has hitherto held the whole of the Assigned Districts, not in sovereignty, but in trust

¹ *Nizam's Debt* (418 of 1854), p. 141.

² *Ante*, p. 417.

for His Highness, so long as the Contingent is kept up and no longer," and that "the alienation of this portion of the dominions of His Highness is temporary only, and for a special purpose" (the pay of the Contingent), "conducive chiefly to the security of the Hyderabad State, and to the preservation of tranquillity throughout its limits,"¹—for which objects, it must not be forgotten, the Subsidiary Force at Secunderabad had been provided and amply subsidised under the Treaty of 1800. In another passage of the same despatch it was observed, that "*whenever the districts in question are restored to the Nizam*, His Highness will derive all the future benefit that may possibly arise from their improvement while under the management of British officers." And the Nizam was assured, in the same despatch, that the Berar Districts "would still form an integral part of His Highness's dominions, and would be restored to him entire, whenever it should seem fit to the two Governments to terminate the engagement under which the Contingent was kept up."²

Reassuring and hopeful as these declarations must have appeared at the time to the Nizam's councillors, it cannot have escaped their notice that the last one quoted was less favourable to their wishes than the formal announcement of Colonel Low in 1853. "Fearing the whole negotiation might fail", he told the Nizam, on the part of our Government, that "the districts might be made over merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent as long as he" (the Nizam) "might require it." In 1860, the restoration of the districts and the maintenance of the Contingent were said to depend on an agreement of "*the two Governments*", which obviously meant on the will of the stronger of the two; and as that had been the state of affairs throughout the existence of the Contingent, there would probably have been little to be gained by arguing that point in 1860. At both periods, as Colonel Davidson, the Resident, said, the Nizam and his Minister felt that they were being "forced into the acceptance of arrangements that they did not desire", under "a system of coercion which had for many years caused them great pecuniary embarrassment". Colonel Davidson had witnessed, he continued, "the objurgations and threats" that made the Nizam acquiesce, in 1853, "to proposals similar to those now

¹ *Hyderabad Assigned Districts* (338 of 1867), p. 20.

² *Ibid.*, p. 21.

submitted to his successor for acceptance", and he was quite sure that "the son had inherited all his father's aversion" to them.¹

Basing their appeal on the distinct understanding with Colonel Low, that the districts were only made over "temporarily"—"merely for a time", "as long as the Nizam might require" the Contingent—the two successive Nizams, and the co-Regents and Ministers, during the minority of the reigning Prince, have made numerous applications for the restitution of the Berars, offering other securities of undoubted sufficiency, for the performance of any engagements, and the payment of any charges that might, after fair consideration, be imposed on the Hyderabad State.

It has, indeed, pleased some persons and some parties connected with local interests, both in Berar and at the capital of Hyderabad, to cry down the reforms of the late Sir Salar Jung at every possible opportunity within the last two or three years, partly through the ordinary channels of public business, partly through the press—as in the recent case of Mr. Gorst, M.P., referred to in the Preface. It may be as well, therefore, to give a little evidence, chiefly drawn from the Resident's Reports, a source not always biassed in favour of the Native Government, that there really has been, as I maintain, a steady and progressive improvement in the administration of the Nizam's dominions for the last thirty years, commencing, in fact, from the disappearance from public life of the Maharajah Chundoo Lall. I have already said that although most of the Nawab Sooraj-ool-Moolk's plans, made out with the counsel and concurrence of General Fraser, were obstructed, and rendered imperfect or abortive, for want of timely and firm support as recommended; it may fairly be said that the measures of reform carried out by Sir Salar Jung, in quieter times, and with a larger and more cordial support from our authorities, were constructed on the lines laid down by his uncle and my father, and placed by them on record.² In Sooraj-ool Moolk's time great progress was made in breaking down the power of the Arabs, in dispersing and punishing bands of plunderers, and in establishing good order on the roads and in the most remote districts. A small commencement was also made under the ministry of Sooraj-ool-Moolk in that work of withdrawing districts

¹ *Hyderabad Assigned Districts* (338 of 1867), p. 26.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 238, 280.

from the hands of Arab jemadars and other military chieftains, to whom they were assigned for the pay of troops, which was the foundation of Sir Salar Jung's financial and administrative success.

In 1845, also, Sooraj-ool-Moolk, not without meeting with much opposition, effected very important and beneficial changes for the better in the judicial administration. He gave the judges of the Dewannee Court increased powers, and abolished the practice of mutilating malefactors, which, in conformity with the letter of Mussulman criminal law, had hitherto prevailed, substituting imprisonment for various terms.

But undoubtedly there was one unforeseen benefit to the Hyderabad State and people from the sequestration of the Berar Provinces in 1853, in the great stimulus that was thereby given to reform and to economy. The severe mortification arising from that territorial restraint had a salutary effect on the Nizam himself, and even on the unrecognised and irregular counsellors that had so long misled his judgment, and restrained to a considerable extent those jealous intrigues that had constantly hampered Salar Jung's immediate predecessor. At first, more especially, he was allowed to have his own way, and being possessed, beyond all question, of greater capacity and a higher standard of duty than any previous Dewan, and receiving more decidedly and signally the countenance and support of our Government than any Dewan since Chundoo Lall, he worked wonders in a very brief period. A fair notion of the general principles by which Sir Salar Jung was guided in his long-continued career of administrative reform, and of his anxiety to deserve the confidence of the British Government, may be gathered from a letter written by him to Sir George Yule, soon after that distinguished gentleman had entered on his duties as Resident at Hyderabad. The "statement" Sir Salar Jung mentions is a detailed explanation of the progress made up to that time with much statistical and financial information in tabular form.

"Hyderabad, 16th July 1863.

"MY DEAR MR. YULE,—I have the pleasure to send herewith for your perusal a statement which I have had drawn up. My real object in it is to lay before you the past and present condition, as well as the future prospects of this Government.

"The prospective measures, however, are but slightly touched upon, and I shall be glad to be favoured with your opinion on the propriety of those measures. When the time arrives for giving effect to them, they shall be submitted again in all their details for your opinion and approval. Some of the measures referred to will require a long time before they can be adopted. I trust it will be understood that I deprecate any comparison between this and more regular and well-established forms of Government. All that I am at present chiefly anxious to show you is the present state of the Government, as contrasted with its condition under former administrations, and to let you see that the evils and difficulties I had to contend against were greater than might be generally supposed.

"I am very anxious to be guided by your advice. It appears to me that there are two points essential to be observed in the construction of any new measures for this Government. The first thing is, that nothing should be done in violation of the precepts of Mohammedan law; and the second, that no innovation on the rules and customs of the people should be unnecessarily or suddenly made; as many such changes, though not apparently difficult of introduction, would cause excitement and dissatisfaction among all classes of the community. Such changes as are necessary should be gradually introduced.

"I would solicit as a favour that you will not hesitate to point out any errors and faults, if you think I have gone wrong; and if doubts occur in regard to any measures or proceedings of mine, that you will call upon me for explanation, without which it is very likely an idea different from that intended may be formed, and then kindly make me acquainted with the opinion at which you arrive. It is certain that neither I, nor any Minister of this Government, can undertake any large measure with success without the approval of the Resident and the British Government. It is a wise principle, even among private individuals, to consult friends when an undertaking of any importance is in view, but the necessity is greater in the case of those charged with the administration of a country. The Dewan of this State cannot do better than consult the Resident, whose knowledge and experience exceed anything to be met with among the natives of this country.

"We can look for counsel and support only to the British Government, and no measure is likely to succeed if that counsel and support are withheld. We also naturally look for the approbation of some one whom we respect and value; and there is no one outside our country to whom we can look up except the British Government.

"With reference to His Highness's views, which you know is a very delicate subject with me, I can at least say with confidence that he really has the improvement of his country at heart, is desirous of a good reputation at home and abroad, and wishes to see justice dis-

pensed to all, and that he may not go wrong in any decisions he personally has to take.

"With regard to the condition and character of the people of this country generally, so far as my own experience goes, and as the Residency records will show, they are not badly off or discontented, and they are quiet and harmless, though some classes are undoubtedly given to idle boasting. All that they require is that they shall be left in the enjoyment of their old-established customs and usages, any disruption of which is sure to be felt by them as hurtful. Any compulsory change opposed to their feelings makes them regard His Highness with something like contempt; and when His Highness is lowered in the eyes of his people, he is powerless to effect any good. And when His Highness is powerless, disorder may at any time begin to prevail in the country, and His Highness will be blamed for the results.

"In conclusion, I trust I shall be pardoned if I say a few words in regard to myself. I beg you to believe that I do not retain my present office from any consideration of personal dignity or profit. My only object and desire is to be of service to my Government, and with this view, and in accordance with the British Government, to introduce such measures and plans as shall eventually and substantially benefit the State, and obtain for me a good reputation. If unable to do so, I would not wish to remain in office a moment longer.

"Believe me, very sincerely yours,

"SALAR JUNG."

With no Resident did Sir Salar Jung work with more cordial harmony than with Sir George Yule, and from none did he receive more wise counsel, more constant support, or more ample acknowledgments of his administrative success.

Passing over the testimony of the Residents in the earlier stage of Sir Salar Jung's administration, our first appeal shall be made to Sir Richard Temple, who, when Resident at Hyderabad in 1867, wrote as follows, in a despatch dated 16th August 1867:—

"In the Deccan, of late years, the constitution, system, and principles of the Nizam's civil government are really excellent: this much is certain. That the result must be more or less beneficial to the country is hardly to be doubted. Whether full effect is given to the intentions of His Highness's Government, throughout the Deccan, I cannot yet say; but independent testimony is constantly reaching me to the effect of great improvement being perceptible."¹

¹ *Papers, British and Native Administration* (108 of 1869), p. 69.

In the annual *Return of Moral and Material Progress* for 1867-8 compiled at the India Office, it is said :

“The vigorous efforts made towards reform have now placed the financial credit of the Nizam’s Government on a satisfactory footing ; it enjoys the confidence of the moneyed class, and it can now raise money at very moderate rates of interest, instead of the usurious charges of former days.”¹

With regard to the assessment of land revenue, it is said that “pains have been taken more and more to render the annual settlements equitable and moderate” : and that “all classes, high and low, connected with land or with trade, continue to flourish”.² The judicial institutions have undergone the process of being entirely remodelled ; and in the annual *Return of Moral and Material Progress* for 1869, the following reference is made to the new class of Magistrates and Judges, who are gradually replacing throughout the country the hereditary and separate jurisdictions, which are still maintained in some great nobles’ estates.

“All these officers are well educated, though all have not done well ; several had originally received a training in one or other of the British Provinces. Many discharged their duties with more or less of efficiency ; and some have by their firmness and uprightness brought credit to their department.”³

In his report as Resident for 1869-70, Mr. C. B. Saunders thus warmly testified to the great improvement that had taken place in the administration of the Nizam’s Dominions in the previous twenty years :—

“It is hardly too much to say that the Hyderabad with which I first became acquainted in 1860, was to the Hyderabad which was described, for example, in the despatches of my predecessor of 1820, Sir Charles (afterwards Lord) Metcalfe, as the England of the present day is to the England of the Stuarts,—a result essentially due, as Government is aware, to the beneficent administration and sound policy of the present Minister, Sir Salar Jung, and to the support afforded to him by my predecessors in office. Not only was the public treasury full, but the annual income of the State exceeded the annual expenditure by about eight lakhs of rupees, while the credit of the Government stood

¹ *Moral and Material Progress of India*, 1867-8, p. 113.

² *Ibid.*, p. 114.

³ *Ibid.*, 1869, p. 117.

proportionately high. Owing chiefly to the abolition of the baneful system of former times, by which the collection of the revenue was farmed out to contractors, disturbances in the interior of the country had become rare. The Hyderabad Contingent had not fired a shot, except on its own parade-grounds, since the suppression of the mutinies.

"In no respect does the recent administration of His Highness's country contrast more favourably with the state of things prevailing twenty years ago than in regard to revenue matters.

"The police has been put on a satisfactory footing; and life and property are only slightly more insecure in His Highness's territory than in many parts of the country subject to our administration."

At present there is no reason to suppose that life and property are in the least more insecure in the Nizam's dominions than in any other part of the Indian Empire. In every respect, and in every quarter, improvement has been visibly progressive. In January 1880, after an inspection of the public offices at Aurangabad, the Resident, Sir Richard Meade, wrote a letter to the Nawab Sir Salar Jung, in which, as will be seen from the following extracts, he highly commended the district administration.

"Now that I understand", he said, "we have finished all that your Excellency wished me to see in connection with the affairs here, I think I may assure you in this way of the very great gratification that has been afforded me by this opportunity of observing their condition and working.

"The work and records of the Survey Department appeared to me to be admirable, and to leave nothing to be desired; and the care that has been bestowed on everything connected with this Department was very striking.

"The Settlement operations are, of course, quite distinct from the Survey work, but I gathered that they are being conducted with equal care."

In the beginning of 1882, the Resident, Sir Stuart Bayley, went carefully and closely into an elaborate plan for certain reforms in the organisation of almost every department of State, communicated by the Minister for his information, and for the benefit of his advice, and the Resident gave to all the details of this plan his cordial approbation.

Authentic statistics, among which may be mentioned those collected by the Imperial Famine Commission, which visited the

Nizam's capital in 1878, show a remarkable improvement in the condition of the agricultural population in the Hyderabad State since the accession to power of the late Sir Salar Jung. At the present day the condition of the cultivators of the soil in the Nizam's territories will compare very favourably with almost any provinces under British rule.¹ They are not heavily taxed, the assessments being very generally much in the ryot's favour. They have never been compelled to contribute to an income-tax, a licence-tax, or any other of those new imposts and cesses with which inventive ingenuity has harassed the people and stimulated disaffection. No land is ever sold for arrears of revenue, or in satisfaction of a court decree; and thus no land in the Nizam's Dominions has passed into the hands of money-lenders and soucars, as has occurred to such a disastrous and alarming extent in other parts of British India, and with a view to check which unpopular and impolitic disturbance of social relations, Mr. Hope's Deccan Ryots' Bill was brought forward.

If the Berar Districts have prospered, as they undoubtedly have, under British management, the other provinces of the Hyderabad State which have remained under the direct rule of the Nizam, have prospered in at least an equal degree. If tested by the spontaneous growth of land revenue, due simply to increased cultivation, by orderly conduct and absence of crime among the inhabitants, and by the general evidence of their well-being and contentment, the Provinces ruled by the Hyderabad ministry have made quite as marked an advance as those under the Berar Commission. This advance is, to say the least, quite as remarkable in the Raichore and Dharaseo districts, restored to the Nizam's direct rule by the Treaty of 1860, as in any of the districts retained under the control of the British Resident.

¹ See, also, *ante*, pp. 79, 87.

CHAPTER XII.

Departure from Hyderabad—Return to England—No Redress from Court of Directors—Letter to Major Moore—Letter from Mr. John Sullivan—Return to India—Letters from the Rajah of Travancore and from Sir Mark Cubbon—Home again—Death of Mrs. Fraser—Letter from the Rajah of Mysore—Petition against the annexation of Mysore—Letters to Major Evans Bell—Blindness—Consulted as to a reward for Salar Jung—Death—Concluding Remarks on General Fraser's character and counsels.

AFTER fifty-two years' constant performance of duty in offices of the highest importance and responsibility, interrupted by only four months' absence on leave, General Fraser embarked at Madras in February 1853 on board one of the P. and O. steamers, on his way to Southampton by the overland route, without one word of compliment or thanks or valedictory recognition of his long and faithful service by the Government of India, either published in the *Gazette* or addressed to himself personally.

It is very remarkable that his old friend, General Sir Mark Cubbon, was afterwards treated in exactly the same fashion, and on very similar provocation. In 1861, Sir Mark Cubbon, after sixty years' continued service in India, and after having successfully conducted for twenty-five years the administration of Mysore, was allowed to go home by the Government of Lord Canning without any acknowledgment whatever of his distinguished and honourable career. Parties in England and India were bent on the annexation of Mysore, and General Cubbon was opposed to it. He had made no secret of his aversion to that iniquitous and impolitic project. His high reputation and great experience would have made his opposition formidable at home, and his influence was, therefore, to be diminished, if possible, by letting him leave India without notice, apparently under a cloud. In his case the ungracious disregard was, in every sense, of no effect or consequence, for Sir Mark Cubbon died at Suez in April 1861, on his way to England. His reputation has assuredly not suffered.

The displeasure of Lord Dalhousie sat very lightly on my father, who was not only conscious of the rectitude, and convinced of the judicial accuracy, with which he had disposed of every detail in the Aurungabad and Bolarum controversy, which formed the immediate and most evident cause of his resignation, but was under a very confident impression, when he left India, that, as soon as the papers reached home, their "honourable masters", the Court of Directors, would judge between the Governor-General and himself, and that he would obtain complete exoneration from blame, and relief from that injurious imputation of "party spirit", which had stung him to the quick.

Although he retired from India without any official acknowledgment of his public services, my father did not leave Hyderabad without many cordial and touching proofs of the high estimation in which he was held by all classes of the community, English and Indian—by the officers and men of the Subsidiary Force and of the Contingent, and by the dignitaries and functionaries of the Hyderabad State, from the Nawabs Shums-ool-Oomra and Sooraj-ool-Moolk down to others of quite a humble position. The Minister assured my father that when the Nizam was informed that General Fraser was going to leave Hyderabad, His Highness "cried like a child".

Returning to England after an absence of more than half a century, my father's first impressions and earliest experiences of the world of home-life, from which he had so long been exiled, were not agreeable to his feelings, physically or morally. The climate struck him as less genial and more gloomy than what he recollected it to be. He was unquestionably disappointed with the reception officially given to the cases connected with his retirement. General Fraser had quite failed to appreciate the full force of Lord Dalhousie's pre-eminent influence in the Court of Directors, in the Board of Control, in both Houses of Parliament, and in both our great political parties, when he expected that he would obtain justice and redress from the Home Government. The Governor-General was then supposed to be carrying on, with brilliant success and popular enthusiasm, his grand policy of the internal consolidation of British India, its territorial aggrandisement, and the acquisition of revenue and treasure, by the annexation of protected States and the extinction of friendly

dynasties. Those who, at home and in India, like my father, like the Honble. Mountstuart Elphinstone, Sir Henry Lawrence, General Sir John Low, General John Briggs, the present Earl of Albemarle, Sir Erskine Perry, Mr. John Dickinson, and others in and out of Parliament, saw and predicted that the annexation policy was weakening both the military and moral strength of the Empire, were few and far between, and were generally set down as old-fashioned and Orientalised sentimentalists. The Marquis of Dalhousie had such well-founded confidence in unlimited support from the Ministry and a large majority in the Court of Directors, that in 1854 he annexed the allied State of Nagpore, and confiscated the real and personal property of the reigning family, without even a reference to the home authorities. He had impressed "the Court" and "the Board", even before the full collection of papers had been transmitted for their information, with a belief that the settlement of the long-vexed question of the Contingent and of the constant pecuniary pressure on the Nizam, was equally beneficial to His Highness and to ourselves, and that our possession of the Berar provinces was a point gained for us of great commercial as well as political value. Lord Dalhousie's exultation over this matter, and his opinion of the effect it ought to produce to his credit, were so great, that in his Farewell Minute reviewing his own administration, he put down the gross revenues of the Assigned Provinces, charged with the cost of the Contingent (although the sovereignty and the surplus alike belonged to the Nizam), as a clear addition to the revenues of British India. "By the several territorial acquisitions just enumerated", he says, "a revenue of not less than (£4,000,000) four millions sterling has been added to the annual income of the Indian Empire:—

Punjaub	.	.	.	£1,500,000
Pegu (1856)	.	.	.	270,000
Nagpore (less tribute)	.	.	.	410,000
Oude	.	.	.	1,450,000
Sattara	.	.	.	150,000
Jhansie	.	.	.	50,000
Hyderabad	.	.	.	500,000
				<hr/>
				£4,330,000 ¹

¹ *Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie* (245 of 1856), paragraph 19, page 7

This was not a time when even the least doubt as to the Governor-General's infallibility, or any check on his onward progress, would have been considered admissible or endurable by the authorities in Leadenhall Street and Cannon Row to whom he was nominally subordinate. The differences between the late Resident at Hyderabad and the triumphant Governor-General were simply passed over, almost without notice, entirely without criticism, as little more than matters of routine, of small public importance or consequence. When it became evident that no redress or special acknowledgment of his good services was to be expected, under the actual circumstances of the day, from the Home Government, there can be no doubt that my father and his personal friends—those who knew and understood how his long labours at Hyderabad had been misinterpreted and perverted—were hurt and indignant. The following letter to his old friend, Major Moore, will give a fair notion of what his feelings were at this period.

“Portledge House, 19th March 1854.

“MY DEAR MOORE,—I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 15th on Friday last, but the Post Office arrangements in this part of the country, and the fact of there being no delivery of letters in London on Sunday, rendered it useless for me to reply to you until this day.

“You suggest to me to write something regarding the proceedings of the Court of Directors. But it is so much opposed to the bent of my disposition to write anything anonymously, that I have never yet done so in the course of my life. I do not wish you to infer that I consider there would be anything immoral or unworthy in doing so, but only that it would be repugnant to my feelings, and inconsistent with a self-imposed rule which has always withheld me from acting in public life in any way except openly, in my own name, and with all that responsibility which such conduct necessarily involves. I have certainly but little reason to entertain any sentiments of respect or gratitude towards the Court of Directors, for they have been but little grateful to me for the unintermitting labours of a life spent in their service, and have shown but little sense of what was due to the character of one who has long held the highest offices in India, when they permitted, and sanctioned by their silence, that false and injurious imputation of the Government of India regarding certain official acts of mine, which, if true, would have dishonoured and degraded me, but which, not being true, can only degrade and dishonour the Government itself. Those

who could have attributed to me a private and partial motive, or have supposed that I was ever biassed by a concealed or selfish feeling in any one act of my public life, have either betrayed an entire ignorance of the whole antecedents of my official career in India, or have formed an erroneous judgment of my principles from some utter misrepresentation.

"I wish you to understand that if I have refrained from commenting on the proceedings of the Court of Directors, and the many errors with which they are chargeable—which would be an easy task, without the aid of much talent or labour—I have been withheld by no motive of either love or fear, but simply from the reason already stated, and because I now wish to cease from all connection with the Court of either a friendly or hostile nature. I shall always, as a matter of course, be prepared to discharge any duty which it is competent to them to impose upon me, and which comes within the obligations of my commission; but the day is now past when any duty would be performed with that zeal which always animated me up to the period when the local Government of India falsely accused me, and when the Honourable Court of Directors abandoned me, and failed to vindicate the insult I had received.

"Your recent exclusion from the Direction will never discredit you in the estimation of those by whom your character, your abilities, and your aptitude for business are known, since it will be obvious to them that such an event could have been the result only of a preconcerted party scheme. That the result has proved so much opposed to your habits of active occupation, and at the same time so prejudicial to the interests of India, no one can regret more sincerely than I do. But I do not think you will long stand alone in your present position, for the debates in Parliament plainly enough show that the recently granted renewal of the Charter is but a temporary expedient, preparatory to a transfer of the Indian administration to Her Majesty's Government.

"I hope to be able to leave England in the beginning of May, as three or four parties have already indicated a wish, though nothing yet has been decided, to take the remainder of my lease of Portledge House.

"My only object in moving is to exchange a climate which I much dislike for one to which I am very partial, and to which I have been so long habituated.

"Believe me, my dear Moore, ever yours sincerely,

"J. S. FRASER."

Major Moore had ineffectually dissuaded my father from his intended return to India; and a remonstrance reached him also

from another old friend, Mr. John Sullivan, who, having entered the Madras Civil Service in 1801, rose through the various gradations to be a Member of Council, and retired in 1841. At home he became an active member of the Court of Proprietors, and published many books and pamphlets, always advocating a liberal and equitable policy alike towards the allied Princes and the British subjects of India.¹ In 1842 he made a powerful appeal before the Court of Proprietors in favour of employing the Natives more extensively in the government of their own country.

“Upton, Slough, May 23rd, 1854.

“MY DEAR FRASER,—I have long been anxious to write to you, but it was only yesterday that I got your direction from W. McLeod. I heard with great regret that you had determined to return to India. Surely this is a hasty resolve. You have not even set your foot on the Continent, and it would really be almost sinful if you were to retire to your nook at Cuddalore, without having at least taken a glance at all that is to be seen on the other side of the Channel. You really have not even made a fair trial of English life, and life on the Continent is likely to be found by you much pleasanter, because more in unison with our Indian habits, than the ways here are. I had intended to have written you a long sermon on the subject, but am interrupted. Is there any chance of your coming up to town?

“I send you three copies of a letter I sent to Lord Aberdeen some months ago, and which I have now printed.² It gives the story of the last, or rather the latest, of our aggressions, for Lord Dalhousie's earth-hunger is insatiable. He will not leave Prince or Chief in India, if he has his way. Under his rule great progress has been made in bringing on a state of things in which, when realised, the Governor-General will represent the Monarchy; the European officers, the aristocracy; and the Natives, reduced to a dead level, the democracy.

“The papers relating to the negotiations with the Nizam for the cession of territory in lieu of debt, are printing, and will soon be before Parliament.³ I was glad to read the following passage in Tucker's Memorials:—

¹ *Letter to Sir John Cam Hobhouse on the Native States of India*, 1850; *The Koh-i-Noor, to whom does it belong?* 1850; *Are we bound by our Treaties? A Plea for the Princes of India*, 1853; *Letter to the Earl of Aberdeen on the Confiscation of Berar*, 1854, etc., etc.

² *Are we bound by our Treaties? A Letter to the Rt. Hon. the Earl of Aberdeen on the Confiscation of Nagpore* (W. H. Allen & Co.), 1854.

³ The Blue Book so often quoted in this volume, *Nizam's Debt*, (418 of 1854).

“It may be clearly shown that the financial difficulties of the Nizam’s Government have been produced mainly by the British authorities, who have compelled him to maintain an expensive military force, contrary to Treaty, for our own purposes, and not with any view to His Highness’s interest or wishes.’

“With our kind regards, most truly yours,

“J. SULLIVAN.”

As Chairman of the Court of Directors, Mr. Tucker had written to Lord Dalhousie on the 24th April 1848:—“Towards the Nizam we stand in a different relation; and there must be a strong case to justify our interference with His Highness, except for the purpose of ameliorating his condition, and rendering him an act of tardy justice, by relieving him from a military charge, imposed upon him for our own purposes, without any regard to the obligations of the Treaty. I trust that this military force may be dispensed with by and by, as the most easy means of restoring his finances.”¹

Soon after the General’s arrival at Madras he received the following autograph letter from the Rajah of Travancore:—

“Palace, Trevandrum, 7th October 1855.

“MY DEAR GENERAL,—I am happy to learn from the Madras prints that you have returned from Europe. I am truly rejoiced to welcome to India again an old and sincere friend of ourselves and of Travancore. I hope that yourself and your family are in the enjoyment of health and happiness. Having spent the best part of your life in tropical regions, I doubted very much if the exceeding cold climate of England would prove congenial to your constitution. I suppose that one, at least, of the reasons that prevailed with you to leave Europe was that the climate did not agree with your health. I shall be very glad to hear from you the first time you are at leisure. I should like to know what members of your family have accompanied you, and where it is your intention to reside. I am glad that your return to India brings a visit between us within the limits of possibility.

“I am thankful to be able to state that myself and all the rest of the family are in the enjoyment of our usual good health. General Cullen, our Resident, is also doing quite as well as ever.

“As you take so sincere and warm an interest in all that relates to our happiness, I cannot deny myself the pleasure of giving you a piece of domestic news, at which I am sure you will feel quite as much joy any of us. There is now a fair prospect of an addition to our family

¹ Kaye’s *Life of Henry St. George Tucker*, 1854, p. 586.

in the course of a couple of months, by my only niece.¹ Our prayers were long offered to the Almighty for such a favour, and we look forward with sanguine hope to His grace for its consummation.

"I have to acknowledge the receipt of your kind letter to me dated the 18th of August 1853, from England. I could not say this ere this, because, at first, my occupation allowed but little time to spare, and then I began to have reports of your intended return to India, and hence I thought I had better wait.

"Hoping to have the pleasure of hearing early from you, and happy in being able to offer you again my best regards, with such a comparatively small distance between us,

"I am, my dear General,

"Your sincere friend,

"MARTANDA VERMAH, K. S. Rajah.

"P.S. The two extra initials, which you will find in this attached to my signature, are the abbreviations of the title 'Koola Shakhura'. The free use thereof I am only entitled to make after wearing the crown of my ancestors, which ceremony, I am happy to say, has been celebrated on the 5th of July last, with all the prescribed festivities usual on that occasion.

"M. V., K. S. R.

"To General J. S. Fraser, etc., etc., etc."

My father did not make any long journeys or excursions during his visit to India in 1854 and 1855. He passed nearly the whole of his time either at Madras or at Cuddalore, a place much associated with his recollections of both his parents, and which had been his own head-quarters for several years when he was British Commissioner and Agent for the Foreign Settlements. He did not revisit Hyderabad. Before he left England, and since, there had been some rumours and, as he understood, some prospects, of his being nominated to a high military command—which, however, came to nothing eventually—and it is to this that General Cubbon alludes in a letter which he wrote from his retreat in a hill-fort near Bangalore, a short time before General Fraser finally left India.

"Nundydroog, 7th May 1855.

"MY DEAR FRASER,—I have the pleasure to enclose a letter from the Rajah of Mysore. You will be glad to hear that he is getting on quietly, and feels more at ease than the people about him would allow

¹ The succession in the Travancore family is through females only.

some years ago. Indeed, if he would only retrench his expenditure, and pay off his debts, there would be nothing more to desire.

"We heard that you had been proposed for the Madras command, and great was the disappointment of the army when the project failed. I am not, however, prepared to believe in the story of the Duke of Wellington's memorandum,¹ because it is well known that he pressed that command on Sir Thomas Dallas. But it is not material whether such a memorandum exists or not, for the public voice will make itself heard, and insist on justice; and I am glad, therefore, you are going home, to be at hand when the next vacancy happens, which is expected about the end of this year. I do not by any means despair of having the pleasure of seeing you again in this country.

"Pray offer my best respects to Mrs. Fraser, and believe me,

"Yours very sincerely,

"M. CUBBON."

The immediate cause of my father's second return to England was the failing health of my mother. I do not think he ever became quite reconciled to the English climate, and it was probably from that cause that he changed his place of residence very often, taking a new house nearly every two years. In all other respects he lived a very quiet and almost a retired life, going very little into society beyond the circle of his own family and a few old friends. He continued to be a great reader, especially of works of science, and was very fond of frequenting institutions and shops where astronomical and scientific instruments could be seen and examined. He took the deepest and most lively interest in all that was going on, at home and abroad, particularly in India, and it need hardly be said that the outbreak and progress of the Mutinies and Rebellion of 1857-8 were watched and followed by him with close and painful attention. He offered his services to the Government during the height of the Mutinies, being then in wonderful health and strength for his age, and Lord Derby, in replying to the General, mentioned that Lord Ellenborough, to whom the papers were sent, spoke of him as "a most distinguished and talented officer". He wrote and received many letters about this time; old friends, both English and Native, at Hyderabad and

¹ It was reported that the Duke had left a memorandum in the War Office advising that no Company's officer should ever be made Commander-in-Chief in India, or at either of the Presidencies.

other places, being among his correspondents; but his papers after his return home, from being no longer of official importance, and partly, no doubt, from his failing sight, were not kept in perfect order, or carefully preserved, and the records become scanty as he advanced in years. With the exception of this letter from the Rajah of Mysore, I find nothing of any consequence remaining from the correspondence of this period.

“Palace, Mysore, 6th February 1858.

“MY DEAR SIR,—I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 1st of December last, through Sir Mark Cubbon, and besides the pleasure the sight of your handwriting afforded me after a period of many months, I was also gratified with the expressions of friendship therein accorded me.

“It is gratifying to observe that the great rebellion in this country, alluded to in your letter, is now assuming a more settled aspect. The dark clouds that had gathered round the North-Western Provinces are gradually dispersing, and the seditious movers in this rebellion are being apprehended in every village and town, and dealt with retributively. My own country, I am happy to say, has continued free from contamination, and I am quite certain that this happy circumstance is owing to the wise and judicious measures adopted by Sir Mark Cubbon. I will not at present dwell at greater length on the harrowing scenes of cruelty and blood which this rebellion has caused, nor on the sacrifice of the lives of many of England’s best and bravest officers in suppressing it, but I shall merely state that as my welfare and happiness are bound up in the success and power of the British Government, so has it been my desire to regard and support that Government as my best friend and benefactor.

“I am much obliged to you for your kind inquiries regarding my health, which, I regret to say, is not so good as could be wished, owing probably to the infirmities of age which are fast stealing upon me. I have now entered my sixty-fourth year, and it is not possible at this advanced age to enjoy uninterrupted health. As a change, I propose going into the country to Nunjengode and Chamrajnuggur for a few weeks, and to start from hence in a day or two; and should it prove beneficial, I may prolong my stay in those parts.

“Time has wrought great changes in my family. I am sorry to say that some of the ladies of my zenana who were acquainted with Mrs. Fraser are dead. I have now but four grandchildren alive out of a large family of children and grandchildren.

“Be so good as to make my best regards acceptable to Mrs. Fraser, whose welfare I always have at heart; and I hope you will never fail to

gratify me with a few occasional lines giving me the news of yourself and of Mrs. Fraser and of your children.

“ With sincere best wishes,

“ I remain, dear Sir,

“ Yours sincerely,

(Signed in Canarese)

“ MYSORE KISHEN RAJ WADIYAR,

“ Rajah of Mysore.”

In March 1860 the greatest of all possible afflictions fell upon my father in my mother's death, at the comparatively early age of fifty. The Maharajah of Mysore, in the following letter, alludes to a letter of condolence of earlier date:—

“ Palace, Mysore, 16th September 1861.

“ MY DEAR SIR,—After a long time I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 25th of July, and was gratified to hear that you were in good health.

“ From the circumstance of your not having acknowledged the letter I wrote to you immediately on the death of my much lamented friend, Mrs. Fraser, being communicated to me, as also the one I sent you by my Durbar Surgeon, Mr. Campbell, I conclude you have not yet received them. I trust, however, that when you next write I shall have the pleasure to hear that they have safely arrived.

“ I have not words to express how greatly my feelings were shocked when the news of General Cubbon's death was announced to me. In him I have lost a valued friend and well-wisher, and the public service one of its most honourable members.

“ In regard to the administration of my country, which General Cubbon made over to Mr. Saunders, the present Officiating Commissioner, before his departure from Mysore, and the office of Judicial Commissioner to Major Dobbs, I have nothing to add but that its affairs are conducted on the same broad principles of government as were introduced and matured by General Cubbon.

“ Circumstances having rendered it necessary that my country should now be restored to me, I have applied to Lord Canning for its restoration, and am anxiously looking forward to my request being complied with.

“ Doctor Campbell, who is now in England, will either send or call on you with my letter. According to royal etiquette which obtains among the Princes of this country, I have forwarded by that gentleman, with the permission of the Governor-General, some jewellery for Her Majesty's acceptance, in token of my respectful recognition of Her Majesty's assumption of this country, and trust it will meet with Her gracious reception.

"I am truly grateful to you for your expressions of regard, and also for the interest you take in my welfare. I am glad to observe that neither time nor distance has abated the fervour of your friendship for me.

"I regret to hear that you are leading a secluded life, and that you take no active share in what is going on in the political world, a circumstance which I can only ascribe to the great loss you have sustained; but you will pardon me for saying that it is incompatible with the high character and great fame you have acquired in this country, to allow your feelings to be so swayed by this event.

"I am glad to say that my family and grandchildren are in good health. With every good wish for your health and happiness,

"Believe me to remain, my dear Sir,

"Yours very sincerely,

(Signed in Canarese)

"MYSORE KISHEN RAJ WADIYAR,

"Rajah of Mysore."

It may be remembered that only two years after the management of the Mysore country had been assumed by the Governor-General, Lord William Bentinck, General Fraser, who had been Resident at Mysore, expressed in a letter to Sir Frederick Adam, the Governor of Madras, his doubts as to "our treatment of that weak, but good-natured and kind-hearted man", the Rajah, and his conviction that "the permanent assumption of any portion of his country would be a stain upon our good faith and national character". In that letter, moreover, he briefly but justly summed up the true origin and cause of our supersession of the Rajah. "Our system of non-interference, or at least our abstinence from regular and well-considered guidance in his youth, did the mischief, and then we pounced upon the prey which our policy had driven into the toils."¹ In writing to Major Stokes, the Resident at Mysore, in 1839, the General assumed as the right course—though with no assurance as to its being taken—that "we should, at no distant period, restore the Rajah to power".²

Many years had now elapsed since he expressed these opinions, but he had seen no reason to change them, while his aversion to the policy of annexation, and to any isolated measure calculated to weaken the moral supremacy of the Imperial Power in India, was much strengthened by the incidents and evident lessons of

¹ *Ante*, p. 28.

² *Ante*, p. 94.

1857. He was prepared, therefore, to receive with satisfaction and sympathy the news that an effort was being made by a small party of members of both Houses of Parliament and some old Indians to save the tributary State of Mysore from extinction at the demise of his old friend, the Rajah, a step upon which the Government of India was avowedly determined. In 1865 the fate of Mysore was trembling in the balance, when a book was published by Major Evans Bell, clearing away a mass of misrepresentations, and recommending the policy which was eventually ordered by the Home Government to be carried out in every particular—the maintenance of the Mysore State and the gradual restoration of Native agency in its administration. General Fraser thus acknowledged receiving a copy of this book, sent to him by the author.

“Parkhurst, 11th July 1865.

“MY DEAR SIR,—I beg you will accept my best thanks for the book you have been so kind as to send me,¹ conveying a clear and distinct view of the case of the Rajah of Mysore. Your arguments in this matter are exhaustive and impregnable, and such as I would fain hope must be absolutely convincing to every impartial and honourable mind. But God knows what may happen with the many evil influences and selfish prejudgments arrayed against you. Much will now depend on the ability of the members who are to bring the case before Parliament.

“Believe me, my dear Sir, yours faithfully,

“J. S. FRASER.”

The case was not actually brought before Parliament that year, except in one or two questions, which received no positive or final answer; but in the next Session a deputation, introduced by Sir Henry Rawlinson, Sir Edward Colebrooke, and other members of the House of Commons, waited on Lord Cranborne, (now the Marquis of Salisbury) then Secretary of State for India, to urge upon him a reconsideration of the whole case, more particularly as modified by the Rajah's adoption of an infant kinsman as his son and heir. In August 1866, a petition bearing the signatures of many retired Indian officials of high repute, was presented to the House of Commons, by Mr. John Stuart Mill, M.P. for Westminster, praying that “your Honourable House will take such

¹ *The Mysore Reversion* (Trübner, 1865).

steps as may seem in your wisdom most efficacious for ensuring, with the least possible delay, the re-establishment of a Native Government in the tributary State of Mysore, with every possible security for British interests, and for the prosperity and happiness of the people of the country." General Fraser joined with his old brother officers of the Madras Army, General Sir John Low, and General John Briggs, in signing this petition, having consented to do so in the following letter.

" Parkhurst, 13th July 1866.

" MY DEAR SIR,—Having been always of the very decided opinion that our annexation of Mysore would be at once a most unjust and a most impolitic measure, I can have no hesitation in requesting you to be so good as to add my name to the more influential signatures that may be affixed to the Petition you are proposing to address to the House of Commons.

" I sincerely wish it all the success due to the intrinsic merits of the cause it pleads, and to the able advocacy with which you are generously endeavouring to support it.

" I am, my dear Sir, yours faithfully,

" J. S. FRASER.

" Major Evans Bell, etc., etc."

A gradual failure of sight reduced more and more, in the latter years of my father's life, his capacity for occupying himself with books and correspondence, and rendered him very dependent on the ministrations of those around him. One of the last letters written with his own hand was addressed to the same gentleman whose well-directed exertions on behalf of the Rajah and State of Mysore we have just seen him encouraging and supporting.

And here I cannot refrain from expressing my belief that if ever our statesmen, without distinction of party, succeed in giving the true stamp of Empire to our policy in India, and in rallying all races and classes in cheerful allegiance to Her Majesty's Crown, it will be by proceeding on the lines that have been so clearly pointed out by Major Evans Bell, and by adhering to the doctrines that he has constantly preached. I know that I am not alone in feeling how much I am indebted to him for the light he has thrown on the historical course, on the right principles, and on the best securities of our Imperial supremacy; but few can have had the opportunity that has fallen to me of knowing under

what difficulty and discouragement he has carried on the war for more than twenty years against the contradictions, the contracted views, the brilliant and barren professions of those who hold, under every advantage, the high official platform. Few of those in India who have profited, or are likely to profit, by his work, can be aware, as I am, under what sacrifices, and even privations, it has been carried on, and how it is curtailed and confined by material deficiencies.

In the next letter, called forth by the receipt of another of Major Bell's books, General Fraser may be said to have recorded his final protest against both of Lord Dalhousie's imputations—that of "ambitious greed" in his plan of reform for the Nizam's administration, and that of "party spirit" in the command of the Contingent, to which I think my father was alluding in the last sentence of this letter.

"Twickenham Park, 15th August 1868.

"DEAR SIR,—I have had the pleasure to receive your note, and accept with thankfulness the copy of your work on Indian Policy.¹ I have no doubt I shall be greatly interested in it, as I have already been with your former works on the subject of India. I shall now only notice an observation that I see on the 73rd page of your book, which has some reference to myself.

"It is quite true that I submitted to Lord Dalhousie the suggestion therein alluded to, with regard to a proposal for our assuming the entire but temporary management of the Nizam's country. His Lordship dissented from this without giving me any special reasons for doing so, and I now learn for the first time, from your book, what his reasons were. One of them appears to have been that the Nizam's assent to such a proposal would never have been voluntarily given, coupled with an insinuation that such suggestions as that I had made proceeded 'in too many instances from the promptings of ambitious greed'.

"With regard to the first of those objections, I had much better means of judging how far my suggestion would have been adopted by the Nizam than Lord Dalhousie possessed; and if I had not been thoroughly sure of the ground on which I stood, and of the strong probability of success, the suggestion never would have been made. The Nizam was on very friendly terms with me, and the Dewan owed his office entirely and exclusively to myself, and would not, I was persuaded, in any way counteract my wishes. Under these circumstances,

¹ *Retrospects and Prospects of Indian Policy* (Trübner and Co., 1868).

there was no sufficient reason to doubt our obtaining the Nizam's consent, until his friendly feelings were alienated, if not from myself, at least from the British Government, by the harsh and imperious language in which Lord Dalhousie thought proper to address His Highness in a direct despatch.

"As to Lord Dalhousie's remark about 'ambitious greed', I had, at all events, not contemplated any prolonged exercise of the functions of sovereignty at Hyderabad, such as we have exercised in Mysore for thirty years, since I intended, in our agreement with the Nizam on this subject, that the tenure of our control over his country should positively be limited to the maximum of five years, within which period I felt quite assured that the Nizam's debt to us would be repaid, and such administrative reforms effected as would then enable us to divest ourselves of our temporary power, without any probability of a recurrence of those evils from which we should have rescued the Nizam, and especially from what he so much dreaded and abhorred, the loss, perhaps to be permanent, of Berar, the finest part of his dominions.

"Various evils existed in the Nizam's country, which I had long most strongly urged the Supreme Government to insist upon having repressed by more energy and determination on the part of the Nizam than he was willing to exert, but I was persistently baffled in these attempts by Lord Dalhousie. His real motives for this conduct I never could divine, and I could only attribute it to his imperious and self-willed temper, which, even in matters of mere opinion and suggestion, could bear no rival near its throne.

"Excuse the lengthened egotism of this note. I sensibly feel the injustice of that imputation which would fix upon me the glaring fault, I may say crime, of having been actuated by base, sordid, and dishonourable motives in the conduct and discharge of a public duty.

"Most truly yours,

"J. S. FRASER."

The evidence contained in this volume, more especially in Chapters x and xi, has given ample materials for a judgment on the question whether there was more of "ambitious greed" in the policy towards the Hyderabad State recommended by General Fraser, or in that devised and carried out by Lord Dalhousie, and no more need be said on that subject.

I should like, however, to explain that my only object in the strictures on Lord Dalhousie's policy and procedure into which I have been led, has been that of relieving my father's memory from the imputations of "ambitious greed" and "party spirit", and from

all participation in the compulsory assignment of the Berar Provinces under the form of a Treaty. It is impossible for me to have ever had any personal feeling against Lord Dalhousie, to whom I am indebted for that first appointment on the Staff, which is always the most difficult step to obtain in India.

I may add that although I cannot see the way to acquit Lord Dalhousie and others of having wrongfully kept back from the Nizam the explanation and acknowledgment that was due to him, of the serious misstatement in their original demand for the maintenance of the so-called Contingent as being based on "*the obligations of a Treaty*", when they had satisfied themselves regarding their error,¹ it would be very unfair to blame Lord Dalhousie as being the author of that misstatement. He found it accepted, embodied in the very name of "the Hyderabad Contingent" officially given to that Force,² and so represented in several Parliamentary Blue Books.³ Misled by this assumption, he pitched his demands in so high a tone, and with such a menacing accompaniment, that it may well have subsequently seemed difficult for him to lower the claim or to relax its terms, without losing dignity and surrendering the whole position.

Moreover, it has been stated, on what is understood to be very good authority, that in his general policy of acquiring territory and revenue from the allied States—under the delusive notion that the Empire would be consolidated, and its military strength increased—Lord Dalhousie was not really acting on his own initiative, but on instructions from the Liberal Cabinet and a conclave of Whig patriarchs held at the Marquis of Lansdowne's house, Bowood.

There is another great public object which I hope may to some extent be advanced by the publication of this book, though I have chiefly dwelt upon it in the Additional Appendix—the formation and maintenance at a high standard of Silladar Cavalry on the system that long prevailed in the Hyderabad Contingent. I have not thought it expedient to go so fully into the subject in this

¹ *Ante*, pp. 345, 352, 360, 368, 369, 423.

² *Ante*, p. 359.

³ See e.g., *Third Report of Lords' Select Committee* (627, II of 1853), Appendix, pp. 121 and 143. Hyderabad "bound to maintain a Contingent Force", the number of troops given, "commanded by British officers, and available, *under Treaties*, to the British Government"

volume as may be necessary hereafter, but I trust I have said enough to indicate the necessity of caution, and the want of a careful inquiry.¹ I do not hesitate to say that the innovations in matters of regimental discipline and duties of parade and fatigue, imposed of late years on the troopers, have not tended to bring into the ranks the same class as formerly; while the restrictions and prohibitions regarding the tenure and sale of Assamees have not merely approached very closely to that arbitrary curtailment of the soldier's emoluments which, especially in India, has been the frequent cause of mutiny, but have amounted to a deterioration and confiscation of property that has operated most cruelly on the finest military class in India. An Assamee, or the ownership of a horse, was worth, according to a computation made when Sir George Yule was Resident, fully 1,200 rupees—it would have fetched that price if sold by auction. Under the operation of the new rules, more severely applied than was ever intended, and subsequently cancelled by order of the Government of India, for reducing the number of horses held by individual Silladars, the price has not been allowed to settle itself by the value as ascertained by private sale or auction, but was locally, and thereby removing responsibility on the part of commanding officers, authoritatively limited to a certain sum, 450 Government rupees, causing a very heavy loss to those who have purchased or inherited this description of property. The Government has, however, not approved of this. The cases of thirty-five forfeited Assamees specially reported to Government on behalf of officers and men of the Hyderabad Cavalry, recommended to have a larger compensation awarded them, have been sent to the General Commanding the Contingent for inquiry and report; but the inquiry drags in a vexatious manner, the cause of delay being very generally attributed to the fact that if these thirty-five appellants receive any redress, there are at least seven hundred and fifty other equally strong cases for compensation that would at once be preferred. The settlement of these cases on anything like equitable terms would cost something like three and a half lakhs of rupees (about £30,000). But let anyone conversant with the ordinary prejudices and feelings, not merely of the Hyderabad Cavalry, but of any nation or tribe, with regard to property or privilege, try to fathom

¹ Additional Appendix, p. xxiii.

the depth of the rancour and heart-burning that must arise from such an interference with vested rights and long-established possessions.¹

The question of individual Native officers and Silladars in the Hyderabad Cavalry possessing a large number of Assamees was one upon which General Fraser was called upon to give an opinion a very short time before he left the Residency. In the letter from the Government of India, dated 17th of September 1852, commenting on the trials of Zoolticar Ali Beg and others,² it was held that the "extent of property" in Assamees held by the Rissakdar was "objectionable", and the Resident was requested to suggest "measures for its reduction". In his reply to this part of the letter, dated the 29th October 1852, the General wrote as follows :—

"It is possible that some inconvenience may be found to exist from any individual having so large a number of Assamees in a Regiment as to operate to the entire or even partial exclusion of others from a similar privilege; but as a general principle, I am disposed to think that the possession of large property of this kind by the Native officers of the Cavalry is a decided advantage rather than otherwise.

"It gives them an importance, an influence, and an elevated station in the Army, which it is desirable they should possess; and it forms, no doubt, a bond of attachment to the Government they serve which would elsewhere be sought for in vain. It is this which contributes in a great measure to give that high tone and character to the Nizam's Cavalry, which render it probably superior to any other Irregular Cavalry in India."

In consequence, I presume, of this opinion, and of others to the same effect given at the same time, no change in this direction was made by the Government of Lord Dalhousie, or by any authority, civil or military, until the period referred to in the Additional Appendix. The results, though not as yet irremediable, have been, in my opinion, most mischievous, lowering the "high tone", and "character" of the Force, which General Fraser eulogised, and repelling the best class of recruits, besides, as already said, injuring the property and prospects of some of the finest soldiers. As remarked by me at page ii, Additional Ap-

¹ Before applying for furlough on this last occasion of my being in a position to avail myself of leave, I recorded my views for communication to Government on two occasions on this subject, and those reports remain on the records of my office, where I placed them by desire of the Resident.

² *Ante*, pp. 398, 399.

pendix, the Government of India have endeavoured to set matters right; but these orders are not being fully acted up to. My farewell record explains how. This is the report referred to in pages xxiv and xxv of the Additional Appendix, and foot-note on previous page.

In consequence of the strong opinion given by General Fraser, as the last fruit, it may be said, of his fourteen years' experience and command of "the Nizam's Army",—as it was usually called at Hyderabad until the changes of 1853—Lord Dalhousie took no steps to reduce the number of Assamees held by single officers and troopers, and the Silladaree system was hardly at all tampered with until about 1875;¹ since when those inroads on the vested rights and valued possessions of the whole class and community from which the Hyderabad Cavalry used to be recruited, have been suggested and partially carried into effect, and in consequence there are two systems prevailing now. Against those encroachments and inroads I have always protested, and given all the resistance in my power, officially and officiously, in season and out of season, and I shall always continue to do so.

When the Officer Commanding the Hyderabad Contingent adopted the unusual course of submitting his views directly to the Government of India, and of charging a previous Resident, and some other local officials, with neglect of his recommendations, I felt myself bound, as stated fully in the Additional Appendix, to enter the lists on behalf of my late Chief, General Sir Richard Meade. As to my being competent and justified in entering on such a contest, I would refer to Sir Stuart Bayley's remarks in the Additional Appendix, page xl.

My opposition neither springs merely from feelings of friendly regard for the interests of old comrades with whom I have lived and served, in the field and in quarters, nor from feelings of conservative regard for property recognised by law and by ancient custom, but rather, and mainly, from considerations that are at once military and political. In all arms of the Indian service, but more especially in the Cavalry arm, a cheerful spirit of confidence and attachment in the men towards their English officers and the Government they serve is an essential element in their value and efficiency. The growth and establishment of such a spirit among the large body of Hyderabad troops was well secured, as General Fraser urged in

¹ See Additional Appendix, pp. vi to xxvi.

the letter just quoted, by the presence among themselves of a select and influential class, chiefly composed of Native officers, with a large stake in the service, constituting a pledge for their loyalty and good conduct. This class is attacked and injured by the innovations I deprecate; and a sense of wrong and loss—loss of property and loss of social position—is a bad basis for discipline and loyalty. The innovations in the Silladaree system I look upon as a thoroughly false move, both on military and political grounds, and I am very sure that it ought at once to be checked and rectified in the interests of the Empire.

If ever the dreams attributed to some Russian statesmen and soldiers are in any degree realised, by an invasion of India, whether it be led or only instigated by Russia, we may rely on it that a great part will be played by, or will be allotted to, large bodies of the Irregular horsemen which Central Asia can furnish in almost endless numbers. What Light Cavalry have we in India to meet these formidable hordes? Without fully answering that question here, I will only say that our numbers are at present very insufficient.

In the case of the Hyderabad Contingent Cavalry, the Indian Government has recognised the injustice done the soldiers, and has issued orders to remedy some of the evils I complain of; but it is against local authorities I have had to contend, and have more recently contended.¹

General Fraser was, I know, occasionally consulted on Indian affairs after his retirement, both by Members of the Indian Council, with many of whom he was personally acquainted, and by the Secretaries of State, but I find very few letters relating to such matters among his papers. Almost the only question of any interest regarding which there is any record was a statement of his views, given at the request of Mr. Vernon Smith, afterwards Lord Lyveden, in 1860, as to the most feasible and acceptable mode of rewarding the Nawab Salar Jung for his invaluable services during the rebellion of 1857-8. But, as he said to his friend Mr. Willoughby, afterwards Sir J. P. Willoughby, Bart., of the Secretary of State's Council, his advice was for the most part negative and inconclusive. "I must not forget," he wrote, "to express a hope that you received the copy of my letter to Mr.

¹ See explanation in connection with my remarks on this subject Additional Appendix, pp. lxxii and lxxiii.

Vernon Smith, which I sent to you just before I left London. It was on the subject of a reward to be given to Salar Jung, for his good and faithful conduct to us during the Mutiny, regarding which Mr. Vernon Smith had requested me to give my opinion. I am aware, however, that it can have been of little or no use to him or to you, as it rather tended to exhibit the difficulty of suggesting a suitable mode in which to recognise his services than to remove that difficulty, and point out a reward which would be substantial and unexceptionable."

I was in England on leave in the summer of the year of my father's death, when I found General Fraser, notwithstanding his great age, and the total blindness by which he was then afflicted, apparently in good health and spirits, and giving us no special cause for anxiety on his account. One of the last things he said to me was to beg me to stay at Hyderabad, and so far as lay within my power and the scope of my duties, to watch over the welfare and independence of the Nizam's sovereignty, for there, he said, was the centre and strength of the Empire.

He died on the 22nd August 1869, having then entered on his eighty-sixth year.

I cannot trust myself, nor would it, perhaps, be a becoming effort on my part, to say all that I think and feel as to the character of my father. He was a man of scrupulous integrity and unsullied honour, firm and faithful in all trials, and generous to a degree. After fifty years of lucrative employment he carried nothing with him on his retirement from India beyond his military pension and the value of his personal property in the Residency at Hyderabad, and as this work shows, the esteem of numerous persons of high distinction, both European and Native.

My father never, to the last day of his life, departed from the strong opinions he had formed and expressed at a very early date, as to the real "community of interests" between the Hyderabad State,—“situated in the heart of India”, and “exercising a considerable moral influence over the Mussulman population in our own dominions”,—“and the British Government”.¹ In conjunction with his views as to the advisability of at once promoting reforms in the Nizam's Government and preserving its internal independence,—which was, indeed, his policy with regard to all the allied States

¹ *Ante*, p. 62.

—he always entertained the desire to see a more close union, on more equal terms, of Englishmen and Indians in the great work of Government. In 1840, it may be remembered, when he made arrangements for an investigation into the Wahabee conspiracy, and formed a joint Committee for that purpose of European officers and Native gentlemen, he mentioned as one of the advantages he expected from that measure, that we “should exhibit upon a small scale, what I think it is highly desirable we should begin to do on a more extensive one, a wish to see brought prominently forward and employed in honourable office, and united with us in our councils and deliberations, men of rank and respectability among the Mohammedans.”¹

This was the aim he had before him in his various endeavours to have Mr. Dighton, Captain Meadows Taylor, Captain Bullock, and others, employed in the Nizam’s administration. It is true that, in consequence, as has been abundantly made manifest in the preceding pages, of the lack of interest and support vouchsafed by the Government of India, his plans were only partially successful, but his counsels and his efforts have left a lesson which may be usefully studied and learned. I may add, that almost the last despatch he wrote to the Government of India, dated December 20th, 1852, conveyed the proposal of an arrangement made between himself and the Minister, Sooraj-ool-Moolk, as a last plan to save the Nizam from having to assign the Berar Provinces, whereby “the talooks of Deodroog and others in the Raichore district were to be placed under the superintendence of Captain Meadows Taylor”, already administering successfully Shorapore for the Nizam, with a view to regularly meeting the current pay of the Contingent and interest on the arrears. But Lord Dalhousie had already determined on having the Berars with a Treaty; he had directed the Resident to “abstain from pressing” for payment of the debt,² and the reply from Government simply postponed the consideration of all such matters “till Colonel Low shall have assumed charge of the Residency”. What then followed we know.

My father wished Englishmen and Natives to co-operate under the influence of the same generous pride and honourable ambition, and with a common path open before him. I can testify from my own experience to the useful services, during the Ministry of Sir

¹ *Ante*, p. 62.

² *Ante*, p. 375.

Salar Jung, of the late Rajah Cundasamy, and of a gentleman of Persian descent, still living, Sooltan Mohammed—the former having been a recognised vakeel, passing between the Residency and the several centres of executive power in the city. I may add that Sooltan Mohammed was always selected by the Nawab to be the *mihmāndār*, or personal conductor, for sporting purposes especially, of his English friends, of distinguished visitors who came to the Hyderabad country with introductions from Government, or of myself when accompanied by friends on my own private invitation and account. If I have taken my full share of the good work of ridding the country of wild animals, I feel that I owe very much to the good offices of my excellent friend, Sooltan Mohammed. My father neither wished to Orientalise Englishmen nor to Europeanise Indians, but, if I may be allowed to coin a word, to Imperialise both races. In this respect his convictions and his counsels were identical with those of the late Nawab Salar Jung, as expressed in the letter to myself of 11th December 1874, which will be found further on in *fac-simile* form. “I like to be a Liberal”, said the great Mussulman statesman, “as far as the improvement of the people and advancement of public life are concerned; but I assure you I like to be a perfect Conservative when the question of national usages and customs comes forward, if they do not interfere in any improvement as above mentioned. So I think I can have the sympathies of both parties.”¹

To the sympathies of both great parties I appeal for a just policy of reparation and of progress, not only for the Hyderabad State, but for the British Empire in India. If this book should have any good effect in that direction, my efforts for the vindication of my father's memory will not have been in vain.

¹ Lithographed letter, facing p. xxvi of Additional Appendix.

APPENDIX.

(A.)

LETTERS OF COUNT DU PUY.

(Page 22.)

These letters are, perhaps, worth preserving, on account of their quaint and intensely French style; and, also, as showing the tact and good feeling with which the English Commandant and Commissioner must have performed his difficult duties.

“À Son Excellence le très Honorable Hugh Elliot.

“ Pondichéry, le Mercredi, 4 Decembre 1816.

“MONSIEUR LE GOUVERNEUR,—Ce n'est pas sans émotion que je viens vous raconter qu'aujourd'hui notre cérémonie de reprise de possession, et de rétablissement du pavillon français s'est faite avec toute la décence et la dignité possibles. Le ciel le plus serein semblait nous protéger; un sentiment de fraternité électrisait tous les Anglais et Français qui se trouvaient à Pondichéry: on se rapprochait; on s'embrassait, et sans interprête, tout le monde s'entendait.

“Votre représentant, Monsieur le Capitaine Fraser, qui est réellement un homme très distingué, a fait jusqu'à ce jour les honneurs Britanniques avec noblesse et avec grâce, comme si vous l'aviez inspiré; et à ce matin, au milieu d'une immense population, bruit des canons et des acclamations universelles, après un discours plein de sensibilité et d'éloquence naturelle, il a résigné les pouvoirs qu'il tenait de votre Excellence comme Commandant provisoire. Il les a résignés avec le même empressement qu'il aurait pu mettre à prendre possession d'une place nouvelle.

“Le pavillon anglais a cessé de flotter; et de suite on y a substitué le pavillon français.

“Plusieurs personnes ont essayé de dire des choses convenables: et partout on a entendu l'expression de la reconnaissance des Français qui

habitaient ces contrées, et qui, grâce à la bienveillance de votre Gouvernement, ont reçu des consolations proportionnées à leurs infortunes, et ont joui, pendant la guerre, de toutes les douceurs de la paix.

“ M. le Capitaine Fraser en a communiqué successivement les résolutions prises par votre Excellence en conseil. Elles m’ont paru toujours dictées par le désir d’obliger mon Souverain et ma nation. Je n’y ai donc trouvé que matière à de nouveaux remerciements pour le très Honorable Gouverneur et pour Messieurs du Conseil.

“ Je suis avec la plus haute considération,

“ De votre Excellence,

“ Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

“ LE CTE. DU PUY.

“ M. Dayot me prie d’être son interprète, et cela ne m’est pas difficile, puisqu’il partage mes sentiments pour vous.”

“ Pondichéry, le 3 Janvier 1820.

“ MONSIEUR ET CHER VOISIN,—Je suis furieux contre votre modestie qui veut vous faire croire qu’on ne vous estime, et qu’on ne vous aime, qu’en proportion des services que vous pouvez rendre. Apprenez que mes sentiments pour vous n’ont besoin ni de sel, ni de tabac, ni de balances pour être bien fondés !

“ On vous aime sans assaisonnement et pour vous même.

“ C’est aussi comme cela que je veux être aimé, si non, non.

“ LE CTE. DU PUY.

“ Présentez, s’il vous plait, mes hommages à vos dames.”

“ Pondichéry, le 23 Février 1820.

“ MON AIMABLE VOISIN,—Je devrais vous faire une petite querelle pour avoir évité de traverser la bonne ville de Pondichéry en vous rendant à Madras, mais vous avez eu sans doute quelque motif plausible, et je ne dois pas vous condamner sans vous avoir entendu. Si je n’étais ici seul à mon poste vous auriez déjà reçu ma visite chez madame votre mère, que tous nos habitants considèrent comme une dame de Pondichéry, dont ils honorent les vertus. Hier M. Leschenaut a renouvelé ma tentation d’aller vous voir, lorsqu’il est venu m’apprendre son projet de voyage—et le même motif m’a retenu. Je dois me féliciter de ma discrétion, puisque cette nuit il a pris fantaisie à nos jardiniers de Bethel de désertir dans quelqu’une de vos olidées,¹ pour faire niche à M. Faucheur. Cette fugue n’a été que partielle, parceque j’ai mis en campagne toute notre armée de pions, Cipahis, etc., etc. Qu’eut on dit,

¹ Holidays !

si Mons. le Gouverneur était aller dormir paisiblement à Godelour, quand on s'agitait ici ? Il faut donc, bongré malgré, rester à son poste.

“Mons. Leschenaut vous racontera surement les doléances de l'île Maurice au sujet d'une épidémie qu'on suppose y avoir été introduite par la *Topaze* à son retour de Manille. L'île de Bourbon s'est hâtée de prendre les mesures les plus sévères pour empêcher la communication. Il est présumable que cette maladie est notre *choléra morbus* avec quelque modifications ; cependant il est possible qu'il soit un fléau d'un autre genre. Je vais en attendant soumettre les bâtiments qui viendront de ces îles à une visite de médecin, même à une petite quarantaine, s'ils ont des malades à bord ; mais quel sera l'effet de pareilles mesures, si votre Gouvernement n'en ordonne pas de pareilles ? car vous êtes les grands seigneurs de la côte, et par conséquent vous offrez bien plus de moyens de communications que nous. Croyez-vous qu'il y ait lieu de provoquer à ce sujet l'attention du Gouverneur de Madras, qui peut avoir reçu quelques renseignements de Mons. son confrère de l'île Maurice ?

“Adieu, mon amiable voisin, je vous salue un peu plus profondément qu'autrefois, puisque vous êtes Monsieur le Major. Si votre embonpoint augmente avec vos dignités, nous vous appellerons gros Major. En attendant je vous embrasse.

“LE COMTE DU PUY.”

(B.)

THE NIZAM'S MILITARY CO-OPERATION.

(Page 247.)

As so much has frequently been said in disparagement of the discipline and equipment of the troops furnished by the Nizam for co-operation with our forces, in our critical struggle with Tippoo and with the Mahrattas, it is only fair to state that when war was declared against Tippoo Sultan, 1790, *our Subsidiary Force* of two battalions of Sepoys, with six guns manned by Europeans, sent in accordance with Treaty to Hyderabad to strengthen the Nizam's army, was found “*to be in so unmilitary and imperfect a condition as to be entirely unfit for service in the field*”. The Nizam brought the matter at once to the notice of the Governor-General, who lost no time in expressing, through a letter to the Resident, dated

June 17th, 1790, his regret at the inefficiency of the Subsidiary Force, and admitting that "His Highness had good reason to complain of a failure on the part of the Company's Government in affording His Highness the support which he is entitled to by Treaty as well as by repeated promises." The Resident was directed to assure the Nizam that "the Governor-General would call the authorities at Madras to a most rigorous account of their misconduct, and would take the earliest opportunity to replace the force unfit for service with other troops complete in numbers and perfect in discipline."

Notwithstanding the difficulties caused by the weakness of the aid supplied from Madras under Treaty, and at his cost, the Nizam "put his own troops in motion, and created much alarm and embarrassment to Tippoo", thus rendering to Lord Cornwallis, as he stated in a letter to the Prince of Wales, dated August 14th, 1790, valuable aid at a most critical time. In the campaign which ended in the Partition Treaty of Seringapatam in 1792, besides a portion of his army which acted independently of the force under the Governor-General's own command, and which attacked and captured three of Tippoo's most important fortresses, the Nizam sent a body of more than 10,000 Cavalry, under the command of his own son, Secunder Jah, who afterwards succeeded to the throne, which gave adequate strength to Lord Cornwallis in that very arm in which his force was most deficient.

Lord Cornwallis, in a despatch to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated May 2, 1792, expressed his high sense of "the valuable and ready aid rendered by His Highness's Army against the common enemy, which had a material influence in producing the rapid and successful termination of the war."

In the final war against Tippoo Sultan, which ended in his death during the storming of Seringapatam on the 4th of May 1799, besides the Subsidiary Force of 6,500 men in the Nizam's pay, 7,000 Infantry and 10,000 of the best Cavalry in the service of the Hyderabad State, joined the British Army under Lord Harris, and formed its left wing, under Colonel Arthur Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington, on which fell the brunt of the fighting in the battle of Malavelly. Without the aid of the Nizam's Cavalry in conveying supplies of grain, the siege of Seringapatam could not have been carried on at all.

Lord Wellesley states, in a despatch to the Secret Committee dated 12th April 1804, that the first intelligence reached him "through a loyal communication forwarded by the Nizam's Agent in attendance on Scindia", early in 1803, that a hostile confederacy against the Company's Government was being organised by Scindia, Holkar and the Rajah of Nagpore. The forces under General Sir Arthur Wellesley and General Stevenson—the latter of whom had the Subsidiary Force under his command—during the campaign of Assaye and Argaum, were supported by "6,000 disciplined Infantry of the Nizam's Army, and 9,000 Cavalry, under leaders of approved valour and attachment to their Sovereign."¹ The English Commanders spoke highly of the aid given by the Nizam's troops in their operations.

General Arthur Wellesley, in his report on the battle of Argaum to the Governor-General, dated 30th November 1803, says:—"I have also to inform your Excellency that the Mogul" (Nizam's) "Cavalry under Salabut Khan, and the Mysore Cavalry under Bistnapa Pundit, distinguished themselves. The former took a standard from Scindia's troops."²

Very strong and clear testimony, in a short compass, as to the great assistance given by the military force of the Nizam during the second Mahratta, or Pindarree war, from 1817 to 1819, will be found in the following extracts of a letter from the Resident at Hyderabad, Mr. (afterwards Sir Henry) Russell, to the Governor-General, the Marquis of Hastings, dated 28th December 1817.

"The Contingent provided by the Nizam's Government to serve with our armies, independently of the troops employed in local duties connected with the general advancement of the Service, consists of the following corps:—

INFANTRY.

Four Berar Battalions, with Artillery, under Major Pitman	3,368
Captain Hare's Brigade, with Artillery	3,157
Mohammed Salabut Khan's regular Brigade, with Artillery, under Captain Lyne	1,900
	<hr/>
	7,425

¹ *Official Notes*, published in London, 1803.

² *Duke of Wellington's Despatches* (1852), vol. ii, p. 895.

Brought forward	7,425
CAVALRY.	
Reformed Horse, under Captain Davis	4,000
Jaghiredar Horse, under Mohammed Salabut Khan	2,000
	<hr/> 6,000
Total	<hr/> 13,425

"This force," the Resident observes, "is hardly inferior, even in its numerical strength, to the Contingent which the Nizam is bound by Treaty to provide, and it is of a description much more efficient for our purpose, and much more expensive to His Highness's Government, than a larger Contingent would be if composed of troops of the quality contemplated when the Treaty was drawn up. Of the two kinds, the Infantry are the better troops; but the Horse, besides increasing our ranks, serve at the same time to diminish those of the enemy. The Auxiliary Horse at Poona, under Captain Swanston and Captain Spiller, have shown the fidelity and exertions of which troops of that description are capable. Brigadier-General Doveton speaks highly of the Nizam's Reformed Horse under Captain Pedlar in the affair of the 16th at Nagpore, and the whole of them are said to be eager to be employed against the Mahrattas, and to talk of revenge for the battle of Kurdla.

"Rajah Chundoo Lall has also furnished for the service of the 1st and 2nd Divisions of the Army, 270 camels, a very expensive equipment in this part of India."

Sir Henry Russell also observes, in a letter dated Hyderabad, December 31, 1817, to Major Agnew, Political Agent with General Sir Thomas Hislop's army, that "the whole of the Nizam's disposable force—indeed, the only Infantry that he has that is efficient—is attached to the different divisions of our Army."

In further illustration of the Nizam's military affairs, and of the difficulty the Home Government has so constantly found in getting its instructions, and even its orders, carried out in India, an example may be given in the following extract from a Political letter to Bengal, from the Court of Directors, dated 21st January 1824, paragraph 80 :—

"As it affects the Native States, it appears to us to be humiliating and galling in the extreme. The proceeding of appointing European officers to the command of corps raised and maintained by Princes, whom we have not, as yet at least, professed to treat as dependent,

must be felt as a fresh inroad on their remains of independence; as an exclusion of the higher class of Natives from the places of power, trust, and emolument, which they have hitherto held, and of which it is both cruel and unjust to deprive them; and as indicative of further designs on our part which we assuredly do not entertain, and which it is very undesirable to have imputed to us."

Here is another extract of the same significance —

"The authorities in England have been opposed to the policy of this species of interference in the internal arrangements of our Native Allies, and the system is only tolerated from the difficulties which oppose a sudden alteration. It is in the contemplation of the Local Government gradually to reduce the number of European officers to be employed with this description of Force, in which case there will be a proportionate reduction of expense."¹

Of course, nothing was done, and the expense was not reduced.

(C.)

"CLAIMS OF THE NIZAM."

The pamphlet with this title, published by me in 1867, commences with a historical sketch of the Hyderabad State and our relations with it, the substance of which already appears in this volume. It will be sufficient, therefore, to quote here only that portion of it discussing the questions treated in Chapter XI.

"The narrative may now pass on to the comparatively remote period of 1845, by which time the Nizam's financial position—inevitably complicated by enforced extravagance in military outlay—again became a subject of solicitude at Calcutta. During a decade or so, His Highness had continued to enhance a long-standing claim upon our confidence and goodwill by steadfast adherence to English interests, effectually quelling all malcontent disposition in his subjects to take advantage of the strains and perplexities which beset us in that troublous time. Throughout our Afghan, Gwalior, and Punjab jeopardies, the Nizam's unwavering example and active influence were ever on our side, and could hardly have been more emphatically manifest in the tented field.

¹ *Papers on the Affairs of Hyderabad sent by Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington, with a Note dated 10th April 1830: Duke of Wellington's Despatches and Correspondence (1877), vol. vi, p. 551.*

Special credit may also be claimed for the alacrity with which (notwithstanding the implication of a brother) His Highness promoted the detection and defeat of the Wahabee conspiracy, in '39, which, at first ostensibly local, turned out to be part of a ramified confederacy for overthrow of the British power. Nor should it be left unnoted that his specific right, under the Treaty of 1790, to equal division of conquests, was distinctly ignored in the non-partition of Kurnool.

"The chronicle of the Nizam from '45 to '53 is little more than a register of official correspondence between the Governor-General and the Resident, General Fraser, who had succeeded Colonel Stewart in '38. As already outlined, it was mainly taken up with remonstrance from headquarters, regarding outstanding arrears and default in the pay of the Contingent, not untempered, however, with candid allowance for its excessive costliness, which, indeed, was palpably condemned in immediately subsequent reduction. For no sooner had we acquired in 1853 the long-coveted security for discharge of an oppressively enforced obligation, than we commenced a downward course in military outlay, ending in a descent to 24 lakhs per annum, against the 40 which had been previously exacted through more than thirty-three years of unbroken peace; and, as the adequacy of the so reduced Force to any emergency was more than sufficiently tested under the terrible strain of the Mutiny, it is simply matter of plain, demonstrable account that the Nizam had been needlessly and wrongfully burdened with the sum of those thirty-three years' excess, or, in round numbers, £5,280,000. Nor less carefully suppressed, we may be sure, was the enormous set-off which may be equitably claimed by the Nizam in respect of a steady increase of patronage by nominations to the preposterous staff of the Contingent; although it must not be forgotten, in justice to Lord Dalhousie, that under his administration the abuse was materially abated. His Highness, in short, appears to have been treated (through the medium of smooth official periphrasis) as if he had been a fraudulent unthrift, rather than the practically passive instrument of an ally's exorbitant behests.

"The history of the negotiations, terminating in an assignment of Berar, by the Treaty of 1853, is still involved in obscurity, which may be, more or less, dispelled by the expected Parliamentary return. But an abrupt change of the Residency, in the resignation of General Fraser, with other indications, is not unsuggestive of demands in excess of the ultimate mortgage of the district. Guerillas of party warfare have been known to call it a session; and the unscrupulous hardihood might be traceable to a foregone conclusion which the Calcutta Foreign Office could not cheerfully abandon. It is, at any rate, sufficiently clear that Lord Dalhousie's intemperate hint to the Nizam (which was elicited in the House of Commons) that British power was 'able to crush him at

its will, is not inconsistent with a stringency of original design in advance of the actual result. In fact, a cession of territory in perpetuity was proposed; but, as the substitution of an assignment, and ratification of it by Treaty, were the work of 'a little month', the overture may be regarded as a *pro forma* experiment upon approved long-suffering. By this Treaty, concluded the 21st of May 1853, the Nizam assigned, in trust to the British Government, Berar and the border districts down to Sholapore, with the Doab between the Kistna and Raichore, the Honourable Company (little dreaming of impending dissolution) agreed to maintain, *out of His Highness's revenues*, an Auxiliary Force of not less than 5,000 Infantry, 2,000 Cavalry, and four batteries of Artillery, entitled the Hyderabad Contingent.

"Faithful accounts of receipts and expenditure, yearly, were explicitly promised, together with regular payment to the Nizam of any surplus revenue. He was also released from liability to further levy in time of war, and from immediate payment of the debt. Now, the charge upon the princely revenue, in respect of the Contingent, was gradually reduced, as heretofore stated, to 24 lakhs; and 8 lakhs (or four annas per rupee) was subsequently pronounced by Lord Canning to be *an ample proportion* for civil management. It has, by the way, been publicly asserted, and never denied, that *two annas* (per rupee collected) was the understanding with which the Nizam made over his possessions in 1853, and that such excess of expenditure between 1853 and 1860 was accepted by him as a set-off against the debt of 50 lakhs, ostensibly due by His Highness, for liquidation of which we held the Berar districts in trust; or, in other words, the majestic surrender of the bond in 1860 was, in point of fact, illusory. But, accepting the double haul in 1860 as justifiable, the surplus revenue due, under Treaty, to the Nizam should now be yearly at least 18 lakhs. Of this enormous sum (multiplied, that is, by the gradual increase in intervening years from 32 lakhs to 50) not a single rupee, down to the close of last year, had found its way to his treasury. The civil management, in fact, has been so over-zealous to ratify its distinctive epithet, in unbounded civility to the nominees of patronage, that the permissive clauses of the Treaty have been practically strained into absorption of the gross revenue. This, too, in presence of Lord Canning's recorded admission that the Nizam ought not to be charged more for administration than the cost of his own provinces, or of those under British rule. To these direct results of the assignment of Berar must be added an incidental injustice which materially and permanently aggravated the drain upon a burdened revenue. On assuming the territory, we indiscriminately dismissed the Native officials, replacing them with appointments of our own. Many of the families thus pitilessly ejected had a traditional (*quasi* hereditary) claim upon the

local magistracy and collectorships; and they were consequently, together with still needier dependents, thrown upon the State, whose pensioners (at the capital) many of them remain to this day, a horde of embarrassing idlers.

"Close upon the ratification of this Treaty—the signing of which is said to have broken his heart—followed the death of the Minister Sooraj-ool-Moolk, who was immediately succeeded by his nephew, Salar Jung, the present upright and enlightened premier adviser of the Nizam. Of the importance of his services, alike to his master and to England—especially during the mutiny—a chronicler of the period can hardly write too warmly. Combining with a chivalrous spirit, and a rare cultivation in the arts and learning of many countries beyond his own, that aptitude for politics and administration which marks a born leader of his fellow men, this genuine Asiatic worthy is probably destined, if spared, to regenerate and uplift his country, as he has already approved himself her preserver from internal dissension and from irretrievable financial disorder. The value, too, of a character so high-toned and exemplary, in guiding and elevating the aims of other Native Ministers, is not to be lightly estimated. Next after the health of the Nizam, should certainly stand that of his true Excellency, Salar Jung, as an element of vital import to the State and its foreign relations.

"The appointment of Colonel Davidson to the Residency, in April 1857, and the death of Nasir-ood-Dowlah in the following May, are the next events of importance; and, with the accession of Afzul-ood-Dowlah, the reigning Nizam, arrives the eve of the great mutiny.

"With the incidents of that terrible ordeal this recital is not specially concerned, beyond such as illustrate the steadfast, invaluable fidelity of the Nizam and his excellent Minister, together with the signal services of the Hyderabad Contingent—a supremely fortunate combination which, steadying the Deccan on the one hand and despatching swift succour northward on the other, was probably the salvation of British India. The Contingent, we learn, was first launched against the fortress of Dhar, which by forced marches they reached just after the escape of the rebel garrison, but in time to follow in pursuit. This rapid movement and essential service is reasonably alleged as a claim (still unsatisfied) upon the Dhar booty; especially as it was followed up by the speedy and signal success of overtaking the fugitives, *en route* to Neemuch, and capturing a battery of eight guns (that of Mahidpore) which would otherwise have served the mutineers. This timely arrest certainly prevented a second Cawnpore tragedy at Neemuch, and probably—in crippling the rebel forces at a critical juncture—materially affected the ultimate issue of the war. For the successful result of this, their initiative (known as the action at Rawul), the

Nizam's Cavalry were ordered an extra (or *batta*) of five rupees a month to each man during the remainder of field service; and it is nothing short of humiliating to have to add that, with a symmetrical coolness peculiar to that sultry clime, the discharge of this impulsive obligation was left to the pliable Nizam. In their junction with Sir Hugh Rose at Saugor, and in assisting to force the pass of Muddempore—at the capture of Talbeit and fall of Jhansi—at the decisive action of Koonch, gained under the fiercest strength of a tropical sun—and in a final demonstration against Tantia Topce;—in each and all were the efficiency and resistless dash of the Contingent conspicuously displayed.¹ Nor are these brilliant latter-day services without a worthy counterpart in others, long anterior, of their predecessors in the Mahratta war. Those exploits, as well as earlier successes against Tippoo, were duly rewarded by division of acquired territory, in conformity with the Treaty of 1790; but in the results of the mutiny, as in the already noted case of Kurnool, the effect of that uncanceled compact may be looked for in vain—a contrast deplorably suggestive of greed elated by security.

“The incidents available to exemplify the Nizam's fidelity—which, in many ways, appears to have been sorely tried—are generally significant of utmost alacrity, zealously seconded by his Minister (who, *inter alia*, secured for us the devotion of the Arab mercenaries, in arrest of mutineers and otherwise), to anticipate and crush the seething disaffection of the mob by condign punishment of ringleaders. This earnest of thorough goodwill was specially afforded in preconcerted measures² for defence of the Residency, when attacked (on the memorable 17th of July) by a band of Rohilla insurgents, one of whose leaders was shot dead during the repulse, while the other—Moulavi Alla-oo-deen—was immediately accommodated with a free passage to one of the Andaman islands, where, it is satisfactory to add, he remains. It is, moreover, on record that Colonel Davidson, with laudable vigilance, caused the Nizam to be narrowly watched, and so ascertained that emissaries had vainly endeavoured to shake his inflexible allegiance.

“The loyal devotion of His Highness was finally displayed in ready consent, during the mutiny, to a counterpoise of suspected danger from the Sepoys at Secunderabad, by material addition to the British Force.

¹ In connection with this memorable campaign may be quoted the testimony borne by an evidently well-informed writer (“Anti-Annexation”) on the Army of India, in the *Daily News* of the 25th of December ultimo, who cordially singles out Colonel Abbott, of the Contingent, as a consummate handler of Irregular Cavalry, with reference to possible employment of such force in the East of Europe.

² Under the able command of Colonel Briggs, on the Staff of the Residency, and for many years employed in the Contingent Service.

The personal and instrumental aid of the Nizam throughout this direst of trials is as clearly and completely evident as the relief of Lucknow, or the dethronement of the Great Mogul. How it was recognised—or, rather, how rewarded—is the remaining point for attention.

“The usual preliminary conviction that something must be done appears to have been arrived at with moderate expedition. So early as March 1858, Colonel Davidson recommended that rewards should be conferred upon the Nizam, and upon certain members of his Court, in recognition of recent services; and the Governor-General took no more than eleven months for action upon this timely hint.

“In July 1860, the promise was at last fulfilled by formal presentation of English manufactured articles, amounting in value to a lakh of rupees, or £10,000. To the Nizam’s uncle, and to his Minister, Salar Jung, £3,000 each, in the like medium, accompanied in the latter case by the Governor-General’s express recognition of “his ability, courage, and firmness”, and by the cordial thanks of the Government. Other functionaries also were proportionately gratified. It must not, however, be forgotten that, in return (*satis superque*) for the £10,000 worth of gifts to himself, His Highness forwarded, for the acceptance of the Governor-General, presents valued at £15,000, which are ‘quietly incurred’ in the Imperial Treasury, against future indulgence in impulsive generosity to other serviceable connections. The *substantial* return for value received in fidelity and active support was a *formal* remission of the old debt (whose circumstances are fresh in the reader’s recollection) of fifty lakhs, together with surrender of Dharaseo and Raichore—a fragment of the security assigned in 1853—and transfer of Shorapore, which, by rebellion of the late Rajah, had nominally reverted to the British Government. Nominally only, because that *sumesthan*, or principality, was a recognised fief of Hyderabad, and we had no valid claim to the lapse thus ostentatiously made over to its rightful owner. Of the Exalted Order of the Star of India, with which His Highness was invested in the following November, the less, perhaps, said the better, as the gift was not only prohibited by a cardinal tenet of his faith, but obnoxious to Native feeling and prejudices, affording a mischievous handle for scurrilous placards and other signs of disaffection.¹

“*Prima facie*, this was a liberal, not to say lavish, arrangement; but the benevolent-uncle aspect of the affair wholly disappears under examination of the supplemental Treaty concluded in the same year. For it imperatively exacted a cession of territory on the left bank of the

¹ The delay of this investiture was attributable to reluctance on the part of the Nizam, which, notwithstanding religious and political reasons “of strong prevailment” he finally yielded on learning that the honoured name of the late Prince Consort was at the head of the Order.

Godavery, worth (reckoning woodland and forest) at least the half-million professedly relinquished in remission of the whole debt, which, however, was really taken out—as formally admitted by Lord Canning—in the extra two annas per rupee for civil management, as agreed in 1853. We, therefore, *de facto*, remitted with one hand, and gripped an equivalent with the other; while the restitution of Dharaseo and Raichore left us secured (for Contingent and for Civil management) to the extent of thirty-two lakhs, with so much of calculated margin that British management (including manipulation of the surplus) has since raised it to little short of fifty. That the Berar Commissioners are, in effect, instrumental to a scheme and policy of injustice, nowise detracts from the marked ability with which they have administered this vast seed-field, and the substantial improvement which they have produced; in which connection may be appositely cited an emphatic recognition in the *Bombay Times* of the co-operative efforts of the late Resident, Sir George Yule—one of the few Civilians who are thoroughly qualified, by peculiar aptitude and length of service, for any post (not excluding the highest) in India. In the preliminary negotiations, moreover, we tried hard—so hard, indeed, that the Nizam was on the point of throwing them up in disgust—to obtain the power of managing Berar through whatsoever agency we might please to select; and, although this experiment was discreetly abandoned (partly, it has been stated, in default of a supple agent), his consent was ultimately extorted, not without undignified higgling, to administration by our Resident at Hyderabad, without audit, and with elastic latitude in expenditure.

“It is thus apparent that, from first to last, a retrospect of our relations with the Nizam should be carefully avoided by resolute sticklers for the perfection of British rule. Few chapters of its history, it is to be hoped, are so calculated to tax either the credulity of devotees, or the versatile audacity of hirelings. Nor are significant indications far to seek that its already sinister look will be seriously smirched by the Parliamentary return in store for them. The omission, for instance, of Colonel Davidson’s ‘political section’, or review, in his published despatch for 1861-62, looks very like the suppression broadly insinuated (nor yet denied) in the *Times of India*, of the 3rd of April 1866, and is scarcely accountable on other surmise, inasmuch as the hiatus is peculiar to that year. The obvious inference is that an honest review of recent policy may have proved unpalatable, and that it was quietly pigeon-holed with other dead men’s tales.¹ There is at least as valid reason

¹ An accidental delay in preparation of these pages for the press has opportunely reserved them for signal confirmation of the surmise, in a recently published letter—disclosing an abstract of the missing section—for which the reader is now referred to page 481.

to suppose that daylight would be deprecated in the case of a long correspondence which must have preceded the final arrangement of 1860; for it is notorious that the Resident was so little disposed to effectuate the original scheme (of managing the district *ab extra*) that, before he was himself aware of the Government design, it had reached the ears of the Nizam. It is, therefore, we repeat, not at all improbable that the treatment which our faithful Ally has endured within the last twenty years will be voted uglier and shabbier still before it is quite done with. His claim, to be sure, is strong enough, without fishing for shabbiness below the surface; for the salient case of Berar is, *ab initio*, redolent of that taint. The district fell to him in 1804, as his due share of Mahratta spoil, under the convention of 1790; and to take it back, in trepidation for usurious arrears, was assuredly the reverse of handsome. But, waiving a charge not likely to smite the corporate conscience of diplomacy, it must be finally reiterated that the claim so pressed upon the Nizam is, in equity, fundamentally bad and untenable. The Contingent which we forced him to maintain—in an excess of strength and costliness, on our own subsequent showing, as forty to twenty-four—expressly contemplated a time of war; whereas it had been maintained at our instance, and kept at our call, through no less than thirty-three peaceful years at the time (1853) of our exacting security for the arrears it had inevitably entailed.

“Not wishing to bring down upon this iteration the robust expletive associated with Prince Hal’s, the writer forbears to retrace the manœuvring duplicity of 1860, and the intervening encroachment upon the terms of that stringent bargain, which have just been treated in detail. Enough, it appears to him, has been cited to fix the Government of India—down to last summer at least—with systematic one-sided reciprocity, and with quasi-chronic disregard of Treaty obligations which are patent and unrepealed. Self-condemned, indeed, for retention of Berar stands the India Office, in Lord Halifax’s official acknowledgment of the Bhootan Treaty. ‘The existence’, he remarks, ‘of a strong Government in the neighbouring States, and the prosperity of their subjects, are among the best securities for the permanent peace of our frontiers. To deprive the Government of a contiguous country of the means of enforcing its authority over its chiefs and functionaries, and of compelling them to execute the engagements which it has entered into for the maintenance of the peace and security of our country, can *in no case* be sound policy. In this view it would not be advisable to impair the resources of the Bhootan State.’ Substituting Hyderabad for Bhootan, this utterance of abstract wisdom may be fairly claimed as distinctly and logically tending to the restitution of Berar; for, while no candid judge of the situation can doubt that, *plus* that fair district,

the Nizam would easily satisfy our claim for a Contingent at the reduced rate, it is still more certain that our hold of it weakens his executive power and grievously impairs his resources.¹ To infer the effect of adherence to such treatment on the Native populations, and on the policy and temper of their chiefs, is more easy than pleasant—less pleasant still to confront the future which, in default of prompt and ungrudging redress, it is providing for our Indian Empire. The day may be nearer at hand than is now discernible to complacent acquiescence in the system, (unless stirred by the salutary portent of a new order of Indian Secretaries), when the nobles and gentry of England may find themselves vainly repenting of indifference to the wrongs and complaints of a landed aristocracy at least as ancient as their own.

“In the hope that he has moderately succeeded in the primary aim to be readable, the writer now commends to reflection, and, wherever possible, to active sympathy, the monitory lesson of this ‘abstract and brief chronicle,’ with the rebuke of misused authority which it too plainly implies. In urging the appeal, he is sensible of present disadvantage in an attitude of patient expectancy which the world is too ready to ignore, and in prediction of dangers less urgent, ostensibly, than such as are sufficient for the day. He will not, however, despair of English opinion, once fairly informed and aroused, as inadequate and helpless to insure for the weak that measure of justice which, in view of a menacing background, its organs are eager to concede. If full-blooded Swagger, ever the first to come, must needs be first served at the counter of a nation of shopkeepers, it is now, he submits, full time that the patient abiding of the meek be remorsefully beckoned to the front for long overdue attention.”

From *The Examiner*, May 18th, 1867.

THE INDIAN DILEMMA.

“SIR,—I find myself, unexpectedly, at liberty to fortify the case of the Nizam of Hyderabad (which you kindly enabled me to plead, in a letter under this head, on the 2nd of March), with a full confirmation of the hint quoted from the *Times of India*, viz.—that Colonel Davidson’s Administrative Report for 1862 was purposely curtailed at headquarters of its ‘political section’, or summary of recent Calcutta policy. In fact, I am released from intended reservation of the identical document by opportune issue of the enclosed printed letter from a

¹ Which, nevertheless, do not deter His Highness from munificent support of English educational plans at Hyderabad, or from the extra strain of 20,000 mouths fed during the famine.

native gentleman to Sir Henry Rawlinson, which, you will perceive, to some extent anticipates the expected Parliamentary return, and leaves no motive for awaiting it. Referring to the ostensible reward (in 1860) of the Nizam's services, he states that 'Colonel Davidson remarked, in the political section of his Report for the year 1862, that the restoration of two of the assigned districts was no reward for his valuable services, nor was the retention of his other districts by any means justifiable; but the *Calcutta Foreign Office suppresses this section.*'

"The writer, sir, has presumably seen one of the few unmutilated copies of the despatch in question, which rumour has long declared to be extant. One, at any rate, has found its way to these fingers; and, if you can oblige me with requisite space, I will no longer delay to notify (in substance) this remarkably frank and suggestive digest of our dealings with the Nizam, which the Indian Government forbore or omitted to publish with the remainder of the Report—the death of Colonel Davidson, observe, having intervened, and the tenour of the missing (thirty) paragraphs being as adverse and damaging as might consist with official decorum.

"The section (vii) in question, of the report, No. 26, dated Hyderabad, 27th June 1862, is devoted to a review of the Treaty of 1860, and its bearings upon British interests. Glancing at the unscrupulous discontent of certain 'public writers' with our non-acquisition of Berar in perpetuity—which he dismissed as simply regardless of right—Colonel Davidson proceeded to point out that the inducements offered to the Nizam for surrender of his fairest province were inadequate and (by implication) illusory. Relinquishing Raichore and Dahraseo, we received in exchange a sufficient guaranty for all our claims under the Treaty of 1853 which assigned those districts; and—having obtained such security—we had no pretext for retaining them. We, moreover, received, *in perpetuity*, a district on the left bank of the Godavery, of considerable intrinsic value, and specially important as commanding the hydraulic works on that river. The additional transfer of Shorapore, he maintained, was mere restitution of what did not belong to us—of a principality formerly annexed to Hyderabad by the Treaty of 1817, and none of our interventions (which are recited in detail) had impaired the Nizam's sovereign rights over the territory; while from any claim to forfeiture, by rebellion of the tributary Rajah in 1857, we were clearly barred by the same Treaty.

"Of the old debt of fifty lakhs, which the compact formerly annulled, Colonel Davidson observed that it was distinctly repudiated by the present Nizam, as it had been by his father, on the ground of counter-claims, or set-off, which, they complained, had not been recognised nor refuted. It was, therefore, not to be wondered at that our Ally failed

to regard the liberality of the Government in cancelling a disputed debt, as spontaneous and unequivocal remission.

“Finally, he called to remembrance—in terms which the coming light may show to have been calmly ironic—that such restoration and remission were designed in recognition of his Highness’s services during the revolt of 1857-8, quietly adding that to have alluded at such a time to the most remote possibility of coercion for obtaining that which he was so resolutely bent on withholding, was not, of course, to be thought of.

“The significance of this paragraph might easily be heightened, and the papers called for by Sir Fitzroy Kelly will fully prove that coercion (after mutineers had ceased from troubling) was not absolutely unthought of; but, in presence of the dominant topic which just now engrosses political columns, I must not further presume upon your approved indulgence.

“I am, etc.,

“May 6, 1867.

“EXUL.”

ADDITIONAL APPENDIX.

AFTER completing the main portion of my labours in connection with this work, it occurs to me that there are some points which I have either passed over or not laid sufficient stress upon, and which, therefore, may now appropriately be summarised and added here.

When I first joined my appointment at Hyderabad as one of the Political Assistants, I was, to some extent, familiar with the history of the Residency, owing to my having been so much there while my father was in office, and again afterwards when Colonel Cuthbert Davidson succeeded him as Resident, for I married the latter's niece, Miss Catherine Jane Davidson, of Cantray in Inverness-shire, and eventually became Colonel Davidson's Assistant.

I joined the Nizam's Cavalry (as it was then called) in 1853, the year in which the Districts were assigned to the British Government, and I accompanied the Force which proceeded to take possession of the Raichore Doab. With the Hyderabad Contingent I remained until the termination of the mutiny in 1858, when I was transferred to the Court of Hyderabad, in consequence of a letter from the Resident, who, after recording my services during the late campaign in Central India, informed the Government of India that he had reason to know that my connection¹ with the Residency would be acceptable to the Hyderabad Durbar. My services with the Contingent enabled me to obtain a thorough knowledge of the class of gentlemen with whom I should hereafter associate, because numerous relatives of our soldiers were friends and companions of H.H. the Nizam and his Noble. In those days men of position and family eagerly sought service in our ranks. Since then, however, these soldiers, of whom what has been written is mostly favourable, have suffered (as recorded by a Resident of Hyderabad recently) "gross injustice at the hands of some officers", and what I shall state hereafter in regard to irregularities still going on, will, I trust, convince the Govern-

¹ See *post*, p. xxxvii.

ment that their orders are not being fully acted up to. The instructions of Government are highly creditable and proper, but their orders are not properly executed. The General officers sent to command the Contingent are gallant soldiers, and, doubtless, for command in the Regular Army they are eminently qualified. Trained, however, under the regular system, they are disposed to change one they can little understand or appreciate. The Hyderabad Contingent being a Political Force, there are considerations in that State Department which require to be duly weighed before any new system is introduced; and some of the remarks I feel bound to make will show that for years past much of my time has been occupied in the endeavour to guard the ancient Hyderabad Cavalry system from innovations or alterations proposed by military authorities sent to us from Bengal. To enable the readers of this work to understand the difference of the two systems, *i.e.*, Hyderabad and Bengal, I append the following note.

THE HYDERABAD CAVALRY AND ITS SILLADAREE SYSTEM.

In 1853 the Nizam's Army was transferred to the British Government by a Treaty concluded in that year, when the Hyderabad Districts, now known as the Berars, were assigned to the British Government for the support and maintenance of the Force now termed the Hyderabad Contingent, composed of four regiments of Cavalry, four Batteries of Artillery, and six regiments of Infantry. This Force, it was arranged, was to be under the control of the Resident as hitherto, its organisation remaining on the Irregular system, as a local Force. So the Contingent under the British Government did not lose its peculiar features as they existed prior to the transfer. The scale of Establishments was revised at that time with a view to retrenchment, but the several regulations governing the interior economy and discipline remained the same. The Hyderabad Cavalry was organised on the Silladaree system; *i.e.*, any member of the Force had the privilege, if a man of property, of owning a number of Horse Assamees, *i.e.*, horses, with the right of nominating soldiers, called "Bargheers", to ride them, drawing from Government a fixed allowance for each

horse, feeding and maintaining them and riders. This principle existed at the time of transfer; no change was contemplated at that time, nor was any suggested until many years after. It enabled the Government to maintain a body of efficient Cavalry without incurring expense or risk in purchase of horses; and, by the simple arrangement of a monthly payment per head, they were relieved of any necessity of caring for the regular supply of remounts, and saved the heavy expense of keeping up large establishments for that purpose. On the other hand, the military classes of the country, having money to invest, find suitable employment for it and for themselves on objects which are congenial to their tastes, and at the same time produce a profitable return on their outlay. The soldier who thus invests his money throws his whole interests, both personal and pecuniary, in the balance with the Government he serves. renders himself a loyal, useful, and trustworthy retainer, and removes himself from the temptation to join the evil-disposed, who, having no such property or interest at stake, might abandon their standard in time of peril, or during a crisis such as the Indian Mutiny of 1857-58.

Irregular Cavalry can be organised on two different systems, viz., the "Silladaree", as with the Hyderabad Contingent, and the "Khudaspa", as in the Bengal Army.

The "Silladaree" system admits of a soldier being the owner of more than one horse in a Cavalry Regiment, and having the right of nomination of the troopers, or riders of his extra horse or horses these riders being approved as efficient soldiers like himself.

The "Khudaspa" system permits a soldier to become the owner of the horse he rides, and of no more.

From my previous writings it will be perceived that, so far as Hyderabad is concerned, I am in favour of the former system in preference to the latter, and for many reasons. Among other arguments in favour of the single horse and trooper proprietorship, it is advanced that such a soldier rides his own horse, and, therefore, takes an additional interest in its well-being, spends more money on its food, and is careful to maintain at all times its good condition; on the other hand, an impression exists that a trooper, or rider, of another man's horse cannot be expected to devote so much care and attention to the animal he rides, and, therefore, that the "Khudaspa", or single-horse system, should succeed better than the other.

This impression, however, in my opinion, is fallacious, as the care and condition of their horses is a matter of discipline which all Irregular Cavalry officers have been able to insist upon and maintain. The idea, no doubt, may be traced to the fact that British officers coming from England, with knowledge of their own Cavalry, and notions as regards organisation and discipline, expect to find something of the same sort in Native Irregulars. But experience has shown, and will show, that Indian circumstances, climatic influences, and natural proclivities of the Indian soldier, demand a special and different treatment, and everything that suits a British trooper will not answer with him. Keeping this in mind, it will not be hard to prove some of the erroneous impressions held in favour of the "Khudaspas" system.

In the first place, in regiments organised on that principle, the burden of procuring Cavalry recruits is placed on the commanding officer, who sends out recruiting parties, and these of course procure recruits without capital, or such as are obliged to borrow for appearance's sake. Such a recruit has to commence his soldier's life with a debt of 400 rupees and more. A portion of this is a private loan, the rest being advanced by a Government fund which exists for this purpose. Then this impecunious trooper has to pay instalments towards liquidation of his debt in two or more different places, and he finds that he has actually to starve himself to enable him to meet the demands on his small monthly allowance. These are the liabilities he incurs, out of thirty-five Hyderabad rupees (equal to thirty Government rupees) per month :—

	R.	A.	P.
Subscription to Government Fund . . .	3	0	0
" " towards Horsekeeper's pay . . .	3	0	0
" " Forge Fund . . .	0	8	0
" " Bheestee (Water) . . .	0	10	0
" " Forage . . .	3	0	0
" " Grain for Horse and Pony . . .	9	4	0
Extras	0	10	0
	<hr/>		
	20	0	0
Instalment of Government Debt . . .	6	0	0
Uniform and Accoutrements . . .	3	0	0
Balance for Food and Private Debt . . .	6	0	0
	<hr/>		
	35	0	0

(for 4 years)

It will be seen from this account that a recruit has only six rupees per mensem left him for his own nourishment for a period of four years, and although after that long probation he obtains twelve rupees for his own personal use, yet the hardships he has borne meanwhile, are poorly compensated for by this relief, which is generally lessened by his having to maintain a family of his own. In this position he is not a bit better off than the "Bargheer", who gets his pay clear of all encumbrances, while he has not had the pull of four years' privations. The "Khudaspa", pinched by these privations, only lacks the opportunity to starve his horse instead of himself. He is known not to allow any chance of doing so to slip by, and this necessitates vigilant supervision on the part of Squad Duffedars (non-commissioned officers) when the horse of a "single proprietor" is getting his food. The "Khudaspa", moreover, is so surrounded by restrictions in regard to the treatment of his horse, as well as the "Syce" and pony towards whose keep he contributes, that he has already become aware that his "ownership" of the horse he rides is practically a myth. He finds, under present regulations, that, although he has contributed, or is doing so, towards the price of his horse, he has actually no power to use it, or the pony, or the "Syce", in any other way than that ordered by his superior officer. He is not consulted in the purchase of a horse suitable to himself, but he is simply allotted one, which he must groom and keep in condition, and which he must resign at the will of his superior officers. Here, again, he is no better off in any respect than a "Bargheer", or trooper, who rides another proprietor's horse, and who, without depositing 400 rupees, enjoys no less advantages than the single-horse proprietor.

A man in possession of 400 rupees will not offer himself as a recruit for the Cavalry unless his relations are already in the corps, the simple reason being that he, as an outsider, will gain less by investing that sum in the regiment than out of it. The case is different with a man offering himself for the position of Silladar, or owner of more horses than one. He himself secures at once a respectable position in the corps, commands the prospect of rising to a commission, and not only finds employment for the investment of his money, but also secures a reasonable income, owing to the feasibility of working his "Pagah", or number of horses, with greater economy. These are certainly singular advantages to him-

self, but in them also will be found a corresponding profit and advantage to Government. We not only secure the services of a respectable and perhaps powerful retainer, but also assure ourselves of the loyalty of his party, the troopers of his horses being generally his own relations and friends. A Silladar, in fact, possesses a direct, personal, social, and influential heavy stake on the side of the Government he serves—a stake of such importance as to render him, his family and troopers, more loyal to the State in troublous times; while the single-horse owner has, perhaps, his 400 rupees, accumulated under privations, and no other interest, in the Government or its concerns. In proof of this, read the history of the Silladars of Hyderabad during the mutiny, and compare it with what happened in Bengal.

Here I tender my thanks to my former chiefs, C. B. Saunders, Esq., C.B., Sir Richard Meade, K.C.S.I., and Sir S. Bayley, K.C.S.I., for their uniform courtesy to me while filling the office of their adviser.

When Mr. Saunders was Resident in 1875, proposals were first submitted in view to disturbing the existing organisation of the Hyderabad Cavalry, and they commenced officially by the General Commanding the Contingent submitting to the Resident an order, which he proposed to issue to the Force, providing for the sale of horses belonging to pensioners or outsiders not in the service, and restricting future proprietorship to ten horses only; present Silladars of any number of horses not to be interfered with, so long as they remained in the service. To this the Resident replied, that the absorption of outside Silladars by degrees might be sanctioned, and meet with his approval, but restriction of a Silladar to ten horses only would change the character of service in the Contingent Cavalry, the more so when taken in conjunction with minor reforms already introduced and carried out by the General. These regiments of Hyderabad, he said, had stood the test of the Mutiny, and, although prepared for improvements, the Resident declared that the most mature consideration was necessary before any radical change was introduced into the system. On the whole, he thought it best to take the orders of the Government of India on this matter; but before doing so, would like to know whether the changes now proposed by the General, together with those already made, embraced all the reforms he intended to recommend; or whether, for example, he

desired an increase in the number of European officers; also, what pay he would assign to the Native Adjutant created by him, and whether a corresponding reduction should be made in that of the Rissaldar-Major.

Upon this the Brigadier-General, on 26th May 1875, submitted a Memorandum, embodying his proposals of reform in the Hyderabad Contingent. The most important measures contained therein were an increase to the number of European officers in Cavalry and Infantry, and the very gradual extinction of the Silladaree system in the Cavalry. In regard to the latter, he observed that the old Bengal Irregular Cavalry was constituted precisely as the Contingent Cavalry now is, on the Silladaree system, which it was found necessary to abolish, and the aim of his present proposal was to do carefully and very gradually for the Contingent Cavalry what has been done with so much advantage for the sister service. Respecting the increase of British officers, he considered it indispensably necessary. In his memorandum, the General shows how very weak every regiment and battery is in officers, not sufficient, in fact, to take the field in any case; and, as against the idea that because the Contingent has got on very well with its present complement of officers, and needs no more, he urges that the good services of these regiments in subsequent engagements were attributable to the increased number of British officers attached to them, and to the efficient leading of the latter. Further, he adds, in the old fighting days there was a British officer to every two companies, besides the Commanding Officer and Staff; moreover, there were four Brigadiers and their Staff Officers.

In concluding this part of his subject, he urges that the increase of officers is so important, that if the increased expenditure should be an obstacle to its being carried out, he would urge a reduction in the strength of the whole Force, in order to meet it.

Coming to the subject of the Silladaree system, the Brigadier-General declares that, whatever its merits may have been, its usefulness has passed away. The present Silladars have no claims on Government for services in the field, but are chiefly speculators, pocketing the profits of the soldiers. It was owing to them that the prices of "Assamees" have been inflated 200 per cent., and the controlling power is in their hands. To show that Native officers have too much power and influence under this

system, he quotes a General, who wrote twelve years before: "I know of a case where an officer holds sixty Assamees, who actually, in 1857, decided whether his regiment was to go on service or not. *It is true he used his power entirely for the advantage of the State, and has always shown himself a loyal and deserving servant of Government*, but I cannot believe that it is either safe or advisable to trust so much in the fidelity of any Native." (Note.—The *italics* are mine, as proving what I said above.)

"The above description", adds the Brigadier-General, "will answer to existing circumstances. The Native officer is alive, possesses more Assamees, and more influence than he did when those words were written." From paragraph 4 to No. 15 the General gives his reasons for recommending the gradual abolition of the Silladaree system. Among these are, "that it is disadvantageous to the interests of Government and unjust to the soldier. The latter does not get his pay nor give any loyalty to the State. Bargheers, or troopers, are dissatisfied and inefficient. A Bargheer cannot become the owner of a horse because he has no money."

It is needless to point out that under this system the tie between man and horse, so essential in all Cavalry, does not, cannot, exist. "Let vested rights", he says, "remain untouched; existing Silladars should be permitted to retain their Assamees while they remain in the service—not afterwards. The extinction of this system would be very gradual; it would occupy many years. But the measure, however gradually brought into operation, would infuse heart and hope into the troopers, who now feel that their career is without prospect."

The remainder of this Memorandum is taken up with minor subjects of detail, or interior economy of requirements, abolition of Native bankers, introduction of Bengal accounts, deposit and other funds, winding up with composition of regiments, in which the General recommends an increased number of other classes than Mohammedans, and is strongly in favour of the Sikh element, as being a fine race of fighting men.

The Resident at Hyderabad answered the General's communication and Memorandum on 10th June 1875, and informed him he would submit the whole correspondence, after printing, to the Government of India, and requested him to hold in reserve all

further measures, involving considerable or important changes in the constitution of the Force, or in the interior economy and discipline of its regiments, which might commit the Government to any particular line of policy before its orders were received.

It will be seen from the above Memorandum that the Brigadier-General, a Bengal officer, condemns a system which he knows little about, beyond that it has stood the test of time and rebellion, and proposes to introduce in its stead one that has done neither. The tendency of Bengal officers in those days was to suppose that all the institutions and organisations in their Presidency must be superior to those of others; and even the rude and startling lesson of the Mutiny did not altogether remove this idea, for here we find a Bengal officer, some years after, recommending the abolition of a military organisation which he admits proved itself loyal and useful to the State, in favour of a Bengal one, which was the very reverse. Such a proposal, in itself, is sufficiently condemnatory, and in submitting it, with the General's Memorandum, to the Governor-General, Mr. Saunders' opinions and expositions of the objectionable proposals are both elaborate and crushing.

Before going to it, however, I will give one more proof within my own knowledge of the loyalty and faithfulness of the Hyderabad Cavalry, under the Silladaree system, in the Mutiny in 1857-58. At that time there was stationed at a small cantonment, Lingasoo-goor, 200 miles from Hyderabad, a small detachment of Cavalry, consisting of one Native officer and twenty-five troopers, in addition to a regiment of Infantry and two guns. Every soldier of all arms was a native of the North of India, where rebellion was then raging. Sedition was rife in and around the little station, and armed rebels were gathering together on the frontiers. The Native officer of Cavalry and many of his men came from Delhi, where their families were shut up, for it was then besieged. The total number of English officers at that station was five, while the Natives probably numbered 2,000. Knowing that the Force would probably have to take the field, the chief military and civil officers called a council of war, inviting all the Native officers of all arms to attend. Every man not on duty came. The Council was addressed by the civil officer, also a military man, who informed them of the latest news from Bengal; also that the Chief of a neighbouring State was about to join the rebels, and the Commanding Officer

would shortly call for their services to fight the enemies of the State. Were they and their men ready, at all hazards, and in spite of all temptations, to support the cause of the Government they served? Every officer present rose and placed the hilt of his sword in the hand of each European officer in turn, and the Native Cavalry officer said "Inshallah! we are ready." A few days after, the Cavalry accompanied the guns on service under one English officer only, and behaved as well in the field as they did in camp. Not one word of discontent or rebellion was heard, and those soldiers were faithful and true under the most trying circumstances that can be conceived.

On the 3rd July 1875, Mr. Saunders commences his despatch by remarking that the General had not been long in command before he introduced one or two changes in the Cavalry branch without reference to the Resident, and shortly afterwards began to carry out a complete *bouleversement* of the old system in the Hyderabad Cavalry. Hence he interfered, and requested no further changes should be made pending orders from Government. Changes in interior economy of Cavalry Regiments, made on the General's own responsibility, will be referred to afterwards for the Governor-General's information, but for the present it is sufficient to discuss the Memorandum. The Resident proceeds to take the General's reasons for abolition of the Silladaree system one by one, as he cannot allow an old system to be abolished without explaining its nature and objects. He denies that the usefulness of the Silladaree system has passed away, and quotes despatches of General J. S. Fraser, "an officer of rare political sagacity, as well as extensive military experience", showing his high opinion of the Nizam's Cavalry under that system, and deprecating any changes therein. Again General Fraser, in another despatch, says, "The Nizam's Cavalry is of a peculiar character, and is, I believe, considered as the best of its kind in India."

As regards "discipline", under the Silladaree system, it may be admitted not to be such as the General approves; but that sort which is required for Regular troops is not necessary or judicious with Irregular Cavalry, into which the more respectable of the warlike classes of India would not enlist under a European system of discipline. The General's next objection is that the Silladaree system places too much power in the hands of Native officers.

Mr. Saunders remarks that it was made a special object to create in these regiments posts as Native officers in the prime of life,—posts which, from their duties and responsibilities, officers of ability and character might occupy with pride and satisfaction to themselves; and the Resident believes that this system has resulted in developing an exceptionally high stamp of Native troop commander. He quotes authorities to show that under a Silladaree system there is no difficulty in recruiting, as these regiments were maintained to absorb the military material abounding in the State, and not to import it from elsewhere. Such charges as “obstruction to efficiency” and “failure before the enemy”, the Resident remarks, he had never heard before, and meets them at once by quotations from official despatches of Sir Hugh Rose (now Lord Strathnairn), who states that the Hyderabad Cavalry showed admirable steadiness under fire, and thanks the Resident most cordially for “having allowed me to have the command of a large portion of your Force, which owes so much of its efficiency to the excellent organisation you introduced. I shall always remember the never-failing goodwill which its officers and men displayed towards myself, and the good service which they did to the cause of my Queen and country.” Records like these may be allowed to speak for themselves. It seems past dispute that the Contingent is now amply competent to perform all the duties devolving on it, in connection with the primary object of its formation, viz, the defence of the Nizam’s own country. It is also on record that on the only occasions of its being employed in the field against the enemies of India, its conduct earned for it the praise and admiration of its Generals. “Therefore”, says Mr. Saunders, “I really do not see any necessity, or even reasonable grounds, why the reorganisation of the Hyderabad Cavalry should be undertaken at the sacrifice of all those political and other advantages which cluster round the present system.” He objects strongly to the proposal that Silladars should be made to dispose of their “Assamees” on leaving the service, and quotes the instance of one of the finest officers of Cavalry, “Ahmed Buksh Khan”, whose son, in the same regiment, according to natural hereditary right, and the will of his father, succeeds to his troops, and horses, and horsemen, in the same manner as the knights of old.

Now, as regards the changes introduced in Cavalry arrangements

by the General, one was to order every Silladar or Bargheer to groom his own horse. In India, where Native grooms are always kept, it is unnecessary for a trooper to groom his horse, but in the Nizam's Cavalry it was a condition of his service that he was *not* to do so. This change not only caused the greatest vexation to all Native troopers, but it really was the thin end of a wedge intended to upset the system, root and branch. It had the immediate effect of making many Bargheers throw up our service, send in their resignations, and seek employment in other quarters, and Sir Salar Jung told the Resident that men were applying to enter his Cavalry. Other changes, such as cutting down the usual leave for Mohammedan festivals, importing saddles from *Cawnpur* (Bengal again), and putting the men under stoppages to pay for them, as well as for certain alterations in the Horse Lines, were quite enough to bring about among the Native Irregular troopers what is known as a "mistake", but would more properly be translated an *émeute*, which more recently actually occurred in one regiment.

Thus, Mr. Saunders laid before the Viceroy all that could be said, from his view, in favour of the old system, and did not attempt to disguise his appreciation of an organisation established by some of the most distinguished of his predecessors. At the same time, from a military point of view, he can offer no positive opinion as to whether the General's scheme of reorganisation should be set aside, or adopted. All he requests is, if the Silladaree system is to be retained, that such general instructions should be laid down by H.E. in Council as will obviate the risk of its being impaired from time to time by regimental commanders who may happen to condemn it; on the other hand, if reorganisation is to proceed, he trusts that the Silladaree system may not be abolished gradually, but *at once*, in accordance with proposals which he will make for suitable compensation in money, or otherwise, to every Native officer or soldier now in the Force, who cannot be made to fit into a place under the General's system, without present or future depreciation of his property, the lowering of his self-respect, or even the violation of his national or reasonable prejudices.

On 10th October 1875, the Government of India requested a further and fuller report on the several points mooted; and before this matter went further, Mr. Saunders had left Hyderabad and was succeeded by Sir Richard Meade, who possessed special

qualifications to report on this matter, as he had himself served both under the "Pagah" (or Silladaree) and "Khudaspa" systems.

On the 19th February 1876, Sir Richard Meade submits his report. He first wants to know if the Government deem it proper and desirable that the Hyderabad Cavalry should be assimilated in organisation and discipline to the Regular Army, as that is the General's intention. He assumes that the character of the Contingent as a local force, specially kept up for service within Hyderabad limits, and neither available for, nor liable to, employment beyond them, except in the contingency described in Treaty of 1853, is not open to doubt or question. He then states, *seriatim*, all the measures of reform proposed by the General, which have already been given above by Mr. Saunders, and in the Memorandum, and expresses his opinion on each. From his own experience in Gwalior under a similar organisation and the same number of officers as in the Hyderabad Contingent, he can only say that the former was, in all essential respects, efficient for the duties required of it, or that could be required of the Hyderabad Contingent within the Nizam's territories, and he cannot endorse the General's view, that an increase of European officers is absolutely necessary. If a reduction in strength of the Force is clearly required to render it efficient, the saving should be applied to decrease its general cost, and not to increase its officers.

Regarding the General's poor opinion of the Native officers of the Contingent, Sir R. Meade's knowledge in other parts leads him to believe that, with careful training and selection, a fair proportion would be found fitted to meet every requirement, and he does not concur in the opinion that Native officers are so useless and valueless as the General considers them to be. He is not prepared to condemn the Silladaree system absolutely. It was that originally and universally in force in our Irregular Horse, in which, as in the Contingent up to late years, it answered, on the whole, fairly for a long period. We were compelled to have recourse to it to some extent, when forced to raise a new army during the Mutiny, and may have to do so again, if any such convulsion recurs.

Sir R. Meade shares the opinion that an attempted extinction of this system will involve a serious interference with the rights of property which have been acquired in a duly recognised and sanc-

tioned state of things, and justice demands that such rights should not be injured ; and he thinks it will only be possible to bring about the change desired by the General very gradually, and, for the present, to but a partial extent. He then suggests a number of rules which might be adopted with advantage without injustice to existing interests. These consist chiefly of all the minor matters of detail mentioned in the General's "Memorandum", nearly all, however, tending to assimilation with the Regular Army. After making careful inquiry into the value and price paid for "Assamee" in the Hyderabad Cavalry of late years, it was found to have fallen to about the worth of a horse and equipment, while in the Nizam's Irregular Horse each Assamee was worth Rs.1,000, from which it may be assumed that the changes already introduced into the Contingent are unsuited to and unpopular with the military classes of the Deccan, who formerly filled its ranks. The General wishes the Cavalry Regiments to consist of three squadrons: one of Deccan or Rajputana Mohammedans, one of N.W.P. Mohammedans, and one of Sikhs. Sir R. Meade does not agree, but is of opinion that they should, as far as possible, be recruited from the Deccan, and Southern and Central India ; nor does he approve of the General's proposal for annual camps of exercise for Contingent troops.

Subsequently, Government issued its orders on this subject, and I here append the rules which were conveyed to the General Commanding to be carried out in the Cavalry Regiments.

Rules regarding sale and purchase of Assamees in the Hyderabad Contingent Cavalry Regiments, taken from letter No. 6, dated 19th February 1876, from the Resident at Hyderabad, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

"1. Silladars now in the Service will not be required to reduce the number of their assamees now held by them ; but no Silladar will, in future, be allowed to acquire by purchase or otherwise, except in the case hereinafter mentioned, more than (10) ten assamees, including those previously possessed by him.

"2. Where a Silladar is already the holder of (5) five or more assamees, he will not be at liberty to add to that number without the special permission of his Commanding Officer.

"3. If, on the demise of a Silladar, the heir to his estate is serving in the regiment, and the assamees held by the deceased become the property of such heir, he shall be allowed to inherit them without reference to the above limitations.

"4. If the heir of a deceased Silladar is not serving in the regiment, or is not at once entertained in it, the deceased's assamees will be sold.*

"5. Dismissal from the Service, or transfer of a Silladar to another corps, will involve the sale of his assamees, unless in the latter case they are transferred with him.

"6. No person of any class or description, not serving in a regiment, will be permitted to hold assamees in such regiment; and all assamees now held in contravention of this rule will be gradually sold off with as much consideration as possible for the interests of the holders.

"7. To enable Commanding Officers to aid deserving Bargheers, who desire to become Khudaspahs, by purchasing for them assamees offered for sale, or available therefor, under the foregoing rule, an advance of a maximum sum not exceeding Rs. (10,000) ten thousand will be authorised for each Corps for this purpose."

These were the only orders sanctioned by Government, and it was expected that they would have been generously carried out in the spirit in which they were conceived; but this was not the case. So determined was the General to substitute single proprietor system for the Silladaree, that he left no means untried to gain this point; and, on his departure from Hyderabad in 1881, he addressed Government direct, and commented on the late Resident's military administration. This letter was forwarded of course to Hyderabad for report; and, from the voluminous correspondence which followed, my readers will understand that for a second time I was overwhelmed with work in preparing memoranda for the new Resident's consideration. The General told the Government he had appealed in vain to the Resident for consideration and justice to be shown to the Bargheer class; and having been appointed by the Viceroy for the purpose of reforming the Contingent (this is not confirmed by official documents), he thinks it his duty to bring the whole matter under Government consideration before surrendering his command. Now, it will be seen from this that the General's advocacy has been in favour of one *class* of persons as against another, instead of a larger and more comprehensive support of a Bengal military system, as against one which, in my opinion, is not only superior, but far better

* It has been arranged, however, that in the event of an heir to such property showing promise of becoming a good soldier, he being a minor at the time, that the estate be held in trust until he join the ranks.

adapted to Hyderabad and its Cavalry. In support of this view, and at the request (see extract entered hereafter) of Sir S. Bayley, then Resident¹, I drew up a Memorandum embodying once more all the opinions I originally held, hold now, and will continue to hold on this matter.

Memorandum by Colonel Hastings Fraser, Military Secretary to the Resident at Hyderabad.

“When the question of the Silladari system was first mooted, I placed my views on the subject before the Resident, Mr. Saunders, who generally accepted them, and subsequent events proved that they were not entirely at variance with the orders which were issued to the Force after approval by the Government of India.

“I have, notwithstanding all that has been urged against this system, continued to hold the same opinion, and am still fully convinced that the requirements of the times neither demand nor justify changes being made in the Silladari system of the Hyderabad Contingent Cavalry without giving full compensation to Silladars, should it be proposed to take their assamees from them at a valuation; but I sincerely trust that I may show cause why it will be a better policy to encourage the retention of our old system, rather than destroy it.

“The constitution of the Contingent Cavalry is peculiar, and differs in so many ways from that of the Regular Army, that exceptional measures, in which usages of the Force have not been lost sight of, are always deemed necessary for the administration of the Contingent Cavalry.

“Unlike other regiments raised in times of emergency, and made up of men of all classes and nationalities, and, in some cases, disbanded when no longer required, the Contingent Cavalry is a kind of territorial regiment (a scheme the Secretary of State for War is now introducing into the British service), whose interests are confined to the country to which they belong, and from the military class of which they are to be recruited.

“These regiments were formed from small parties or squadrons maintained, and invariably commanded, by the chiefs and nobility of the country, who eventually settled down and became Silladars in the newly-formed regiments, the men of which were already equipped, and were good riders probably from their youth. All that Government had to do was to place a European officer in command of each regiment, who had simply to teach his men how to manœuvre according to the English mode of drill; the Silladar, or, as he was first designated, the Native Commandant, having the equipment of the men entirely in his own hands.

¹ See his letter, *post*, p. xl.

"Doubtless the original cost of an assamsee was moderate, compared with its market price in after years; but this enhanced value was not due, as is generally supposed, to a spirit of speculation, but to a desire on the part of wealthy Mohammedan gentlemen to obtain a footing in this popular branch of the Service, whereby they not only added to their own dignity, receiving a fair income for their money (which their religion forbids them to put out to interest), but also acquired the means of giving employment to such of their relatives and friends as were anxious to become 'Gentleman troopers,' a term then applied to the rider of a horse.

"As the original Silladars or founders of the regiments died, or retired, the number of assamees were gradually increased, either by distribution among the Silladar's relatives, or by sale; and so keen was the contest to obtain assamees, that native gentlemen vied with each other, regardless of cost, for the coveted position of Silladar, little dreaming that it would ever be proposed that their prescriptive rights should be interfered with. Up to the present time this has not been permitted by Government.

"Such is a brief outline of the assamee system, which always worked well, and was not only approved of by commanding officers generally, but strongly supported by successive Residents, whose orders on this subject are still on record. Extracts are to be found at pages 5 and 12 of a letter addressed to Government by Mr. Saunders, a former Resident, No. 79, dated 3rd July 1875.

"Although these opinions were offered many years ago, I nevertheless heartily re-echo the sentiments therein expressed, both with regard to the assamees, and the position of the Native officers; and from my long experience in the Contingent Cavalry, having served with it both in quarters and in the field, and in the administration of the Force, I have no hesitation in saying that the assamee system was and is the best for the Contingent Cavalry; it has never failed, although often put to severe tests on service. The Hyderabad Contingent was in the field and in Scindia's country when the Gwalior Contingent failed us, and subsequently the Hyderabad Contingent attacked and dispersed the Mahidpur local force, and captured from them their battery of Artillery and siege guns, having made two double marches of forty miles each to enable them to accomplish this end.

"No serious charge, that I am aware of, was ever brought against the assamee system of the Contingent Cavalry. The attacks that have been made on it from time to time were initiated by officers, fresh from commanding companies and troops of the line, who, apparently, could not be reconciled to the peculiar system which gave the Native officers of the Contingent much greater influence over the men than that exercised by Native officers of the Regular Regiments.

“When I consider the efforts that are now being made by Government to raise the tone and position of Native officers of the Regular Army, by entering their names in the Army List, insisting upon their performing the duties of company officers, refusing to promote the old stamp of men, and offering direct commissions to Native gentlemen, I cannot refrain from saying that the ‘cat’s-paw’ argument formerly brought to bear against the Silladar system (but in reality directed against the influence commanded by Native officers over their men) must, I think, in these days redound to the credit of the Contingent authorities, who have for seventy years maintained a system which required that Native officers should perform their legitimate duties as troop officers, and which system has at length been recognised by Government, and introduced into the armies of the three Presidencies.

“A system that has for so long a period induced Native gentlemen to enter our Cavalry Regiments is, I venture to think, worthy of some consideration, and it is my firm conviction that with the abolition of the assamees will also go the class of men that Government is now so anxious to induce to enter the Regular Army.

“Moreover, I do not think that under the Treaty obligations of 1853 we are justified in applying hard-and-fast rules so detrimental to the interest of the Silladars, and, in an indirect manner, compelling them to sell their assamees at one-half, and sometimes one-third, of their former selling value.

“This interference with the rights of the Silladars has, as was reported to Government by Mr. Saunders, been much canvassed by the men themselves, and is often made a subject of discussion by the people of the city of Hyderabad; and the general opinion is, especially among the relatives and friends of those Silladars who have inherited assamis which were originally conferred on their ancestors by the Nizam, that the British Government is not entitled to sequester them. The men of the Cavalry, while zealous in the performance of their duty, and loyal to the Government they serve, nevertheless tenaciously cling to what they consider their inherited rights and privileges, and look with suspicion and distrust on the introduction of any scheme that may tend to vitiate these rights and privileges, as was the case recently in the 4th Regiment Cavalry when a new system was introduced. If, regardless of the inherited rights of the Cavalry Silladars, it is intended that the Khudaspa system should be introduced into the Contingent, I trust it may not be carried out in the hasty manner as has been done in the 3rd Cavalry. I would propose that the Government orders of 1876 be strictly adhered to, and should any assamees lapse, full compensation be paid to the heirs, at the rate estimated when Sir George Yule was Resident, viz., Rs. 1,200. I allude to this estimate because I not only consider it equitable, but the

Silladars cannot then complain at being called on to relinquish their assamees; whereas any estimate based on the realisation of sales that have taken place in recent years would not give satisfactory results, as it is well known that not only has a certain amount of coercion been brought to bear upon such sales, but that fair bidding has in many instances been discouraged by officers favourable to the new system. A Silladar in the 4th Cavalry petitioned the late Resident to the effect that he had been turned out of the Service for no fault of his, but merely on his having been declared physically unfit, and on his wishing to devise his assamees to his brother, who was serving in the regiment, he was not permitted to do so. On inquiry, the petitioner's statement was found to be true. A special invaliding committee pronounced the man perfectly fit for further service, and Sir R. Meade ordered his reinstatement, and the restoration to him of his assamees, and any loss arising from the transaction should be borne by the officer who had acted contrary to the orders of 1876.

"It is urged that putting up an assamee to auction leads to those acquiring this property incurring debt. This may have been the case formerly, when Native bankers were allowed to establish themselves in the bazaars of the regiments. This is prohibited now, and all bids hereafter will be made by men who have saved money for this purpose, and who, if Mohanmedans, cannot otherwise invest their savings.

"Sir S. Bayley proposes to let the system authorised in 1876, and recently republished in Resident's General Orders, have a trial for two years. During this period it will be amply proved whether, in fixing the price of the assamee at Rs. 1,200, we have over-estimated the amount.

"Scarcely any change of importance can in these days be made without in some way inflicting hardship on some parties, and as, in such cases, the minority usually have to suffer, so our Silladars, who, though small in number, are great in influence, will be the sufferers if we persist in forcing the Khudaspas system on them. I doubt the policy of even purchasing such a change.

"The Khudaspas system, if really the best, as is so often asserted, will of itself take root and flourish without any care or attention on our part. All that we have, in my humble opinion, to do is to recognise both systems, and to leave them to stand or fall by their own merits. There must be no restriction placed on Silladars purchasing assamees to the extent allowed by the regulations.

"My note would be incomplete were I to allow the statements of Generals Wright and Gough against the Silladar system to pass without noticing some of the reasons they assign for condemning our present system. They argue that it is opposed to the maintenance of

discipline, as they consider it a failure, or rather that it tends to maintain a rough organisation and a loose discipline.

"Assuming for a moment that these defects belong to, and exist with, that system, I have only to point out that it has been demonstrated beyond question that they have not been instrumental in lessening the martial qualities and efficiency in the field of the Force. Sir Hugh Rose's record, as inserted at page 12 of Mr. Saunders' letter, already quoted, is proof that the Hyderabad Contingent Cavalry proved its efficiency from its state of organisation, and that the system tended to produce results which afforded complete satisfaction to those who had an opportunity of forming a judgment, not theoretically, but practically.

"Generals Wright and Gough urge a system that they have been accustomed to. If they see defects in practice in working the Hyderabad Cavalry system, they can be, and perhaps ought to be, remedied, but without necessitating a change in the system itself, which, in principle, has served its object well in the past, affording, as it surely did, a means of living to the respectable and high-spirited military classes of the Deccan.

"It is asserted that the old system did not provide for grooming horses by their riders, and therefore stable duties were neglected. Now it must be admitted that this has nothing to do with the principle of the Silladari system itself. This concerns merely the practice obtaining in the Hyderabad Cavalry. Originally it was not contemplated that a Cavalry soldier was to groom his horse, while a liberal allowance granted by Government for its maintenance provided for the employment of a syce for that purpose.

"I do not say that a soldier of the Hyderabad Cavalry will hesitate to groom the horse he has ridden, when separated by necessity or by duty from his attendant, the syce. I am aware, from personal knowledge, that the contrary is the case.

"An officer does not groom his horse, and this does not detract from his efficiency as a soldier. So also a Cavalry trooper, on whose horse a syce is employed, was never expected to groom it, to render him more efficient than he otherwise would have been. Stable duties might rather be superintended by the Cavalry soldier, and his efficiency be thus established without wounding his feelings, as there is no doubt that the work is looked down upon as menial by those of the Contingent Cavalry who seemingly have acquiesced in its introduction. I make the above statement from a knowledge of the number of men who have left the Service, and are leaving it, as soon as they have served sufficiently long for their pensions, and accepting service in the Reformed and other Troops of His Highness the Nizam's Government. The average service of the men who have this year been pensioned in

the Cavalry Regiment at Bolaram, near Hyderabad, is only 23 years and some days. They carry with them their pension of 3½ Government rupees, and Commandants of regiments in the Nizam's service readily entertain these men.

"Again, it has been asserted that the Silladar system leads to rough organisation and loose discipline, as a Silladar owning two or more horses may come under the command of his own bargheer. Now this latter phase has been rendered impossible by the rule that every non-commissioned officer is to be a Silladar.

"In this manner I say that every defect in practice that may crop up can be remedied by rules which need not interfere with the principle of the Silladari system; and now I would state my arguments in favour of the retention of the system which has proved successful hitherto. Before doing so, I will notice one more point in General Wright's letter, addressed direct to the Government of India, in the margin of paragraph 11 of the second enclosure of which there appears a petition addressed to him by the Bargheers of the 4th Cavalry, praying to be made Khudaspa. Small blame to their wishing to acquire assamees at a third of the price originally paid by the Silladars. Three of our regiments of Cavalry, the 1st, 2nd, and 4th, have still a number of pagahs existing in them, as the officers commanding these corps have rightly interpreted the orders issued in 1876, and have not hastily adopted the views of the General Officer lately commanding the Continent.

"To pursue my arguments now. First, in the good faith of the British Government, many a family of wealth and position changed service from under the Nizam to the British, under promises made to them by the Native Government that their privileges would be respected by the Government to whom they were transferred. In 1828,¹ and on several subsequent occasions, the Resident directed in General Orders and in correspondence that their privileges were not to be interfered with. Again, in 1864, in 1876, and in 1881, orders have been pro-

¹ "This was on the occasion of the outbreak of a mutiny in the 3rd Cavalry, in which the Commanding Officer was cut down on parade by a few of his own mutinous men, and which was chiefly caused by the arbitrary introduction of certain measures of a harsh nature, some of which were similar to those recently introduced by General Wright.

"An extract regarding this case, and the orders thereon by the Honorable the Court of Directors, will be found at pages 22 and 23 of Mr. Saunders' letter No. 79, dated 3rd July 1875, and Brigadier-General Wright's attention was drawn in October 1878 to the Resident's General Order issued at the time, directing the utmost freedom to be allowed to Silladars in the disposal of their assamees, and he was informed that the order was still in force, and should be strictly adhered to."

mulgated, placing the Silladari system on a basis tending to afford Silladars security, and it would be a breach of faith now if those rules are set aside.

“The question naturally arises, What have our Silladars done that their annihilation is proposed? Have they given offence? Have they failed in duty? Have they behaved badly before the enemy? ‘No’, the answer comes; ‘but their existence is incompatible with discipline, and they hold power which rightly belongs to the European Commissioned officers.’ I say rules can be framed that can remove all power from the Silladar, and that without either affecting his purse, or that of the Nizam’s Government, and also without interfering with the Silladari system of the Hyderabad Cavalry.

“The changes proposed tend again to require the presence of additional commissioned (British) officers with corps, in direct infringement of the Treaty of 1853, which required our administration of the Force on economical principles, and a few years saw the charges reduced from 40 to 24 lakhs yearly. Another consideration is, if the assamees are taken over at the full value, the Government itself will become a grand Silladar of the Hyderabad Cavalry, and they will become the great owners of the extra horses of the present Silladars at a heavy cost, which will considerably lessen the surplus revenue the Nizam is entitled to. We are already, by furnishing new arms to the Contingent, adding considerably to the charges, and any further additional expenditure will naturally affect the surplus.

“Any change of system, I fear, will have the effect of removing gradually, if not quickly, those men and the sons of those men upon whom we relied in 1857. In the 3rd Cavalry, the most influential Silladar is leaving, and he is removing his sons from the Service. In the place of the old class, mercenaries from Hindustan have been freely invited to enter the ranks, contrary to the orders of Government. I feel confident that many of those coming from the north are the sons and relatives of the mutineers of 1857.

“The Silladar’s right to nominate his own Bargheer is allowed with reluctance, although more than once the attention of General Officers has been called to the subject.

“A foot-note at page 17 of Mr. Saunders’ letter, already referred to, mentions his intention of requiring the Brigadier-General Commanding the Hyderabad Contingent to submit, for the Resident’s information, copies of all important orders issued by him to the Hyderabad Contingent, as was done formerly. This is the practice observed in the Punjab Force, and I would strongly recommend its adoption in the Hyderabad Contingent. [This order has now been issued.]

“If the Silladari system, as it now is, be allowed to continue, and if

the defects are pointed out, arising from the pursuance of our old practice, I feel I can submit subsidiary rules that will remove such defects without in any way touching the privileges pecuniarily of the present Silladars and their heirs.

"I have in the foregoing endeavoured to avoid any of the points taken up by former Residents, and have consequently confined myself to an expression of my opinion as to what I, from long experience, consider necessary for the Contingent Cavalry.

"HASTINGS FRASER, Colonel,

"Military Secretary.

"Hyderabad Residency,

"2nd August 1881."

As I was aware that many months must elapse before this correspondence would be disposed of, and having observed for some time past that the Resident's orders were being set aside, thereby creating ill-feeling, a mutiny having taken place in one regiment, I obtained Sir S. Bayley's permission to reissue the orders of 1876, and to require strict adherence to them. Needless to add, that this produced more letters from the General Commanding the Force, who found fault with the wording of some rules being different from those of 1876; but this was explained, and the orders remained in force. An attempt was made to have the order cancelled, but it was too late, and, moreover, I informed the Resident that it was no fresh order, but only that of 1876 reiterated. In the Confidential Department I communicated my reasons for taking the action I found it necessary to adopt on that occasion. In August 1882, the Governor-General of India in Council addressed the Resident at Hyderabad, conveying his orders upon a report submitted by the General Commanding, on the question of the necessity for compensation to Silladars of the Hyderabad Cavalry, on account of depreciation in value of their assamees, and on the future arrangements to be made for the maintenance of the Silladaree system as originally existing in the Contingent. I regret to say that the compensation had not been granted prior to my departure.

I append an extract from that letter, which settles this matter up to the date above-named; and I may here mention that reference is made in this work to the difference between General Fraser and Lord Dalhousie in connection with this same subject, and the order here given is quite in accord with my father's views.

(EXTRACT.)

"4. The proposals of Sir Charles Gough for the extinction of the Silladari system, as supported by Sir Stuart Bayley, appear to be as follows :—

"I.—That the privileges conferred in 1876 be restricted to Silladars who were such previous to 25th April 1876.

"II.—Men enlisted since, or who have become Silladars since the 25th April 1876, not to be allowed to hold any bargheer assamees unless already in possession of them.

"III.—Each man to provide himself with horse, pony, and appointments, paying Rs. 500.

"5. The Governor-General in Council is not prepared to accept these proposals unreservedly, as they appear to amount to restricting the rules of 1876 retrospectively to those Silladars who were then in the Service, and fixing a minimum horse price at Rs. 500 for the future.

"The rules of 1876, sanctioned by the Government of India, were framed to get rid of the abuse of the Silladari system; and were republished in 1881 in the General Orders of the Hyderabad Residency, No. 139 of the 16th June 1881. These rules contain no hint of such a limitation as is now proposed by Sir Charles Gough, and the Government of India consider that they must be held to apply to all those who have entered the Hyderabad Contingent Cavalry since 1876, and that they must be strictly maintained without any deviation from them until further orders.

"6. I am therefore to request that the proposals of Sir Charles Gough for the future, as approved by Sir Stuart Bayley, may be clearly formulated, and that a date may be proposed for their introduction if approved by the Government of India, it being distinctly understood that they will not in any way apply to any persons who have entered the Cavalry of the Hyderabad Contingent up to the date which may be fixed."

The orders now issued arose out of correspondence which passed prior to the advent of Sir S. Bayley's successor to the post of Resident at Hyderabad. The Civilian who relieved him was followed again by another non-military officer, making in the whole three in succession who had to consider these important military matters. During the latter end of the year 1883 I found it necessary to submit again a confidential paper in regard to proceedings of some officers in the Force, whose acts tended to subvert the principles of the rules laid down by the Government. To render futile such interference in future, I proposed to lay down subsidiary rules.

I reiterated my desire, a second time, to have my views placed before the Government. I now applied for furlough. This I am at present enjoying. It will extend to the 20th January 1885, when I obtain my Colonel's allowances. I must revert now to proceedings at Hyderabad after Sir S. Bayley's departure.

Sir S. Bayley was succeeded by Mr. W. B. Jones, who was Chief Commissioner of Berar, a post for which he was eminently fit, and as he is now filling the office of Chief Commissioner of Nagpur, his talents for civil administration find a fair field for their exercise. His health failed him at Hyderabad, and he begged for transfer on Mr. Morris's departure. Mr. Jones was of kindly disposition, and his hospitality proverbial. During the short period he remained at Hyderabad two events of importance occurred, viz., the death, first, of Sir Salar Jung, and the loan proposed to be borrowed in England for the Chanda Railway. Soon after he assumed office, under the encouragement given me by Sir S. Bayley, who, in a letter to Government in the Financial Department, dated 13th July 1882, says, at para. 8: "I can safely say that Colonel Hastings Fraser has on several occasions brought to my notice innovations tending to increased expenditure, which an external Audit Department, with only the somewhat indefinite code of local rules to guide it, would probably have failed to check"; thus commending me for watchful attention in view to saving expenditure; so that the Berar surplus revenue might not be lessened. I drew up a Memorandum, which I submitted to Mr. Jones for eventual report to Government, as the surplus was considerably lessened yearly by what I considered a too frequent change in the armaments of the Contingent Force. In that Memorandum I show that from 1871-73 new smooth-bore muskets were supplied, costing Rs. 1.19.900, and so soon after as 1875 a change was made, and Enfield rifles supplied to Infantry, costing a sum of Rs. 1.42.600. This was completed in 1878; and a year later, when our troops were ordered to be in readiness for field service, they were hurriedly armed with Sniders, the former arms being found unfit for active service. Now the whole Force nearly is armed with Sniders, which cost Rs. 3.90.000; of this amount one lakh was for Cavalry carbines, the cost of which hitherto was borne by Silladars, and not paid out of State revenue. Arms are supposed to last for twelve years. Another loss was the breaking up and destroying of old stores and arms instead of returning them

to the Nizam's Government. I pointed out then that our true policy is to make fast friends of the Native Princes of India, by every means in our power, and to show more confidence in them as the best of our allies in time of war. I indicated the great strides that Russia was making in the East, having in twenty-three years annexed about 1,224,000 square miles, and declared we ought to consider how we are to act when we find Russia one fine morning knocking at our gates for admission. I heard no more in regard to this paper, but members of the Press in England will notice that what I anticipated at that time has taken place—that Russia understands the use she can make of her irregular hordes; and it is with a special view to having troops capable of meeting such levies that I advocate the retention of our Irregular Forces, and that the Native States should be encouraged to improve them. Anyone acquainted with India must be aware that should Russia invade India (I am not one of those who believe that this is her object, and am of opinion that diplomacy may bring about an understanding that she will rest contented with what she has acquired) it would be in her power to slip her Irregulars to plunder the country while her Regular Army advances to be met by ours. But where are our Irregulars to meet hers? They require no tents or commissariat. From October to the following rains the country is covered with crops, and in whichever direction the Irregulars move, food exists in abundance for them. Lord Strathnairn declares, in his letter to the Resident, that our horse were “the wings of his operations”.

That I have always felt sympathy for the Nizam's Government and its soldiers is known to many, and I insert here a letter which, at that time, I desired might be considered confidential, as I was on the point of returning to India to be employed again, I hoped, in the Political Department, and which I wrote to Sir Stafford Northcote by permission of the Secretary of State for India (1866). I beg attention to it, as, from my remarks therein, it will be seen how highly I esteemed the late Sir Salar Jung. It is a pleasure to me to publish a private letter from him, as showing his personal feelings towards and regard for me also. [See lithographed letter.]

“SIR,—I have now the grateful honour to offer for consideration the views of British policy towards Hyderabad, which you have been pleased to invite, through Mr. W. S. Northcote's obliging note of the 21st ult., in reply to my proposal to submit them, and I beg leave to assure you

11th December 18th 44
Campybraham Pth

My dear Friend

I have the pleasure to
acknowledge the receipt of
your two very kind notes of yesterday
and the day before, which were
delivered to me immediately after
my arrival here (Ibrahim Pth).

Pray accept my best thanks
for your kindness and the very
attention you have shown in
keeping the Utterdun ready for
me according to native customs
and hope that all your brother
gentlemen will follow your
example, I like to be liberal
as far as the improvement

of the people and advancement
of public life is connected, but
I assure you I like to be a perfect
conservative where the question
of national usages and customs
comes forward if they do not
interfere in any improvement as
above mentioned, so I think I
can ~~win~~ have the sympathy of the both
parties.


As soon as I had the pleasure
of perusing ~~your~~ your kind note
I sent Mr Woodworth (my Chaplain)
to the City to take all the Comrades
who have left your camp without
your ~~knowledge~~ knowledge to your camp by
tomorrow, but I think that they

had not been safe
have to remain to it

I am sure that
pleased to learn the
Wife and Family
their breakfast is
not comfortable for
we will have this
block this afternoon

Hoping that you
my bad English. We
to self and friends.

Believe
Yours
L.A.



no advancement
is connected, but
I like to be a perfect
where the question
usage and customs
if they do not
improvement as
I think I
both

Had not been informed that they
have to remain with the camp

I am sure that you will be
pleased to learn that my Mother
Wife and Daughters enjoyed
their breakfast in your small
but comfortable parlour here
We will leave this at about
2 o'clock - this afternoon.

Hoping that you will excuse
my bad English With kindest regards
To self and friends

Believe me
Yours very sincerely
S. L. S. J.

that the opportunity thus kindly afforded is embraced with singular satisfaction. For having steadfastly adhered, with maturing conviction, to the Conservative principles derived from my father, General Fraser, and from the late Colonel Davidson, I am, indeed, happy to have to vindicate them before the distinguished upholder of justice to Mysore, from attacks upon like-minded policy which they have for several years sustained from journals in the adverse interest. Nor can I feel other than encouraged by the precedent of a wise and generous dealing with the claims of the Rajah in attempting to elucidate the Nizam's.

"The starting-point for a clear understanding of our position at Hyderabad must be at least as remote as the period (1820-25) of Sir Charles Metcalfe's Residency, when he prevailed with the Nizam, Secunder Jah, to sanction administration of his territory, and collection of its revenue, by European District Superintendents, as set forth in a work (p. 232) which I published in 1865, called *Our Faithful Ally: The Nizam*, and two copies of which are herewith forwarded for the honour of your acceptance.

"Down to the demise of that Sovereign, the reform thus initiated was attended with excellent results, in suppression of disorder and development of resources; but its circumstances were not favourable to permanence. The persuasive influence of Sir Charles was, practically, compulsion of a weak Prince, connived at by a Minister (Chundoo Lal) who cared for nothing but retention of a lucrative position, and who unscrupulously bartered the independence of his master for the personal support of our Residents. In fact, this creature's corrupt subservience to the official rapacity of the time was a primary and abiding cause of the embarrassments which have beset the dynasty. Through such means and motives, relatives and friends from England were readily hoisted into the Nizam's service, entailing an annual extra—as shown in the recent Parliamentary return¹—of thirteen lakhs upon the charge of the Contingent. It is not surprising that Nasir-oo-Dowlah, the late Nizam, on accession in 1829, hastened to mark his sense of an obviously degrading attitude, in the only feasible direction, by formally requesting immediate withdrawal of the English supervisors. To this impulsive requisition Lord William Bentinck, on a principle of non-interference, did not hesitate to accede.

"You are generally aware, Sir, no doubt, of the extent to which the Nizams—before even this date—had been burdened and drained by excessive military expenditure, and by consequent financial straits. I need hardly remind you how the covenanted equipment (in 1800) of Native troops, to the extent of 9,000 horse and 6,000 infantry, was

¹ "*East India (Deccan)*, No. 338—to which I beg to be understood as hereafter referring—at page 27, paragraph 11."

gradually swollen to a force whose "extravagant costliness" was distinctly admitted (as hereafter quoted) by Lord Dalhousie, and which was less gradually reduced from the enormous annual outlay of forty lakhs to about twenty-four, so soon as we assumed control of it. A prominent result of this oppressive impost may be recalled, in the enforced surrender by Secunder Jah of an annual tribute from the Northern Circars of seven lakhs, which he had to alienate (in perpetuity) for little more than half of its real value, or, to be precise, 1.16.66.666 rupees, thus losing, for temporary relief, an income which, properly husbanded, would have gone far to extricate him. Nor should it be overlooked that the heaviest claim (a substantial trifle of 78.70.670 rupees) was that of Messrs. Palmer and Co., of Hyderabad, whose advances had twice over been legalised by the British Government. For further particulars of Hyderabad indebtedness, I would refer you to a published pamphlet by a Native gentleman, Mr. Poorooshottum, whose averments will be found sustained in more than one despatch of Colonel Davidson in the same (338) Return.

"My father (then Colonel Fraser) was appointed to the Residency in 1838. Making himself thoroughly acquainted with the causes of a chronic deficit whose harassing effects (in arrears of pay, etc.) were constantly pressed upon his attention, he conceived the idea of reverting to the system abruptly repealed in 1829—that of placing specified districts under the improving management of English superintendents until the Nizam should be free from debt. The General's aim and intention were strictly and honourably limited. Of holding beyond the projected release from financial difficulties he never dreamed; and when he became aware of a settled purpose at headquarters of assuming such districts on terms repugnant to his sense of right, he quietly resigned his post. This, Sir, is the head and front of an offending which free (or mercenary) lances have repeatedly assailed, but which he would never stoop to vindicate. A son's anxiety, however, not to lose the advantage of this opportunity, may, I think, reckon upon kindly sympathy.

"Not presuming to speculate upon the change of design which finally determined my father's course, I can affirm (upon letters in my possession) that, at one time, Lord Dalhousie's intention was to regard the contemplated districts in the light of a mortgage; and from the same source I derive a strong belief that had his Lordship lived he would have counselled restitution of them, for I find him declaring as follows: 'My own opinion of the affairs of that kingdom' (Hyderabad) 'remains as it was when I had the pleasure of conferring with you. Full examination of past representations, and of despatches up to the present time' (October 13, 1848) 'compels me to feel that the state of the country from any supposed oppression or misrule is not such as to warrant an interference by the British Government at present. I remain of

opinion that an interference will become necessary; but I think that the necessity will be brought about by a financial catastrophe, and not by any popular outbreak, or by any disorganisation of the Army, such as it is, or of the administration of the Government in the provinces, such as it is. While I am not one of those who regard the Contingent Force as an oppression and an injustice, I yet think that we do not stand free of blame in respect of the footing on which we have maintained it; and whenever the Nizam shall manifest a sincere wish to enter into an amendment of his administration, I shall be ready, on the part of the Government of India, to meet his endeavours to reduce the expenditure of his kingdom by entering on the consideration of the means of diminishing the extravagant costliness of this Force and its appendages.' Subsequently, when Lord Dalhousie had determined upon interfering, with a view to freeing the Nizam of his difficulties, he remarked, in another letter:—'It would not be expedient yet to make the announcement definitively to the Minister. Its necessity, however, at an early period appears so probable, that I beg to have confidentially your views on the particular district which may be most conveniently *mortgaged*, as it were, for this purpose.' Again, his Lordship declares:—'I will rigidly act up to the requirements of the Treaty with him. I will give him aid and advice. I will effectually take care that, if he chooses to ruin himself, in spite of aid and advice, he shall not disturb the peace of British territory, or either injure or play with British interests. But I will not contravene the Treaty on the pretence of protecting the Nizam; and I disavow the doctrine of our having any moral or political obligation to take the Government of his country into our own hands, merely because he mismanages his own affairs. And I recognise no mission entrusted to us to regenerate independent Indian States, merely because they are misgoverned.'

"It may be remarked that the foregoing admission of an internal quietude not warranting interference was made shortly before the Punjaub and Oude annexations, and that the peace of Hyderabad was thereafter disturbed by an influx of dispersed ruffianism from those countries. The Nizam himself very neatly and pertinently disclaimed responsibility for the unwelcome novelty, in reply to a remonstrance from General Low, upon the ominous presence of so many Rohillaes and Afghans in the country. 'How many miles,' quoth His Highness, 'do they pass through British territory before they get into mine? Why do you let them come?' The retort was justified by events. While our administration somehow issued in widespread rebellion, the Nizam not only kept his kingdom quiet, but could afford—as testified by Colonel Davidson, p. 16, par. 18—to lend us the assistance of his Contingent, and to defray the extra allowance which their auxiliary service entailed.

"The carrying out of Lord Dalhousie's ultimate decision devolved, of

course, upon my father's successor; but I know—and it is corroborated by a statement in one of Colonel Davidson's despatches, p. 4, par. 7—that the Nizam and his Minister fully understood *two annas* in the rupee to be the fixed charge for management of the assigned districts. This proportion was, in 1860, declared by Lord Canning to be limited to four annas, which, although ostensibly an arbitrary duplication of the original agreement, was fairly based upon the average cost of British districts. Of a settlement thus formal and authentic, it might have been predicted, without abject credulity, that one more double (or eight annas) would prove the extreme of official hardihood; but reference to last year's Administrative Report will prove indisputably that, to secure a payment of twenty-four lakhs to the Contingent, we have actually squared Lord Canning's revise by spending upwards of sixteen annas. No wonder, and little credit, that six clear years rolled by before a single rupee of the stipulated surplus revenue was transferred to the Nizam's treasury.

"I would here crave indulgence for digressing to rectify a distortion by the *Friend of India* of a passage (p. 28, par. 15) in Colonel Davidson's despatch, No. 91, upon which that journal has ventured with characteristic acrimony. It is within my knowledge, Sir, that the Colonel in that sentence intended to convey to the Government that the Natives of the assigned districts were delighted at being restored to the old dominion, although fear was at first afloat that the leases granted under British management might be set aside. Speedily reassured by a proclamation from the Minister that our administration would not be materially changed, they hailed with unqualified satisfaction the policy which had restored them to the Nizam. For this assurance I have the voucher of Colonel Davidson's autograph marginal note—one of many which I took at his instigation. Indeed, I was always advised and encouraged by him, during the many years of our close official intercourse, to examine fully all records of our relations with the Court and country; and it was thus that I acquired the materials for my historical narrative, which I have translated into Hindustance also, for publication on my return to India, intended in next January. I fondly imagined (begging excuse of a little egoism) that in drawing up that narrative I was doing the Government a service; but, having been superseded by a civilian at Hyderabad, I am forced to conclude that the effort was not appreciated by the dominant influence, and that zealous study of political duties by a soldier is in temporary disfavour. I trust, however, that, having so qualified myself, after no inactive career in my original profession, I may obtain employment again in that branch of the Service. But it is more than time, I fear, to revert to my subject.

"Of the feeling of the Hyderabad Government upon Berar, and our retention of it, there can be no doubt whatever. It has been, I may

say, categorically elicited in the enclosed answers (marked B) to a series of questions which I have not been able to find, but which may be readily collected from the replies. That the restoration of Berar would materially strengthen the hands of the present upright and able Minister—both for the good of his country and to other promotion of English interests—I am fully convinced. Sir Salar Jung has already to contend with a quasi-hereditary stain of presumptive British leaning. His uncle, and predecessor in the office, is universally held to have broken his heart over the treaty assigning Berar; and every suggestion from the relative of the chief instrument in that detested transfer is received with suspicion. Salar Jung is essentially our friend, and I cannot refrain from deferentially submitting that to him—in the event of our relinquishing Berar—should be conceded the grace of announcing the restoration to the Nizam, so that His Highness may be made to feel how mainly he owes the boon to the conduct and sagacity of his Minister. I do not hesitate to avow that my admiration of the latter in his public capacity, and for his multiform service in the Mutiny, is enhanced by personal regard. As young contemporaries, we were long associated in both sport and study; and I have the gratification of enclosing a copy of a letter which I received from him on leaving Hyderabad, and which, coupled with the address from a middle-class body which I did myself the honour of forwarding for your perusal, may serve to show that my discharge of official duties at this Court conciliated a tolerably wide range of goodwill. The private friendship thus agreeably testified has frequently enabled me to make the most of a subordinate diplomatic position by tendering advice in the direction of economy and administrative reform, which, I humbly conceive, has not been wholly wasted. Such, at any rate, was the earnest aim of my work at Hyderabad, which, under a less anti-military *régime*, I would be happy enough to resume.

“In conclusion, Sir, I heartily hope to convince you, by this statement, that restitution of Berar would be at once just and politic; though I indulge the hope that considerations so really identical are no longer to be systematically sundered in the management of Indian affairs. Having shown that the ideas and overtures preliminary to the treaty of '53 tended and pointed to eventual restoration, I confidently reaffirm that, the debt being formally cancelled in 1860, we had no right, in opposition to the expressed wish of their rightful lord, to retain the assigned districts; and that the implied wrong has been flagrantly aggravated by subsequent absorption, year after year, of the stipulated surplus in food for official patronage. That restitution of them would materially strengthen the hands of the Minister, I have already urged; and I may add that in the training of his family he has conscientiously prepared for active utilisation of the new field and career in this

direction for which he so ardently longs. He has, moreover, inspired the native landowners with emulation of a wholesome example; and many of the nobles are, I know, already learning to manage and administer their districts in an improved fashion. In one case, I have been the medium of supplying a Native gentleman (a Talooqdar, in charge under one of the Nizam's relations) with a complete set of instruments for land survey. But the proportions and import of this question are, believe me, not limited within the borders of Hyderabad. All India—or native Hindostan—knows that in this case a revenue administered in trust has been forcibly retained. Without dwelling upon the sure effects of such a conviction upon a temper so shrewdly tested, I will simply declare that I cannot over-estimate the beneficial influence throughout the peninsula which might be exerted by a simple act of justice and redress in restoring Berar to the Nizam.

“In the accompanying papers, Sir, I lay before you all the documentary evidence of Native views and feeling at present within my reach; but I must ask that they be regarded as confidential, and that no reference to this private communication be made, should you hereafter extend to the Nizam a conciliatory policy so happily begun with Mysore. I am most happy, I repeat, in the opportunity of placing them in your hands, finally commending the Minister's Memorandum, once more, to your especial consideration. Inquiry on the spot—the sooner and more searching the better—will fully sustain his assurance that he could easily pay the Contingent at the reduced rate, and effectually promote the happiness and contentment of his own people with the surplus which official patronage annually arrests on what I have shown to be its legal and equitable road.”

(B.)

“1. Were Berar restored to the Nizam, it would be administered on the same plan as it is now under the British Government, just as the other restored districts are. The roads and other public works would be attended to in common with those in other parts of the country, and as circumstances and the state of trade required; but the surplus funds, now devoted to the improvement of Berar exclusively, would be available for the general improvement of His Highness's territory.

“2. This is a question I might be excused from answering; but it appears to me, as the British Government prefer spending all the surplus revenue in the improvement of Berar, instead of paying it to the Nizam as the Treaty engagement requires, that if Berar be absorbed in British territory, its revenues would be included in the general revenue of India, and money would be expended for improvements in Berar, only in proportion to other districts of the British territory.

“3. Of course every effort would be made to carry on the Adminis-

tration for the improvement of cultivation and well-being of the ryots. Probably schools and other public institutions would not at once be established, as extravagance and consequent embarrassment must be avoided, but everything that is necessary would be gradually introduced.

"4. The Contingent was kept up on a very expensive scale, when cash payments were required from the Nizam. Had this force been at the present reduced strength, there would have been no difficulty in meeting the demand and avoiding the embarrassment which resulted in the assignment. The Nizam could now easily and readily meet the demand, on account of the Contingent as now constituted, if the districts were restored.

"5. You might recollect I told you that I was endeavouring to establish the Administration on distinct and settled rules and regulations, so that my successor may have a plan ready to his hand, and he would be under the necessity, for his own credit's sake, to carry on the Administration on my plan, or otherwise improve it."

After my departure from India, an article appeared, copied in the local paper, and extracted from the *Bombay Gazette* in March, recording a portion of my career in India, and I give it here for the purpose of showing that the outside public were cognisant of my efforts to prevent injustice being done.

"This officer, the Military Secretary to the British Resident at Hyderabad, who has just proceeded to Europe on his well-earned furlough, is the eldest son of the late General J. S. Fraser, the Resident at Hyderabad from 1838 to 1853. Born on 30th October 1829, and educated at Kensington Grammar School, Colonel Hastings Fraser obtained his first commission, Ensign, in 1847, in which year he made his first acquaintance with Hyderabad, where he arrived in order to join his father. At Mulkapoor he was met by two squadrons of Cavalry, consisting of a hundred men, commanded by a Munsubdar of high rank, by order of the Nizam Nascer-ood-Dowlah, whose directions were that they should escort young Fraser to his destination. This escort he headed on arrival at Hyderabad. He joined the 37th Grenadiers at Secunderabad, which regiment he afterwards left for the 46th Madras Native Infantry at Jubbulpore. It was during his connection with this regiment that Lieutenant Fraser was entrusted with the honour of escorting the Governor-General's Agent in the Sangor and Nerbudda districts, an opportunity which may be said to have afforded him his first experience of political life in India. In 1853, young Fraser quitted the 46th Madras Native Infantry to join H.H. the Nizam's Cavalry, now part of the Hyderabad Contingent. In 1859 he obtained his Captaincy, and it was during his association with the

Nizam's Cavalry that young Fraser first gained experience of actual engagement in the field. According to the *Mudras Army List*, he was actively employed from July 1857 to January 1859 with the Cavalry brigade of the Hyderabad Contingent, and accompanied the Field Force under Colonel W. Orr to Mhow in October 1857, coercing *en route* the refractory Zemindars of Peepliah and Raghooghur. He joined the Bombay column before Dhar in October, and was present with the 4th Cavalry Hyderabad Contingent on the 12th November at Rawul, when the Mahidpoor mutineers were, after forced marches, overtaken, several hundreds slain, and a complete battery, including siege guns, etc., captured; specially mentioned for conspicuous gallantry on the occasion—*vide* letter from the Resident at Hyderabad, No. 1-329, of 28th November 1857; was appointed Staff Officer to the Contingent. Present with the Malwa Field Force under Sir James Stuart, K.C.B., at the battle of Mundisoor; on 21st, 22nd, 23rd, and 24th November was thanked by Colonel Orr (in G.G.O. No. 183A of 29th January 1858); served in the action in forcing the pass of Dhamonee by the Contingent troops under Colonel Orr, C.B.; joined the Central India Field Force under His Excellency Sir Hugh Rose, G.C.B. Present at the action of Muddenpoor and in the pursuit, when a considerable number of mutincers were cut up. Thanked by Sir Hugh Rose in G.G.O. No. 110 of 1858. Joined the operations against Tal Behat under Colonel Orr, C.B. Was present before Jhansi from the 20th March to 15th April, and commanded during the greater part of the day the 3rd Cavalry Hyderabad Contingent at the battle of Betwah. Thanked for his conduct at Jhansi in G.G.O. No. 174 of 1858. Was specially mentioned by Sir Hugh Rose as follows:—‘Lieutenant Fraser, Staff Officer of the Hyderabad Contingent, gallantly killing three of the enemy at the general action of the Betwah.’ Was in the action at Koonch; noticed by Colonel Orr, C.B. (G.G.O. No. 324 of 1858). Was in the action at Bilowah. Thanked for services in G.G.O. No. 310 of 1858. Was in the operations against Gwalior. Brought specially to notice by Sir Hugh Rose ‘for unwearied zeal and good service during the whole of the campaign in Central India—*vide* G.G.O. No. 321 of 1859. Thanked by Colonel Orr for his gallantry before the enemy (medal and clasp for Central India).’ In addition to all this, we are indebted to the *Bombay Gazette* for further interesting details connected with the illustrious and honourable career of the gallant officer who forms the subject of this review. Previous to the Mutiny, Lieutenant Fraser, we learn, elicited the warm acknowledgment of the Resident at Hyderabad for the rapid march which he made with a squadron of Cavalry, and the dash with which he captured some Arabs, who could only be got at through a trap door, through which he entered at the head of a dismounted party of his horsemen, and compelled the Arabs to lay down their

arms. Notwithstanding the gallantry displayed by Lieutenant Fraser on the above occasion, and the conspicuous services he rendered in Central India, however, the Horse Guards ignored the recommendation which had been forwarded to them that he should, on obtaining his Captaincy, receive a Brevet Majority. On his return from Central India, Lieutenant Fraser, at the recommendation of the late Colonel Davidson, then Resident at Hyderabad, with the cordial approval of the Nizam's Durbar, was transferred to the Hyderabad Residency as Second Assistant Resident, and from Brigadier Hill's farewell order on Lieutenant Fraser's departure from his military field of employment, we cannot but be convinced of the estimation in which he was held whilst in the Contingent. The last clause of that order ran as follows:—

“ ‘Brigadier Hill is gratified at the interest Lieutenant Fraser has evinced in a branch of the Service in which he has served with so much credit to himself, and for the peculiar duties of which he is so well qualified.’

“ We are now told of an episode which forms a part of the history of Hyderabad. It is one which, but for the forethought and cool daring of Lieutenant Fraser, might have led to most disastrous results. The story is this. At a Durbar held in the Nizam's palace, at which Colonel Davidson, then Resident, was present, a Rohilla, Jehangeer Khan, fired a shot in the courtyard, by which one of the Minister's attendants was hit in the leg. This was followed by a tremendous hustling. Jehangeer Khan then drew his sword. The Staff, with the exception of Lieutenant (now Colonel) Hastings Fraser, withdrew towards the Nizam's garden. Lieutenant Fraser, at the sight of Jehangeer with the drawn sword, unsheathed his sword, and bounded between the parties, ready for action if the man attempted to proceed further. Fortunately, there was no need for this, as the man did not relish a contest with the colossal figure before him, and he was taken prisoner. Lieutenant H. Fraser was highly commended for his judgment in not having cut down the ruffian—not a difficult thing for one who is accredited with having killed over fifty mutineers during the then recent campaign, and with having had a hand-to-hand encounter with three of them at once at the battle of the Betwa (*vide* list of services). Had Lieutenant Fraser cut the man down, the man's friends or co-religionists might have joined in the *mêlée*, and raised the ire of the whole Mohammedan population in sympathy with the would-be assassin. From this period to 1866 Captain Fraser remained in Hyderabad, occasionally acting, on Colonel Davidson's recommendation to Government, as First Assistant Resident; and we are glad to find that the expectations the Resident had of the capabilities of the gallant Captain were realised, and that on the lapse of a year he was able to

report that 'Captain Hastings Fraser throughout the year had conducted the duties of First Assistant Resident in a most efficient, industrious, and able manner'. We learn from Sir R. Temple's commendation of the gallant Captain that he had not confined his work as First Assistant Resident to the ordinary routine of civil, military, and magisterial duties, but that he was the first to introduce sanitary arrangements, accompanied with such improvements in the roads and buildings at the place, that they elicited the praise of even Sir R. Temple whilst Resident at Hyderabad. Says Sir Richard :—' Mr. Temple cannot close this Minute without placing on record his own satisfaction at the present condition of the bazaars. In point of cleanliness and general appearance they are not inferior to any that he has seen in other parts of India, and the signs of recent improvements are everywhere apparent. This he believes to be due, in the first instance, to the interest and attention which Captain Hastings Fraser, the Assistant Resident, devoted to the subject.' Besides his various duties and attention to the public welfare of the inhabitants, he founded a school at Hyderabad for native youths, and raised a clock tower. During the eight years Captain Fraser occupied the magisterial chair, it is calculated that he tried over 15,000 cases, with only three appeals against him. After nearly twenty years of duty in India, Captain Fraser availed himself of the leave he was entitled to, and proceeded to England. Whilst here his opinion on the vexed question, then before Parliament, of the non-payment to the Nizam's Government of the surplus revenue of the Berars was invited, with the happy result that the Nizam's Government has ever since had this revenue paid to them. In 1866 Captain Fraser published *Our Faithful Ally the Nizam*. In 1858 Major Fraser returned to Hyderabad, and was, strange to relate, not appointed to the post of First Assistant Resident, but to that of Military Secretary. *Que diable donc allait-il faire dans cette galère?* Considering Major Fraser's qualifications and aptitude for political work, the question may well be asked. We find Major Hastings Fraser during the past fifteen years occupying the post of Military Secretary, or rather, our contemporary says, if the truth be spoken that of a Political in honourable exile. Without referring to the important questions connected with the Hyderabad Contingent which came under his consideration, and whose cause he vindicated, to the stand he made on behalf of the soldiers who followed him in Central India in 1857 for the suppression of the Mutiny, subjects well known to a large circle of his friends, and engraven in the grateful memories of the receivers of the benefits of his disinterested advocacy, we may, however, mention that the gallant Colonel, who is just returning to Europe, all through the convulsions which have lately throbbled through Hyderabad, has kept neutral, and retained the respect of all the contending parties;

may, more, he has received invitations from the most opposite parties to bring his extended experience of Hyderabad affairs to bear on the administration of this country."

In regard to the political situation at Hyderabad, after the death of the eminent statesman who for so many years conducted the Administration, I wish to say a few words, since my name has been freely mentioned in connection with affairs at this period. That I possessed the esteem of all the high nobles at the Hyderabad Durbar, as well as that of several British Residents at Hyderabad, their letters to me amply confirm.

"To G. F. Edmonstone, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign Department, with His Excellency the Governor-General,
Allahabad.

"(Political Department.)

"SIR,—With reference to the notification, dated 27th October 1858, No. 4,118, in which Captain Campbell is permitted to resign his appointment of Second Assistant to the Resident at Hyderabad, should the Right Honourable the Governor-General not have already made any arrangement to fill this vacancy, I have the honour to request you will do me the favour to submit for his Lordship's favourable consideration the name of Lieutenant Hastings Fraser, of the 46th Regiment M.N.I., and at present second in command of the 4th Cavalry, Hyderabad Contingent.

"2. Lieutenant Fraser served with the Hyderabad Contingent during the whole of the late campaign in Central India, and held the post of Staff Officer under Major William Orr, who has frequently brought to my notice the good services performed by him in that capacity. His name has also been mentioned in terms of high praise in several of the despatches which I have submitted to his Lordship in connection with the campaign.

"3. Lieutenant Fraser has passed the examination in Hindustani required to qualify him for the Staff. He is very conciliatory in his bearing towards, and liked by, the Natives; and I have reason to know that his connection with the Residency would be acceptable to the Hyderabad Durbar.

"I have, etc.,

"(Signed) C. DAVIDSON, Resident.

"Hyderabad Residency, 14th December 1858."

“Ootacamund, 8th November 1873.

“MY DEAR FRASER,—Pray excuse my keeping your papers so long. I have been, and am, very busy. I can only say that most, if not all, contained in these documents, is known to the Commander-in-Chief, and he would, I am sure, be very glad to give you distinction. As vacancies occur, etc., we are called to send in the names of officers for C.B., and last year I mentioned your name pretty freely. You have every chance of a C.B., but for a long time you cannot expect the good-service pension. This *old* officers get, who have served long, and done their duty, slow and rapid, as they best could. It is not a reward for field service merely. I wish I had met you at Hyderabad last year. Hope we may meet some day soon.

“Yours sincerely,

“ROB. C. STEWART.”

“Sreenuggar, November 27th, 1874.

“MY DEAR COLONEL FRASER,—I would not have you ‘Bubbur Jung’,¹ but ‘Bubbur-ool-Moolk’,² as we are about the same age, and should have corresponding titles of rank.³

“Yours very sincerely,

“SALAR JUNG.”

“Hyderabad, 31st March 1875.

“MY DEAR COLONEL FRASER,—It affords me much pleasure to think that this meeting has been the happy means of strengthening a friendship that has existed between our house and yours for so many years; and while feeling very proud of the exceeding kind manner in which you have written of my nephew, I must say that he is delighted at the happy result of this meeting, and has written to me acknowledging the many obligations he is under to you, and saying how grateful he is for all the kindness you have shown him.

“Yours very sincerely,

“SHUMS-OOO-MOORAH, Amir-i-Kubbir.”

“The Residency, Hyderabad, 20th January 1878.

“MY DEAR FRASER,—You have probably heard of the row which took place at the railway station some days ago, in which the African Guard

¹ Lion in Battle.

² Lion of the Country.

³ This is inserted to show the kindly feeling entertained towards me by the Minister of the State. If these Eastern titles were recognised in the West, this title, the third grade at the Nizam's Court, would be equivalent to that of Earl.

were concerned. I have arranged with the Minister for an inquiry being made into the affair by a Court composed of an officer of the Residency and an official of H.H.'s Government.

"As it is desirable that the officer I nominate to this duty shall be of mark and experience, to carry due weight with him, I should like you to undertake the job, as I am sure you will be able to carry it out better than any of the other officers available for it, and I shall be much obliged by your doing so.

"R. MEADE."

Extract from a letter from His Highness the Nizam's Minister to the Resident at Hyderabad, dated 18th February 1878.

"May I beg that you will kindly convey to Colonel Fraser my cordial appreciation, on behalf of this Government, of the patient and exhaustive manner in which he has, conjointly with Molvee Mooshtak Hoossain, conducted the inquiry."¹

Extract of a letter from the First Assistant Resident, Hyderabad, to Colonel Hastings Fraser, Military Secretary to the Resident, Hyderabad, No. 5,879-P., dated 22nd February 1878.

"4. In forwarding for your information the accompanying extract from a letter from Sir Salar Jung, I am to express Sir R. Meade's entire concurrence in the remarks therein contained, and to convey to you his own acknowledgments and thanks for the patient and able manner in which you have conducted this inquiry."

"Madras, 16th February 1878.

"DEAR COLONEL FRASER,—I have read over to the Commander-in-Chief the papers you sent me, and which I now return.

"Sir Neville Chamberlain desires me to inform you that your field services have already been the subject of His Excellency's consideration before recommending officers in the annual return for the C.B. Your name has been sent in with two or three others quite recently.

"You are, of course, aware that the Commander-in-Chief is unable

¹ Instituted in the matter of an affray which occurred at the Hyderabad Railway Station, between the Railway Police and a party of H.H. the Nizam's African Cavalry Guards.

to bring into consideration your Political service when weighing your Army service against that of other officers of this Army.

"Believe me, truly yours,

"F. JEBB, Adjt.-Genl.

"To Colonel Hastings Fraser, Military Secretary,
Hyderabad Residency."

"23rd February 1881.

"MY DEAR COLONEL FRASER,—Allow me to offer you my thanks for your note of the 20th current, condoling with me on the sad loss I have sustained. I trust the long friendship existing between yourself and my late brother may exist afresh between ourselves.

"I am, with kind regards,

"Yours very sincerely,

"BUSHIR-ODD-DOWLAH."

"The Residency, Hyderabad, 25th July 1881.

"MY DEAR COLONEL,—I came to a decision in the matter of the Silladari system with great hesitation and reluctance. I should like the Government of India to hear what there is to be said for retaining things as they are, or rather as they were intended to be by Meade's notes of '76. It occurs to me that you may like to have your views represented; and though I don't think your note, in its present form, would quite do (the object being mainly to controvert Wright's views), I shall be very glad to append to my letter a note by you on the subject, which, without repeating what is said in Saunders' letter, should show the arguments in favour of keeping things as they are. I would add a paragraph to my draft, saying, 'I have had great hesitation in coming to a conclusion on a subject which is entirely new to me, and with which not only am I unfitted to deal, but concerning which such experienced officers as the Brigadier-General Commanding the Contingent and the Military Secretary, Hyderabad, take the most diametrically opposite views. That the Government of India may have clearly before them both sides of the question, I append a note on the subject by the Military Secretary, Colonel Hastings Fraser, whose long connection with the Contingent, extending over a period of twenty-four years, entitles his views in favour of the retention of the Silladari system to the fullest consideration.'

"Yours sincerely,

"S. C. BAYLEY."

“Hyderabad, December 21st, 1881.

“MY DEAR COLONEL FRASER,—I am extremely obliged to you for your kind sympathising letter, and I hope that the friendship which always existed between you and my father will now exist between us.

“IGBAL-OO-DOWLAH.”

“Hyderabad, February 7th, 1883.

“MY DEAR COLONEL FRASER,—I am much obliged to you for your kind letter, but am sorry to hear that you contemplate leaving Hyderabad; the more especially as there has been always so strong a friendship between my father and yourself. You do not say in your letter when you leave this, but I hope I may have the pleasure of seeing you before you go.

“Believe me, dear Colonel Fraser,

“Yours sincerely,

“VIKAR-UL-OOMRA.”

“Residency, 8th February 1883.

“MY DEAR COLONEL FRASER,—I am glad that you go to visit the Amir-i-Kabir; but will you, before going, come in here for a minute, for I want you to make for me an inquiry from the Amir-i-Kabir, which I can best explain verbally?

“W. B. JONES.”

“Hyderabad, 4th June 1883.

“MY DEAR COLONEL FRASER,—I am glad to learn your stay in this country will still extend to a few years.

“Believe me, yours very sincerely,

“R. NARINDUR Bahadur, Peshcar.”

“June 11th, 1883.

“MY DEAR COLONEL FRASER,—Allow me to welcome back to Hyderabad one of the oldest friends of my father. I was very glad to receive your kind note, and the nice basket of apples you sent me. Instead of troubling you to call on me, I propose doing myself the pleasure of calling myself, if you will be good enough to let me know when I may do so.

“I remain, yours very truly,

“MIR LAIK ALI.”

“13th July 1883.

“MY DEAR COLONEL FRASER,—It is with much concern that I have learnt from the newspapers that you have at last made up your mind to retire from the Service, because, after your eminent father, there was no other officer who was so intimately acquainted with the antecedents of our family, as well as of the Hyderabad State; and since the elders of our house passed away, I have always looked upon you, in times of difficulty, as an old friend of the family, to resort to for advice and consolation; but this stay also I see we are to be deprived of. However, I trust that you will, after recruiting your health, soon return to India, and be able to secure a suitable appointment under this Government, where I do not doubt, by your long experience and knowledge, combined with your genial disposition and good nature, you will be an ornament—more than anyone we may hope to secure.

“I earnestly trust you will prefer this to any other private enterprise.

“With kind regards, believe me,

“Yours very sincerely,

“SHUMSOOL-OOMRAH, Amir-i-Kubbir.”

“22nd October 1883.

“MY DEAR COLONEL FRASER,—I cannot allow you to leave Hyderabad without expressing my very sincere regret at your departure, after an honourable and distinguished career of more than a quarter of a century, during which time you have endeared yourself to, and gained the esteem of, all the old families in Hyderabad. Your long and varied experience has enabled you on many occasions to give sound, wholesome, and kindly advice to those who have required it; and your departure will be a personal loss to most of us, who have looked upon you as a true and intimate friend and well wisher of this State, as well as of the people of Hyderabad. I wish you a pleasant journey to your native land, and trust your absence will not be a permanent one. I can only say, in any case, you will always live in our hearts.

“With kindest regards and best wishes,

“I remain, yours very sincerely,

“BUSHIR-ODD-DOWLAH.

“P.S.—I write with my own hand to say that, when once you are pensioned, and obtain permission from the British Government to serve our Government, I shall be the *first* to welcome you here.

“B. D.”

“Hyderabad, Deccan, 23rd October 1883.

“MY DEAR COLONEL FRASER,—I regret to learn that your term of office is drawing to a close, and that you are about to leave us, preparatory to terminating your official career in India. I need hardly say that your father’s name, and your own long service in this State, will always keep your memory alive in Hyderabad; and if, like General Briggs, you should elect to spend your well-earned years of rest in this country, no one will rejoice more than myself.

“Yours truly,

“MIR LAIK ALI.”

“14th January 1884.

“MY DEAR COLONEL FRASER,—With reference to the letter I wrote to you before you went to England, I wish you to understand that should you make up your mind to return to Hyderabad, I will gladly encourage your coming here, and joining the Administration in some manner.

“Yours very truly,

“SALAR JUNG.”

“Hyderabad, February 18th, 1884.

“MY DEAR COLONEL FRASER,—I am sorry to learn that you are contemplating leaving Hyderabad, but I hope that your absence will be a short one. In fact, I trust that for many years to come I may continue to enjoy the intimacy of friendship which has existed between us so long.

“Yours truly,

“VIKAR-OO-L-OOMRA.”

Mr. Jones was still Resident at that Court, and he frequently came to my house, or called me to the Residency, to converse on subjects then under consideration. Several letters also passed between us, and in one I told him that public opinion, as brought to my notice by one officer in particular, Syed Mahdi Ali, the head of the Revenue Board, which was confirmed from other sources, pointed to the late Minister’s son as fit to be employed in the Administration. He replied that he would not forget the Minister’s son in the arrangements to be made.

In March 1883 my health failed, and under doctor’s advice I proceeded to Australia, where I was kept regularly informed of passing events at the Nizam’s Durbar. A letter which the Senior Administrator, the Peshcar, had written, to be forwarded to me in Australia, was handed to me on my return. In it he prays me

to assist him by interviewing Lord Ripon at Simla on return. This, of course, it was not in my power to do ; but as the several subjects mentioned by him form much of the history of that time, I shall notice them when I place my other work before the public, although for sufficient reasons I withhold these documents for the present. The late Minister, Sir Salar Jung, had informed others, as well as myself, that he did not intend to consider the Railway Loan again until the Nizam came of age. Doubtless he felt that the acceptance of it would be pleasing to certain parties. As he remarked to me, "I have got into the mouth of a snake, but I will wriggle out again." On the 15th November 1882, only two months and a half before he died, he wrote thus :—

"I much thank you for the kind wishes you express for the prosperity of H.H.'s dominions in connection with your remarks regarding Mr. Abdul Huq and the Railway business, but I was sorry that I did not feel justified in accepting the proposals made through him. The liabilities and risks were so much greater than I had ever contemplated when I sent Mr. Abdul Huq home, that I could not during the last years of H.H.'s minority commit the State to such heavy and possibly embarrassing engagements. Abdul Huq, however, no doubt did his best to obtain the most favourable terms he could, and worked with much energy and bil ity."

Again, in the month of January 1883, Salar Jung said something to the same effect to General Briggs, my predecessor in office, who resides at Bolarum, the head-quarters of the Contingent. This officer told me, however, that he was not quite sure what loan the Minister referred to ; but as the Chanda Loan was the only one then under consideration, I conclude it referred to the Railway. Besides, Salar Jung directed his Vakeel¹ to inform me he had withdrawn from it, and I have his Vakeel's letter to that effect. This was only a few days before he died, and on the 3rd February 1883, only five days before his death, in conversation with me, he assured me that he would not take it up, confirming thereby the message he had sent only a few days before.

On my return to Hyderabad from Australia, the Senior Administrator's Vakeels were constantly with me ; and in regard to this loan, I have abundance of letters proving that one and all objected to it, with the exception of the Amir-i-Kabir Khoorshed

¹ Agent.

Jah Bahadur, who consistently supported it. Friends of mine were inquiring as to whether I would advise their investing. With such absolute proof in my possession of unwillingness on the part of the majority of Government to see this loan eventually arranged, and the way in which the Press were pitting me against the other Residency officials, I telegraphed to England, and suggested to my friends to hold aloof.

One Indian journal, through some misunderstanding, actually gave me as an authority for a statement that this Chanda Loan transaction was forced upon the Hyderabad Durbar by official pressure. I did not make that statement; but in answering an inquiry from the Resident as to its appearance in the *Calcutta Statesman*, I explained that the Special Correspondent who interviewed me at the period of the Nizam's Installation was aware of much that had come under my notice. I could not, therefore, contradict certain statements made by him, thus seeming, perhaps, to acquiesce in them, which afforded some grounds for his writing as he did; but at the same time I told the Resident that in the event of the Viceroy speaking to me, I could enlighten him in Hyderabad affairs.

My views as to the form of Government which Sir S. Bayley and Mr. Jones had intended should be adopted at Hyderabad, are in accord with those expressed by Busheer-ood-Dowlah in a letter he wrote to England in connection with this Chanda Railway Loan, returning at once certain memoranda and Articles of Association of a Company being raised for that Railway, "in case it might be thought he committed himself to approval (by retaining them over a single post) of any portion of such documents, or of an agreement entered into by Sirdar Diler Jung,¹ and giving his reasons for this course. As one of the Members of Council of Regency, which consists of the five highest nobles in the State, he strongly opposed the scheme, as also did the son of Sir Salar Jung; and H.H. the Nizam was never consulted; and the two former officially recorded protests against it. The only two members of this Council from whom a quasi-consent was obtained are not sufficiently acquainted with English to understand the Agreement, and both repudiate any responsibility for the guarantee of thirty-two lakhs of rupees by Hyderabad. It is only necessary to state

¹ A title then recently conferred on Mr. Abdul Huq.

that in the prospectus of the Company the investing public are told that surveys, sections, plans, and estimates of costs of the lines are complete ; whereas for eighty miles no survey has been made, and the cost cannot be guessed at, much less calculated."

At this period the Peshcar and myself were on the best of terms, but subsequently we had little intercourse. On another subject in connection with the Nawab Busheer-ood-Dowlah I say a few words, as I had something to do with it. It was a matter of precedence at Court. This Nawab claimed precedence over his cousin, the Amir-i-Kabir. This matter had been decided, I understand, by the late Minister in favour of the Nawab. The Resident, Mr. Jones, sent me to arrange for this gentleman conducting him to the Durbar, as the senior member of the family after Salar Jung's death. This the etiquette of the Durbar requires.

Subsequently the Nawab found, on Mr. Jones's departure, that the Peshcar was unwilling to conform to what had been settled. He remonstrated, and hoped I might be referred to. I drew up a report of what occurred. After submitting it I left for England. This was shortly before the Installation. The Nawab had informed me that, in the event of justice not being done to him, he intended to appeal to the Viceroy, and refer the latter to me. Of the efforts made by me to bring about a reconciliation between these rival families, and to enlighten Government in regard to the matter of supposed bribery by the late Amir-i-Kabir, I have numerous letters. His private secretary, Mr. Shapoorjee Cheenoy, came to me by permission of the Resident, and I drew up a report, which Sir Richard Meade was pleased to term "a valuable one". The story in connection with this will form an interesting chapter in my new work. Mr. Shapoorjee was truly faithful to his master's interest in this matter.

In conclusion, I attach, though it was never published, as intended, in England, an account I drew up at the installation of His Highness the Nizam. It calls attention to my hopefulness that His Highness will prove a credit to the brothers, Colonel John and Captain Claude Clerk, who, with efficient tutors under their orders, superintend the young Chief's education. Captain C. Clerk is still with the Nizam, occupying a post which it was once contemplated I should occupy had Captain Clerk desired to leave. No better officer could be found than the one who now fills it, and I trust he

may long enjoy the privilege of advising his young charge. In regard to my succeeding to the place had a vacancy occurred, I shall have much to say hereafter. From my report on Busheer-ood-Dowlah's appeal, when it is published, the public will learn my opinion of both Captain C. Clerk and Major Gough's abilities to advise those under whom they occupy the position of Secretary.

The Minister, Salar Jung, also, I consider fortunate in having at hand a servant so faithful to the family as Mr. Syed Hoossein Belgrami.

THE INSTALLATION OF HIS HIGHNESS THE NIZAM OF HYDERABAD.

Never has Hyderabad seen such stirring times, or been treated to such a variety of interesting, I might say exciting, events, as now. Scarcely had we gotten over the hurry and bustle attending the preparations for the reception of the young Nizam on his return from Calcutta, the erection of triumphal arches, the illumination of the city and its suburbs, and the preparation of addresses that were never read, then comes the news of the installation of the Nizam, received with manifestations of joy by the public. Parties are again divided, and speculate most widely as to who is to be the first Dewan under the new *régime*, and the ludicrous efforts made by rival cliques to trot forth their special candidate for the Dewanship in the pages of the local papers, are extremely amusing; then the commotion caused by the appearance amongst us of the *Calcutta Statesman*, with its remarks on the Residency officials; and last, though by no means the least uninteresting (as here, again, if rumour can be relied on, rival cliques are concerned), we have the great libel case in which Mr. Seymour Keay is suing for damages.

I must not, however, anticipate events, but commence in due form by reminding your readers that the country over which the young Prince will be shortly placed, and which is commonly known as the Nizam's Dominions, is a hilly tract of land, about 1,800 feet above the level of the sea, bounded on the north by the district of Khandesh and the river Taptec, on the south by the Toongbuddra and the Kistna, on the east by the Wurdah and the Godavery, and on the west by the districts Dharwar, Sholapoor, and Ahmednugger, and said to cover an area of 97,837 square miles; having a population of 9,845,594 souls, or 112 to each square mile, of whom 925,929 are Mohammedans; and a revenue of Rupees 2,87,90,200, all told.

Hyderabad is the largest Native State in India, and is divided into four great provinces, viz., Hyderabad, Aurangabad, Bidur, and Berar or Hyderabad Assigned Districts, the three former being under the direct control of the Native Government, while the latter is under the Government of India, administered by the Resident, who exercises the powers of a local Government. The capital, Hyderabad, is a large city, walled on all sides, covering an area of more than two square miles; it has no less than thirteen gateways, and is separated from the Residency by the Moosi river, which is spanned by three substantial stone bridges, one being called the Oliphant Bridge, it having been planned and erected by Colonel Oliphant, Madras Engineers, formerly in command of the Corps of Engineers, Nizam's Army, and who as Ensign held the post of Field Engineer at the reduction of the Fort Nowah. The Colonel's son, M. S. Oliphant, for some time held the appointment of Private Secretary to His Excellency the late Sir Salar Jung, until compelled to resign by the Government of India.

As a fair description of the Residency, the City, and other places of interest will be found in Murray's *Handbook of the Madras Presidency* (second edition), pp. 356 to 408, I need not here enter into these details, but shall pass on to what will be more interesting to your readers.

Hyderabad is not only the most conservative city in India, but to the stranger would appear the most barbarous, owing to the tenacity with which it clings to the habits and customs of days gone by. Here, every individual, from the highest to the lowest, is armed, not with one weapon only, but with a number of various kinds, from a dagger to a double-edged sword, and a pistol to a blunderbuss; for, according to traditions, a warrior is only fit for battle when he has his "Panch Hatyar" (five arms) complete, and as each individual makes it a point of duty to show off to the best advantage, the pomp and show, I might say swagger, here seen will scarcely be met with in any other part of India. It is nothing strange here to see an ordinary Moonshee, in the receipt, perhaps, of from fifty to a hundred rupees a month, conveyed to his work in a nicely painted palanquin, having in his wake one man with his sword, another with his hookah, a third with his shoes or pandan; while the attendants of a Jagheerdar and others must consist of at least a dozen or so of Arabs or Rohillas, some running in front, some behind, with the horsekeeper hanging on to the tail of his master's horse; while the dignity of the many nobles and petty chiefs that abound in the city of Hyderabad is maintained by their keeping up such a number of armed men as they consider necessary to make their rank and station as great as possible in the eyes of the public.

Yet with all this pomp and ceremony, and in spite of the dirty, ragged gangs of armed Rohillas, Arabs and others, and the motley troops

of shaggy horsemen who enliven the narrow streets of this ancient city, the confusion caused by the blocking up of narrow lanes by elephants, camels, palanquins, etc., the roar and the hubbub of its every-day life, and the haughty swagger of the young dandies, who delight to show off their various-coloured robes, and to strut about with long, streaming puggries, and shoes, generally red, about one-third shorter than their feet, and into which they can just manage to stick the tips of their toes, Hyderabad is not the ruffianly place that many suppose it to be, and this a visitor will soon find out, if he only cares to remain long enough with some friend in Chudderghat, where he will see scores of Europeans and Eurasians daily going to their various occupations in all parts of the city, into the remotest parts of which "Tommy Atkins" also finds his way whenever he has a cur to palm off on some rich Native for some fancy price.

When the father of the young Nizam, Afzul-ud-Dowla, was placed upon the Musnad in the year 1857, he first left his residence at nine o'clock in the morning, seated on the largest elephant that could be obtained, and proceeded in great state towards the Palace, surrounded by nobles in their Oriental splendour, and guarded by a whole army of troops, chiefly Infantry, and he had no sooner entered the chief gate of the Palace, than, according to custom, a buffalo was brought forth and sacrificed across his path. On the arrival of the Resident (Colonel Davidson) with his Staff, His Highness was led to the Musnad by the senior member of the Shums-ul-umra family (who adopted as his heirs the Nawabs Motasham-ood-Dowla and Busheer-ood-Dowla; but the former died not long ago, and that branch of the family is now represented by the Nawab Busheer-ood-Dowla) and Salar Jung, who each held one of his hands. The Resident then addressed His Highness, congratulating him on his accession to the throne of his forefathers. After the presentation of Nuzzar, which followed soon after, the ceremony was closed with the slaughter of two sheep in the adjoining court.

The dynasty of the Nizam began in the year 1712, and His Highness, Meer Mahboob Ali Khan, is the ninth in succession. He was born on 17th August 1866, and, while still under three years, was proclaimed successor to his father, the late Nizam Afzul-ud-Dowla, who died at Hyderabad on the 26th February 1869, at the early age of forty-three years. The infant Prince was placed on the Musnad by the Minister and the Nawab Shums-ul-umra, the formal ceremony of his installation taking place on the 6th March 1869, when the Resident, C. B. Saunders, Esq., C.B., attended by his Staff and a number of military officers from Secunderabad, proceeded to the Palace, where the Minister, Nobles, and the principal Sirdars had assembled. After the usual salutations, the procession moved into the interior court, when it was met by

the young Prince, who was borne in the arms of his nurse. Taking the little fellow's hand, the kindly Resident led him towards the Musnad, and after a few congratulatory remarks, to which the late Sir Salar Jung replied on behalf of His Highness, the Resident and his Staff left the Palace, all seemingly well pleased at the successful termination of the ceremony.

Of the young Prince's early days there is little to be said further than that, until the year 1875, when his education commenced with tutors placed under the control of Captain Clerk, appointed Guardian, he was left entirely to the care of his grandmother and mother. The late Nizam having lost three sons, he was, it is stated, persuaded by a Fakir whom he had consulted, not to set his eyes upon his last born, lest some evil should befall him, and to this precaution on the father's part is attributed by some the life of the son. Strange as it may appear to people in England unacquainted with the manners and customs of Orientals, that a ruler so powerful as the Nizam of Hyderabad should restrain himself from seeing the face of his only surviving child at the mere bidding of a holy man, yet it is nevertheless the fact; notwithstanding all the civilising influences of British administration, the Fakir continues to hold his own, and is still the oracle to whom those in distress resort.

The first Guardian to the young Nizam was Captain John Clerk, late of the Rifle Brigade, and now Colonel and Equerry to H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh, who arrived in Hyderabad in 1875. Owing, however, to the sudden death from cholera of Mrs. Clerk, he resigned his appointment, and was succeeded by his brother, Captain C. Clerk, who arrived in Hyderabad in November 1876, and is still in attendance on His Highness, and will, no doubt, be remembered when the Prince comes into power. During the period between 1877 and 1881 His Highness's education and training have been carried on with activity and earnestness, and "considering the difficulties and prejudices to be overcome, the progress made is most satisfactory", His Highness having now acquired a fair practical knowledge of Persian and English. The young Nizam has "strongly developed that taste for manly sports and exercises for which all his ancestors were noted in their youth. He is very fond of cricket and tent-pegging, in which latter he excels; and those who have been associated with the young Prince in educational and social affairs, speak in the highest possible terms of his amiability and desire to please"; and as regards his preparation for administrative work, His Highness has for some time past been studying, under Captain Clerk's advice, a *précis* of the revenue, financial and general work of the State, drawn up for his use; and during his tour to Raichore, Goolburga, and Aurangabad, His Highness has had opportunities of inspecting the

various Departments, the working of which was carefully explained to him; and the "intelligent interest" that he manifested in all that was placed before him augurs well for his future career as a ruler of the State. Captain Clerk met with some opposition, on which I may comment hereafter.

On the occasion of the young Prince having been declared heir to the throne, a Regency, consisting of the late Sir Salar Jung and the Ameer-i-Kabcer, was formed for the administration of the affairs of the State, and for the purpose of the training of the young Nizam. At the time when the Regency was established, Busheer-ood-Dowlah, a nephew of the Ameer-i-Kabcer, and now his heir, was appointed Minister of Justice.

His Highness the Nizam is now enjoying excellent health and strength, and is more lively than he has been for a long time past. His Highness, as may probably be remembered, was prevented through ill-health from being present with the Native Princes and Nobles assembled in Bombay in the year 1875 to welcome His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales to India; and although fears were entertained that the same cause would prevent his being present at the great Durbar, held at Delhi, on the occasion of the proclamation of the assumption by our gracious Queen of the title of Empress of India, yet, with great care and attention, he was, to the credit of Captain Clerk, not only able to be present at the great assemblage, but to return to his people, if not better, at least in no worse state of health than he left them.

His Highness was to have left Hyderabad for England in April last, accompanied by a large suite of the Hyderabad nobility; but, owing to the melancholy event that deprived Hyderabad of its guiding hand, and the Nizam of a wise counsellor, who was suddenly summoned to journey in a direction we all must go sooner or later, His Highness's visit to Europe had to be postponed.

It is generally believed that during His Highness's recent visit to Calcutta the Viceroy endeavoured to impress upon him the necessity for, and the benefit he would derive from, such a visit, but all will admit that he must not be coerced into going.

His Highness and suite, while *en route* to Hyderabad from Calcutta, whither he had proceeded on the 17th December, stopped at Goolburga for the purpose of laying the foundation-stone of a cotton mill, about to be erected at that place by a company of enterprising Native gentlemen. There was great demonstration at the station and along the whole route to the town, which was nicely decorated. The following afternoon, 10th January, 4 p.m., His Highness arrived at the site of the new mill, where he was received by the Chairman and Directors, and conducted to a raised dais in the centre of a neatly constructed

pandal (canopy), surrounded at various distances by triumphal arches, bearing, among other mottoes and banners of welcome, "May progress be the motto of this State", "May thy Ministers be true and loyal."

After a few words from the Chairman, Director of the Company, giving a summary of the history of the origin of the factory, His Highness replied—"Mr. Chairman, Ameers, ladies and gentlemen,—It gives me, I assure you, great pleasure that I was able to accept the invitation given me a short time ago that I should lay the first stone of this mill at Goolburga. It will, when finished, as you are doubtless aware, be the second mill that has been constructed in the Hyderabad State. Some two years ago I visited, with His Excellency the late Sir Salar Jung, the cotton mills at Hyderabad, and I was much interested with all that was shown me there on the occasion of my visit. I need hardly say that I entirely concur in the views expressed in regard to industries and enterprises in my dominions by His Excellency the late lamented Nawab Sir Salar Jung, and to which you have very justly alluded in the address made to this assembled company. The development of the resources of my country will soon claim my closest attention, because I feel sure that the prosperity and happiness of my subjects will result therefrom; and this being the case, I take, and shall continue to take, the deepest interest in the enterprise now being undertaken. I have great pleasure in according my consent to your request that you shall call this mill the 'Goolburga Mahboob Shahi Mill Company, Limited', sincerely hoping that the mill will prove a financial success. I will now proceed to perform the pleasing duty of making use of this beautiful trowel, by laying the first stone of the Goolburga Mahboob Shahi Cotton Mill Company, Limited."

The Nizam then proceeded to a separate pandal, where the stone was suspended, covered with a cloth bearing the words "Faith, Hope, and Charity". A bottle containing some coins and papers having been deposited in a place prepared for it, the Nizam was presented with a handsome gold trowel, with which he proceeded to lay the stone; and no sooner had he declared the stone to be properly set, than he was covered with a shower of flowers, which, by some ingenious contrivance, was made to fall from the ceiling of the pandal, and at the same time to unveil the stone.

Goolburga, it should be remembered, is a large city with a population of about forty thousand souls, nearly two-thirds of whom are Hindoos, and the remainder Mohammedans. It is the head station of the district, and is garrisoned by a regiment of Cavalry, a little under 300 strong, and a few companies of Infantry of His Highness the Nizam's Reformed Troops. Goolburga has always been noted for its mosques, shrines, and saints, and its Mohammedan inhabitants for their turbulent character. Three years ago a serious outbreak occurred here,

followed some time after by a rising of the convicts of the central jail, numbers of whom eventually made good their escape. The erection, therefore, of a cotton mill at such a place augurs well for the future welfare of the people, who, it is hoped, will soon learn to beat their swords into ploughshares.

The young Nizam returned to Hyderabad by special train on the morning of the 11th January, and was received with greater demonstrations of joy than had previously been accorded him on any of the former occasions of his return to his capital. The approach of the train was announced by the boom of the guns stationed on the Red Hills, about half-a-mile from the station, and was soon followed by a salute from the Mud Battery at Secunderabad, about five miles off; and as the train glided into the station, the guard of honour from the Reformed Troops presented arms, while the Cavalry band, which was in attendance, played "God save the Queen." His Highness, who seemed fatigued, went at once to his carriage and drove off towards the city, escorted by a troop of the African Cavalry. The Palace of the Nizam is about two miles from the railway station, the route to which was lined on both sides with troops, behind whom were dense crowds of men, women, and children, decked in their best gaily-coloured clothes, all anxious to get a glimpse at, and to make their salaams to, their youthful Padishah, who was received throughout the whole route with demonstrations of great joy.

The shops and dwelling-houses, which had been previously white-washed, were nicely decorated with flowers, evergreens, and various coloured designs, while a goodly array of different-coloured flags, banners, mottoes, etc., floated in the air; the streets were hedged with foliage, palms, and other plants; and no pains had, apparently, been spared to show off the bridges, city gates, and the principal buildings to the best advantage. Certain localities had been assigned to the different Departments of the Nizam's service, viz., Revenue, Education, Military, Municipal and Public Works, each of which had its magnificent triumphal arch done up in such a manner as to represent the Department to which it belonged, and much praise is due to all concerned for the taste and skill with which these elegant and stately structures had been erected and decorated. In the evening such a blaze of lights shone forth as Hyderabad had never before witnessed. Public buildings as well as private dwelling-houses, whether of the rich or poor, in and out of the city, were illuminated according to the means of the people, and presented such a scene of dazzling beauty that the young Nizam was induced to mount his elephant at about 9 p.m., and visit some of the principal places in the city.

Owing to the present unhealthy state of Chudderghat, the Resident was compelled to remove to his summer residence at Bolarum, the head-

quarter station of the Hyderabad Contingent, about eleven miles from Chudderglat. Here the Resident and his Assistants are up to their eyes in business, arranging accommodation for the large company of distinguished visitors that are now beginning to pour into the place. His Excellency the Viceroy, the Marchioness of Ripon, the Governors of Madras and Bombay, the Commanders-in-Chief, Sir Donald Stewart, Sir Frederick Roberts, and General the Honble. Arthur Hardinge, with their various Staffs, estimated at about 100, will reside at Bolarum in such houses and tents as can be provided. The Residency and its compound are to be lighted; and, judging from the great preparations that are being so rapidly pushed on, great doings are expected.

Although no official programme has yet been published, it is generally believed that the Viceroy will hold a levee for the European officers on the morning of the 4th; after which, visits will be exchanged by His Highness the Nizam, followed by a grand state ball in the evening. The 5th will be devoted to the real business of the Installation, and the Nizam will entertain the Viceroy at a state banquet on the 6th. There will be a grand review of all the troops in garrison, followed by a banquet in the evening to the Nizam at the Bolarum Mess, while the afternoon of each day will be taken up with racing and all kinds of sports.

In the account of the laying of the foundation stone of the new cotton mills at Goolburga, by His Highness the Nizam, it will be remembered that His Highness stated, "The development of the resources of my country will soon claim my closest attention, because I feel sure that the prosperity and happiness of my subjects will result therefrom; and this being the case, I take, and shall continue to take, the deepest interest in the enterprise now being undertaken."

I little then thought that the youthful Prince would soon demonstrate that these were not mere formal expressions, to be forgotten almost as soon as uttered. His Highness, with a view to set an example to his Nobles and wealthy subjects, and to convince all of the interest he takes in the development of industrial institutions in his country, sent the other day for the share-book of the Goolburga Mahboob Shahi Mills, and put his name down for fifty shares in the company. This spontaneous act was much talked of in the city, as indicating the liberal and considerate spirit which will characterise the future administration of His Highness, which is happily so soon to commence.

In consequence of the rapid movements of His Excellency the Viceroy *en route* to Hyderabad, the ceremony of the Nizam proceeding to the boundary of his territory to receive and conduct His Excellency through his dominions was dispensed with, and in lieu thereof a deputation, consisting of Major Trevor, First Assistant Resident, Colonel Dobbs, Judicial Superintendent of Railways, and two principal officers of the Hyderabad State, proceeded to Raichore, where it met His Excellency and accompanied him to Hyderabad.

The special train containing His Excellency the Viceroy, the Marchioness of Ripon and suite, arrived at Hyderabad at 4.30 p.m. (2nd Feb.). The near approach of the train was announced by a Royal salute of thirty-one guns, fired from the Red Hills by a Reformed Troop Battery, and His Highness the Nizam arrived at the station just in time to shake hands with the Resident, Colonel Hastings Fraser, Military Secretary, and some of the principal officers. When the train steamed into the station the guard of honour from the Reformed Troops presented arms, and the band played "God save the Queen". His Excellency, on alighting from his saloon carriage, which had been sent round from Calcutta to Madras, was received by the young Nizam, the Resident, the principal officers of the Hyderabad State, the Major-General Commanding the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, and the Brigadier-General Commanding the Hyderabad Contingent; and while the ceremony was proceeding, a shower of flowers was made to fall upon the party from the roof of a neatly constructed pandal. Such of the Nobles as had accompanied the Nizam to Calcutta came forward and shook hands with Lord Ripon, while the Nawab Busheer-ood-Dowlah, who had had to remain behind to conduct the affairs of the State, and the other Nobles who had not been to Calcutta, were introduced to His Excellency by His Highness the Nizam.

In addition to the officers already referred to, there were present on the railway platform all Staff Officers of the garrison not on duty, including Volunteer officers, and the few Reformed Troop officers who were considered eligible to be present on such occasions; and what with the grandeur of the decorations, the glittering robes of various-coloured satins and velvets with which the principal Nobles, about twenty in all, were attired, the different-coloured uniforms of the officers, set off with gold and silver lace, the scene on the platform was extremely grand, several fair views of which have, I believe, been obtained by the enterprising photographers, Molkenteller and Brothers.

Although all officers of the garrison, from the three cantonments of Bolarum, Trimulgherry, and Secunderabad, were ordered to be present, admission to the platform was by ticket issued by the Resident, while admission to the railway enclosure was by ticket issued by the manager of the railway, and it is no doubt due to the precautions taken by those entrusted with the management that everything went off so well, without that crush and confusion which usually attends such gatherings.

The formal ceremony concluded, the Viceroy was escorted to his carriage by His Highness the Nizam and the Resident, when the Vice-regal party left the station, escorted by a detachment of the 14th Hussars, and saluted by a guard of honour, which had been drawn up outside the station. Lord and Lady Ripon, the Foreign Secretary, and the Resident, occupied the first carriage, which was driven by two Royal

Horse Artillerymen in full dress; then followed the carriages of the members of the Viceroy's Staff, general Staff, regimental and departmental officers, and after an interval of a few seconds came the carriages of His Highness the Nizam, escorted by his African Cavalry guard, behind which followed carriages of the Native Nobles and Chiefs, each attended by small detachments of mounted men.

On arrival at the Civil Club, which ends the road to the railway station, the Nizam turned to the right, and proceeded along the Residency road to the City, followed by his Nobles, except two of the principal officers of the State, who had been directed to accompany the Viceroy. From the same point, viz., the Civil Club, the head of the Viceregal train turned to the left and passed through Chuddergat, over the Hussain Sangar Tank bund to Secunderabad. After stopping a short time at the Assembly Rooms to exchange horses, the *cortège* proceeded by the One Tree Hill through the Military Cantonment of Trimulgherry to the Bolarum Residency, where it arrived at 7 p.m.

From the Hyderabad Railway Station to Secunderabad the entire route was lined with the Nizam's Reformed Troops, who saluted the Viceroy as he passed along. Similarly, from Secunderabad to Trimulgherry the road was kept by the Madras Native Infantry and the Secunderabad Police, while the road from Trimulgherry to Bolarum was held by the troops of the Hyderabad Contingent. As His Excellency passed through Secunderabad, a Royal salute of thirty-one guns was fired by the Royal Artillery from the Mud Battery, and a similar salute was fired by the Hyderabad Contingent Battery at Bolarum, where His Excellency was received by a guard of honour, with band and colours from the 21st Scotch Fusiliers.

Regarding the decorations, there is not much to say, extending as they did from the Residency to Secunderabad, over a distance of more than four miles, and again from the Residency to the Nizam's Palace. Nearly two miles too much had apparently been attempted. Had the same material and labour, or I should say money (for Government had to pay for all), been confined to a more limited space, doubtless the effect would have been much better. Throughout the route above-mentioned various-coloured flags, banners, streamers, etc., hung from lines stretched along both sides of the roads, supported at intervals of about fifty yards by long bamboo poles bound round with different-coloured cloth, looking something like long barber's-poles, tipped off with star and crescent, which seemed to figure everywhere, no device or motto being, apparently, complete without it. Across the road, at various places, were stretched different-coloured strips of cloth, bearing the mottoes, "Long live His Highness", "God bless the Country", "A right Royal welcome we give thee", "Long live the Nizam", "Welcome to the Viceroy", "God bless our Empress", "Health, Wealth, and

Prosperity", "Long may His Highness reign", "God bless the Empress of India", "Long Life and Happiness", "Rich and Poor welcome thee" "Welcome", etc., etc., as also some few in Persian character.

Along the Secunderabad route there were six triumphal arches, and along the City road three; and as these are almost identical with the arches already alluded to, they may be passed by with the remark that for artistic skill the military outstepped all others, more particularly when it is considered that the cost of its erection was entirely borne by the officers of the Reformed Troops. The other arches were erected at the expense of Government. Great credit is due to Major Neville and the officers under his command, who, as a rule, do not draw one-third of the salaries drawn by the other officers of the Nizam's Government. If the loyalty of the people is to be judged by outward demonstration, then indeed we have seen it at this place. Mr. Wilkinson's stately mansion, which was nicely decorated, was the first on the list.

On Monday, 4th February 1884, at 10 p.m., was held what is termed the "ceremony of Mizaj Pursi"; that is, four of the principal officers of H.H. the Nizam's State proceeded with due ceremony to Bolarum to inquire after His Excellency's health. These officers were received by the Military Secretary, the officer on special duty in the Foreign Department, and one of His Excellency's Aides-de-Camp, and, after the usual formalities had been gone through, were dismissed by the officer on special duty in the Foreign Department presenting attar and pân.

At 11 a.m. the same day, the Nizam, attended by nine of the principal Nobles and officers of State, paid what is termed a private visit to His Excellency at Bolarum. The Military Secretary to the Viceroy, the officer on special duty in the Foreign Department, and one of His Excellency's Aides-de-Camp, proceeded at 8 a.m. to Hyderabad, and escorted His Highness the Nizam to the Viceregal residence. On the arrival at Bolarum the Nizam was received, on alighting from his carriage, by the Resident and an Aide-de-Camp of the Viceroy, and conducted to the verandah, where he was met by the Foreign Secretary, who conducted the Nizam to His Excellency's presence. The Viceroy, receiving the Nizam at the edge of the carpet, conducted him to a seat at his right hand; and on the right of the Nizam were seated the Resident, the Ministers, Nobles and officers in attendance on His Highness, according to their rank. On the left of the Viceroy sat the Foreign Secretary, the Major-General Commanding the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, the Brigadier-General Commanding the Hyderabad Contingent, the Private and Military Secretaries to the Viceroy, the officer on special duty in the Foreign Department, and the Military Staff. After a short conversation, the Native Ministers and Nobles who had accompanied the Nizam were presented to His Excellency by the Resident, each of whom presented a nuzzar of five gold mohars, which

was merely touched by the Viceroy and remitted. The ceremony was brought to a close by the Viceroy offering attar and pân to the Nizam. The Foreign Secretary offered attar and pân to the four principal Ministers and Nobles, and the officer on special duty in the Foreign Department to the others.

His Highness, who was escorted to and from Bolarum by his own Cavalry, was received with a salute of twenty-one guns, fired by No. 3 Battery, Hyderabad Contingent, and a guard of honour from a British regiment. The Contingent band was in attendance, and played during the interview, and the Contingent Cavalry lined the road leading to the Residency. The same formalities attended His Highness's departure, and salutes were fired at Secunderabad as His Highness passed through the station.

At 2.45 p.m. the same day, a deputation, consisting of the four principal officers of the Hyderabad State, waited on the Viceroy at Bolarum for the purpose of conducting His Excellency to the Nizam's Palace. His Excellency left Bolarum at 3 p.m., under a royal salute from the guns of the Contingent Battery. He was escorted by a wing of the 14th Hussars and a wing of the Contingent Cavalry, and was attended by his Private and Military Secretaries, his personal Staff, the Foreign Secretary, the Major-General Commanding Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, and the Brigadier-General Commanding Hyderabad Contingent, with their respective Staffs. On arrival at the Palace at 4.30 p.m., His Excellency was received on alighting from his carriage by the Nizam and the Resident, and conducted to the Durbar Hall, where he occupied a seat on the right of the Nizam; to the right of his Excellency sat the Foreign Secretary, the Major-General Commanding Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, the Brigadier-General Commanding Hyderabad Contingent, and His Excellency's Private and Military Secretaries and personal Staff; while on the left of the Nizam were seated the Resident, and beyond him the Ministers, Nobles, and officers in attendance on His Highness, according to rank. After a short conversation, the Ministers, Nobles, and officers of the State were presented to His Excellency by the Resident, each of whom presented a nuzzar of five gold mohurs, which His Excellency touched and remitted. The ceremony of the return visit was brought to a close by the Nizam presenting attar and pân to His Excellency, to the Foreign Secretary, and to the Resident, and the principal officers of the State to the other British officers present. His Excellency was then conducted to his carriage by the Nizam and the Resident, and left under a royal salute of twenty-one guns by the Nizam's Artillery; the road leading to the city was lined by the Nizam's troops, and a guard of honour, which was drawn up in front of the Nizam's Palace, saluted His Excellency on arrival and departure.

His Excellency closed the day by a levee, which was held at Bolarum

at 9.30 p.m., and was attended by all officers, Civil and Military, a few non-official Europeans, and a number of Native gentlemen. The levee closed by the presentation to His Excellency of the Native officers in garrison by their commanding officers.

The 5th February 1884 will ever be remembered as a red-letter day in the annals of the Hyderabad State, not only on account of the installation of the youthful Prince, Mir Mahboob Ali Khan, but as the first instance on record of a Viceroy and Governor-General having visited Hyderabad. At the first dawn of day Hyderabad seemed to have suddenly sprung into a lively state of activity; everywhere the roads were being swept and watered, the last finishing touches were given to some of the decorations, mounted orderlies hurrying along, and troops of all kinds moving in different directions to take up the various positions assigned to them along the city and Chudderghat roads; and scarcely had these time to take up their positions, when carriages of all kinds, from the usual rat-like pony trap to the swell turn-out of the city Nawab, came streaming into Hyderabad, and ceased only a few minutes before the time fixed for the Viceregal *cortège* to arrive.

His Excellency left Bolarum under a Royal salute, fired by the Contingent Battery at 9 a.m., accompanied by a deputation of the four principal officers of the Hyderabad State, the Foreign Secretary, the Private and Military Secretaries, the officer on special duty in the Foreign Department and personal Staff, the Major-General Commanding Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, and the Brigadier-General Commanding Hyderabad Contingent, with their Staffs. The Viceroy was escorted by a wing of the 14th Hussars and a Battery of Royal Horse-Artillery. The handsome dress of the men and their soldier-like bearing added much to the grandeur of the procession. The road from the Bolarum Residency to the City, upwards of fourteen miles, was lined by British, Native, Contingent, and Nizam's troops, behind which were gathered crowds of people anxious to see the Lord Sahib as he passed by. Here and there His Excellency was cheered by the people, but their demonstration was so feeble that their voices were almost lost in the noise created by the horses' hoofs and the rattle of the guns.

Their Excellencies the Governor of Madras and the Commander-in-Chief in India, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, who had preceded the Viceroy, arrived at the Palace a little after ten o'clock, where they were received with the honours due to their rank, and escorted to the seats allotted to them, on the immediate left of the Viceroy, by the First Assistant Resident and the Military Secretary. All Civil and Military officers invited to attend, the Nobles and Ministers of the State, and other persons specially invited, were requested to be seated in the Durbar Hall half-an-hour before the arrival of His Excellency the Viceroy.

His Excellency arrived at the Palace at 10.30 a.m., and was received by a guard of honour, with band and colours, from the Nizam's troops; and as he alighted from his carriage he was received by the Nizam, the Resident, and the four Ministers and principal officers of the State. A procession was then formed, and moved towards the Durbar Hall in the following order:—

The officer on special duty in the Foreign Department.

The Foreign Secretary.

The Resident.

His Excellency the Viceroy's Staff.

His Highness the Nizam's Staff.

His Highness the Nizam.

His Excellency the Viceroy.

The Brigadier-General Command-

The Major-General Commanding the Subsidiary Staff.

ing Hyderabad Contingent Staff.

On the procession entering the Durbar Hall, a second guard of honour, stationed within the quadrangle, presented arms, and the band played the National Anthem, and a Royal salute of thirty-one guns was fired in honour of His Excellency, on whose approach all present arose to their feet, and remained standing until His Excellency took his seat.

That part of the Palace in which the ceremony of Installation was held is called the Durbar Hall, at the extreme end of which a chair had been erected, over which was a beautiful canopy covered with embroidered cloth, and supported by four handsome silver poles ornamented with gilt scroll work. On the dais, which was covered with yellow velvet carpets, were placed two chairs of state, one representing the Musnud; and in front of the dais were placed two chairs, one for His Excellency the Viceroy, and the other for the Nizam, while on either side were arranged, along the whole length of the hall, chairs for all invited to attend. There were fully two hundred persons present, about twenty-five of whom were ladies; and what with the variously-coloured uniforms of the officers—scarlet, blue, green, French grey, drab, dark grey, etc.—the heavily embroidered coats of the Politicals, and the gorgeous dresses of the Ministers, Nobles, and other Native gentlemen, attired as they were in gold-brocaded coats of satins and velvets of green, purple, and other colours, the scene was grand beyond description.

On entering the Durbar Hall, His Excellency took his seat in front of the dais, and His Highness the Nizam on his right. On His Excellency's left were seated the Foreign Secretary and the other British officers and guests present, while to the right of the Nizam were seated the Resident at Hyderabad and the Ministers, and Nobles and officers of the State, according to rank. After all had been seated, His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General rose and addressed the Nizam as follows:—

“I can assure Your Highness that it affords me great gratification to be able to be present here to-day in order to discharge, in the name and on behalf of the Queen and Empress of India, the duty of declaring Your Highness to be invested with full powers for the administration of your State. When I learnt from Your Highness a few weeks ago that you had a great wish that I should come to Hyderabad for this purpose, I felt a strong desire to comply with your request, in which I saw a proof of your Highness's attachment to the British Government and of your confidence in the strength and sincerity of its friendship.

“I am, I believe, the first Viceroy or Governor-General who has ever visited Hyderabad, and my presence on this occasion is a mark not only of the close and intimate ties which unite the Ruler of this Great State to the Government of the Queen-Empress, but also of Her Majesty's deep interest in the welfare of the Nizam.

“During the long years of your minority, Your Highness and your people enjoyed a singular advantage in having at the head of the Administration of the State one of the foremost statesmen of India—a man who, by his high intelligence, his varied capacity, and his devotion to Your Highness's interests, was able amidst all the difficulties of a minority to conduct the Government of the State with a success which entitles him to the grateful remembrance both of Your Highness and of the Government of India. Sir Salar Jung, during Your Highness's youth, had done much to reform the Administration in many ways, to improve the revenue system, and to give increased security to life and property, and at the moment of death he was contemplating further measures of improvement. It had been my hope that when Your Highness came of age he would have been at hand to aid you with his long experience, and to serve you with his well-tried zeal; but it has pleased God to ordain otherwise, and to take him from your side at the very moment when, in some respects, you must stand in need of such assistance as he could have given to you, and his absence from among us casts a shade even over the brilliant ceremonies and heartfelt rejoicings of this auspicious day. But his work survives him. I trust that Your Highness's Ministers will ever make it a guiding object of their administration to preserve and to extend that work.

“I have now a few words of practical advice to offer to you. Look to your finances—disordered finances are the ruin of States. It is so everywhere. It is very specially so in India. Carelessness and extravagance in financial matters mean, first, heavy taxation and the gradual impoverishment and ruin of the people, and then loans with increasing interest and final bankruptcy. Reasonable economy, just aid, and equal taxation, mean ever-increasing prosperity and expanding wealth. A good revenue system is the foundation of good government in India, and without it the Prince is embarrassed and the people miserable.

Again I earnestly trust that Your Highness will keep a strict watch over the honest and equal administration of justice; that the judicial officers of a State should be pure, above the taint of suspicion, and courageous—above the influence of fear, secures for a ruler the gratitude of his subjects and the admiration of his neighbours. Pure justice is the brightest jewel that can adorn a coronet. Let it ever shine forth on yours.

“Your Highness has before you a great and arduous task. You are the ruler of some ten millions of men; their welfare will henceforth depend greatly upon you, upon your wisdom, your industry, and your self-denial. Let me entreat you not to look with vain satisfaction upon the outward shows of power, upon the wealth and splendour by which you will be surrounded—upon the submission and often the flattery which will meet you on every hand. Your territories are extensive, their revenues great, their population numerous; but let none of these things be your pride. You are young, and will be pressed upon many sides by the temptations to which youth is especially exposed; but never let them gain the mastery over you: you have nobler aims to follow and greater deeds to do. If you would make for yourself a name among the Princes of India, you can only win it in the days in which we live, by the justice of your Government, and by the acknowledged prosperity of your people. That people’s loyalty to your honour and to yourself is manifest and unquestioned; it rests with you to preserve it, and, as years go on, to deepen it into the most precious possession of a ruler, the unfeigned love of his subjects. The care of those subjects has not been entrusted to you by God that you may make them the instrument of your pleasure or your pride. He has given them into your care that you may rule and guide them for His glory and their welfare. In their well-being you will find your truest happiness, in their contentment your best security. Set before you no lesser aim; be satisfied with no meaner fame; but as you look back over the roll of your ancestors, and recall the annals of your House, let it be your ambition that when you, too, shall be gathered to your fathers, men should say of you, ‘He left his people the better for his rule.’

“And in this great work, difficult and trying as it will often be, I can promise you the constant support and never-failing assistance of the Government of the Queen-Empress. The single object of the British Government in regard to this or any other Native State is that it should be prosperous and well governed. So far as we can aid you to promote that end you may ever command our help. The maintenance of the Native States of India is a cardinal point of English policy in these days, and the existence of these States is, in true judgment, of the greatest advantage to English interests. That your Government should

be strong and orderly, that your finances should be well managed, and your taxation justly raised, and that your nobles should be faithful and your people contented, is, as I well know, the earnest wish of the Sovereign whom I represent here to-day. She will watch your career with a strong and unfailing interest; do not disappoint her hopes.

“And now, my friend, in whom I shall ever feel a deep personal interest, it only remains for me to place you in that musnud, and to express my earnest hope that it may please God to bless and guide you, and to make your reign prosperous and your rule just and honourable, so that the fair promise of this day may not be blighted, and that future generations of your grateful people may recall the date of your Installation as the commencement of a bright era in the history of the State.”

The address having been translated by Mr. Durand, the Foreign Secretary, His Excellency took the Nizam by the hand and conducted him to the chair of state on the dais, and, addressing him by his full titles of His Highness Asaf-Jah, Muzaffur-ul-Mumalik, Nizam-ul-Mulk, Nizam-ul-Dowlah, Nawab Mir Mahboob Ali Khan, Bahadur, Futch Jung, declared him invested with the full powers of Administration. The band played the National Anthem, and salutes of twenty-one guns were fired by the batteries at Hyderabad, Secunderabad, and Bolarum, in honour of the Nizam. All present having now resumed their seats, the Viceroy's Khillat was brought in and conferred on the Nizam, after which Khillats for the four principal officers of the State were brought in and conferred on Nawab Salar Jung, Rajah Narrindur Peshcar, and Nawab Shums-ool-Oomra,—Nawab Bushceer-ood-Dowlah, the other principal officer, not being able to attend, owing to indisposition, and his Khillat was, therefore, forwarded to him. The Nizam then rose and acknowledged the Viceroy's address as follows:—

“Your Excellency, it gives me the greatest pleasure to be able to offer Your Excellency a very hearty welcome to Hyderabad. It would have been to me and all my people a matter of much regret and disappointment if the occasion of my Installation had not been graced by Your Excellency's presence. I am sure we owe this honour to Your Excellency's well-known solicitude for the welfare of this State, as well as to Your Excellency's personal kindness to myself, of which I have recently received proof, which I shall never forget. I assure Your Excellency that I am deeply sensible of both.

“I hope Your Excellency will accept my warmest thanks for having incurred the trouble and fatigue of a long journey in order to honour me on the present occasion. The event augurs well for my future Government, and I accept it joyfully as a first token of the amiable and kind relations which have always subsisted between the British Government and my predecessors in this State.

"The advice which Your Excellency has been kind enough to offer me, I accept with the greatest sincerity. I shall ever endeavour, in all matters that concern the prospects and prosperity of this State, to consult the wishes of Your Excellency and of the Government of which Your Excellency is the honoured head. I am sure that in doing so I shall be consulting the best interests of myself and of my subjects.

"I hope Your Excellency will take an early opportunity of conveying to Her Majesty the Queen-Empress of India the sentiments of friendship and respect which I entertain towards the Imperial name."

On concluding his address, the Nizam and all present resumed their seats, when their Excellencies the Governor of Madras, the Commander-in-Chief in India, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army advanced in succession, and offered their congratulations to His Highness the Nizam. Attar and pân having been distributed, the Viceroy and the Nizam left the Durbar Hall, in the same order of procession as they had entered, and the ceremonies observed on the arrival of His Excellency were repeated on his departure from the Palace.

In order to avoid the fatigue of a long drive back to Bolarum in the heat of the day, arrangements had been made for the entertainment of His Excellency and suite at the Chudderghat Residency, but owing to a fatal case of cholera having occurred at the Residency a few hours before the Installation, His Excellency drove to Major Neville's, the Commander of His Highness the Nizam's troops, where he remained the whole of the afternoon, until he left in the evening for the state banquet.

The sudden death of Mr. Peake, Assistant Superintendent of Telegraphs, cast a gloom over the place, and his loss is much felt by all in the Department, especially among the young signallers, with whom he was a great favourite, and ever ready to assist them in time of trouble or distress. At 2 a.m., when past all hope of recovery, the Residency surgeon asked him if he had any message he wished to convey to any person. "Yes", said the dying man, "tell Mr. Gordon that the arrangements for which I came here are complete and in working order."

Of the banquet that was given this evening in the Nizam's Palace, it may be mentioned that about 400 persons were present, a large number of whom sat down to dinner. A beautiful gold service, that had been purchased for this occasion many years ago by the late Sir Salar Jung, through his Agents, Messrs. Rogers, Rock and Co., of Friday Street, London, was for the first time displayed to-night, and was admired by all who saw it, as well as the beautiful furniture which the late Minister had had prepared under his own supervision when he visited England in 1876. A magnificent stuffed tiger, presented to His Highness by me, and set up by the late Henry Ward of Vere-

street was much admired also. In proposing the health of His Highness the Nizam, His Excellency the Viceroy said :—

“Ladies and Gentlemen, I have a toast to propose to you which will not need more than a few words from me to recommend it to your acceptance. The occasion is not one for making speeches, and the toast that I have to offer to you is one which I am sure will meet with a cordial reception from you, for I am about to ask you to drink to the health of His Highness the Nizam. It is not only that we may express our thanks to His Highness for the princely and magnificent hospitality with which he has entertained us this evening, but it is far more that we may take this opportunity of assuring him how heartily we pray that it may please God to grant him a long life and prosperous and happy reign, and that that personal government which he has taken upon himself to-day may be as successful as I am confident we all desire it should be.”

The toast was drunk with cheers, after which the Nizam briefly returned thanks, and proposed the health of Their Excellencies the Viceroy and Lady Ripon.

The Viceroy then replied as follows :—“Your Highness, I am very grateful to you for having proposed my health and that of Lady Ripon upon this occasion. As I said to Your Highness this morning in Durbar, it has been to me a source of very great pleasure to be able to be here upon an occasion of such great historical interest, because it is the first occasion upon which Her Majesty’s representative has visited Hyderabad, and also because of the interesting event which has occurred to-day, in respect to which we all entertain a deep and earnest desire that Your Highness’s reign, thus begun, may be continued prosperously to the end. I can assure Your Highness that so long as I hold this office which I now fill, it will be my constant desire to afford to you and to your Government every help and assistance in my power, and I am quite sure that you will receive from the Resident here, Mr. Cordery, the best advice and the most constant support both to Your Highness and your Government. I greatly regret that Lady Ripon is not able to be present to-night. Unfortunately, she met with a slight accident two days ago, which, although not of a serious character, has prevented her accompanying me. I should regret her absence under any circumstances, but I regret it the more for her sake, because she has lost one of the most beautiful sights which it has ever been my good fortune to witness.”

From Secunderabad to the City the road was kept by the Nizam’s troops, who, from the early hour of 6 p.m. until after the return of the Viceroy at about 12 o’clock, remained on duty.

The illuminations of the last two nights, it is said, have surpassed anything of the kind ever before seen in Hyderabad. At the first

sight the scene looked brilliantly grand; but as soon as the eye became accustomed to the glare of so many lights, there appeared a sameness about all the illuminations, varying only according to the number of the lights used, which, of course, depended upon the liberality of the people; and while there were many who spared no expense, there were some well-paid officials who tried to shuffle through the business with the expenditure of a few paltry bottles of oil. The house of Mr. Wilkinson, Director Public Works Department, was, as usual, beautifully illuminated, and a great number of lights shone from the houses of the "Kham Commissioner" and the Superintending Surgeon, and the Padree Sahib had lights running up to the top of the church steeple.

The grand old Hussain Sangor tank looked its best on Tuesday night, bonfires having been lighted round its shore, and electric lights shining out the whole length of the Bund; between each bonfire were suspended numerous lamps of various colours, so that the border of the tank, some miles in circumference, was one girdle of fires and lights of all colours, shapes, and sizes. The steamer *Lady Meade*, and a few other boats, were prettily lighted up, every available rock in the tank was made use of for some kind of decorative work, and in the centre were about two hundred tiny craft floating about and casting the rays of their various-coloured lamps on the surface of the water.

The Bund of this magnificent tank connects Chudderghat with Secunderabad; it is about two miles in length, the top forming an excellent road, wide enough for three carriages to pass abreast, and it is much frequented in the evening by ladies and gentlemen from both stations, who enjoy the cool, refreshing breeze wafted over this extensive sheet of water, which covers an area of many miles. This tank supplies Secunderabad with water, and irrigates a great extent of paddy ground in the vicinity of Hyderabad. On its waters float a small steamer and several boats, which are frequently used by pleasure parties. The steamer *Lady Meade* is the gift of a Hyderabad nobleman, who generously placed it on the lake for the use of the public. The cost of original construction of the bund is said to have been 2,54,636 rupees; it has recently undergone extensive repairs and alterations, which have probably cost a good deal of money. The works are of a permanent kind, and were superintended by Mr. Heenan, a zealous and energetic engineer, serving under the Government of H.H. the Nizam.

ADDRESS TO THE VICEROY.

Two deputations waited on His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, at the Bolarum Residency, at twelve noon yesterday, for the purpose of presenting His Excellency with addresses of welcome. The first one, which was called in punctually at twelve o'clock, consisted of all the different members of the Native community. Mr. Ramchendra Pillay, pleader, read the Address, printed on parchment, with a blue border, and which ran thus :—

“ THE ADDRESS OF THE NATIVE COMMUNITY.

“MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,—We, the undersigned Native residents of the Cantonment of Secunderabad, crave leave to approach Your Excellency, and to offer on behalf of the whole Native community of this place a loyal and cordial welcome to your Lordship and the Marchioness of Ripon. We consider ourselves especially fortunate in being honoured with a Viceregal visit, an event unprecedented in the annals of the capital of the Deccan, and we embrace this opportunity of recording our high sense of esteem for Your Lordship's wise rule; and it behoves us, as devoted and loyal subjects of our beloved and gracious Sovereign, the Queen-Empress, to express our deep feelings of joy and thankfulness on such an auspicious occasion. In the discharge of the important and onerous duties appertaining to your exalted position, Your Lordship has visited many towns and cities more prosperous and with greater advantages in many respects than are possessed by this Cantonment; but, in the warmth of our attachment to and regard for the person and throne of our kind and loving Sovereign, whom Your Lordship so worthily represents, we yield to no other community in British India, and we are, therefore, naturally proud and much delighted at the visit amongst us of Your Lordship and Lady Ripon.

“We take this opportunity to submit for Your Lordship's consideration, that while we have many things to be grateful for, the want of a proper supply of wholesome water is grievously felt by all—Native and European, rich and poor—and we regret to state that the inconvenience and hardship felt alike by all classes, are simply inexpressible, and a successful water project would therefore be an incalculable and everlasting boon to this town. The efforts of the Cantonment and Municipal Committees in connection with this subject have produced no favourable results, and we would, therefore, earnestly solicit Your Lordship's attention to this matter.

“Secondly, the civil population of this Cantonment is rapidly increasing and becoming more enlightened under the benign British rule, and consequently a Municipal Committee, similar to those in other places in British India, but subject to necessary and local modifications, is a

great desideratum. We have a Committee of Meer Mohallas, or principal residents of a locality, elected by the Cantonment Magistrate, who is its President, but it is merely an echo of the voice of the Cantonment Committee, existing only in name.

"Thirdly, the Cantonment Magistrate, with his multifarious duties, including that of Secretary to the Cantonment Committee, is also Judge of the Civil Court, with unlimited jurisdiction. It is consequently too much to expect such an officer, despite all his intelligence and honesty, to go through the almost Herculean task imposed on him with satisfaction to himself. We would, therefore, respectfully suggest the advisability of separating the civil jurisdiction from the criminal, and nominating a distinct judge for each. The same suggestion also applies to the British Resident at Hyderabad as the local High Court; and the appointment of a judicial assistant, with similar powers, as is the case in other Native States, will be hailed with great delight and gratitude. In making the above remarks, we beg to be distinctly understood that we do not mean to cast the slightest reflection either on our energetic Cantonment Magistrate or our popular Resident, whose respective abilities are too well known to need any special reference.

"In Your Lordship we recognise a fitting representative of the Empress of India, who, with a singleness of purpose, has inaugurated a policy which has endeared you to the hearts of your Native subjects, as exemplified by the universal entreaty that Her Most Gracious Majesty may be pleased to grant an extension.

"With such noble examples of self-sacrifice and righteousness, and all the virtues that ennoble a statesman and Governor before him, it is our earnest hope that the young Nizam, whom Your Excellency has lately installed on the throne of his ancestors, may, by the help of Providence, prove mindful of the welfare of the millions of his subjects.

"Thanking Your Excellency for the courtesy and kindness with which you have condescended to hear our humble address of welcome, and soliciting the favour of Your Lordship to convey our respects to Lady Ripon for the honour she has done to this country and its people by her visit, and with prayers to God that He may grant you and Lady Ripon a long life, prosperity, and perfect health."

And, at its conclusion, the address, enclosed in a casket, manufactured by Messrs. Orr and Sons, of Madras, on which was engraved a suitable inscription, was placed before H.E. the Viceroy, who received the deputation seated, with Mr. Cordery, the Resident, on his right hand, and his three Secretaries. Lord Ripon then called in the deputation of the Mohammedan community, when Mr. Shumshuddeen, Assistant Cantonment Magistrate read an address, and placed it on a silver tray and handed it to His Excellency. It ran as follows:—

"THE ADDRESS OF THE MOHAMMEDAN COMMUNITY.

"MAY IT PLEASE YOUR LORDSHIP,—We, the representatives of the Mohammedan community of Secunderabad, beg to tender to Your Excellency our hearty congratulations on your safe arrival in Hyderabad, and we hope that the result of your visit here will be to give additional strength to the friendly feeling which has so long and happily subsisted between the British Government in India and His Highness the Nizam.

"It is with feelings of the greatest joy that the Mohammedans of this part of the Deccan respectfully approach to greet and welcome Your Lordship, and to express their heartfelt gratitude for the kindness evinced by Your Excellency towards His Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad in honouring the auspicious occasion of His Highness's installation to his hereditary *musnud* with your illustrious presence, an honour of which not only the whole of the Mohammedan community, but His Highness the Nizam himself and his nobles, should justly feel proud.

"Since Your Lordship's assuming the *régime* of this vast country of India in 1880, we have, with feelings of delight, read, through the medium of the public press, Your Lordship's excellent sentiments anent bettering the condition of our country, and we feel certain that Your Excellency is devoted to the interest of India and its people, and specially to the social and political improvement of the Mohammedans, who, from causes beyond their own control, have been losing ground with other races in social and political position, and that under Your Excellency's Government they will regain it.

"Among the several memorable public works accomplished by Your Excellency, we note the repeal of the Vernacular Press Act, the encouragement given to Indian trade, and the Education Commission, from the proceedings of the last of which we learn that Your Excellency has acted up to what was expressed in reply to a memorial referring to an Education despatch of 1854) presented to Your Lordship in 1880 when about to leave England; that the despatch lays down clearly and forcibly the broad lines of the true Educational policy for India; and that upon those lines it has been Your Lordship's intention to work, and we thus clearly observe Your ship's Lord sympathy and anxious desire to promote the extension of elementary education among the poorer classes of our countrymen.

"In Your Lordship, India has found a benefactor whose enlightened policy has entitled him to the glorious distinction of being the most upright and impartial ruler it has ever seen. We can never forget, nor should India ever be unmindful of the great services Your Excellency

has rendered for the public good, maintaining your high office undiminished in its powers, utility, and dignity. Of the admirable manner in which Your Lordship has administered the extensive territories committed to your charge, it is sufficient to say that Your Excellency's name will go down to posterity as one whose career will bear a favourable comparison with those of the most illustrious representatives of India of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress, and we trust that a gracious Providence may enable Your Lordship long to enjoy the well-earned fame."

Mr. Siraj-ul-Hasun then stepped forward, and explained to His Excellency that, as he was not well acquainted with English, he had given the purport of the address in Urdu verse, and asked His Excellency to accept it, which was accordingly done.

His Excellency then rose and addressed the deputation of the various classes in words more or less to this effect:—

It gave him much pleasure to hear the feelings of loyalty, which they had just expressed, towards the British Government, and he would be glad to convey their sentiments to Her Majesty. He was gratified at the welcome they had given him personally, and also as Her Majesty's representative. He had no doubt they expressed the genuine feelings of the residents of the Cantonment of Secunderabad, and he was, therefore, much delighted at the expressions of loyalty and welcome. They had touched upon three points in their address, which he admitted were very important and entitled to his careful consideration; but the information they afforded him was of necessity so limited, that he was not in a position to give an opinion. He would therefore, leave it in the hands of his friend, Mr. Cordery, who, after carefully investigating it, would forward his views to the Viceroy for favourable consideration. He was much obliged to them for the good wishes expressed on his and Lady Ripon's behalf, who, he was sorry to say, was unable to be present on that pleasant occasion, owing to a slight indisposition. In conclusion, he thanked them for the valuable casket with which they had presented him. The design was both original and displayed great taste, more so than any other he had yet received.

To the address by the Mohammedans, His Excellency replied somewhat to this effect:—"Gentlemen, indeed I have much pleasure in accepting this address on behalf of the Mohammedan community of the Secunderabad cantonment. I am astonished at the loyalty of the Mohammedans, and glad to see it. It has been a source of pleasure to me in that I have had the pleasing task of placing, with my own hands, H.H. the Nizam on his hereditary throne, and I can assure you I will ever take a deep interest in him and his subjects. I assure you, gentlemen, it lies entirely in your own hands to educate your

people, and I hope that you who are educated will take an interest and exert yourselves in this matter. I can assure you, I am always ready to support the Mohammedan community ”

In answer to the address in Urdu, written in verse, and especially presented by Mr. Syed Siraj-ul-Hasun, Police and Railway Secretary to H.H. the Nizam's Government, His Excellency said that he was very much obliged to Mr. Syed Siraj-ul-Hasun for the address; that he was unable to reply to it, as His Excellency was not acquainted with Urdu, but that he would not fail to have it translated for his information later on.

H.E. THE VICEROY'S DEPARTURE.

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, having accomplished the mission upon which he visited Hyderabad, and its concomitant observances, arrived at the Secunderabad Railway Station at half-past two yesterday afternoon, on his return to Bengal, accompanied by Lady Ripon and their suite, escorted by a squadron of the 14th Hussars, and a squadron of the Hyderabad Contingent. The Viceregal party left the Bolarum Residency at a quarter to two; and during its progress through the military lines, salutes were fired and other demonstrations made of loyalty and attachment to the British Crown and the honour due to its representative. On His Excellency's approaching the railway station the guard of honour, furnished by the 24th Native Infantry, presented arms, and on his reaching the platform the same compliment was paid by a guard of honour of the Middlesex Regiment, each being supplemented by the first part of the National Anthem by their respective bands. To meet His Excellency there was on the platform a select gathering of the principal officers and notables of this station and of Hyderabad, including H.H. the Nizam, accompanied by the Minister the Peshcar, Shums-ool-Oomrah, Busher-ool-Dowlah, and Vicar-ool-Oomrah, the Resident and Staff, the Major-General Commanding Hyderabad Subsidiary Force and Staff, the Brigadier-General Commanding Hyderabad Contingent and Staff, the commanding officers of the corps in cantonment, and a few departmental and regimental officers, with most of whom in turn His Excellency and her Ladyship shook hands, exchanged compliments, and conversed freely and affably. They remained on the platform for the space of twenty minutes or more, bowing in graceful recognition of the respect paid to them in the doffing of caps and hats by the spectators as their Excellencies passed to and fro. The Secunderabad station and its appended buildings, and the quarters of the railway officials within the premises, were gaily festooned and decorated. The station especially presented an air of gaiety without garishness. The management of

the various flags and devices, the judicious blending of colours, and the neatness with which they were disposed, commanded particular notice and elicited much commendation. It evinced taste and skill, and must have cost much labour. As their Excellencies entered the archway they were greeted with a shower of small bouquets and single flowers falling from the roof, which caused some surprise to their Excellencies and others. Her Ladyship pronounced the contrivance to be unique, and the effects one of the prettiest she had ever seen. The floor of the archway was carpeted, and the space thence to the carriages covered with red floor-cloth. It is to be regretted it did not occur to those who so well superintended the decorations that appeared so complete, to put up also an awning from the archway to the carriage, as the sun at that hour was powerful. As the train got into motion, the Royal Artillery, who were on the other side of the line, fired a salute of thirty-one guns; and, ere it was over, the sound of locomotion produced by the vehicles which conveyed away Lord and Lady Ripon had died away in the distance.

With reference to my remark at page xv, that General Wright communicated to the Resident his impression that he had been appointed to the command by the Viceroy for the purpose of reforming the Contingent, "but that this was not confirmed by official documents", I wish it to be clearly understood that I have not the slightest doubt that General Wright really entertained that impression. There can be no question that General Wright is an admirable soldier, indefatigable in every way to promote what appears to him to be for the benefit of those over whom he exercises command, but too much in favour of the regulations and traditions of the Bengal Army, in which he was trained, to appreciate the political and social conditions on which the Silladari system was founded, conditions which still exist, and the existence of which makes any tampering with that system and its vested interests most unadvisable and most dangerous.

The Resident, Sir Richard Meade, ascertained at an interview with the Viceroy, Lord Northbrook, that General Wright had misunderstood his instructions, and this was confirmed by General Sir Henry Norman and by the Military Secretary, Colonel Earle.

Again, I remarked in my Memorandum, submitted to Sir Stuart Bayley (page xxi, footnote), that some of the Orders issued by the

General were similar to those which resulted in two officers of the Cavalry Division being cut down on parade in 1828, and which, I may add, brought down upon the Resident a rebuke and a warning from the Court of Directors, dated 15th April 1829, in the following terms:—

“We cannot hold the Resident, ———, entirely blameless. It certainly reflects no credit on the principal British functionary in the Nizam’s country that proceedings, which have led to such serious results, should have been taking place under his official authority for a considerable length of time without his interference. Certain allowances are undoubtedly to be made for the situation of ———, who, as a Civil Servant, naturally reposed greater confidence in the long experience and tried character of Lieut.-Colonel Davies than in his own judgment; and believed that officer’s assurances that the new regimental arrangements contained nothing offensive or injurious to the men. The event has proved, however, that such implicit reliance is not safe; and the Resident, as the representative of the British Government, was both entitled and bound to exercise a surveillance over all the acts of British officers in the Nizam’s Service, whether civil or military.”

In recalling the fatal occurrences of 1828, and the judgment passed upon them by the Home Government, I have not the slightest intention of suggesting that General Wright was either of a harsh or of a rash temperament as Commandant of a Force; but I have always wished, in my capacity of military adviser to the Resident, and wish now, to point out that the Resident is the responsible officer who is bound to guard against anything occurring, whether it be an innovation or not, calculated to injure or to irritate soldiers of a special class and of rare quality, such as those of the Hyderabad Cavalry formerly were. I was, therefore, compelled to state forcibly my apprehension of bad consequences, sooner or later, if the Resident did not interfere. I had, subsequently, good grounds for anxiety in the conduct of two troops of one of our Regiments which, in my opinion, as well as in that of others competent to judge, had been drawn into insubordination. When, later on, in 1882, a Regiment of Infantry, or a large part of it, misbehaved, I considered it high time to prevent a similar censure to that of 1829 coming down upon the Civilian Residents under

whom I had lately been called upon to serve, to submit what may be termed an indictment reviewing what had occurred.

The recognition given by Sir Stuart Bayley to the efforts that I had made to keep down the expenditure in connection with the Contingent was very encouraging to me, and proves more strongly than ever what I have always maintained, that everything connected with the Contingent should be carefully considered on broad principles of political equity, and not committed to the routine of any Department.

In conclusion, I wish to call attention to the fact that from the year 1866, when my letter written to the Secretary of State for India at his desire¹ (as also one I addressed to the President of the Board of Control, the Right Honble. Henry J. Baillie, which will appear in a subsequent publication) resulted in my views receiving attention and being adopted, I have consistently adhered to my then formed resolution not to allow any consideration of incurring ill-will to deter me from pointing out, from time to time, innovations or interference, whether connected with the Hyderabad Contingent in the Military Department, or with changes in connection with the Force which, as local Auditor-General, I regulated. The acceptance of my views in almost every instance is an abiding reward to me for my former successful labour.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. xxvi.

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